Political Geography: Indo-Pacific / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 25 Years

1. India’s Service Sector: New Areas for Future Cooperation

Author:: Hyoungmin Han
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Given the growing significance of the Indo-Pacific region, the strategic importance of India is on the rise. With its considerable population and economic potential, India offers many opportunities for cooperation in various sectors. However, past cooperation between Korea and India has focused on the manufacturing sector. In order to consolidate economic ties be-tween Korea and India and to access the growing Indian market, cooperation in various industries, including services, is necessary. In this article, we will explore key aspects of India’s service industry and policy implications for better cooperation between two countries.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Markets, Bilateral Relations, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

2. Korea-India Economic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Era

Author:: Jeong Gon Kim, Kyunghoon Kim, Jonghun Pek, Yoo Jin Nam, and Wondeuk Cho
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: With the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific region in the spotlight, India's strategic value has come to the fore. The Korean government has included cooperation with India as a key task under its Indo-Pacific Strategy. This article aims to contribute to the establishment of economic cooperation with India from a medium- to long-term strategic perspective. Accordingly, this article analyzes the strategic changes of major countries towards India and India's response strategies, and the emerging agendas of economic cooperation between India and major countries. Lastly, this article proposes policy directions and key agendas for Korea-India economic cooperation.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: India, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

3. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

4. Arming Allies and Partners: How Foreign Military Sales Can Change the China Problem

Author:: Brennan Devereaux
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Allies and partners are “a center of gravity” for the DoD National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.1 But are regional nations building military capacity to help the United States prepare for and deter a potential clash with the People’s Republic of China, or are they solely focused on defending their own territories? Although regional nations’ aims may often overlap, they also diverge in some cases. Partner-capacity development must therefore reflect the distinction between deterrence and territorial defense. The US military has been diligently building relationships and developing partner capacity in the Indo-Pacific region for years, conducting dozens of exercises annually and recently establishing the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.2 These efforts in the Indo-Pacific region have increased with the US military’s attempt to shift away from the Middle East, and President Joe Biden’s declaration that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”3 Regardless of efforts in the region, not all relationships with partners are equal; the potential assistance each partner would be willing to provide the US military in a conflict with China will vary for myriad reasons. Although each nation’s support requirements and development goals are distinct, assistance through military sales is a foundational aspect of building capacity, providing allies and partners a venue for acquiring military equipment. The Foreign Military Sales program, often critiqued for its inefficiencies, is being revamped by the US Department of State and Department of Defense.4 Partner nations purchasing US military equipment will remain focused on their own national interests, which for many partners remain security and the defense of sovereign territory. Updates to how the United States approaches military sales can also be tailored to support US military interests more effectively. In other words, US strategic objectives should underpin the prioritization of sales to specific countries, and US efforts should extend beyond financial benefits or the intangibles of building partnerships. To account for the unique and distinct challenges the US military faces in the Indo-Pacific theater, the modernization of Foreign Military Sales should aim to provide the United States with a relative military advantage over China by tailoring the program’s approach to arming allies in a way that complements US military efforts in the region. Modernizing Foreign Military Sales begins by categorizing nations based on their expected roles in a potential clash between the United States and China.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. Implications for Modern Warfighting Concepts: What the US Army Can Learn from Past Conflicts

Author:: Richard D. Butler
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: These four historic vignettes provide context and lessons learned for the US Army as it returns to peer conflict. Although history does not account for the cyber and space domains, the leaders involved in the highlighted conflicts dealt with the reintroduction of maneuver warfare tied to modern fires from land, sea, and air. Peer-level conflict also compelled governments to work intensely in the information space to steel their societies and to influence allies, partners, and adversaries. Using historical reference material and insights from historians and other experts, this essay will help the US Army and the wider community of interest relearn peer rival conflict to support deterrence and prepare for the next large-scale war.
Topic:: War, History, Conflict, World War I, Army, Korean War, and Economic Warfare
Political Geography:: Philippines, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

6. The Prospects of Indonesia’s Nickel Boom Amidst a Systemic Challenge from Coal

Author:: Thibault Michel
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Indonesia is a country that is booming economically and demographically. This not only matters for regional political and energy security, but also increasingly, for the world’s energy transitions, due to Indonesia’s large metal reserves, as well as its equally important coal consumption in industry and for power generation. Over the last 20 years, Indonesia’s economy has been characterized by very dynamic growth, massive increases in its electricity demand, and coal consumption and exports. Hence, its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are on a steady growth trajectory, although the country has committed to lowering them by 32% (unconditional) or 41% (conditional) by 2030. With its Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership application, occurring in the context of global energy transition requirements and geopolitical confrontations, Indonesia is today at a crossroads. Indonesia has 42% of the world’s nickel reserves, as well as substantial reserves of copper, gold, tin, and, notably, coal. This wealth in natural resources has given the mining industry crucial importance in Indonesia’s economic growth and has recently taken an even more prominent place: Indonesia has managed to become the world’s largest nickel producer within just a few years, as its share in global nickel extraction grew from 5% in 2015 to 50% in 2023. The country is also the world’s third copper ore exporter. Coal and energy transition minerals have progressively replaced oil and gas in Indonesian exports. Between 2011 and 2023, oil and gas exports fell by nearly two-thirds and their share in the national exports decreased from 20% to 6%. In 2023, export revenues from copper were larger than those of oil and equal to gas earnings. Yet, having major mineral deposits and mining activities is no longer considered sufficient by the Indonesian government. So far, the mineral industry’s growth has relied hugely on Chinese investments and on low-added-value activities, especially in pyrometallurgy processing. Diversification of trade partners and expansion into new, entire value chains is, therefore, a key objective for the Indonesian government. Indonesia is seeking to boost trade with the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and even the Eurasian Economic Union. However, negotiations over respective agreements are currently encountering hurdles due to American legislation (the Inflation Reduction Act and Foreign Entities of Concern status), which could seriously threaten Indonesian exports of battery mineral components to the US market while they also face hurdles to entering the EU due to environmental regulations. The second part of Indonesia’s strategy focuses on the development of new industrial segments of value chains: refining facilities, hydrometallurgical processing plants, battery factories, etc. To develop these activities, the Indonesian government is using two main tools: the divestment of foreign companies in local firms and export bans on crude ore exports. Such bans have been introduced for nickel in 2020 and for bauxite in 2023, while they are expected for copper in 2024 and perhaps even later for tin. Indonesia is today also confronted with the negative repercussions of mining activities on its soil, including protests over the lack of safety in its mines and smelters, citizens’ expropriations, the presence of indigenous tribes on mining sites, and, above all, damage to the environment. Such damage also has its roots in the substantial amounts of energy used to feed smelters, which mostly rely on the use of coal. Decarbonizing Indonesia’s economy has thus become a central challenge for the country, where the consequences of climate change are already palpable on the archipelago’s soil, with extreme weather events and the sinking of the capital city – Jakarta – as sea levels rise. To carry out the tremendous transformation towards net-zero emissions while ensuring steady and sustainable development, the country has signed a Just Energy Transition Partnership and prepared decarbonization scenarios within this framework. Key priorities in the coming years include renewable energy deployment, grid development and an early phase-out of coal. Deploying renewable energy sources as well as large and resilient grids is made more difficult by the country’s geography. The archipelago includes 17,000 islands, some of them being undeveloped, hard to access and far away from each other. Furthermore, the levelized costs of solar and wind power are currently high in Indonesia compared with other developing countries, while public subsidies for coal do not favor low carbon generation sources. If the two first points are thus very challenging, the last one appears to be the hardest, considering the Indonesian economy’s tremendous dependency on coal. Concerns are therefore rising about Indonesia’s ability and even willingness to pursue a genuine, albeit differentiated decarbonization pathway. There are also many questions regarding Indonesia’s mineral trade strategy. New bans on crude ore exports are expected to come into force, while new mining and mineral processing operations are under development across the archipelago, as quantities of nickel produced in the country are at historic highs. This extraordinary increase in nickel production, concomitant with a global economic slowdown, has resulted in a sharp fall in nickel prices, with nickel losing half of its value between January 2023 and February 2024. As a result, many producers are finding themselves in danger, especially in Australia or New Caledonia. While there could be a deliberate strategy to flood the markets and neutralize competition, notably by Chinese companies that control 75% of the global nickel supply (mainly from Indonesia but also from the Philippines), the country faces serious dilemmas. Indonesia’s oil and gas production is diminishing, and it increasingly relies on nickel exports and higher nickel prices for its economic stability, with coal also remaining very important. Indonesia’s resource nationalism and industrial strategy, which include attracting foreign investments, notably via its OECD membership pledge, require a credible pathway to reduce the carbon footprint of its electricity generation. Among the pathways towards both decarbonization and the development of industrial battery value chains, three steps could be considered: Deploying renewable energy sources, especially solar photovoltaic (PV) power and offshore wind farms, as well as progressively transferring subsidies from coal to renewable energy sources. Developing a clean battery industry based on high environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria and on the wealth of Indonesia’s subsoil, which includes most of the metals used in battery manufacturing. Protecting climate and biodiversity by favoring innovative solutions for mining waste management and upholding high ESG standards.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Electricity, Coal, Lithium, Minerals, Energy Transition, and Nickel
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

7. Guam in Washington, 1972-Present: The Overlooked Strategic Implications of Congressional Polarization

Author:: Mirabai Venkatesh
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Contrary to the long-held logic that giving Guam a stronger, more autonomous voice will undermine U.S. strategic interests, failing to provide Guam with a stable pathway of interest advancement beyond Congress hinders its development and with it the federal government’s ability to achieve soft-power advantages and basic military readiness in the Indo-Pacific theater. Since the United States assumed responsibility for administering the territory of Guam in 1898, it has treated the prospect of Guam’s status improvement as detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. This has informed its chosen method of territorial administration, which places U.S. territories under the authority of the Department of the Interior. Each territory is then given only one formal representative in Congress, specifically the U.S. House of Representatives, but without full-voting rights. This paper will explore how Guam has managed to advance its interests in Washington since 1972, highlighting how congressional representation has become Guam’s most successful pathway of interest advancement with the federal government to date. However, the agency and success of Guam’s congressional delegates must be framed within a broader discussion of the fragility of the U.S. approach to territorial administration, which has relegated Guam to a pathway of interest advancement incredibly vulnerable to political sea change. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate how Guam’s main pathway of interest advancement in Washington is quickly narrowing at the expense of U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, History, Soft Power, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

8. The Women’s Rights Movement in Papua New Guinea: where we came from, where we are and where we wish to go’

Author:: Orovu Sepoe
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:: This new collaborative research highlights the strengths, challenges and powerful role of the women’s rights movement in PNG. The WEAVERS Research Report is the outcome of research conducted by Dr Orovu Sepoe (Lead Researcher) and a steering committee of diverse PNG women’s rights advocates and rights actors. It delves deep into the PNG women’s rights movement to understand “where we came from, where we are, and where we wish to go”. The research team engaged with 38 women’s rights organisations from five research sites across PNG. The research reveals a strong cultural precedent of women coming together in PNG – Meri Bung in Tok Pisin – providing a strong foundation for today’s women’s rights movement. Research findings also highlight that despite fragmentation, weak institutional linkages and funding constraints, women’s rights organisations share a “collective consciousness” – meaning they have a shared understanding of their values and purpose that informs their perseverance in taking action to advance and protect women’s rights. The research was wholly locally-led and guided by the steering committee, which worked collaboratively across all research phases and had representation from disability inclusion and human rights organisations, faith-based groups, and groups representing LGBTQI+ people. The report provides future directions and recommendations for the women’s rights movement, governments, supporters and partners.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, Social Movement, Women, and Feminism
Political Geography:: Papua New Guinea and Indo-Pacific

9. Climate change prioritization in low-income and developing countries

Author:: Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Henry Evans
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The World Bank’s 2023 document Evolving the World Bank Group’s Mission, Operations, and Resources: A Roadmap, otherwise known as the “evolution roadmap,” sets a laudable goal to shift more focus and action onto climate change in low-income and developing countries (LIDCs). The language used throughout the report clearly reflects the Bank’s shifting priorities. The word “climate” was mentioned forty times in the evolution roadmap document, “poverty” was mentioned forty-two times, and prosperity was mentioned only twenty-one times. This shows a clear paradigm shift that is expanding from the World Bank’s “Twin Goals” of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity to also include issues related to climate change and financing. In the evolution roadmap report, the World Bank Group (WBG) rightly identifies that the world has not only stalled, but regressed in achieving the prosperity and development goals set for this decade. Further, the WBG identifies that LIDCs are not prepared to face the development challenges of the modern world. One of the key development issues the WBG identifies is climate change, which has an outsized impact on LIDCs. In this regard, the WBG has already created frameworks to engage climate issues in LIDCs. The WBG’s Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDR) offer a comprehensive resource to support development and climate objectives at the country level. These public reports empower governments, private sector investors, and citizens to prioritize resilience and adaptation and reduce emissions without compromising broader development objectives. These goals can be achieved, the WBG estimates, with an investment averaging 1.4 percent of a given country’s gross domestic product (GDP)— though in some low-income countries that number can be between 5 percent and 10 percent. While the CCDR gives nations the tools to achieve climate objectives without significantly compromising development, it does not bridge the gap between the increasing focus of the WBG and the developed world on climate change and the real priorities of LIDCs.
Topic:: Climate Change, Developing World, Economy, Economic Growth, Inclusion, and Prioritization
Political Geography:: Africa, Indo-Pacific, and Americas

10. The Quantum Race: U.S.-Chinese Competition for Leadership in Quantum Technologies

Author:: Juljan Krause
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Quantum computing is poised to unleash innovation across various sectors, from materials science to pharmaceutical and medical research, finance, logistics, and even climate change management. Quantum computing also has the potential to provide the backbone for future artificial intelligence and autonomous systems that cannot be realized with digital hardware alone, while quantum communication can strengthen security in cyberspace. For these reasons, quantum technologies feature prominently in the emerging technologies race between the United States and China. In this policy brief, IGCC postdoctoral fellow Juljan Krause analyzes China’s advances in quantum communication, which aim to signal China’s technological leadership while protecting Chinese communications from foreign surveillance. He argues that Chinese leadership in quantum communication will have strategic repercussions, particularly as it is likely to give China’s efforts to shape global industry standards additional momentum. Even if quantum communication has no immediate military implications, policymakers should consider how the technology could embolden China further.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

11. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

Author:: Bart Hogeveen, Arindrajit Basu, Isha Suri, and Baani Grewal
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy - that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards. At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product. The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors. Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used. Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific - including Australia and India - should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities. Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific' - and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) - explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’. The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important. It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders - governments, industry, civil society and academia - step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Standards
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

13. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9

Author:: John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence in the North, 2. Developing Northern Australia, 3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific 4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, 5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics. Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.” The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Food Security, Space, Defense Industry, and Minerals
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

14. Gender in Strategic Competition: A Non-Traditional Strategy for Building Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Charity Borg
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Today’s era is defined by strategic competition with “autocrats [who] are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.”[1] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the leading autocratic force, operating with both the intent to reshape the democratic rules-based international order and the resources to advance those aims. States interested in upholding the international rules-based order must enhance their ability to withstand PRC coercion and invest in cultivating a values-based security alliance against the spread of authoritarianism. International collaboration on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda offers a low-cost, high-return opportunity to bolster national and regional resistance to authoritarian coercion while building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners. Increasing national resilience and building alliances that center on enhancing the security of women is a data-backed approach that ensures elevated state stability, democracy, and economic prosperity while increasing the likelihood of a coalition’s willingness to defend the current international rules-based order from those who seek to dismantle it. An overwhelming body of empirical analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the security of women and the democratic or authoritarian tendencies of a state. That same analysis also finds that women’s security is a precondition for a state’s level of democracy. Otherwise stated, countries with higher levels of gender equality are more democratic, less corrupt, and more stable. Whereas “states with higher levels of violence against women are less peaceful [internally and] internationally, less compliant with international norms, and less likely to have good relations with neighboring states,” they are also more likely to align with autocratic governance structures.[1] Authoritarian states such as the PRC understand the benefits of empowered societies, which is why their actions on domestic and international fronts actively seek to suppress women. They fear that like-minded allies and partners will successfully improve security for fifty percent of the population and, as a result, will ultimately tip the scales of power and influence to preserve the values-based international order they desire to uproot. Interest and investment in the WPS agenda are growing around the globe, but not fast enough. Thus far, 18 Indo-Pacific states and one regional organization have sought meaningful engagement and integration of the WPS agenda by various means, opening a door for cooperation across the spectrum of civil, diplomatic, and military security cooperation engagements.[2] However, several transformative policy and operational measures must be implemented to achieve the desired end states. To be transformative and enable lasting change in governmental and national behavior, the thoughtful implementation of the WPS agenda at all levels, from national and subnational to the community and household, is required. First, domestic and international policymakers need to clearly define the security of women as a national security imperative. Second, implementing WPS in the defense sector should focus on training defense personnel to apply a gender perspective to enhance mission effectiveness. Last, those advancing WPS must take an inclusive, context-specific, and localized approach to its integration. To defend the current rules-based international order, like-minded countries must accelerate change and follow through by investing in women’s security.
Topic:: Security, Investment, Strategic Competition, Resilience, Gender, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

15. New Caledonia and French Polynesia: New Opportunities Amid Great Power Competition

Author:: Raihaamana Tevahitua
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: New Caledonia and French Polynesia, like to other Oceanian nations, are gaining heightened significance within the Indo-Pacific framework. Consequently, both non-sovereign territories have improved leverage to assert their priorities in relation to the central French state. Simultaneously, they are increasingly engaging with foreign partners under the guidance of France. This paper offers recommendations for how these territories can expand their influence in this era of Great Power competition.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Geopolitics, and International Competition
Political Geography:: New Caledonia, Indo-Pacific, Oceania, and French Overseas Territories

16. Japan's New Security Strategy and the Changing Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Sheila Smith and Gerald Curtis
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Major changes that have occurred in the global political economy and in international politics in recent years have had a profound impact on nations all around the world. This is nowhere more evident than in the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and especially Japan. This conversation addresses Japan's evolving foreign policy and its impact in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

17. Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries. Longstanding Strategic Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement

Author:: Celine Pajon
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), building on its historical ties and strategic interests in the region. The wealth of these territories in fishery resources and raw materials, the crucial importance of the maritime routes, and the strategic geographical location of PICs in the context of Sino-American rivalry have been key factors behind Tokyo's expanding engagement. Despite these strategic interests, the cooperation with the PICs in the postwar era up until the emergence of the Indo-Pacific narrative has been quite fragmented, reflecting the rather low priority given to the region, the multiplicity of the objectives pursued, and the diversity of engaged actors. Nevertheless, the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) process initiated in 1997 provided an innovative multilateral framework to coordinate with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) over economic cooperation, improve Japan’s communications and iron out tensions, starting with nuclear. The incorporation of the PICs into Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision cements their position in Tokyo’s efforts to preserve a rules-based international order and counterbalance China’s growing influence. Security issues of Asia have thus started to appear on the agenda of the PALM Summits. In addition, Japan has stepped up its cooperation with its closest allies and partners – the US and Australia – as part of the operationalization of a FOIP in Oceania. Finally, a major provider of development aid, Tokyo has also become a diplomatic and security partner for the Pacific Islands. Japan has stepped up naval diplomacy and defense dialogues in the region, in addition to being very active in maritime capacity-building, as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. Despite the rise of Japanese cooperation, which is now truly multidimensional and strategic, Tokyo's ability to influence the Pacific islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. Indeed, the PICs feel little concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. With the US and its other partners increasing their presence in the area, there is a strong impetus for Japan to reinvest in the Pacific. However, Tokyo has yet to develop a formal strategy or vision for the region. This could be announced at the next PALM summit in 2024, which will mark the 10th iteration of this meeting and could be a significant milestone.
Topic:: Development, Cooperation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

18. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Author:: Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

19. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:: Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

20. China and the new globalization

Author:: Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

21. The EU Indo-Pacific Bid: Sailing Through Economic and Security Competition

Author:: Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Over the past five years, the Indo-Pacific region's importance for Europe has grown significantly. However, the launch of the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021 and its subsequent implementation have been affected by growing polarisation between the US and China, and by a fast-changing scenario caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This Report examines the state and perspectives of the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, 18 months after its launch. Are there avenues for cooperation with regional military initiatives, such as the QUAD? How is the economic landscape changing, in particular after the start of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)? What are the main strategies of Indo-Pacific countries for the green transition? And how do the US, China, and ASEAN countries view and act in the Indo-Pacific region?
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

22. Expanding International Cooperation against Corruption in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In light of the Indo-Pacific regional meeting of the 2nd Summit for Democracy (S4D2) (hosted by South Korea) choosing to discuss matters on corruption, Dr. Sook Jong Lee, a Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and a Senior Fellow at EAI, evaluates the state of corruption within the region. Despite persistent and wide-spread efforts to tackle the malignant effects of corruption, Dr. Lee points out that progress has been slow, especially due to the dominance of grand corruption and preserving independence for anti-corruption institutions. Lee concludes by suggesting that, with the Summit as a launch pad, leaders should look into the creation of a network of anti-corruption bodies to boost international cooperation, capacity building, and promoting independence.
Topic:: Corruption, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

23. Strengthening Regional Supply Chain Resiliency Through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)

Author:: Han-Koo Yeo and Wendy Cutler
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In recent years, supply chain disruptions have become commonplace, resulting in governments and businesses rethinking long-held strategies, such as “cost and efficiency,” “just-in-time,” and “offshoring.” Facing shortages of products ranging from personal protective equipment (PPE) to automotive semiconductors, governments have had to mobilize quickly to deal with crises, often cobbling together a series of temporary and ad hoc measures. However, it has become clear that no country can prevent or cope with these disruptions alone. A collective approach, especially among like-minded countries, can greatly enhance supply chain resiliency and security. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)1 is one of the most promising international economic negotiations for addressing supply chain issues. Launched by the Biden administration in May 2022, IPEF is a blueprint for U.S. economic engagement in the region with 14 partners representing 40% of global GDP. Of its four pillars, the Supply Chain Pillar has attracted considerable attention. In many ways, this area is a clean slate, paving the way for creative thinking on rules and cooperation mechanisms to minimize disruptions. IPEF negotiators are making meaningful progress on their supply chain work, with early harvest agreements possibly being announced in late May this year, around the time of the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade (MRT) meeting in Detroit, Michigan. With this in mind, we recommend a series of proposals to strengthen and expand the work of IPEF, both on a sector-wide basis and on critical minerals and materials, which could serve as a pilot for work in other sectors. We recommend important elements that should be included in an “early warning system” and “crisis response mechanism” to make these tools as robust and impactful as possible. We also suggest that IPEF members agree to World Trade Organization plus rules to deter the imposition of export restrictions and facilitate customs processing and essential cross-border movement of products and people during times of supply chain shortage. Finally, we underscore the benefits of supply chain connectivity and co-investment opportunities that can be generated through work in this pillar, especially for the developing country members of IPEF. Regarding critical minerals and materials, we offer several recommendations to cooperate on supply chain mapping, as well as streamlining and harmonizing regulations and standards. Furthermore, we suggest developing a “swap system” to be drawn from the financial “currency swap” mechanisms as a collective response that encourages countries to share their stockpiles during times of severe supply crises. Finally, we propose that Washington negotiate critical minerals and materials agreements similar to the one recently signed with Japan to make other IPEF members eligible for electric vehicle tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act. Our recommended policy proposals will take time to implement and could be taken up in phases. For 2023, we propose focusing on sector-wide outcomes and starting work on critical minerals and materials, which could continue into 2024. Next year would also be an opportune time to build on the cooperation mechanisms to make them more beneficial and relevant. It may also be worthwhile to consider a market access component to this effort. The IPEF Supply Chain Pillar provides a promising opportunity for the United States and its regional partners to set a new course in reshaping more resilient and secure supply chain networks.
Topic:: Economy, Resilience, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

24. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

25. Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Maryruth Belsey Priebe
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.
Topic:: Security, Women, Peace, Equity, and Gender
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

26. Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications

Author:: David Dorman and John Hemmings
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy. In the first installment of a three-part research project, Dr. Dorman and Dr. Hemmings lay out the rise of China’s overall digital grand strategy, Xi’s role in it, and how it has been organized to fulfil Party objectives. The report tracks the rise of the strategy over the past 10 years, the acceleration of that rise during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the current state of the strategy. In particular, it finds Digital China has been supported and designed by General Secretary Xi Jinping himself, and is a bid to make China more competitive vis a vis the West through the digital transformation of rules, institutions, and infrastructure at the national level. Over the past few years, the strategy has risen to become the “overall” strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, bigger than the Digital Silk Road, deeper than the Belt and Road Initiative, more far reaching than 5G or AI, more important than Made in China: 2025, and wider than Cyber Great Power. A renewed Digital China seeks to challenge a hegemonic global system anchored to a previous age. A successful Digital China has profound implications for China’s developmental path, great power competition, and for the norms that will undergird the international system for decades to come. The Party leadership has re-written Marxist economic theory in its bid to incorporate “data” as the basis of its digital economy and in order to foster a Chinese “Digital Marxism”. Digital China seeks to whet the “sharp weapon” of innovation to facilitate its great power rise and challenge to the West. Beijing is testing whether innovative thinking can be created through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning. The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

27. Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Carl W Baker
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

28. A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Rob York, Craig Kafura, Rick Umback, Rose Rodgers, and Thom Dixon
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power. The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response. Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

29. Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

Author:: Tom Connolly
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.
Topic:: National Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

30. ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:: Rob York, Chloe Clougher, Julian Gluck, Jaeeun Ha, and Lindsay Horikoshi
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire. This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface. All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: South Korea, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

31. US-ASEAN Digital Economy Cooperation

Author:: Hanh Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Long criticized for its lackluster record in economic engagement with Southeast Asia, the US is now looking to bolster digital economy cooperation with the region as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Both sides have already engaged in several cooperation initiatives to strengthen Southeast Asia’s digital capacities. These actions/engagements aim to help the region capture the immense benefit and respond to potential socioeconomic disruptions brought by the digital economic boom. However, US-ASEAN cooperation will have to deal with two challenges. First, China has already established a comprehensive and prevalent presence in the region’s digital economy, from hard infrastructure and customer-facing businesses to developing digital standards. Second, Southeast Asia’s diversity in economic development leads to varied capacities among its members. These attributes carry certain security complications for Southeast Asia and the US in the long run. Addressing them will require both sides to further boost cooperation, particularly in shaping regional digital standards.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Digital Economy, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

32. Great Power Politics: The Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Global South

Author:: Kei Koga
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 marks the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and there are expectations that their relationship will be upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Given the good diplomatic, security, and economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, ties are likely to be strengthened. However, Japan is now taking a more competitive strategy toward China, as indicated in the three security documents issued in December 2022, while Southeast Asian states generally continued the same strategic posture by which they have good relations with all great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, while Japan issued the “New Plan for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that emphasizes the “Global South,” it remained silent about ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific, and it was unclear what roles Japan expects ASEAN to play. Although both Japan and Southeast Asian states need to adjust their roles in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains to be seen whether the 50th anniversary becomes an opportunity for clarification.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Power Politics, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Japan, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

33. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

34. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

35. Regional Overview: Indo-Pacific as the 'Epicenter',

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Biden administration released its long-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) this reporting period, along with unclassified versions of its National Defense Strategy and Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews. There were no big surprises. The NSS identified the Indo-Pacific as “the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics” and reaffirmed China as the “pacing challenge,” even while branding Russia as “an immediate threat to the free and open international system” as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. Underscoring the priority attached to the region, President Biden attended the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh and the G20 Summit in Bali, with Vice President Kamala Harris representing the United States at the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Bangkok. Kim Jong Un was not invited to any of the Asia summits but found other ways to attract attention, including some 70 ballistic missile launches for the year while announcing plans to rapidly produce and potentially use tactical nuclear weapons. Chinese President Xi Jinping, when not busy defending Pyongyang’s bad behavior, was busy orchestrating the 20th National People’s Congress, where he was elected “president for life.” Meanwhile, the tech war between Washington and Beijing continued to heat up, much to the dismay of many US allies and partners. More broadly speaking, the economic outlook for the region appeared discouraging even as the administration failed to put much additional meat on the bones of its own Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Other regional trade agreements continued apace, sans Washington, which struggled to get its own House (pun intended) in order as we continue to ponder the significance of the US mid-term elections.
Topic:: International Relations, National Security, Deterrence, ASEAN, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia and Indo-Pacific

36. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Author:: Scott Bentley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

37. FACTORS IN CONSTRUCTING INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC

Author:: Mohd. Agoes Aufiya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The term “Indo-Pacific” became increasingly significant and was accepted by several countries, including Indonesia. The government welcomed the term as part of its foreign policy projection, which developed its unique perspective or interpretation, including inclusivity, a rule based on international law, and ASEAN’s centrality and cooperation for regional growth. This study would answer the question of how the concept of Indo-Pacific will be interpreted within Indonesia's unique context compared to other countries. Thus, this research aimed to describe several key factors in constructing the Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific concept, particularly under President Jokowi’s leadership. This research applied qualitative with library methods from the primary and secondary data sources. This paper argued six factors that constructed Indonesia’s perspective on Indo-Pacific: maritime historical legacy; the “Bebas-Aktif” principle; ASEAN values; geographical position; and democratic values. The research concluded that Indonesia is one of the major countries that consistently championed the term “Indo-Pacific” within the regional and international spheres, with a “moderate” status in terms of its foreign policy implementation, which is mainly characterized by inclusivity and cooperation in the economy by constructively engaging all countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

38. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:: Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

39. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:: Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

40. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:: Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

41. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

42. EU-Pacific Talks: Trade relations with the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Eliška Prostřední
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: Overall, the debate focused on the diversification of global trading partners and how to achieve it. Speakers also discussed the threats associated with dependence on only a few strong countries, which can then take the position of rule makers. The whole debate was linked to the possibilities of global trade with countries that are part of the Indo-Pacific region. Writes Eliska Prostřední in her report on the debate "EU-Pacific Talks: Trade relations with the Indo-Pacific".
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, Diversification, Trade, Debates, and Economic Dependence
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

43. EU-PACIFIC TALKS: Europe and the Indo-Pacific: Migration and demographic changes

Author:: Kristína Chlebáková
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: Demographic developments – the “greying” of society – remain an issue across the first world; in Europe, the expansion of the welfare state and elevated standards of services has put increasing demands on productivity to maintain the prosperity that has become an integral part of the societal contract.
Topic:: Demographics, Migration, Social Contract, and Productivity
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

44. EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players

Author:: Zsanett Gréta Papp
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players, here you can read the report from the debate written by Zsanett Gréta Papp. During the debate it was discussed, for example, that although each country has its own interests concerning the region, there are several global problems that countries should face together, because one country cannot solve them. On the other hand, it is really difficult to establish dialogue with the Indo-Pacific countries.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Debates
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

45. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

46. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:: Becca Wasser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

47. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

48. Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermeulen
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has led policymakers to re-prioritise the European security architecture and the EU’s neighbourhood, including a positive reassessment of NATO’s role as a reliable security provider. As the transatlantic relationship and the Indo-Pacific are inherently intertwined, this once again highlights the imperative of the EU making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. This presents the EU with an opportunity to project its values, interests and power, though hampered at present by political infighting and the mushrooming of conflicts in and around Europe. Still, the time has come for the EU to assess how it should adjust its approach to Indo-Pacific security. How can the EU effectively strike a balance in security and defence cooperation with partners to uphold key principles of international law and order without endorsing the idea that ‘might makes right’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:: Security, NATO, International Cooperation, International Law, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

49. The South China Sea and Indo-Pacific in an Era of “Multipolar” Competition

Author:: Zachary Paikin, Gilang Kembara, Andrew Mantong, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: A longstanding territorial dispute between claimants in the South China Sea now finds itself nested within a new imagined ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, which itself has become a key theatre in a deepening great power conflict. The EU is geographically distant and a relative newcomer to the strategic terrain in these two regions, yet it cannot afford to ignore them given their crucial economic and geopolitical importance. While the EU’s ability to reduce the constraints on its freedom of manoeuvre is limited, the Union should nonetheless gradually nurture its strategic autonomy by carving out a delineated hard security role in the South China Sea while maintaining a degree of distance from the US approach towards China and the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

50. Playing the Long Game in the South China Sea

Author:: Andrew Mantong
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: In the South China Sea (SCS), as indeed the wider Indo-Pacific, the EU is facing a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. In the SCS, China has been able to create physical realities in defiance of international law by constructing artificial islands in the attempt to sustain its claims to the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos as well as expand its military projection deep into international waters. The US is still the predominant security player in the Indo-Pacific, but its military presence has an increasingly hard time shoring up American power in the SCS. The security dilemma between the great powers is threatening rules-based multilateralism, which runs deep in the veins of the EU and to a great extent defines its international posture.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, International Law, European Union, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS