Political Geography: Iran / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 25 Years

1. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)

Author:: Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 12-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
Topic:: Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

2. Economic implications for Europe of a potential reintegration of Iran into the world economy

Author:: Gabriel Felbermayr, Mahdi Ghodsi, Heider Kariem, Robert Stehrer, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: How would fundamental political change in Iran, leading to a democratic system with a free and rules-based economic order, affect Germany and the EU economically? In the event of change, sanctions could be scaled back, allowing Iran to rejoin the global economy. This study quantifies the economic effects of such a transformation. It neither advocates for nor legitimises the lifting or easing of sanctions under the current regime or without far-reaching and credible reforms that fully address the concerns underlying the sanctions currently in place. Using the newest available data and quantitative methods, the results indicate that lifting EU sanctions alone could raise Iran’s real GDP by more than 80% in the long run while generating moderate but economically meaningful gains for Germany and the EU of around 0.3-0.4% of GDP. These gains are driven by expanded trade, lower energy and input prices, and improved allocative efficiency. When sanctions removal is combined with plausible scenarios of productivity catch-up with Turkey or South Korea, Iran’s GDP would increase by 240-388% and the gains for Europe would increase further, underscoring the strong complementarity between trade integration and productivity growth. Moreover, Iran’s reintegration would reduce energy price volatility, improve the security of maritime trade routes, and lower migration pressures. Overall, the findings suggest that a negotiated transition and rules-based reintegration of Iran would generate substantial mutual economic benefits while contributing to regional and global stability.
Topic:: Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Inflation, Energy, and Trade Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and Germany

3. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica

Author:: Xavier Villar
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
Topic:: Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

4. Netanyahu’s Long Game to Reorder the Middle East

Author:: Akram Zaoui
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the inspirator of the ongoing war in the Middle East, Netanyahu’s actions must be read through decades of political action. US participation in the war marks the apex of years of manoeuvring in Washington to reshape the region. Goals sought include obliteration of regional strategic threats and normalisation with Arab countries from a position of undisputable strength.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Normalization, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

5. The Evolution and Ramifications of the Iran-Saudi Rivalry Through Multiple Lenses: A Review of Mabon, Fraihat and Mohammad

Author:: Ahmet Furkan Özyakar
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This review endeavors to identify key themes and critical perspectives discernible in the scholarship of Simon Mabon’s The Struggle for Supremacy in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran, Ibrahim Fraihat’s Iran and Saudi Arabia: Taming a Chaotic Conflict, and Talal Mohammad’s Iranian-Saudi Rivalry since 1979: In the Words of Kings and Clerics, who have meticulously investigated Iranian-Saudi relations in the Middle Eastern context. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have assumed paramount importance in elucidating the multifaceted political, religious, cultural, economic, and societal dynamics of the Middle East. The postrevolutionary trajectory brought a volte-face to relations, instigating a protracted period of rivalry and conflict spanning four decades, thereby catalyzing the escalation of conflicts across the Middle East. Both countries perceive each other as existential security threats, while concurrently aspiring for regional hegemony. Amidst this backdrop, seminal events such as Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the recalibration of the political landscape after the United States (US)-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the reverberations of the Arab Spring, the execution of Nimr al-Nimr1 in 2016, and the Yemen Civil War have markedly intensified the discord in bilateral relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Although there have been short periods of restrained rapprochement and diplomatic overtures, the prevailing atmosphere of acrimony and relentless pursuit of dominance, both regionally and within the greater Islamic sphere, determine the framework of their relations. Consequently, pejorative labels such as “suspicion”, “infidel”, “enemy”, and “confrontation” often feature in describing the complicated dynamics characterizing Saudi-Iranian relations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Book Review, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

6. The Image of Imperial Russia as an Enemy in the Iranians’ Collective Memory

Author:: Saeed Khavarinejad
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This research tried to uncover the historical factors that have instilled a deep-rooted distrust of Russia in the Iranians’ collective memory. The researcher employed a case study strategy to examine historical empirical data and analyzed the consequences of the conflicts between Persia/Iran and Imperial Russia through collective trauma theory. The research discovered that 1) the 9th–12th clashes and the Russo-Persian Wars in the 17th–19th centuries and their subsequent treaties of Gulistan, Turkmenchay, and later, Akhal, and 2) Imperial Russia’s interventions in Iran during Constitutional Revolution, including the shelling of the Iranian Parliament in 1911, threatening Iranian government by issuing two ultimatums in 1911, the occupation and atrocity against Iranians in Tabriz in 1909–1918, the shelling of the Holy Shrine in Mashhad in 1912, and occupying Iran during Persian Campaign in the First World War in 1914–1918, which later followed with Soviet occupation from 1941 to 1946 in World War II, were among the primary factors which led to distrust of Russia in Iranian collective memory to the present. The evidence for anti-Russian sentiments in Iranian collective memory was identified as contempt in historiographical and literary works, hatred in religious circles, and Russophobia and conspiracy theories among Iranian politicians. The author concluded that the image of Imperial Russia as an enemy in the collective memory of Iranians has been shaped by the transgenerational and lasting effects of the memory of historical events, making the feeling of victimization toward Russia an integral part of Iranian contemporary identity.
Topic:: Imperialism, War, History, Literature, Intervention, Collective Memory, and Distrust
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, and Middle East

7. The 2026 oil crisis: an opportunity for Europe's energy transition

Author:: Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Seven weeks after the launch of the joint US-Israeli attacks against Iran on 28 February, the damage to regional production facilities and the virtual halt to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a rise in crude oil prices of nearly 60% for the WTI index and over 70% for Brent. Despite the two-week truce declared on 7 April, these increases have already had a painful impact on our economies. The duration of the tensions will, of course, determine the severity of the crisis, but the damage has already been done.
Topic:: Oil, Armed Conflict, Energy Crisis, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

8. Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States (3/17/26)

Author:: Juan Cole and Mojtada Mahdavi
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States with Dr. Juan Cole, University of Michigan & Dr. Mojtada Mahdavi, University of Alberta (3/17/26) Israel and the United States' military attacks on Iran have prompted heated debates on the legality, political motives, and global economic impact of this latest war in the Middle East. Join the Rutgers Law Center for Security, Race and Rights for a critical analysis of the history, politics, and international relations between Israel, the United States and Iran by experts on Iran and the broader Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, International Law, Armed Conflict, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

9. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:: Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. Iran may be a turning point for US regime change objectives in Latin America

Author:: Tiziano Breda and Sandra Pellegrini
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: In Venezuela, Operation Absolute Resolve caused no American fatalities, and Nicolás Maduro was captured swiftly and replaced with Delcy Rodríguez, who embarked on normalization of relations with the United States and reforms that benefit US interests. In contrast, Operation Epic Fury in Iran has already seen hundreds of American service members injured and seven killed; Iranian retaliation has inflicted serious political costs on the US and allies; and the replacement for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in US-Israeli operations, is his son, a fellow hard-liner — signaling Iranian defiance rather than concessions. The risk of increasing entanglement in Iran will likely weaken US capacity and dampen domestic appetite for further intervention, at least ahead of the November mid-term elections. Sustained US military engagement in the Middle East may further divert some of its resources deployed in the Caribbean, already deprived of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier.1 This, in turn, may limit the credibility of any threat of further US operations in Venezuela or Cuba, hindering Trump’s ability to extract concessions from Caracas and Havana, particularly those related to democratization. Cuba remains a US priority: Trump has reiterated warnings of imminent changes in the island.2 However, recent US-Cuba engagement suggests that a negotiated political settlement, rather than a direct and costly military operation as in Venezuela, has gained traction. The US has applied pressure to bring the Cuban regime to the negotiating table. A blockade on oil exports has already triggered several power outages that have affected all sectors of the economy and access to basic necessities, and these are likely to deepen as oil import prices hike. The shortages risk heightening social discontent and increase domestic pressure on the government. Previous spikes in demonstrations in Cuba have been spurred by fuel and energy shortages, and recent protests suggest this dynamic remains potent.3
Topic:: Regime Change, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, Energy, and Operation Epic Fury
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Cuba, Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

11. Virtual Briefing Series | US Military Posture and Strike Options Against Iran

Author:: Kevin Donegan, Mick Mulroy, and Jason Campbell
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On January 14, as the Iranian regime brutally cracked down on the largest street protests the country had seen in years, US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to persevere, posting on social media “help is on its way.” At the time, however, limited US military resources in the theater constrained the president’s military options. In the ensuing month since Trump’s post, the Pentagon has repositioned significant forces to the Middle East. This has led to wide speculation that the US is preparing for renewed strikes on Iran even as the Trump administration pursues diplomatic talks with the Iranian regime. To better understand the military planning and force posture dynamics shaping US policy choices, this briefing featured two Distinguished Military Fellows, former commander of the 5th Fleet VADM Kevin Donegan, USN (Ret.), and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Mick Mulroy. MEI Senior Fellow Jason Campbell moderated the discussion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Protests, Military, and Airstrikes
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

12. Virtual Briefing Series | Tehran’s Brewing Troubles

Author:: Zeina AlShaib, Alan Eyre, and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: This briefing discussed the ongoing Iranian protests and severe government crackdown, which have rocked Iran since last week. The street demonstrations, sparked by the country’s economic nosedive and at times turning violent, are the largest in three years. As regime arrests and killings of protesters have intensified, US President Donald Trump has threatened to intervene, his remarks potentially taking on a more vivid significance in light of the American military extraction over the weekend of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro — an ally of Tehran. This conversation featured Alan Eyre, Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at the Middle East Institute. Eyre retired from the US Foreign Service in September 2023, after a 40-year government career, which included negotiating with the Iranian government over its nuclear program. The discussion also featured Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow at MEI and author of the book The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran: The United States, Foreign Policy, and Political Rivalry since 1979.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

13. Forever the Frenemies of the Middle East? Türkiye’s Regional Relations with Iran, 2002 to 2023

Author:: Cem Savaş
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: This article investigates the puzzle of Türkiye’s fluctuating relations with Iran since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Contrary to many scholars’ expectations, the AKP government’s relations with Iran have competition and rivalry rather than just cooperation. Having improved significantly in the early 2000s, the relations became tense following the Arab uprisings and Syria’s civil war. However, the relations between the two countries have included both cooperative and conflictual elements since 2016. This research argues that the most relevant level for analyzing Türkiye’s fluctuating foreign policy strategies toward Iran between 2002 and 2023 is regional. Using the regionalist approaches of Buzan and Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Lake and Morgan’s theory of regional orders, the article examines how the “local security externalities” of the Middle Eastern regional security complex (RSC) affect Türkiye-Iran regional relations by particularly focusing on speech acts of Turkish high-level foreign policy actors. By acknowledging the multi-layered nature of Middle Eastern politics, this study also considers the role of extra-regional actors and non-state armed groups in Turkish foreign policy attitudes toward Iran.
Topic:: International Relations, AKP, Regional Security, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

14. Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026

Author:: Jessica Anania, Vicka Heidt, Anna Tuohey, and Jessica M. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: Entering 2026, the global security landscape is defined by record-high levels of armed conflict, democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and an accelerating climate crisis—dynamics unfolding alongside unprecedented cuts to foreign aid and development assistance. These converging pressures are reshaping conflict environments in ways that disproportionately endanger women and girls while eroding the systems meant to protect them, even as women remain central actors in humanitarian response, peacebuilding, and civic resistance. Women, Peace and Security: Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026 integrates gender-responsive analysis into conflict forecasting by drawing on insights from the Women, Peace and Security Conflict Tracker and expert consultations. This report identifies three cross-cutting trends expected to shape conflict dynamics in the year ahead: the increasing weaponization of hunger as a tactic of conquest and control, with devastating gendered consequences; political transitions that intensify repression, violence, and women’s exclusion at critical decision-making moments; and worsening climate shocks that compound displacement, insecurity, and economic loss for women and girls. The report also profiles 10 settings—Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel & Palestine, Mali, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where these dynamics are likely to be especially acute in 2026. By centering gendered risks as early warning indicators of instability, this report addresses a critical gap in mainstream conflict analysis and offers policymakers, donors, multilateral institutions, and civil society leaders a more inclusive framework for anticipating crises, protecting civilians, and advancing more durable and inclusive peace and security outcomes.
Topic:: Security, Women, Armed Conflict, Inclusion, Democratic Backsliding, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Global Focus

15. Analysis of Van Province’s Migration from Iran by Geographically Weighted Regression Method

Author:: Bahadır Yüzbaşı and Çetin Görür
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The ability of migrants to adapt to their new environment in a short period of time while establishing a new life is an important factor affecting the welfare of both individuals and societies. The process of adaptation can determine the quality of life of the individual, reflecting the migrant’s ability to adapt socially, economically and culturally to their new environment. Adaptation in the new life after migration is usually associated with factors such as age, post-migration support from public institutions, postmigration support from relatives, post-migration support from neighbors, and inadequate educational opportunities. In this study, migration from Iran to Van province was analyzed using the geographically weighted regression (GWR) method. The analysis focused on identifying the factors that influence individuals’ responses to the statement “I adapted to my new life in a short time after migration”. According to the analysis results, it is observed that the GWR method gives stronger results. In comparison to the ordinary least squares (OLS) model, the GWR model demonstrates clear superiority across all evaluation criteria, indicating that the GWR model provides a substantially better fit to the data by capturing spatial variability more effectively.
Topic:: Migration, Integration, Forced Migration, Spatial Heterogeneity, and Local Modeling
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Van

16. Avoiding a Long War - Objectives and Conditions for the US Attack on Iran

Author:: Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: The American operation in Iran may be prolonged, lasting several months instead of the planned few weeks. The low public support of Americans for intervention and the economic effects of rising oil prices are unlikely to change the US administration’s stance. Difficulties in completely eliminating the threats posed by Iran may prompt Donald Trump to increase military involvement, including the use of special forces or the launch of a ground invasion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

17. The war in Iran: a test of the Gulf states' economic resilience

Author:: Julia Sochacka
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: Forecasts of the long-term economic consequences of the war in Iran for the Gulf states are unequivocally negative. The scale of the losses depends on whether the strategies for building economic resilience implemented by these countries can withstand the shock caused by regional destabilisation. Faced with Iran taking control of the Strait of Hormuz, the EU’s top priority in the short term will be to ensure energy security, and in the long term to diversify its economic partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Economics, European Union, Resilience, Energy, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

18. Economic shockwaves from the Iran war fuel protests across South Asia

Author:: Pearl Pandya
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: South Asia was one of the first regions to experience the economic fallout from the Iran conflict. The impacts are only increasing with time, and growing economic hardship, along with governments’ responses, has already translated into unrest. ACLED records more than 1,200 demonstrations across South Asia related to the economic impact of the Iran war, including over a shortage of cooking gas and fuel and the rising cost of living. No country in the region is immune to the economic fallout, and protests over the rising cost of living have been recorded in each one of them (see map below). Across South Asia, these demonstrations have increased from an average of three per day before the war to 15 now. This increase has been most stark in Pakistan and Nepal, countries especially reliant on oil and gas imports and remittances from the Gulf. India, given its size, also unsurprisingly recorded a significant number of demonstrations on the issue. An outlier is Bangladesh, the third-most populous country in the region, with similar economic dependencies but relatively few protests. Its government’s early introduction of mitigating measures has seemingly bought it time.
Topic:: Economics, Protests, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, South Asia, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

19. Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz

Author:: Nader Habibi, Ali Kadivar, Caitlin Talmadge, and Dafna Rand
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz | Monday, March 30, 2026 In a rapidly evolving region, gain clarity beyond the headlines. Panelists: Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in the Economics of the Middle East, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University Ali Kadivar, Associate Professor of Sociology and International Studies, Boston College; Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University Caitlin Talmadge, Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT; Faculty Affiliate, Center for Nuclear Security Policy, MIT Security Studies Program Dafna Rand, Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow, Center for International Studies; Former US Assistant Secretary of State Moderator: Richard Nielsen, Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT; Faculty Director, MIT-MENA, MIT Center for International Studies; Affiliate, MIT Security Studies Program and MIT Institute for Data, Systems, and Society This event is sponsored by the MIT-MENA Program.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Trade, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Persian Gulf, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

20. Energy Shock and Economic Resilience: South Korea and the Iran War

Author:: Tom Ramage
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The 2026 Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have upended global trade and energy access, prompting governments in Asia and around the world to take measures to secure supply chains, ensure continued power generation, and stabilize domestic economies. The disruption to shipments, shortages of key materials, and substantial increases in crude oil and transportation fuel prices raise questions about the impact of the Middle East conflict on the Korean economy and whether it presents a true crisis. This report examines key indicators and signals on the impact of the Iran war on Korea’s economy and assesses the general outlook going forward.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Energy, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, and Strait of Hormuz

21. The Unraveling of Iran’s Regional Strategy

Author:: Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Hezbollah’s decline, Syria’s collapse and Iran’s strategic failures have reshaped the region. No new threats can be allowed to emerge
Topic:: Hezbollah, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

22. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

23. Reforming Iran’s Energy Policy: Strategies for Sustainability, Subsidies, and Global Integration

Author:: Behdad Gilzad Kohan and Hamid Dahouei
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Iran’s energy sector, rich in natural gifts and brimming with potential, struggles to realize its promise due to systemic inefficiencies, heavy dependence on fossil fuels, outdated infrastructure, and the weight of international sanctions. These challenges plague Iran with recurring energy crises, including seasonal energy shortages, environmental degradation, and socio-economic discontent. This article investigates the root causes of Iran’s energy challenges and offers a comprehensive analysis of the critical deficiencies of Iranian energy policies. Based on these insights, the article proposes a strategic roadmap with immediate, medium-term, and long-term policy recommendations to stabilize the sector, most critical of which include subsidy reforms, ambitious renewable energy integration, and energy efficiency improvements. The proposed reforms emphasize the importance of transparent governance, targeted investments, and stakeholder engagement to achieve meaningful change. By aligning its energy policies with global sustainability trends and addressing domestic inefficiencies, Iran can transform its energy sector into a model of innovation and equity.
Topic:: Sanctions, Reform, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, Subsidies, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

24. A Resurgent Trump Returns to a Turbulent Middle East

Author:: Paul Salem
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trump’s unpredictable yet forceful leadership is entering a region in flux, offering both challenges and opportunities for his second term
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hezbollah, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

25. Two to tango: Russian-Iranian drone cooperation

Author:: Katie Fricke, Taylor Hankins, and Victoria Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Iran and Russia are strengthening their partnership through collaboration on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) development and deployment. Iran’s drone programme presents a multifaceted challenge to NATO. The acquisition of Western technology through reverse engineering, coupled with Iran’s growing reputation as a drone supplier, enhances its military capabilities and global infl uence. Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine exposes vulnerabilities in NATO-provided defence systems and undermines eff orts to protect member states and partner countries. The proliferation of this technology to other state and non-state actors complicates NATO’s defence strategies. It is important for NATO to understand the drone warfare dynamics shaped by the Russia-Iran partnership. Analysing their innovations and integration into military doctrines is crucial for anticipating threats and developing countermeasures.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

26. A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Author:: Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, and Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change. Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future. The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions. Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria. Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface. The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.
Topic:: Regime Change, Geopolitics, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and Eastern Mediterranean

27. Hizballah’s Identity Crisis in the Wake of Nasrallah's Assassination

Author:: Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: This new edition of Tel Aviv Notes examines Hizballah's actions during the "Iron Swords" war. The Author Eitan Ishai analyzes Hassan Nasrallah's strategy in the conflict, arguing that the identity dilemma inherent in Hizballah's existence led its Secretary-General to misjudge the situation and misinterpret Israel's moves. This critical miscalculation resulted in a devastating blow to Hizballah, raising concerns about its status in Lebanon and ultimately leading to Nasrallah's demise.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Hezbollah, Assassination, and Hassan Nasrallah
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

28. Shallow Ramparts: Air and Missile Defenses in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War

Author:: Sam Lair
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: There are two remarkable stories about defenses during the war between Israel and Iran in June 2025. One is the failure of Iran’s much-discussed air defense system; the other, the success of the Israeli missile defense system. This chapter begins with the poor Iranian performance before turning to the Israeli defensive efforts. Ultimately, the war underscored how fragile Iran’s air defenses were, how key air superiority was to Israeli strategy, and how strained the Israeli air and missile defense system was despite its impressive performance. The June 2025 war illustrates the difficulty of air and missile defense in modern high-intensity conflict, demonstrating challenges facing defenders and strategies for the offense.
Topic:: Security, Missile Defense, Armed Conflict, and Air Defense
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

29. Regional Terrorism Trends Before and After October 7

Author:: Suat Cubukcu, Eoin B. Healy, and Adam Blackwell
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel triggered a rapid escalation in regional conflict and reshaped the operational landscape of Iran-backed violent non-state actors. Using data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center’s GRID database, this article compares patterns of terrorist violence in the Middle East one year before and after the attack. The analyses reveal a dramatic rise in drone, rocket, and missile attacks—particularly by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—against U.S., Israeli, and maritime targets. Despite the volume, these attacks caused limited casualties due to advanced U.S. and Israeli defenses, signaling a broader shift toward low-cost, high-frequency stand-off warfare, causing disruption over decisive outcomes. While Hezbollah and Hamas suffered major losses at the hands of Israeli forces, the Houthis emerged as Iran’s most active and disruptive proxy. The analysis underscores a post-October 7 reconfiguration of the proxy landscape and highlights the strategic limits of Iran’s indirect warfare and its eroded ability to deter direct Israeli attacks on Iran.
Topic:: Terrorism, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Proxy Groups, Regional Security, October 7, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

30. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

31. Iran in the Israeli Calculus: What Comes Next?

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Israeli-American war on Iran has not fully achieved its intended goals. While it may have caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and gained relative advantage in armed confrontations, the underlying hostilities remain unresolved, escalating the risk of renewed military conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Nuclear Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

32. The war on Iran: End of the battle is a prelude to the next round

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Israel launched a war on Iran to halt its nuclear project. Iran hit vital Israeli sites in response. Unable to act alone, Israel relied on U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Qatari mediation secured a ceasefire, but without resolving root causes, making future escalation likely.
Topic:: Armed Conflict, Escalation, Airstrikes, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

33. The Pendulum Swings Back: Envisioning the Future Trajectory of an Increasingly Asymmetric Iran-Russia Defense Relationship

Author:: Jim Lamson and Hanna Notte
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Key takeaways (1) Cooperation continues. Over the course of 2024 and spring 2025, defense cooperation between Iran and Russia continued. The countries’ adoption of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership capped a string of other activities, including numerous high-level political-military meetings and transfers of select defense technologies. Iran delivered Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia and continued to assist Russia’s UAV production. Most assistance, however, flowed from Russia to Iran, especially in the aerospace, ground, and space domains. (2) A year of upheaval. Silhouetted behind these general trends, a confluence of geopolitical, regional, and battlefield developments fueled a growing asymmetry in the defense relationship. The DPRK emerged as an increasingly important supporter of Russia’s war against Ukraine; Israel’s campaign against the “axis of resistance” and Iran itself ushered in a new era of strategic vulnerability for Iran; in spring 2025, the U.S. administration began to engage Moscow diplomatically, potentially affecting Russia’s calculus regarding cooperation with Iran, at least in the most sensitive areas; and finally, in mid-June, Israel (eventually joined by the United States) engaged in a short aerospace conflict with Iran. (3) A growing asymmetry in needs. Israel’s campaign against Iran and the “axis of resistance” damaged the country’s military-defense assets and exposed key shortcomings, forcing Iranian strategic planners back to the drawing board. Strategically more vulnerable, Iran’s preexisting appetite for Russian assistance in areas such as long-range strike, air and missile defenses, and naval denial has only grown further. For Russia, which expanded the local production of Shahed drones, diversified its sourcing of UAV components, and shifted to focus on other UAV designs, reliance on Iran has passed its peak. Though Russia may well remain interested in production technology for the Shahed-238 drone and its variants as well as Iran’s transfer of other drones and even missiles to enable more diverse strike packages, its dependence on Iran to meet battlefield needs in Ukraine is presently trending downward. (4) The pendulum swings back. While both partners likely retain an interest in sharing lessons from their respective military campaigns, and while a degree of institutional inertia may propel defense cooperation, we observe a shift toward an increasingly asymmetric partnership, with Iran far more dependent on Russia than vice versa. Full battle damage assessments from the Israel-Iran aerospace conflict, the trajectory of battlefield conditions in Ukraine, and the extent of Chinese assistance to both Russia and Iran, are among the factors that will determine how far the pendulum will swing back toward a more asymmetric Iran-Russia defense partnership. (5) Imagining different futures. Based on developments since 2024 that have affected Iran’s and Russia’s defense needs from each other, as well as the drivers and constraints shaping the defense relationship, we consider a continued strategic partnership to be the most likely future. Other futures—a limited military alliance, a full military alliance, or a breakup—are less likely, though not altogether inconceivable, assuming certain contingencies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, and Middle East

34. Iran: A Report on the DACOR Bacon Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference

Author:: Keith McCormick
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The DACOR Bacon House Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference, held on September 12, focused on Iran. The conference brought together academics, former diplomats, and policy activists to analyze the new situation facing Iran in the Middle East after a string of military setbacks, and the prospects for diplomacy with the United States. A list of participants is appended to this article.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, Environment, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

35. Hezbollah Is Down But Not Out

Author:: Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Undermining the group in Lebanon requires targeting its networks abroad.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Hezbollah, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon

36. Caution and Fear of a Crackdown: Iranian Kurdish Opposition Responses to the Israel-Iran Conflict

Author:: Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Iranian Kurdish opposition groups remain committed to regime change in Iran, but external and internal factors contributed to the caution with which they approached the recent conflict. In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s recent strikes on Iran and its calls for regime change, major Iranian Kurdish opposition groups issued several statements, condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran but not necessarily espousing the war’s aims. As opposition groups that have fought against the Islamic Republic for decades—Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa for jihad against the Kurdish parties in Iran in 1979—each statement echoed a longstanding stance of the respective group. Nevertheless, the Iranian Kurdish parties responded to Israel’s calls for immediate regime change with caution and suspicion. Now that a ceasefire has been declared, they fear a crackdown in Kurdish areas of Iran in the aftermath of the conflict, in line with previous periods when Iranian Kurdish areas have become scapegoats for the regime.
Topic:: Regime Change, Domestic Politics, Kurds, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

37. Is the Islamic Republic Starting to Crack? The Signs to Watch

Author:: Holly Dagres
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Although the crisis has not yet checked all the boxes that would signal fatal regime vulnerability, the situation could change quickly due to shifting conditions on the battlefield, on the streets, or within the halls of power in Tehran.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

38. Regional Order Making after October 7

Author:: Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Marc Lynch, Simon Mabon, Waleed Hazbun, and Curtis R. Ryan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: In December 2024, we convened a workshop at the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute in partnership with POMEPS and SEPAD to discuss regional changes and their meaning for our book. How did the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and Israel’s rapidly expanding military actions from Lebanon to Iran change the region? Were those changes in line with the book’s theoretical predictions? And what would our book have to say to the new aspirants hoping to remake regional order?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Alliance, Violence, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and United States of America

39. China’s Long Game in Iran’s Short War

Author:: Pierre Pahlavi
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Following the twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, China has quietly accelerated its strategic partnership with a weakened Islamic Republic through renewed infrastructure commitments, expanded technological cooperation, and deepened diplomatic alignment. This calculated entrenchment represents Beijing’s broader ambition to reshape the post-American architecture of influence across Eurasia, potentially shifting the future of Middle Eastern geopolitics away from Western capitals toward Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

40. Virtual Briefing Series | The Future of US-Iran Relations

Author:: Zeina AlShaib, Alan Eyre, and Jason Campbell
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: This on-the-record briefing, moderated by MEI's Zeina Al-Shaib, discussed the future of US-Iran relations. The recent 12-day war saw coordinated US and Israeli airstrikes against key Iranian military officials and nuclear facilities. Washington is weighing Iran’s conditional offer to return to nuclear negotiations contingent on firm security guarantees. Tehran is assessing whether to pursue diplomacy or reinforce its deterrent capabilities after this decisive confrontation. What impact will Tehran’s and Washington’s next steps have on the region’s already fragile political balance? The briefing featured Alan Eyre, a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI. A former senior State Department diplomat, Eyre served as a core member of the US nuclear negotiating team with Iran in 2010-15. The briefing also featured Jason H. Campbell, Senior Fellow at MEI. Campbell has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Our experts discussed the lessons learned from the war between Israel and Iran; the prospect of renewed fighting; the future of Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the ripple effect of this conflict on the wider region; as well as outlines of a durable diplomatic solution.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

41. The Regional and Domestic Elements of Erdoğan's Grand Strategy

Author:: Alistair Taylor, Matthew Czekaj, and Gonul Tol
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Gönül Tol to discuss how shifting regional dynamics — from the Israel-Iran war to renewed violence in southern Syria — are reshaping Turkey’s foreign policy and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's domestic agenda. They unpack Ankara’s ties with the US under the Trump administration, its strained relations with Israel, the implications of Turkey’s peace process with the PKK, and Erdoğan’s bid to maintain his hold on power. The conversation also explores how Turkey is positioning itself as Western engagement grows more uncertain and what this means for the future of democracy in the country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, PKK, Regional Politics, and Political Transition
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and United States of America

42. Costly Adaptation, Not Capitulation: Iran’s Likely Trajectory Under the Post—JCPOA Pressure Campaign

Author:: Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Following the 12-day war with Israel, the reinstatement of U.N. Security Council snapback sanctions, and Washington’s renewed maximum pressure campaign, the Islamic Republic is now experiencing the most intense external political and economic coercion in its history. Yet this strategy is unlikely to deliver on the United States’ intended goals of regime change or nuclear restraint. Instead, it is pushing Iran toward deeper poverty, more complex security postures, and a trajectory that increases, not reduces, the likelihood of a costly military confrontation. From Tehran’s standpoint, Washington’s objectives extend beyond nuclear limits toward regime change. Negotiations are viewed as potential ambushes for another round of conflict, and accepting U.S. demands would be politically humiliating. In this deadlock, Tehran opts for resistance as the only survivable path. Iran has adapted its economy to withstand the strains caused by far-reaching Western sanctions through a wide range of measures. These include diversification, trade restructuring, de-dollarization, alternative banking pathways including offshore banking to circumvent U.S. control, shifting trade eastward to China (now Iran’s top trading partner), and import substitution in manufacturing and agriculture. When intense external political and economic pressures fail to produce the expected capitulation, a misinterpretation of Iran’s vulnerability could invite further pressure. Without a credible diplomatic path, this dynamic creates the possibility for a dangerous escalation cycle. While U.S. strikes on Iran this past June did considerable damage to nuclear facilities, Iran retains enough nuclear fissile material and technical expertise to preserve a position of strategic ambiguity. Iran’s adaptation strategy has preserved core state function and regime cohesion, even as the general public has suffered. Increasingly, Iran has become a patron welfare state, rewarding regime loyalty and shielding public employees and politically connected groups from the effects of sanctions, shifting economic burden onto the broader, politically disconnected public. By 2027, Iran will have approximately 10 million more people in poverty, a figure that could bring Iran’s overall poverty rate to 70 percent. Prolonging hardship for the Iranian public will not succeed in toppling Iran’s leaders or advancing U.S. objectives; the Iranian regime itself has proven adept at absorbing the costs of Western pressure, adapting its economy, and retaining nuclear leverage. America’s pressure-only policy only heightens the risk of a major Middle East war and thus should be discarded. The U.S. should instead reengage diplomatically with the Iranian regime toward the goal of stringent limits on Iranian nuclear capabilities in return for economic relief.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regime Change, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Domestic Politics, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

43. The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal

Author:: Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: President Donald Trump can secure a new, better nuclear deal with Iran by removing the barriers that have prevented American companies from entering the Iranian market. This could be achieved through a phased approach that would not require immediately lifting primary sanctions. Doing so would help secure greater nuclear concessions from Iran, generate economic opportunities for American companies that would create an estimated 200,000 American jobs annually, and make a new agreement more durable by strengthening its political bases of support in both the United States and Iran. Decades of sanctions on Iran have failed to compel political capitulation. Instead, Iran has rationally developed a so-called “resistance economy” that evades sanctions, benefiting and empowering hard-liners with close connections to the government. In Washington, many misinterpret Tehran’s resistance and believe that sanctions have not worked because the pressure has not been great enough. But Tehran has held firm, not because sanctions have been too mild but because of a lack of clear and immediate benefits from disarmament. A U.S. policy that includes real economic incentives for compliance will change this equation, empowering more moderate elements of Iranian society and bringing economic benefits not only to the Iranian middle class but to the U.S. and the wider Persian Gulf region. President Trump should issue targeted Office of Foreign Assets Control general licenses, enabling the export of up to $25 billion in U.S. goods annually to Iran, primarily in aviation, agriculture, automotive production, and telecommunications. A deal should also license a five-year carve-out for American–owned foreign subsidiaries operating in Iran, enabling U.S. access to as much as $4 trillion in unrealized Iranian investment opportunities by 2040. Such a license would allow the United States to partner with Gulf regional allies to modernize Iran’s transport and logistics networks, thereby advancing broader regional development and cooperation. The prospect of losing such partnerships would be a powerful incentive for Iran to exercise military and political restraint. In parallel with the technical nuclear discussions, a dedicated economic dialogue could explore ways to keep Iran’s consumer market open to American companies in the near term and unlock investment opportunities for U.S. investors over time. One potential method in that vein would be the inclusion of a “snap-forward” mechanism, in which economic openings accelerate based on Iranian compliance and good behavior. Such a carrot offers the path toward a more robust and dynamic U.S.–Iran economic partnership built on trust. Incorporating economic incentives into a new U.S.–Iran nuclear agreement would benefit private sector constituencies in both countries, bolstering American jobs and industry while reintegrating Iran into the global economy. In the long term, such a multifaceted agreement could blaze a path toward peaceful coexistence with Iran.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Negotiation, Nuclear Energy, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

44. The Cape Assurance Corridor: Turning Maritime Security into a Regional Export for Southern Africa

Author:: Erika van der Merwe
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:: Red Sea insecurity has rerouted significant volumes of global trade around the Cape of Good Hope, shifting both demand and opportunity toward Southern Africa’s waters. The region can convert this diversion into a durable preference by offering an exportable public good in the form of assurance. This means delivering safe, predictable, and increasingly low‑carbon passage that insurers can price and operators can plan around. This brief proposes a SADC‑led Cape Corridor Assurance Framework that integrates existing regional centres with national Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) feeds to produce daily risk bulletins, incident metrics, and audited port KPIs in formats recognised by underwriters and Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs). A Clean‑Corridor Compliance Code with continuous automatic identification systems (AIS) for high‑risk calls, designated and monitored Ship-to-Ship (STS) zones, and beneficial‑ownership disclosures can help deter shadow‑fleets without penalising compliant traffic. Cable resilience should be treated as core corridor infrastructure through charted no-anchor/no-trawl areas, VTS integration, and pre-contracted rapid repair capabilities. Service reliability should be showcased through transparent KPI dashboards at Durban, Cape Town, and Ngqura, regularised offshore bunkering at Algoa Bay, and green-fuel bunkering at Saldanha and Walvis Bay, all under strict safety and environmental protocols. This package complements the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by standardising essential security and regulatory practices, while also endeavouring to respect national sovereignty through a minimum‑standards approach. In a world of geopolitical detours, the most profitable route is the one whose risks are visible, managed, and insurable. With pragmatic governance and disciplined execution, Southern Africa can make the Cape Corridor that route.
Topic:: Exports, Trade, Resilience, Shipping, Supply Chains, Instability, and Maritime Security
Political Geography:: Africa, Iran, Middle East, South Africa, and United States of America

45. CRINK Security Ties: Growing Cooperation, Anchored by China and Russia

Author:: Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Hugh Grant-Chapman, Truly Tinsley, and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Military and security cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) accelerated significantly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This includes a surge in transfers of arms and dual-use goods, a new mutual defense pact, and more frequent and diversified joint military exercises. Observable security cooperation has taken place bilaterally or trilaterally, with no discernable official cooperation taking place quadrilaterally. However, there have been instances of Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean players working together in diffuse ways to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Overall, the China-Russia security partnership is the most robust, but North Korea and Iran have quickly strengthened security cooperation as well, primarily with Russia. Despite strengthened ties among CRINK countries, the four countries are not always on the same page. To date, limited overt military support for Iran following attacks by Israel and the United States showcased how various factors—transactional calculations, power asymmetries, geographic distance, simultaneity of conflict and fatigue, U.S. military involvement, different interests, and elements of distrust—affect the willingness of CRINK countries to directly support one another via military means. Overall, the two larger powers—China and Russia—anchor CRINK cooperation. They have much more to offer to incentivize others to support them, and they are the most closely aligned bilateral actors. China, Russia, and North Korea are the trio most likely to support one another in times of need.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine, and Asia

46. Air Superiority in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Iran and Ukraine

Author:: Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine in more than three years of fighting, but Israel seized air superiority over Iran in less than four days. Despite the vastly different circumstances and strategic objectives facing each nation’s forces, this CSIS comparison of the two campaigns holds lessons for countries seeking to achieve air superiority in modern conflicts—or to deny it to their adversaries. Israel succeeded where Russia failed by building and equipping an organization that fit an offensive air superiority doctrine, preparing the battlefield with special operations forces, and taking full advantage of its intelligence edge. Ukraine succeeded where Iran failed in taking advantage of dispersion and mobility to prevent its suppressed air defenses from being destroyed.
Topic:: Intelligence, Special Operations, Air Force, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

47. CRINK Diplomatic Ties: A Broader Tilt Toward the Global South

Author:: Mona Yacoubian and Briana Winslow
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The so-called CRINK (China-Russia-Iran-North Korea) countries are strengthening bilateral diplomatic ties in important ways. Yet multilateral engagement among all four countries remains a rarity and underscores that CRINK still falls short of an “axis.” The relationship between China and Russia—on full display during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and subsequent military parade—has transformed significantly and holds the greatest potential to adversely affect U.S. interests. Quieter diplomatic engagements between Russia and North Korea have also exhibited notable growth since 2022, as demonstrated by both UN voting behavior and high-level meetings. By contrast, Russia’s relationship with Iran appears to have cooled after an initial deepening at the outset of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. More broadly, Iran’s valence within CRINK has diminished, as it has less to offer in its weakened state following its 12-day war with Israel and the United States. The looming renewal of sanctions against Iran will put the real power of CRINK diplomatic alignment to the test. Moscow and Beijing have limited ability to shape a coherent and effective response, but CRINK will seize the opportunity to portray the U.S.-led international order as inherently biased against the Global South.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Global South
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

48. Focus on Eurasia: The Axis of Upheaval

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carol Saivetz, and David Wood
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Focus on Eurasia: The Axis of Upheaval: How Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea Seek to Change the World: Tuesday, October 28 Speaker: Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, authoritarianism and threats to democracy, and the state of the transatlantic alliance. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and U.S.-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

49. Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA (Session 3)

Author:: Peter Krause
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA: Past, Present, and Future of Iran-Israel relations An online mini course for the MIT community with Peter Krause (PhD '11). Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. This webinar is hosted by the MIT-MENA program at the MIT Center for International Studies. About the speaker: Peter Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College. His research and teaching focus on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. He currently teaches courses on Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, research methods, and international relations. He is a faculty associate in the International Studies Program and the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program at Boston College, as well as a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program.
Topic:: International Relations, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Political Science, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North Africa

50. Tehran’s Red Lines, Trump’s Maximum Pressure, and Regime Survival

Author:: Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Progress toward a potential nuclear deal between the United States and Iran stalls, amid a high-stakes process for Tehran and others
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Donald Trump, and Regime Survival
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

51. Iranian Public Opinion Soon After the Twelve-Day War

Author:: Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in-depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear issues, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. This report probes attitudes in late September and early October 2025, a few months after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. This survey found notable signs of the "rally-round-the-flag effect" that many observers were commenting on at that time, including very positive appraisals of some aspects of their government’s and military’s performance during the war. The findings also include multiple indicators of political and economic discontent, but these measures were largely unchanged from the previous year. Much of the report covers attitudes towards Iran’s nuclear program in the context of broader views on national security. Three-quarters held that President Trump used negotiations with Iran to buy time while Israel and the United States prepared to attack Iran. Large majorities maintained that their military fought back successfully during the Twelve-Day War when no other country provided meaningful assistance. Support for Iran’s missile program has hit a record high, and for the first time, a slim majority of Iranians favored having a nuclear deterrent, not just a peaceful nuclear program. Attitudes regarding the possibilities of more military strikes, tougher sanctions, and further negotiations with the United States indicated both continued resistance to coercion, and some openness to compromise if given credible reassurance.
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

52. How the Twelve-Days War with Iran Tested the Strategic Alliance between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus

Author:: Spyros Katsoulas
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Spyros Katsoulas explains how the triangular Israeli-Greek-Cyprus relationship survived the test of the 12 day war with Iran this past June, while noting that challenges remain on the horizon stemming from both Turkish and Israeli policy trajectories.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Strategic Planning, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, and Cyprus

53. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:: Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

54. Israel's Attacks on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Goodbye to Economic Sanctions?

Author:: Amos Nadan
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Prof. Amos Nadan evaluates the Iran-Israel war in light of past attempts to use economic sanctions as a tool of coercion against Iran.
Topic:: Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Coercion, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

55. Humiliation and Transformation: The Islamic Republic After the 12-Day War

Author:: Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 exposed critical weaknesses in the Islamic Republic’s military, strategic, and ideological frameworks, marking a turning point for the regime. The Iranian government’s failure to achieve its political and military objectives undermined the regime’s credibility, revealed the limits of its deterrence, and intensified internal debates about its future. This paper examines the war’s causes, conduct, and consequences, analyzing its impact on Iran’s governance, ideology, and regional standing. I argue that the conflict accelerated the regime’s loss of strategic coherence, prompting increased repression, a nationalist pivot, and institutional restructuring, while leaving Iran vulnerable to future crises.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, and October 7
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

56. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:: WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

57. Grievance and Flawed Governance in Iran’s Baluchestan

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? As Iran struggles with geopolitical tensions and economic duress, its periphery regions are facing additional challenges. Baluchestan, the southern part of Sistan and Baluchestan province, has experienced recurrent unrest. Many residents feel the government discriminates against them as a religious and ethnic minority. Militancy persists. Environmental concerns compound the difficulties. Why does it matter? The central government’s repeated pledges to reduce poverty in Baluchestan through development and improved governance have been undermined by chronic mismanagement, lack of investment and suppression of dissent. Deepening socio-economic disparities, threats of militancy and growing environmental challenges are likely to bring greater strains. What should be done? Enhancing popular participation in local governance, making economic reforms and improving environmental stewardship are the best ways to address Baluchestan’s entrenched crisis. But meaningful progress will require considerable support from the central government, notwithstanding the other huge challenges it faces at home and abroad.
Topic:: Economics, Poverty, Governance, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Baluchestan

58. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Author:: Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

59. The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a critical catalyst for cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—what the authors call the “axis of upheaval.” Already, defense cooperation between these countries has enabled Russian aggression against Ukraine, increased their military capabilities in ways that make each country a more formidable threat, emboldened their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine and experience in modern warfare, for example, are diffusing to each axis country. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist. The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

60. Rise of the E-Militias: Designated Terrorist Groups Infest Iraq’s Digital Economy

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Iraq’s digital economy is one of its fastest-growing sectors, driven by an expanding youth population, a transition to e-governance services, and the potential for Iraq to become a regional data transit hub. As with militia monetization of Iraq’s oil sector, the telecommunications industry is attracting the attention of U.S.-designated terrorist groups. They have two motives: to generate threat finances and to control and monitor data to strengthen their grip on the population and on Western diplomatic, military, and commercial entities inside Iraq. In the year before Iraq’s November 2025 elections, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani revealed the extent of militia penetration of the sector by awarding sensitive telecoms contracts to a now-sanctioned militia economic conglomerate, while also offering U.S.-origin equipment to militias and channeling lucrative 5G mobile telephony licenses exclusively to militia businessmen.
Topic:: Terrorism, Digital Economy, Telecommunications, and E-Government
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

61. Bleak with some silver linings: scenarios for EU-Iran relations

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: In 2015, relations between the European Union (EU) and Iran reached a peak with the conclusion of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) between Russia, China, the US, the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran. The deal was capably facilitated by the EU External Action Service without losing sight of the interests of its larger Member States. At the surface, Iran accepted temporarily binding constraints on the development of its nuclear programme in exchange for reintegration into the global economy. At a deeper level, the deal was meant to prevent nuclear proliferation across the region and to start building back trust – especially between the US and Iran – as a basis for follow-up discussions about regional threat perceptions and security postures, including elements like Iran’s missile programme and regional security activities. However, by late 2024, three major turning points had brought EU-Iran relations to an all-time low: first, the E3 and EU’s failure to deliver on their part of the nuclear deal after US withdrawal in 2018; second, Iranian arms deliveries to Russia since 2022; and third, near-unconditional support for Israel from European countries like Germany, the UK and France since 7 October 2023, including against Iran and its ‘axis of resistance’ (a network of armed groups linked to Iran with various degrees of autonomy and support). It is in this context that the present brief outlines scenarios for EU-Iran relations for the next two to three years. The purpose of scenario development is to imagine different futures under conditions of uncertainty in order to foster a better understanding of the pathways that can lead to any of these futures.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, and Middle East

62. Unpacking Iranophobia in the Iranian Supreme Leader’s Discourse

Author:: Ali Basarati
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s social and political landscape underwent a significant transformation, challenging Western-centric political narratives and discourses, fostering a new epistemological and ideological framework rooted in the Shiite Islamic principles. This study aims to investigate the prevalent phenomenon of reconstructing and redistributing the discourse of Iranophobia through the Iranian Supreme Leader’s discourse. Employing Foucauldian discourse analysis, the study examines 100 speeches delivered between 2006 and 2024 to understand how Iranophobia is framed, its causes, and its strategic implications. The findings suggest that Iranophobia is not only a geopolitical construct but also a mechanism of political fear used to sustain global hegemony and justify restrictive policies against Iran. The study highlights how Iran’s ideological independence and counter-hegemonic stance have intensified its portrayal as a security threat. By analyzing the Supreme Leader’s discourse, this research provides insights into the broader geopolitical struggle and the discursive strategies shaping Iran’s international positioning.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Ideology, Iranophobia, Islamic Revolution, and Counter-hegemony
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

63. Aftershocks from Gaza: From Local to Global Consequences (Part 1)

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The grotesque attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza have upended long-standing assumptions about regional order. The Middle East’s previous reliance on a US-led security framework has given way to a fragmented, multi-aligned landscape in which middle powers pursue their interests, while the Palestinian issue—long marginalized—has returned to the center of regional and global diplomacy. Israel has secured tactical military gains but at the cost of increasing diplomatic isolation, while conditions in Gaza have fueled global demands for a sustainable political solution. Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria face profound setbacks, while Turkey and the Arab Gulf states seek to expand influence without the means to dominate. China and Russia remain cautious players, unwilling or unable to shape the conflict’s outcome. For the United States, the Gaza war poses a strategic dilemma. Despite efforts to broker ceasefires and secure hostages, Washington has been unable—or unwilling—to exert decisive leverage on Israel. The Biden and Trump administrations alike have struggled to articulate a coherent, sustainable strategy that balances US interests in security, energy, stability, and credibility. The ISD Gaza Report is organized in two parts: Part I: A ground assessment of the regional shifts since October 7, with particular focus on Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the reemergence of Palestine as the central unresolved question in Middle East politics, and the role of regional states. Part II: A deeper analysis of Iran’s position and prospects, scenarios for regional order, and US policy options, culminating in concrete recommendations for advancing stability while protecting US strategic interests. Participants underscored that any durable path forward begins and ends with Palestine and the Palestinians. US policymakers must adapt to a regional order defined not by hegemonic control but by contested pluralism and assertive middle powers. Strategic clarity, consistent diplomacy, and credible leverage are essential if Washington hopes to pursue its interests amid the aftershocks from Gaza—and not merely react to them.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hezbollah, Strategic Interests, Palestinians, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

64. Canadian-Based Company Fined by U.S. Commerce Department for Hiding U.S. Exports to Iran

Author:: Aline Spyrka
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Canada-based biotechnology company Luminultra illegally exported from its Maryland-based production facility three Photonmaster luminometers and 25 aqueous test kits valuing $33,438 USD to Iran on October 21, 2022. Under instructions from the Iranian buyer, and hopes of future sales to the Iranian market, Luminultra agreed to falsify export declarations and ship the items from the United States via the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Iran. Under further instructions from the Iranian buyer, Luminultra received payment at a Canadian bank in Canadian dollars specifically to avoid payment for the shipment in USD and through a US bank. The case shows a lack of awareness of the risks and penalties associated with willful violation of export controls and sanctions and indicates that Canada needs to improve its outreach to the industry, especially now that a wide range of UN sanctions on Iran are re-instated. It also shows the importance of UN sanctions to prevent banks in third countries from processing illicit payments from Iran. Luminultra signed a settlement agreement in September 2025 and agreed to pay the $685,051 fine. They also agreed to establish an export compliance system and complete export compliance audits over a three-year probationary period.[1]
Topic:: Sanctions, Exports, Compliance, and Luminulta
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Canada, North America, and United States of America

65. A Roadmap for Israel-Lebanon Peace

Author:: Hanin Ghaddar, Robert Satloff, and Ehud Yaari
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Pursuing even incremental steps will be difficult in a country long dominated by Iran’s chief regional proxy, but the two countries’ leaders have cracked the door open for future diplomacy.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

66. Leveraging the Gaps in Russia and China’s Complex Relations with Iran

Author:: Richard Nephew
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Far from signaling a strong trilateral alliance, their history of often transactional cooperation reveals strategic gaps that Washington can leverage to help curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For all the hoopla that preceded it, the trilateral China-Iran-Russia meeting on Tehran’s nuclear program did not appear to generate anything of great significance. The joint statement issued after the March 15 Beijing gathering largely echoed previous such documents, from condemning “unlawful unilateral sanctions” against Iran to reiterating a mutual desire for a diplomatic solution. That said, the mere act of holding the meeting may have been the objective, to signal to the world that the three countries stand together. This show of unity could have immediate practical effects given the partial expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2025—including the “snapback” provision that permits the UN to reimpose full sanctions on Iran if a JCPOA participant triggers the mechanism. At the same time, the three governments still have diverging historical and strategic interests on a range of issues—differences that will not dissipate just because they hold a joint meeting and share friction with the United States. If Washington hopes to exploit these fault lines, however, it must properly understand them.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

67. Attacking Iran's Nuclear Program: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Action

Author:: Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to consider how to define a successful strike, Iran’s potential responses, and whether a strategy of prevention can be sustained. ran’s nuclear program is one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing the Trump administration. While the president has expressed his preference for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, many Israeli officials believe that Iran’s current weakness provides a unique opportunity to destroy or at least set back its nuclear program through a military strike. Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to weigh the pros and cons of military action and answer several questions, including: How does one define a successful strike? What challenges need to be addressed in planning a campaign to destroy or degrade Iran’s nuclear weapons program? How sustainable is a strategy of prevention? And how might Iran respond to such a campaign? In this Policy Note, military expert Michael Eisenstadt explains that a preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power. Such a campaign, he writes, could presage either a more stable order for the region or a new, dangerous phase in one of its most volatile conflicts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Regional Security, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

68. Countering Iran's Deceptive Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In negotiations, the Iranian regime prefers to operate discreetly and secretly, allowing Tehran to shape the information spectrum and protract talks to buy time and wear down their negotiation counterparts. By shining light on the diplomatic process, U.S. policymakers can provide a counter-narrative that takes to task Iranian intransigence and provides accurate information for the Iranian public. Iran's adept use of secrecy, disinformation, and stalling tactics has long posed significant challenges to international efforts aimed at curbing its nuclear ambitions. As the United States prepares for its renewed negotiations with Tehran, anticipating and countering these tactics is key to shaping the negotiating context and facilitating diplomatic progress.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Negotiation, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

69. Spy Versus Spy: Iran’s Playbook for Espionage in Israel

Author:: Sarah Boches and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Tehran’s recruitment of Israelis for military surveillance, sabotage, assassination plots, and other operations is on the rise, showing how the shadow war between the two adversaries continues to evolve even after their recent hot war.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Surveillance, and Espionage
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

70. Divine Resistance: Hezbollah’s Theocratic Duality of Politics and Military Power

Author:: Sheikh Arslan Zafar and Humera Akhtar
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Backing Hezbollah and deterring Israel," shields are viewed as protecting Lebanon’s interests and security. The "Resistance's Arms" Discourse: Hezbollah has effectively positioned its armed faction not as an uncontrolled militia, but as an essential national defense entity against Israel. This study examines how Hezbollah's actions, influenced by Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine, shape Lebanon’s security and political landscape. By aligning with Iran’s regional goals, Hezbollah defends Lebanon while promoting Shiite interests, including military activities near Beirut. The research explores Hezbollah’s multifaceted role as both a political party and an armed organization supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and its impact on Lebanon's sovereignty and regional stability. It also looks at Hezbollah’s evolution from a resistance movement to a significant political force. This study also discusses Hezbollah’s dual role and how Iran's leadership influences its actions, aiming to protect Lebanon and support the broader Shiite cause. Theocratic political theory is used as a framework to analyze Hezbollah’s connection with Iran and its influence on Lebanon's internal stability. Ultimately, the study recommends including Hezbollah in Lebanon’s political and military structures to reduce potential instability while balancing national unity and regional interests.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Hezbollah, Theocracy, and Shiite
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon

71. Iran and the Artificial Intelligence Revolution: Vision, Institutionalization, and Offensive Uses Against Israel and the West

Author:: Avi Davidi
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The global artificial intelligence revolution has not escaped Iran’s notice. Despite heavy sanctions and an unprecedented economic crisis, Iran is working to develop advanced capabilities in the field and aims to achieve full independence, free of the whims of foreign actors. Public statements in recent years make clear that the Iranian regime understands the significance of this revolution and its implications for Tehran’s security, domestic, and foreign policy. * Alongside attempts to develop strategic capabilities in the field, Iranian offensive-cyber and influence actors[1] are already integrating AI into their operational toolkit to improve the quality of their attacks and operations. These indications may be an early harbinger of malicious Iranian use of AI capabilities and highlight the dangers that may be posed by the development of independent Iranian AI capabilities. This paper reviews the goals the Iranian regime has outlined in the AI domain, the malicious uses already underway, and additional advanced actions that Iran may undertake—or is already undertaking—against its adversaries in general and Israel in particular.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

72. Iran’s Cryptocurrency Economy in Crisis: Financial Implications of Cyberattacks on the Nobitex Exchange

Author:: Avi Davidi
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The Iranian regime is currently grappling with an unprecedented economic and energy crisis that is directly impacting its domestic, regional, and international policies. One of the clearest manifestations of this crisis is the severe damage inflicted on the financial system during the war with Israel—particularly in the sphere of cryptocurrencies. Cyberattacks targeted both central banks and Nobitex, Iran’s largest crypto exchange, from which approximately $90 million was stolen in a June 2025 cyberattack. As a result, crypto trading volume in Iran fell by about 70 percent in July 2025 compared to the previous year. In addition, Israeli and U.S. authorities have recently taken measures against Iranian financing infrastructures that rely on cryptocurrencies. In September 2025, Israel’s National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing (NBCTF) announced the addresses of 187 USDT wallets it had identified as belonging to the IRGC.[1] Following the disclosure, the UK-based compliance firm Elliptic published an analysis showing that these wallets had received $1.5 billion in USDT. The analysis noted, however, that it could not determine whether the funds had in fact been used by the IRGC.[2] At the same time, the U.S. Treasury Department issued designations against a broad Iranian oil-export network that was evading American sanctions. This network employed a wide array of front companies operating in multiple countries to facilitate illicit trade in Iranian oil. According to the announcement, two Iranian nationals played a central role in the scheme by purchasing roughly $100 million worth of cryptocurrencies between 2023 and 2025 as payment to the Iranian government for oil. The network’s cryptocurrency fundraising activity was also used by the regime to transfer money to Hezbollah-linked entities, thereby contributing not only to sanctions evasion but also directly to the financing of terrorism.[3] This paper examines the consequences of the June 2025 cyberattack on Nobitex for Iran’s ability to rely on cryptocurrencies to preserve economic and social stability, as well as to facilitate strategic trade—including in security and military components—at a time of continued international sanctions. The developments in Iran’s crypto sector highlight its growing importance for the Iranian economy—both for those seeking to evade the international sanctions regime, including regime actors such as the IRGC and oil traders, and for ordinary citizens trying to preserve the value of their savings. At the same time, they underscore the vulnerabilities and problems inherent in relying on cryptocurrencies, as well as the importance of U.S. and Israeli efforts to address this system in order to prevent its illicit use by the regime and to undermine it.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Economy, Cryptocurrencies, Economic Crisis, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

73. The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Japan balances between Iran and the West and China deepens its ties to Tehran, Israel faces a shifting landscape demanding new regional approaches
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

74. The Tehran–Moscow–Beijing Triangle

Author:: Yaakov Lappin
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The revisionist bloc reshaping global power balances—and the dangers it poses for Israel and the West.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Palestine

75. The Tragic Irony of the E3’s Snapback Move on Iran

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: France, Germany and the UK have triggered the snapback mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran, citing Tehran’s violations of the 2015 nuclear deal or JCPOA. Iran rejects their authority to do so, arguing that the Europeans themselves breached the JCPOA by adhering to US sanctions and all but supporting Israel’s June 2025 war. Lacking a diplomatic understanding by end September, Iran could leave the NPT, Israel resort to new strikes, and Russia and China refuse to recognise the sanctions, weakening the UNSC’s authority.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany

76. The Adaptation of Land Forces to the New Multipolar Order

Author:: Ricardo J. Vieira
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The adaptation of land forces to the new multipolar order is essential for understanding the current dynamics of the International System. This essay analyses the relationship between shifts in global polarity and the reorganisation of land forces, investigating whether strategic competition is driving a return to a conventional era. The research findings indicate that the unipolar era favoured disarmament policies, whereas multipolarity has intensified geopolitical tensions, making military power a central element of state security. The rise of revisionist powers, such as Russia and China, has reinforced the need for conventional rearmament. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine exemplifies this transition, highlighting the renewed relevance of land forces and conventional logistics. A mechanised, division-level military structure has replaced the expeditionary model of the unipolar era. It is concluded that multipolarity drives conventional militarisation, although other factors may also influence this trend.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Multipolarity, International System, and Superpowers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Asia

77. Beyond Its Wildest Dreams: Israel’s Campaign for Geo-Strategic Dominance in the Middle East

Author:: Richard Silverstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Not since the Roman conquest of the Middle East has any power imposed itself so thoroughly through military dominance as Israel has in the past three years. It has, during that period, achieved sweeping regional hegemony over virtually all of its neighbors. This is the realization of a decades-old objective Israeli leaders have long coveted, but never dared imagine. Even amidst multi-state wars with its Arab frontline neighbors in 1956 and 1973, it only sought limited objectives (the 1948 and 1967 wars may be seen as exceptions). After multiple attacks over the past year on Iran and its regional Axis of Resistance, Israel has in effect redrawn the geo-strategic map. When Syrian rebels toppled Bashar al Assad and cut off Iranian weapons transshipments to Hezbollah, Israel exploited this opportunity to degrade the latter through repeated attacks against it. First, it severely wounded thousands of Hezbollah’s fighters through pager mass explosions. Then it wiped out its long-time leader and an icon of resistance, Hassan Nasrallah, along with his named successor and others in senior leadership. More recently, it invaded Lebanon and now occupies a considerable portion of the south. In addition, the IDF has eradicated many of the villages and destroyed much of the civilian infrastructure there, rendering it virtually uninhabitable. Hezbollah seems, at least for the time being, to be a spent force. Unlike Israel’s past invasions of Lebanon and its 20-year (1982-2002) occupation of Hezbollah’s southern strongholds, which were met with fierce resistance, its more recent incursion has generated little conflict.
Topic:: Hezbollah, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

78. Israel and Iran: Major Threats to Middle East Stability

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: For years, Iran has been accused of being the primary source of instability in the Middle East by much of the West, Israel, and a number of Arab states. One point of conflagration is that it maintains a network of armed groups across the region (the “Axis of Resistance”) which it deploys to attack other states in the area, such as Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The second is that it continues to develop an increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal, which was brought to bear against the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Pakistan and Israel earlier this year. Iran is also criticized for supporting the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (until December 2024). Furthermore, Western and Arab countries believe that Iran has violated article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by enriching uranium beyond the 20% threshold for civilian use. However, perceptions of Tehran as the main agent of regional instability have shifted in the Middle East and beyond during the past 22 months. A growing number of experts and organizations say Israel is committing more and more war crimes in Gaza, including genocide, and launching an unprecedented series of military campaigns.
Topic:: International Law, Armed Conflict, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

79. Caught in the Crossfire: Jordan’s Balancing Act in the Iran-Israel Conflict

Author:: Francesca Maria Lorenzini and Kourosh Ziabari
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Jordan’s defensive action to intercept Iran’s retaliatory drones and missiles, slashing through its skies in mid-June, has drawn both approval and criticism, underscoring the kingdom’s struggles to balance strategic alliances with public opinion.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Public Opinion, Drones, Alliance, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Alliances
Political Geography:: Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

80. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

81. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

82. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:: Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:: Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:: Africa, Iran, and South Africa

83. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:: Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

84. Iran’s 1979 revolution and its resonance today

Author:: Alex Vatanka and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On this week's episode, MEI Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka, MEI Non-resident Scholar Andrew Scott Cooper, and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor discuss the Iranian Revolution of 1979. A seminal event in the history of the modern Middle East, the revolution transformed Iran and its impact continues to reverberate across the region today, nearly five decades on.
Topic:: History, Geopolitics, and Iranian Revolution
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

85. The Gaza War's Regional Reverberations

Author:: Randa Slim and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On this week's episode, President and CEO of the Middle East Institute Paul Salem and Director of MEI’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program Randa Slim speak to MEI's Editor-in-Chief Alistair Taylor about growing concerns over the potential for large-scale regional escalation as the Gaza war continues. *Note: This episode was recorded before drone attacks that killed US soldiers in Jordan on 1/28. *
Topic:: Non State Actors, Conflict, Escalation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

86. Politicization, Ratification of International Agreements, and Domestic Political Competition in Non-Democracies: The Case of Iran and the Paris Climate Accords

Author:: Reşat Bayer and Bijan Tafazzoli
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: While some degree of competition is present in many authoritarian regimes, the implications of such controlled competition on international issues have not received much consideration, including towards international environmental accords. We attempt to rectify this through a framework where we focus on internal political competition in a hybrid, nondemocratic system where national elections are held regularly. Specifically, we argue that the presence of multiple actors competing in elections in nondemocratic settings results in them assuming positions on various issues, justifying their positions, and attempting to mobilize their supporters with considerable implications for international environmental policies. We display our argument in the context of Iranian debates on the ratification of the Paris Climate Accords. Our findings demonstrate that the competing Iranian sides rely on different justifications for their environmental positions, resulting in extensive (negative) competitions of rhetoric where the international dimension emerges as an important feature in the internal competition. Overall, we show that political competition within non-democracies is likely to add to the complexity of international (environmental) negotiations and cooperation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Elections, Paris Agreement, Narrative, and Regime Survival
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

87. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?

Author:: Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

88. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA

Author:: Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arms Control Association
Abstract:: Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

89. The Aras Corridor: Azerbaijan's Rationale Behind the Deal with Iran

Author:: Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and its subsequent push for the Zangezur Corridor, Baku, and Tehran have been embroiled in fierce waves of escalation. With the launch of construction works for the Aras Corridor as the purported replacement to the Zangezur Corridor, the two nations appear to have made a breakthrough, and a thaw can be seen in current bilateral relations. In lieu of Baku’s strong push for the Zangezur Corridor over the last three years, the change in direction triggers the immediate question as to why Azerbaijan agreed to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran. In order to properly address this question, it is essential to distinguish Azerbaijan’s Zangezur Corridor project from its Zangezur discourse, which can otherwise lead to misunderstandings. The main reason for Baku’s concession to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran and backtracking from the Zangezur Corridor is that Baku has achieved its objectives in the Zangezur discourse. Having achieved those objectives, the Zangezur Corridor alone, without the discourse, is of mere local importance to Azerbaijan. Yet the hype around it still persists, with the subsequent international reactions having made the topic somewhat toxic for Azerbaijan.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

90. The BRICS Expansion: Prerequisits and Anticipated Threats

Author:: Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: On January 1st, 2024, BRICS officially expanded. Initially, it was expected that six new states would become members of this club representing the “Global South” - Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Argentina. However, Argentina changed its mind at the last minute due to the election of Javier Milei as president. Unlike his predecessor, Alberto Fernandez, Milei is changing the vector of the country’s foreign policy from the «South» to the «West». Despite predictions of its breakup due to heterogeneity, the BRICS bloc has lasted longer than anticipated. During its time, the number of BRICS members has doubled, and there are still many countries interested in joining. As the BRICS countries strengthen their massive economy and even bigger goals, their ability to influence the world order increases, which may ultimately pose a threat to the entire Western free world. This paper will seek to provide brief answers to the following questions within the frame of expert opinion: 1. What is BRICS? 2. What events led to its expansion? and 3. What threats should we expect from the strengthening of the bloc?
Topic:: Alliance, BRICS, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Iran, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

91. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

92. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:: Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

93. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:: Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:: Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

94. The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science

Author:: Marc Lynch, Ibrahim S. I. Rabaia, Fiona B. Adamson, and Alexei Abrams
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: This special issue of POMEPS Studies offers a platform for scholars to think through what feels like a moment of rupture for the Middle East, for Middle East Studies, and for long-standing assumptions about the region’s politics. This POMEPS collection originated as an open call for papers for scholars affected by or invested in these urgent issues, in an initial effort to give a platform and a voice to those in our network who have grappled with these trends. We kept the call intentionally broad, asking potential authors to reflect on the effects of October 7 and the Gaza War on politics or scholarship. As it turned out, most of the contributors wanted to talk about academic freedoms and the conditions of public discourse in their countries – perhaps because of how profoundly they felt this crisis, perhaps because of the availability of other platforms to discuss the war itself. The issues confronting our field have never been more urgent and the need for academic networks and institutions to rise up to defend it has never been greater.
Topic:: Civil Society, Diplomacy, Education, Genocide, Political Science, Institutions, Academia, Houthis, Forced Migration, Activism, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Frantz Fanon
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, Germany, Jordan, Czech Republic, and Gulf Nations

95. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations

Author:: Jeremy Pressman
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE

96. The Making and Diasporization of Iranian Sexual, Religious, and Political Asylum Seekers

Author:: Navid Fozi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Since the 1979 Revolution in Iran, waves of Iranian migrants, mostly asylum seekers, have formed diasporas composed of four to six million people.1 Asylum- seeking thus illustrates one of the most significant modes of Iranian global mobil- ity. The continuous revolutionary conditions perpetuated by the Revolutionary Guards and Revolutionary Courts have been identified as the sole contributor to the diasporization of Iranians.2 I argue that such a myopic focus on revolutionary moments obfuscates the marginalizing historical processes that have shaped asylum- seeking as a means of engagement with domestic and global inequality. The Islamic Republic has heralded a culmination of Iranian diasporic displacement unleashed by the deterritorializing effects of neoliberal world capitalism through economic globalization and mobility to meet labor demand.3 Coupled with the apparatuses of the modern nation-state, the judiciary, police, and education system have given the traditional exclusionary practices a modern character. I will draw on my fieldwork with Iranian asylum seekers and refugees in tran- sit through Türkiye pursuing permanent resettlement, mainly in North America, Australia, and Europe. These Iranians compose heterogeneous populations that embark on an arduous journey from the Global South to the Global North. They form diasporas of communities whose marginality in Iran predates the Islamic Re- public. Each group finds its own niche while becoming part of the Iranian diaspora. Bahá’ís born into Bahá’i families, heterodox Muslim mystics, and the ethno-religious communities of Kurdish Yársán constitute a group of Iranian asylum seekers who embrace religious ideals and practices that differ from Iran’s official religion: Shīʿi Twelver Islam. As I discuss later, this Shīʿi strand developed in sixteenth-century Iran and promoted a messianic expectation for the return of the twelfth Shīʿi Imam.
Topic:: Religion, Diaspora, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

97. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Rivalry that Remade the Middle East

Author:: Hassan Hassan
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Observers often liken Iran’s strategic policy thinking to the intricate and patient process of crafting a Persian rug.1 The analogy illustrates how Tehran’s strategies, like the rug’s final inscriptions, only become clear upon completion, as seemingly random daily actions gradually reveal a coherent pattern. The comparison is apt for Iran’s traditional approach to power projection but may also be appropriate considering recent changes that have affected both Iran’s coveted rug market and the country’s regional and international outlook. Iran has successfully emerged from a series of geopolitical challenges beginning with the war against Iraq in the 1980s, followed by the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003, and culminating in popular uprisings after 2011—which were backed by its adversaries and threatened its allies in the region. In spite of Iran’s emergence from such challenges, factors such as the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Donald Trump presidency have crippled the Iranian economy and undermined Tehran’s ability to project power effectively.2 In the four decades following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been a prominent player in regional conflicts, particularly against Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 3 Iran has largely maintained the upper hand in the wake of these confrontations, contrary to expectations after the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 The Islamic Republic outlasted Saddam Hussein’s 1980-1988 war, extended its influence via proxies across multiple nations, and cemented its presence in four Arab capitals, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This apparent dominance peaked on 14 September 2019, when two major Saudi oil facilities—the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil field—were attacked using drones. 5 The attack roughly halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production and affected around 5 percent of the global oil supply. 6 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Although Iran denied any involvement, Saudi Arabian officials and the United States nonetheless suggested that drones and cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Rivalry, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

98. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative

Author:: Mansoor Moaddel
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
Topic:: Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

99. False Dawn: Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Amidst Improved Saudi-Iranian Relations

Author:: David Wood
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: On 17 October 2019, furious protests erupted across Lebanon as citizens came to a shocking realization: the country’s leaders had destroyed the economy. Decades of corruption and mismanagement had emptied the state’s coffers, trig- gering a domestic banking collapse and frittering away many Lebanese residents’ life savings. Now, almost five years later, the situation has only grown worse. The Lebanese lira (LBP) has been devalued to the point of irrelevance, crashing from 1,507.5 LBP for 1 USD to over 140,000 LBP in March 2023. House- holds give up essentials like health insurance to pay for diesel power generators and solar panels, as public electricity provisions—along with many other key state services—barely function.1 Meanwhile, the country’s leaders stubbornly resist implementing much-needed economic reforms, blaming the economic crisis on a wide range of factors, from Syrian refugees to general instability in the Middle East. A regularly proffered excuse emphasizes the role of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry has periodically played out on Lebanese soil. This theory argues that Lebanon is a “penetrated society,” inextricably tied to and paralyzed by geopolitical competition, including the Saudi–Iranian con- frontation.2 Thus, Lebanese leaders cannot resolve their disputes until these two regional heavyweights, amongst other foreign powers, reconcile their conflicting interests in Lebanon. Regional competition overlays a domestic political structure already prone to deadlock, which rigidly apportions power between Lebanon’s frequently feuding sectarian communities. Accordingly, various Lebanese politicians hoped that improved Iranian-Saudi relations—facilitated in March 2023 by Chinese mediation—would lead to a breakthrough in their ability to tackle Lebanon’s economic meltdown. Yet, this optimistic reading overestimates the extent of Tehran and Riyadh’s cautious détente, which is unlikely to translate into constructive engagement in Lebanon any time soon. It also downplays the true obstacle to Lebanon’s economic reform process: corruption in the country’s own political and financial elite.
Topic:: Corruption, Diplomacy, Economic Crisis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon

100. The Nuclear Iran “Concept” Is Already Here: Time Is Short to Prevent Israel’s—and America’s—Next Calamitous Intelligence Failure

Author:: Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Groupthink and unchallenged false assumptions about enemy capabilities and decision-making led to the disasters of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 Hamas-led terrorist invasion of Israel. The lessons of these failures demand that Israel’s political and military leadership and their American counterparts immediately reconsider their assumptions about the Iranian nuclear threat to avoid an even costlier miscalculation.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, October 7, and 1973 War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS