It is not the caliphate that the world’s Muslim powerhouses are fighting about. Instead, they are engaged in a deepening religious soft power struggle for geopolitical influence and dominance.
This battle for the soul of Islam pits rival Middle Eastern and Asian powers against one another: Turkey, seat of the Islamic world’s last true caliphate; Saudi Arabia, home to the faith’s holy cities; the United Arab Emirates, propagator of a militantly statist interpretation of Islam; Qatar with its less strict version of Wahhabism and penchant for political Islam; Indonesia, promoting a humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam that reaches out to other faiths as well as non-Muslim centre-right forces across the globe; Morocco which uses religion as a way to position itself as the face of moderate Islam; and Shia Iran with its derailed revolution.
In the ultimate analysis, no clear winner may emerge. Yet, the course of the battle could determine the degree to which Islam will be defined by either one or more competing stripes of ultra-conservativism—statist forms of the faith that preach absolute obedience to political rulers and/or reduce religious establishments to pawns of the state.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Islam, Politics, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the interplay of incumbent, political dynasty and corruption in Indonesia from the
perspective of good governance. In the last local elections held in Indonesia, three interesting issues
came into the limelight: the increasing incumbent power, political dynasty phenomena, and corruption
at the local level. Based on the qualitative data analysis, this research shows that the direct local head
election provided greater opportunities for incumbents to build their political dynasties to perpetuate
their power. Some analysis considered that political dynasties are the cause of corruption. Nevertheless,
corruption at the local level is performed by both dynastic and non-dynastic local head. Thus,
minimizing corruption is not achieved by the restriction of political dynasties but by strengthening the
control of the government. There are five key points in the supervision process to strengthen the control
on the government, namely supervision in the political recruitment in the election process, bureaucratic
neutrality, transparency and accountability in budgeting, and supervision of local policies to avoid pork
barrel policy.
Political polarization is growing in South and Southeast Asia—one part of a troubling global trend. From long-established democracies like India to newer ones like Indonesia, deep-seated sociopolitical divisions have become increasingly inflamed in recent years, fueling democratic erosion and societal discord. New political and economic strains caused by the coronavirus pandemic are only reinforcing this worrisome trend.
This report focuses on six key countries: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Behind the tremendous diversity of these cases lie illuminating commonalities, alongside revealing differences, in the roots, trajectories, drivers, and consequences of polarization, as well as in the attempted remedies different actors have pursued.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Culture, Reform, Democracy, Polarization, and Society
Political Geography:
South Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Southeast Asia
Jakarta’s domestic politics make normalization unlikely despite years of positive signals, but the United States should nevertheless urge it to consider incremental, mutually beneficial steps toward rapprochement with Jerusalem.
On October 29, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will briefly visit Jakarta for discussions with Indonesian president Joko Widodo—popularly known as Jokowi—and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi. Topping Pompeo’s agenda will undoubtedly be the U.S. effort to organize Asian allies around resisting China’s increasing assertiveness in and beyond the region. But Jakarta is also relevant to another Trump administration foreign policy priority, one that has taken on an increasingly high profile in the run-up to the U.S. election—normalization with Israel. Indonesia is one of thirty countries worldwide that do not recognize the state of Israel, and one of three in Southeast Asia. But unlike Malaysia, whose leaders have espoused virulent anti-Semitism, and tiny Brunei, Indonesia has a history of positive (albeit inconsistent) signals toward Israel, raising hopes that movement toward normalization may be possible even if it is not imminent.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Israel, Palestine, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
During his visit to Indonesia in 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the initiative to co-build “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. Located at the intersection between Pacific and the Indian Ocean as well as between Asian and Oceania, Indonesia is a critical pivot and strategic fulcrum of “Maritime Silk Road”. Indonesia’s maritime power strategy, which is centered on the vision of “Global Maritime Axis”, is consistent with the “Maritime Silk Road” initiative. For three years, China and Indonesia have been actively communicating their “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative and “Global Maritime Axis” strategy and deepening practical cooperation and friendly exchanges. A lot of major cooperative projects, such as Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway Project, have been finalized. Cooperation of mutual benefit in fields such as infrastructure construction, trade, investment, finance, e-business, etc, is making constant progress. According to 2015 Report on Five Connectivity Indexes of Countries along the Belt and Road compiled by the research team of Peking University on Five Connectivity Indexes of countries along the Belt and Road, Indonesia ranks the fifth among all 63 countries along the Belt and Road. This shows that the cooperation between China and Indonesia in fields of the Belt and Road Initiative is on a relatively high level. However, with the broadening and deepening of cooperation between the two countries, a series of problems have begun to surface. If the two parties do not pay enough attention to those problems or take measures to solve them, they will have negative influence on the implementation of the two countries on the Belt and Road Initiative. The present report will summarize the achievements of China and Indonesia in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, analyze the underlying problems and the real altitudes of Indonesia, and propose some recommendations.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Despite Indonesia’s reputation for a traditionally moderate brand of Islam, religious conservativism is gaining considerable political traction in the lead up to this April’s presidential election.
During the campaign for the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial elections, thousands of Muslims gathered in massive demonstrations against Ahok, the initial frontrunner and a candidate from a minority ethnicity and religion, accusing him of blasphemy. Many observers have looked at the unprecedented size of the anti-Ahok rallies and their electoral context as a watershed in the evolution of Indonesian Islam.
This article analyses the seismic shift in Indonesian Islam that has occurred, with moderate Islam in steep decline while conservative Islam is on the rise. It argues that radical Islam and violent extremism in Indonesia are only the tip of the iceberg—a resurgence of conservative Islamic ideology and large-scale Islamisation of Indonesian society has occurred over the nearly two-decade old Reform Era.
Topic:
Islam, Politics, Religion, Elections, and Conservatism
he pressures on Indonesian democracy are not likely to abate under a second-term Jokowi or a Prabowo presidency. Incumbent President Joko Widodo is the front-runner to defeat long-time rival Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia’s fourth direct presidential election on 17 April.
Constrained by compromises and knocked off balance by the rise of identity politics, if Jokowi wins a second (and final) term, he is unlikely to make significant progress on much-needed economic, legal, and political reforms.
Despite these concerns, there is hope for the future with a new generation of politicians from outside the elite now seeking to follow Jokowi’s path to national office. Indonesia’s future will depend on how far they use their electoral mandates to shake up a defective system.
After winning the 2019 election, President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s has a great opportunity to bring the Indonesian economy into a stronger footing.
Jokowi’s economic policies achieved mixed outcomes in his first term (2014–2019). He hasn’t delivered a promised 7% economic growth, but steady 5% growth is perceived as a commendable achievement, given slowing global growth, rising uncertainties, and low commodity prices. Macroeconomic stability has been well maintained, and Indonesia’s creditworthiness has improved during this first term.
Topic:
Politics, Economy, Economic Growth, and Macroeconomics
Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Timor-Leste, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji
Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Timor-Leste, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji
Indonesia’s education system is low in quality and the underlying causes are political. Indonesia’s education system has been a high-volume, low-quality enterprise that has fallen well short of the country’s ambitions for an “internationally competitive” system.
This outcome has reflected inadequate funding, human resource deficits, perverse incentive structures, and poor management but has most fundamentally been a matter of politics and power.
The political causes of poor education performance include the continued dominance of political, bureaucratic, and corporate elites over the education system under the New Order and the role that progressive NGOs and parent, teacher, and student groups have had in education policymaking since the fall of the New Order, making reform difficult.
Topic:
Education, Government, Politics, Children, Youth, and NGOs
Rohan Gunaratna, Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri, and V. Arianti
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The evolving concept of Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), as part of ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts, has to address various social, economic, political religious and individual factors that attract or push youth from activism towards extremism. Social media platforms and religious institutions are crucial mediums of influence that can be used to minimise and eventually eliminate the exploitation of these two domains by violent-extremist groups for recruitment, propaganda and legitimation of their extremist agendas. Articles in this issue give an insight into the roles played by social media and madrassas as well as religious leaders and extremists in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Indonesia.
The first article by Rohan Gunaratna analyses the recent riots between the Sinhalese and Muslim communities in Sri Lanka. It observes the historical development of relations between the two communities, specifically focusing on the role of Sinhala ultra-nationalists in advancing their communal and political agenda in the island state. In 2012 and 2013, the ultra-nationalists’ intolerant rhetoric against Muslims and Christians emboldened supporters to engage in mob violence targeting both minorities. Communal riots had erupted in 2014 and intermittent bomb attacks on Muslim establishments occurred in 2017. To restore communal harmony, the author prescribes a cohesive approach that combines laws criminalising intolerant rhetoric and propaganda in cyber and physical space, arrests of those involved in mob violence, and building structures at national and grassroots level to foster communal harmony.
In the second article, Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri examines the madrassa (Islamic seminaries) education system in the context of growing radicalisation and religious extremism in Pakistan. The piece studies the madrassas’ relationship with various political groups, and their local and foreign funding sources. The study relies on published reports as well as quantitative data collected from over one hundred madrassas in Punjab. The study finds that several madrassas in Punjab have links with local and foreign militant organisations that render them vulnerable to external manipulations and interference. However, madrassas which purely dedicate their energies to learning and teaching are generally free of such manipulations. To meet the challenges and overcome the controversies facing the religious seminaries, the article recommends reforming the educational curriculum, providing quality education, reviewing funding sources of madrassas, banning political affiliations of madrassas and monitoring foreign influences on them.
Lastly, V. Arianti probes the use of sharp weapons in terrorist attacks by Indonesia militant groups. She argues that IS’ emphasis on knife attacks in its online publications, frequent employment of vehicle-ramming and stabbing by lone-wolf attackers in Europe and local jihadist groups’ efforts to seek recognition from IS central contributed to the steady rise of knife attacks in Indonesia. The author believes that while knife attacks will continue to be an attack tactic in Indonesia militant landscape, bombings and shootings will be the preferred tactics because of their relative potential to cause mass casualties.
Topic:
Education, Nationalism, Politics, Terrorism, International Security, History, Counter-terrorism, Homeland Security, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Southeast Asia
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Timor-Leste, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Nepal, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea