Political Geography: India / Publication Year: within 5 Years

451. Quad Economy and Technology Task Force Report

Author:: Gateway House
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Conceived in 2020, the task force studied promising areas for cooperation between the Quad countries beyond their pre-existing maritime security partnership. The report highlights the need to increase economic and technological interdependence among the Quad countries and to establish common and updated rules and standards for emerging technologies in five study areas. The unique mix of the group – three developed and one developing nation, three Pacific and one Indian Ocean nation, three producer-trading nations with one massive emerging market – lends itself to innovation, experimentation and cooperation that can be a template for a new, post-pandemic geopolitical era.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Economy, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Australia, and United States of America

452. Unfinished Connectivity in the Bay of Bengal

Author:: Amit Bhandari, Sagnik Chakraborty, Naren Punjabi, and Gitanjoli Dasgupta
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: The Bay of Bengal is a bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and with a population of 1.4 billion, an increasingly important economic zone in its own right. India has been slow to build regional connectivity. The space has been filled by China's Belt and Road Initiative projects, which have not always been beneficial for host countries. The region may be better off pursuing digital connectivity by enabling tech startups – areas of India’s strength. This research uses maps to explore the potential for energy, transport, and financial connectivity across the Bay of Bengal.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Regional Integration, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Transportation
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, Indian Ocean, Indo-Pacific, and Bay of Bengal

453. Engagement of External Powers in Africa: Takeaways for India

Author:: Rajiv Bhatia
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: As multiple foreign powers compete in Africa, there is a need to understand the geopolitical landscape, and analyse the various policies, strategies and motivations of each country. Where lies India in this great strategic game? India has a unique relationship with the continent, with respect for equality, mutual benefit, and need-based assistance. By deepening India-Africa cooperation, bolstering economic relations and leveraging new digital, space and medical technologies, the relationship between India and the African nations can be better cemented, despite the global competition at play.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Engagement, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, South Asia, and India

454. Digital Manufacturing in India

Author:: Amrut Godbole, Sagnik Chakraborty, and Manjeet Kripalani
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Covid-19 has accelerated the process of digital manufacturing, already under way globally, and in India. Companies that saw it as an option, now understand it as an imperative. Within India, digital adoption by companies has outpaced their global peers on several criteria including new business and workforce models. A rush of foreign investment into India’s digital space, will expand this trend. This is a significant shift for India, as Covid’s geopolitical and economic fallout is the realignment of supply chains, largely away from China. India, with its size, market and tech capability, is seen as an alternative site – though it has not been an immediate beneficiary. That has been Vietnam, with its Asian proximity and favourable regulatory environment. However, India is cognizant of the opportunity, and the government has enacted some enabling policies. In November 2020, the Production Linked Incentive scheme (PLI) was extended to over a dozen sectors in which India is already competitive, like pharmaceuticals, automobile, telecom, textiles, electronic tech consumer products. These subsidies encourage products to be made in India, for the home and export market. Just prior to this, in September 2020, the government addressed a core problem in India – labour. It replaced 29 old legislations by four, simplified labour codes, to modernize labour regulations. Meanwhile, those companies in India, largely Indian and foreign multinationals, already on the digital manufacturing path, used the year to fast-track their digital adoption.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Leadership, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

455. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:: Gateway House
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America

456. Reinvigorating South Asian Nuclear Transparency and Confidence-building Measures

Author:: Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights paper explores a series of nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) proposed by military, nuclear, political and regional experts from China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States to address nuclear challenges in South Asia. It categorizes these bilateral, trilateral and multilateral measures into doctrinal dialogues and joint threat assessment exercises; communication lines, pre-notification and de-alerting; and development and employment of strategic technologies. The paper then provides a spectrum of viability across which it identifies proposals with the greatest potential, moderate potential and the least potential for reinvigorating nuclear transparency measures and CBMs in South Asia.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

457. Enhancing South Asian Nuclear Dialogues: The Implications of Covid-19

Author:: Petr Topychkanov
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Before the global spread of Covid-19, nuclear-armed China, India and Pakistan lacked official diplomatic exchanges to address nuclear weapon-related issues. The pandemic then halted even unofficial dialogues between these countries, which had existed in various bilateral and multilateral formats. As a result, China, India and Pakistan are faced with the challenge of keeping a desirable level of predictability concerning each other’s nuclear postures and capabilities. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores ways of dealing with this challenge and enhancing nuclear dialogues in South Asia. It considers both longer-term developments in the region and the recent implications of Covid-19. The paper finds that bilateral dialogue remains more feasible than trilateral dialogue between China, India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, it argues that these countries may need to address specific issues in broader formats. Emphasized by the Covid-19 crisis, such issues notably include emerging technologies and autonomy. On the one hand, these technologies support diplomacy digitalization, allowing nuclear-armed states to use online and mixed formats to develop nuclear dialogues between them. On the other hand, if applied in the military area, these technologies may affect nuclear postures and capabilities, and contribute to military escalation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, COVID-19, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

458. South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States

Author:: Petr Topychkanov and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This report provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 research interviews conducted in 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. The publication also builds on the findings from a virtual workshop that SIPRI hosted on 8 and 9 December 2020 on ‘Nuclear challenges in South Asia: Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the USA’. These discussions revealed a variety of interlocking insights on such issues as no first use, lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement and emerging technologies that are shaping strategic stability. The publication consists of five country-focused sections that explore nuclear postures, strategic technologies and escalatory risks, as well as conclusions that offer building blocks for the next steps on engagement. This report was prepared in the framework of the SIPRI project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia, generously supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

459. A Strategic US Approach to India’s COVID-19 Crisis

Author:: Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The recent surge of COVID-19 in South Asia challenges India’s traditional ability to aid its smaller neighbors, a change that could, in turn, affect India’s influence in its competition with China. Unless India can recover from this surge with the help of allies like the United States, the pandemic could impact the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical balance. In the past, India has often acted as a first responder across South Asia, helping other countries recover from natural disasters, and it initially occupied this role during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, when it helped several South Asian and Indian Ocean region countries cope with the effects of the disease. India’s role as ‘first responder’ has been a key factor in its geopolitical power and in maintaining its role as a leader in the region. However, the resurgence of COVID-19 has jolted India at a time when democratic countries, including the United States, view India as critical to balancing China’s deepening influence cross Asia. South Asia, a region holding 23 percent of the world’s population, now accounts for over 11 percent of global COVID-19 cases and 6 percent of COVID-related deaths. The world’s largest democracy and second-most populous country, India alone currently accounts for over 84 percent of South Asia’s cases and deaths. For most of 2020, it appeared that India, thanks partly to a lockdown, had managed to avert a huge health crisis. During this time, India supported its immediate South Asian neighbors by supplying personal protective equipment and medications. However, the latest COVID-19 surge has created a crisis that has strained the Indian health infrastructure’s ability to meet. With more resources being diverted towards domestic ends, India’s ability to maintain friends and influence other countries has diminished, also potentially shrinking its sphere of influence. The US must therefore go beyond dealing with its own health crisis and also support India in dealing with its crisis. Instead of allowing China to consolidate its positions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, helping India restore its ability to provide assistance would be in the best interests of the United States and its allies.
Topic:: International Relations, Health Care Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

460. A US-India Trade Agenda for the Biden Administration

Author:: Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US ought to counteract the influence of Chinese authoritarianism early and often. One relatively low-cost way is to encourage India to engage more deeply as a competitor with China in the global economy. A democracy since its independence in 1947, with a population about the same as that of China, India is that country’s natural rival in Asia. Beginning with India’s decision in 1990-91 to liberalize its economy, the nation has gradually opened its vast market to global trade. Fueled by fresh access to foreign capital and technology, India’s economy grew over six percent during the first decade of the 21st century. In May 2014, this progress was further advanced by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time in India’s history, a conservative administration had a clear parliamentary majority, making it possible to legislate foundational, market-positive reform. India has adopted a new insolvency and bankruptcy code and replaced multiple taxation regimes across its states with a federal goods and services tax, which is welcome. But India has done little to end its excessive protectionism. Its distrust of foreign corporations, a legacy of colonial rule, endures. Indian policy makers may believe that the US is so eager for Indian competition with China that Washington will grant them a pass on restrictive trade and investment policies. But there is a better choice. India is nowhere near its full economic potential, and the fix isn’t complicated. The Biden agenda for India should encourage India to lower tariffs, to remove barriers to foreign retail, to roll back unnecessarily restrictive data privacy rules, and to provide economic incentives for foreign investment.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

461. Positive Visions, Powerful Partnerships: The Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific

Author:: Stephen Tankel, Lisa Curtis, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States was losing ground to China in the Indo-Pacific when the COVID-19 crisis began. China’s growing economic might, military modernization, and aggressive diplomatic efforts were already eroding America’s competitive advantage and shifting the regional balance of power. A year after the virus first spread, it is possible to identify where the pandemic is affecting diplomatic, economic, and defense trends in ways that could accelerate declines for the United States, but also might create opportunities to reverse or mitigate some of them. Restoring U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is critical to competing effectively against China, and President Joe Biden has made this a top foreign policy priority. In particular, his administration is making the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic forum commonly known as the Quad, which is comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—a core component of its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Chinese post-outbreak behavior has driven increased cooperation among these four countries in the diplomatic, economic, and defense domains to address shared challenges from China. Seizing the opportunities this cooperation creates is critical for the United States. While expanding U.S. cooperation with Quad countries, the United States cannot neglect Southeast Asia, where competition with China for influence is fiercest. Southeast Asia is at the heart of U.S. and Japanese efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and is a region where Australia has played a traditional leadership role. Competing effectively with China requires offering Southeast Asian countries a positive alternative vision to the one Beijing promotes. Whether the United States and its fellow Quad democracies can help Southeast Asian countries recover from the COVID-19 crisis will be a key litmus test of their ability to deliver on such an agenda. This report offers recommendations for the United States to take unilaterally and in close cooperation—bilaterally, trilaterally, and through the Quad—with Japan, Australia, and India to address challenges and seize opportunities created by the COVID-19 crisis along three lines of effort: diplomatic, economic, and defense.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Partnerships, Economy, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

462. What the Quad Is, Is Not, and Should Not Be

Author:: Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Since its establishment in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad) has transformed into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern—particularly the rise of China. The U.S. has pushed for this transformation. Quad members speak of the group as a forum for issues in the Indo-Pacific ranging from COVID-19 and climate change to emerging technologies. But China, Asia’s biggest power, is integral to addressing each issue. In early 2021, the group’s leaders signed a joint statement reiterating the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific—a reference to what all four members regard as China’s illegitimate claims in the South and East China Seas. Indo-Pacific Quad members also have disputes with China: India over its shared border with China; Japan over China’s sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands; and Australia over worsening ties, including onerous trade restrictions and tariffs.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, and United States of America

463. An Analysis of the Binding Constraints on Digital Financial Inclusion in India Using a Decision Tree Methodology

Author:: Nandini Harihareswara and Howard Miller
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:: The past decade has seen significant innovation and growth in the volume and value of digital payments in India. However, we find that the associated gains have been heavily concentrated in favor of wealthier and urban customers and have had less impact on lower income and rural populations. While some customers now have a far greater selection of quick, cheap, and convenient digital payments methods, as much as 65 percent of the population remains effectively excluded. Using a decision tree framework, we test a range of factors on the supply and demand sides that could be binding constraints on further digital finance penetration. We find that an unlevel playing field in favor of the (primarily state-owned) banking sector results in a lack of effective competition that could be inhibiting greater innovation and outreach in favor of lower-income and marginalized people. This unlevel playing field is potentially a function of institutional weakness combined with the nexus of control of the government and the banking sector, which is reinforced by the position of the National Payments Corporation of India. This control may also be viewed by the government as necessary to protect economic stability in a very dynamic market. To the extent that institutional deficiencies are the root cause of regulatory barriers to the entry of new providers and the scope of digital financial services offered, they are a binding constraint on advancing digital financial inclusion. Under this market structure, the outreach and inherent business models of digital payments and transfers do not provide sufficient perceived benefits to attract large segments of the population. Further, a lack of trust in providers combines with the perception of low benefits to generate an additional binding constraint, preventing the market from reaching a critical mass at which the bulk of the population would have the means and the incentives to use the system. Therefore, the market remains at an equilibrium below its potential.
Topic:: Development, Governance, Finance, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: India and Asia

464. The Era of Dis-and-Misinformation Volume XXII, Number 1

Author:: Nicole Kalczynski, Rebecca Blaser, Nicholas J. Cull, Peter J. Phillips, Gabriela Pohl, Michael Christensen, Leonie Holthaus, Bohdan Harasymiw, Feeza Vasudeva, Nicholas Barkdull, Arthur D. Soto-Vásquez, Nadra Hashim, and Vincent Chenzi
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: As the world continues to recover from the devastating fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, navigating the harms of misinformation and disinformation remain at the forefront of global conversations on paving the path forward. Preventing the dissemination of false information—particularly during a time where the ways in which we engage with information environments have fundamentally changed—is increasingly complex. Social media platforms have enabled users to not only engage with media but become distributors of it themselves. When coupled with bad actors, limited repercussions, and poor content regulation, social networks are easily weaponized. At all scales of governance misinformation and disinformation campaigns pose a multidimensional threat. In Myanmar and China, disinformation campaigns were leveraged to target minority groups, while in Central and Eastern Europe, they serve as the cornerstone of destabilizing operations between adversarial states. In yet another facet, countries like Turkey, China, Russia, and Iran have embraced digital authoritarianism and restrict policies on internet accessibility under the pretext of stemming the spread of “fake news.” This year’s issue seeks to shed light on the nature of these evolving threats from a variety of innovative and understudied perspectives. This issue explores the causes and effects of the spread of misinformation and disinformation throughout different parts of the world and will be timely for years to come given the ever-increasing role and breadth of new technologies infiltrating people’s everyday lives.
Topic:: Corruption, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Media, Internet, Social Media, Surveillance, COVID-19, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Sudan, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Eastern Europe, Asia, Myanmar, Central Europe, and United States of America

465. Tangled Wires: Preparing India’s Power Sector for the Clean Energy Transition

Author:: Jonathan Kay
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Almost none of the world’s largest polluters have enacted policies compatible with the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius, a threshold past which climate disruption is projected to become even more frequent, severe, and unpredictable. Fortunately, despite the absence of adequate government support, renewable energy has grown at an astonishing pace in recent years thanks to its plummeting cost. India, for example, has more than doubled its stock of wind and solar power in the last five years, driven less by sustainability concerns than by clean energy’s potential for cost-effectively meeting citizens’ pressing development needs. However, the low prices of wind and solar projects disguise the structural costs renewable energy poses for grids when deployed at larger scales. The intermittent, unpredictable nature of the electricity generated by such technologies—in contrast to the stable, on-demand flow of power from traditional fossil fuel generation—requires fundamental changes to how countries invest in and operate their grids. For India, one of the most important steps for coping with the variability of these new sources of energy will be better coordination of the flow of power between the country’s disparate state-run grids. By increasing the volume of energy traded between state utilities, periods of surplus power in one region can compensate for deficits in others, making for a more stable and reliable supply of renewable energy—one that can better displace expensive and polluting fossil fuels. Yet, while such reforms would be difficult under the best of circumstances, they will be particularly challenging given the unique dysfunctions of India’s power sector. With its politically compromised, perennially loss-making electricity distribution companies already struggling to keep the lights on, bolder change appears unlikely. Deeper reforms to India’s power sector are therefore prerequisites to adopting solutions like regional coordination that can ensure the continued growth of renewable energy. The good news is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s national popularity and the dominance of his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the state level offer the country’s leaders an opportunity to reform the power sector where others have failed. But to take advantage of this opening, Modi must go beyond his modus operandi by investing in incremental institutional solutions rather than one-and-done technical fixes and by serving as a coordinator for India’s states rather than legislating by central fiat. Deeper reforms enabling India to maintain its rapid expansion of renewable energy not only would provide clean, low-cost power to its people but also would help the world offset the failings of more laggard countries, perhaps even putting back within reach the Paris Agreement’s more aggressive target of keeping global warming to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. But the hardest part of this ambitious task lies ahead—in ending the vicious cycles that have plagued India’s power sector for decades.
Topic:: Climate Change, Pollution, Fossil Fuels, and Energy
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

466. Understanding the Encryption Debate in India

Author:: Anirudh Burman and Prateek Jha
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Encryption has become a contentious instrument for protecting the security and confidentiality of online communication. Rapid digitalization in the past decade has led to the proliferation of domestic and foreign online communication services that use encryption and, consequently, pose challenges to national security bodies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). To address these challenges, the Indian government introduced new regulations in February 2021. These regulations require large social media platforms to enable traceability, or the ability to provide information concerning the originator of online communications. Technology companies and privacy activists have opposed such a move on the grounds that traceability would require the breaking of the end-to-end encryption used by many online communication platforms like WhatsApp and therefore would compromise the security of online communications on such platforms. This traceability requirement, however, is only the latest development in a drawn-out, contentious debate over the use of encryption. The contestation between maintaining higher degrees of online security and issuing new rules to grant technological exceptions for security agencies and LEAs is not specific to India. One of the first serious discussions on the issue took place in the United States in the 1990s, when public opposition warded off an early government attempt to sidestep encryption protections with a court order. In the past decade, the use of encryption has only grown more pronounced. The revelations that the United States’ National Security Agency was collecting vast amounts of communications data led to the introduction and increased adoption of end-to-end encryption for online communications. End-to-end encryption is now used widely by online communication platforms like WhatsApp, Signal, and Threema. Its use presents law enforcement and national security agencies with new challenges. Even though these agencies today have greater and easier access to more information than ever before, the absolute confidentiality provided by encrypted online communication platforms makes it harder for these agencies to engage in real-time surveillance to investigate crimes and identity wrongdoers. While some policymakers from India and other countries argue that encryption must only be weakened to solve specific problems, most experts agree that, as of today, there is no technological solution that would weaken encryption for specific law enforcement and national security purposes, while managing to maintain preexisting levels of security and confidentiality for general use. The introduction of any mechanism for specific access would, it is claimed, introduce both known and unknown vulnerabilities into these communications platforms. Such a mechanism would have a systemic effect on all online communication dependent on encryption for ensuring security and confidentiality. In India, these developments create challenges in specific ways. For example, India reports the highest number of child pornography cases worldwide, and encrypted communications makes it difficult to identify culpable parties. Similarly, as India has digitized rapidly, there has been a surfeit of fake and offensive online news that has, in some cases, led to mob lynchings. In addition, terrorist networks have been found to be using encrypted communication channels while planning and carrying out terrorist attacks in India. Over the years, the Indian government’s approach to encryption has responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Indian financial regulators mandated the use of encryption for banking and financial services as they realized the security of such transactions was best protected through encryption. At the same time, the Indian government prohibited telecom operators from implementing bulk or mass encryption in telecommunication services. Starting in 2015, the government introduced different regulatory proposals requiring that messaging platforms and other communication service providers provide plaintext copies of communications to Indian government agencies on request. These proposals, however, faced significant opposition and were withdrawn. Earlier in 2021, the Indian government’s new rules requiring traceability have been officially notified. The mechanisms through which they will be implemented are not yet clear. It is also unclear if these rules are the last demands the Indian government will make to weaken encryption, or whether further demands will arise in the future. To weigh the relative benefits and drawbacks of the Indian government’s proposal, analysts should consider relevant factors such as (but not limited to) whether such changes will offer law enforcement officials the access they desire, how the security of encrypted communications will be affected, and how citizens’ civil liberties will be impacted, among others.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Digitalization, and Encryption
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

467. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:: Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

468. South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN

Author:: Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Under South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his administration, Seoul has undertaken its first unified diplomatic initiative aimed at advancing ties with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative is known as the New Southern Policy (NSP). Though Moon’s efforts toward securing inter-Korean peace have received the most publicity, the NSP has arguably sustained more momentum than any of the administration’s other flagship foreign policy initiatives. Looking beyond South Korea’s relationships in Northeast Asia, it is also important to assess the NSP’s progress toward its goal to “elevate [South] Korea’s relations with ASEAN member states and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level [South] Korea maintains with the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia).”1 The NSP is an extension of South Korea’s need to diversify its economic and strategic relationships amid the uncertainty posed by competition between its closest ally, the United States, and largest trading partner, China. By elevating ties with India and Southeast Asia, particularly in the economic realm, Seoul hopes to insulate itself from the risks posed by trade and strategic friction between the two great powers. Moreover, it hopes to advance its middle power diplomacy and improve ties with India and Southeast Asia commensurate with their growing economic and strategic importance. Though India and ASEAN countries have strong ties to South Korea and share many of the same values and interests, they have not featured as prominently in Seoul’s diplomacy as major powers around the peninsula in the past. While it has clear logic behind it, the NSP’s implementation and outcomes so far are mixed. Of the policy’s three pillars—prosperity (economic cooperation), people (sociocultural cooperation), and peace (political and strategic cooperation)—the prosperity pillar has received the most emphasis. Under this pillar, South Korea has initiated new negotiations for free trade agreements and launched an official development assistance (ODA) strategy aimed at six NSP partner countries. However, cooperation with India has often lagged while cooperation with Vietnam has outpaced attention to most other ASEAN member states. The peace pillar, by contrast, has been relatively underdeveloped and focused mainly on nontraditional security issues while avoiding sensitive strategic issues confronting the region. This pillar showcases how South Korea’s concerns about Chinese influence both motivate and constrain the policy—though Seoul wants to diversify its economic portfolio and strategic partnerships to mitigate its reliance on China, it also must tread carefully to avoid retaliation from Beijing. Even so, while ASEAN, India, and South Korea share common interests on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and denuclearization by North Korea, South Korea’s main security concerns revolve around Northeast Asia, while those of India and ASEAN do not. Seoul’s hierarchy of priorities in the security realm will continue to differ from that of its NSP partners, posing another obstacle to security cooperation. That said, the policy has made progress in strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic infrastructure and institutional apparatus to devote more attention to NSP partner countries, even in just four short years and after being disrupted by a global pandemic. Considering this short period, many of NSP’s projects will take time to show results. Even so, the broad and far-reaching policy has sometimes struggled to define its goals or unify its wide range of elements under a clear strategy. It would benefit from a more well-branded approach to India and Southeast Asia that highlights core projects under each pillar.2 To that end, the Moon administration should strive to evaluate the outcomes of the NSP in its final year in office. Although it is typically difficult to maintain continuity in foreign policy due to South Korean presidents’ limit to one five-year term, the geopolitical and economic imperatives driving the NSP will remain under a new administration in 2022. Given the staying power of these drivers and the continuously growing importance of India and Southeast Asia, South Korea’s next president will have every reason to keep emphasizing these regional partnerships as well.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: India, Asia, and South Korea

469. Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey

Author:: Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: As President Joe Biden and his team seek to put the defense of democracy and protection of human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, they confront the stubborn fact that the United States maintains cooperative security relations with a wide range of undemocratic or democratically backsliding governments. Powerful security interests, especially countering terrorist threats, maintaining stability in the Middle East, and managing competition with a rising China, underlie many of these partnerships. Such situations frequently give rise to a policy dilemma: confronting partner governments over their political shortcomings risks triggering hostility that would jeopardize the security benefits that such governments provide to Washington. Yet giving them a free pass on democracy and rights issues undercuts the credibility of U.S. appeals to values, bolstering the damaging perception that America only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries. Already in the first year of Biden’s presidency, such tensions have emerged in relations with countries as diverse as Egypt, Hungary, India, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. While the Biden administration has publicly and privately raised democracy and rights issues with various security partners, its cautious approach toward some of them has started to attract criticism from those who feel that near-term security interests have been too strongly prioritized compared to democracy and human rights concerns. This paper looks in depth at the democracy-security dilemma with a view to helping U.S. policymakers deal with it more systematically and effectively. Case studies of U.S. policy toward Egypt, India, and Turkey over the past twenty years highlight the complexity of the democracy-security dilemma. In Egypt, U.S. concerns with the country’s authoritarian politics have surfaced periodically over the years yet struggled to find a meaningful place in a relationship dominated by deeply rooted security cooperation, including extensive U.S. security assistance. In India, a strong U.S. push, warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, to further strengthen the U.S. -Indian security partnership has unfolded alongside a distinctly illiberal turn in Indian politics. By contrast, democratic decline in Turkey has coincided with—and contributed to—a major deterioration in Ankara’s relations with Washington, including significant divergence on a range of foreign policy issues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Turkey, India, Egypt, and United States of America

470. Digital Platform Markets of ASEAN and India: Implications for Cooperation with Korea

Author:: Jeong Gon Kim, Seung Kwon Na, Jaeho Lee, ChiHyun Yun, and Eunmi Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The growth of digital platform markets in ASEAN and India is prominent. With COVID-19, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms are expected to rise further; especially five sectors (e-commerce, sharing economy, education, healthcare and fintech) are fast growing seectors. Korean is a potential partner of ASEAN countries and India. Korea's Digital New Deal policy now stresses tasks such as sharing and utilizing data, convergence of 5G and artificial intelligence across whole industries, spreading digital education, digital healthcare, etc., which are closely related to the economic and social needs of ASEAN countries and India. In order to promote regulatory harmonization and cooperation with ASEAN and India, it is necessary for Korea to promote digital economy and trade agreements.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, ASEAN, COVID-19, 5G, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:: India, Asia, and South Korea

471. The Indian Startup Ecosystem and Policy Implications

Author:: Hyoungmin Han, Jeong Gon Kim, Sunghee Lee, and Jonghun Pek
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: A startup refers to a company with ideas and innovative technologies, which have a short period of experience. Recently, startups are leading the fourth industrial technological innovation and affecting job creation and industrial productivity growth, so that its economic importance is increasing. In particular, India is emerging as a startup powerhouse based on its fast-growing economy and relatively cost-efficient excellent talent pool. Also, global investment towards the Indian startup market is increasing. While the number of Korean companies entering the Indian startup market is increasing, only a few have made stable inroads into the market. Based on quantitative data, literature analysis, corporate case analysis, surveys, and in-depth interviews, we objectively identified the Indian startup ecosystem and drew policy implications to increase the accessibility of Korean firms to the Indian market.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Investment, Innovation, Industry, Job Creation, and Startup
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and South Korea

472. THE END OF THE WAR ON TERROR

Author:: Navin Bapat
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: On August 15, 2021, almost twenty years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Taliban recaptured Afghanistan from the American-supported government led by Ashraf Ghani. Afghans pushed to get on American transport planes to evacuate, conjuring images of the US evacuation of Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. Others, afraid of Taliban retaliation, turned to social media to plea for help. Meanwhile, in Kabul, militants paraded in front of the evacuated US embassy, signifying the Taliban’s total victory.
Topic:: Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, 9/11, War on Terror, Vietnam War, COVID-19, Joe Biden, Ashraf Ghani, and Hamid Karzai
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and United States of America

473. Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:: Khaled A. Beydoun and Sahar Aziz
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Join us for a fireside chat between Professor Khaled Beydoun and Professor Sahar Aziz on the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of Global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries.
Topic:: Human Rights, Populism, Islamophobia, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

474. An Unlikely Success: Demonstrations Against Farm Laws in India

Author:: Katerina Bozhinova, Josh Satre, and Shreyya Rajagopal
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 9 December 2021, Indian farmers announced an end to demonstrations against the country’s aborted agricultural reforms (The New York Times, 9 December 2021). Still, key organizers maintain that the movement will continue to monitor government implementation of demonstrator demands into 2022 (The Free Press Journal, 12 December 2021). The decision followed the repeal of agricultural laws deregulating the sale, pricing, and storage of farm produce on 29 November (Reuters, 29 November 2021), more than a year after they were enacted on 20 September 2020 (BBC News, 16 February 2021). As of 9 December 2021, ACLED records over 5,200 demonstration events associated with the farm laws across India.
Topic:: Social Movement, Protests, Demonstrations, and Farmers
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

475. Mid-Year Update: 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2021

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: In ACLED’s special report on 10 conflicts to worry about at the start of 2021, we identified a range of flashpoints and emerging crises where violent political disorder was likely to evolve or worsen over the course of the year: Ethiopia, India & Pakistan, Myanmar, Haiti, Belarus, Colombia, Armenia & Azerbaijan, Yemen, Mozambique, and the Sahel.1 Our mid-year update revisits these 10 cases, tracking key developments in political violence and protest activity during the first half of 2021 and analyzing trends to watch in the coming months.
Topic:: Political Violence, Conflict, Protests, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, Yemen, Colombia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Haiti, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Belarus, Sahel, and Global Focus

476. Cow Protection Legislation and Vigilante Violence in India

Author:: Shreya Maskara
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: In India, over 500,000 students signed up for the government-sponsored nationwide ‘Cow Science’ exam this year, which was scheduled for 25 February 2021. The ‘Cow Science’ exam, a free-of-cost voluntary exam, was purportedly meant to test people’s knowledge about cows, thus furthering curiosity about cows among the public (CNN, 8 January 2021). After widespread criticism of the course material, the exam, a product of the National Cow Commission or the Rashtriya Kamdhenu Aayog (RKA), was indefinitely postponed (Scroll, 22 February 2021). Scientists and educational institutions questioned the reference material as unscientific and critics claimed it was a mass indoctrination attempt by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has linked the protection of cows — considered sacred in Hinduism — to its Hindu nationalist policies and rhetoric (Times of India, 22 February 2021). Since the BJP came to power in 2014, laws protecting cows have been amended in several states to include stricter punishments for cow slaughter. Right-wing Hindu nationalist organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and other cow vigilantes have been emboldened to attack minority groups, including Christian, Muslim, Dalit (formerly known as “untouchables”), or Adivasi (Indigenous) communities, under the guise of protecting cattle. This report analyzes trends in political violence connected to nationalist rhetoric around cow protection in India.
Topic:: Minorities, Violence, Legislation, and Vigilantism
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

477. Naxal-Maoist Insurgency Trends in India During the Coronavirus Pandemic

Author:: Aastha Kaul
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: As countries continue to contend with the COVID-19 pandemic, it has become clear that its impact extends far beyond public health and safety, with the ability to shape political behavior and conflict. The interplay between disease and disorder is perhaps most visible in India, which has been one of the nations worst affected by the coronavirus. Following the onset of the pandemic, ACLED records an escalation of conflict in Jammu & Kashmir (for more see this spotlight infographic from ACLED’s COVID-19 Disorder Tracker) as well as a new wave of political unrest in the northeast (for more see this ACLED report on political violence in northeast India). In contrast, ACLED data show a decline in events in 2020 related to the Naxal-Maoist insurgency, one of India’s oldest post-independence conflicts. The restrictions surrounding the coronavirus pandemic impacted the Naxal-Maoist insurgency in two significant ways. First, the lockdown worsened already strained supply chains, preventing cadres from accessing vital resources such as rations and weaponry. Second, dwindling supplies subsequently affected operational capacity as insurgents were unable to effectively carry out their annual tactical counter-offensive campaign (TCOC). The combination of these factors has led to an overall decline of Naxal-Maoist activity in 2020, compared to the year prior. A comparative analysis of ACLED data for 2019 and 2020 reveals these trends and offer insights into the changing nature of the conflict.
Topic:: Political Violence, Insurgency, Conflict, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

478. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:: Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

479. COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Dependence on China: The Indian Perspective

Author:: Amitendu Palit
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: China is India’s largest source of imports, nearly 15 percent of which are sourced from China. Many of India’s major imports—electrical machinery, electronic and semiconductor devices, fertilizers, antibiotics, iron and steel products, and vehicular parts—are extensively sourced from China. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the critical dependence of India’s pharmaceutical industry on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). The dependence on China for both intermediate and finished products, has encouraged India to incentivize greater production at home through production-linked-incentives (PLIs) and to work with Japan and Australia on reorganizing regional supply chains. The paper examines the repositioning of supply chains in the strategic industry of pharmaceuticals. Efforts to reduce dependence on China assume great importance in this regard as India strives to become the leading supplier of affordable vaccines for tackling COVID-19.) The decade of the 2020’s has begun with India embarking on the dedicated mission of reducing import dependence and increasing self-reliance. The COVID-19 pandemic has starkly exposed the frailties of supply chains relying heavily on China. For India, which relies extensively on China for several critical imports, no sector is more vulnerable to disruptions from over-dependence than its pharmaceuticals. India’s reputation as the “pharmacy of the world” drawn from its great proficiency in making affordable pharmaceutical formulations and vaccines, relies fundamentally on sourcing essential drug intermediates from China. As one of the leading actors in the world’s fight against COVID-19, India is wary of sourcing disruptions from China affecting its ability to contribute to expanding global health security. After focusing on the import dependence of India’s pharmaceutical industry on China, this paper analyzes the recent initiatives announced by India for increasing economic self-reliance and reducing such dependence. It concludes by reflecting on the prospects of India decoupling from China in sourcing pharmaceutical ingredients.
Topic:: Economics, COVID-19, Imports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

480. The Coronavirus: Fueling Concerns and Contrasts between India and China

Author:: Tanvi Madan
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: On February 26, 2020, an Indian plane landed in Wuhan carrying medical supplies for China, which was then the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak. On its return, it evacuated a number of Indian and Bangladeshi nationals, as well as citizens of other countries. On the face of it, this is the kind of cooperative effort that is expected during a global public health crisis, with countries—even competitors—coming together at a time of need. However, the saga of that flight reflected another (prescient) dynamic—that COVID-19 would reinforce and increase rather than alleviate competition between China and India and complicate cooperation, with pandemic response and recovery efforts being seen through a competitive prism. That flight to Wuhan was not smooth; indeed, it was much delayed. Delhi had announced it a week earlier. It was a way to help China, demonstrate India’s capacity, and assist India’s neighbors by evacuating their citizens. But then Indian officials publicly, albeit anonymously, revealed that Beijing was not clearing the flight. The reason was unclear—China, after all, had been requesting international support. There also did not seem to be a bureaucratic snafu. So, was it the visual of Beijing accepting support from India, which Chinese officials and analysts sometimes dismiss as a less capable, even chaotic, neighbor? Was it the desire not to give India a soft power win, including with its neighbors? Was it because the flight involved a military transport aircraft procured from the U.S.? Was it retaliation for the temporary Indian detention of a Chinese ship bound for Pakistan due to a tip-off of dual-use items on board? Or was the reason Chinese unhappiness about Indian travel restrictions to and from China, or Indian export limits on certain medical products? Whatever the reason, China eventually gave the flight clearance, but only a week later and after much Indian negotiation. It was an early sign that the public health arena would not be immune from the competitive atmosphere prevailing between the two countries, and in the region as a whole. Subsequent events only bore that out. There has been considerable discussion about how countries’ perceptions of China would change due to the pandemic—at the beginning because of its mishandling, and then because of its recovery. This chapter argues that, rather than change perceptions, Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 increased the largely skeptical views of China that prevail in India, which had at least 29 million cases and over 385,000 deaths in India by mid-June 2021 (the 2nd and 3rd highest in the world respectively). This trend was further bolstered by the worst boundary crisis between the two countries since they fought a war in 1962. Together, the pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the India-China relationship have been front and center over the last year. They have reinforced and accelerated concerns in India about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain commitment to the rules-based order, as well as its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institutions. And they have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to cooperate and to stabilize their relationship over the last two decades, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spill over into conflict. This chapter examines the impact of first the pandemic and then the boundary crisis on perceptions of China among the Indian government, establishment, and public. It proceeds to outline the consequences of these perceptions on Indian domestic policy, its partnerships with like-minded major and middle powers, and its counter-COVID activism. Finally, it considers China’s response, particularly to Indian policy changes.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

481. Partnering for Africa’s digital future: Opportunities for the United States, South Korea, and India

Author:: Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Technological competition between the United States and China poses a special dilemma for African nations, whose prosperity depends on doing business with both Beijing and Washington. Although President Joe Biden is expected to assume a softer policy stance toward China—one couched in the language of human rights and liberal values, rather than power and strategic capabilities—competition will persist, driven by Beijing’s ambition to control the key technologies of the future. Rising US-China tensions may eventually force African nations to take sides. Speaking at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, then-US Defense Secretary Mark Esper warned allied nations that the use of Chinese company Huawei’s fifth-generation (5G) technology could compromise future intelligence cooperation with the United States. That’s a real problem for Africa because, together, Huawei and Chinese phone maker ZTE have built nearly 80 percent of Africa’s third-generation (3G) network infrastructure, while Huawei has built 70 percent of all fourth-generation (4G) networks and is competing to build all the future 5G networks in Africa. Chinese mobile-phone maker Transsion Holdings controls 64 percent of Africa’s feature phone market, and more than 40 percent of its smartphone market, and social media platforms such as TikTok and Vskit are fast becoming popular among Africa’s connected youth. For African leaders, disassociation from Beijing is becoming less and less feasible—or attractive. So too is closer alignment with the United States. Washington simply cannot match the large volumes of funding that Beijing extends to the continent. Recent conduct by leading US technology companies, including by Facebook and Google following the 2020 US presidential election, has additionally prompted a global pushback against US “big tech” that could make it harder for the US public and private sectors to compete and hold sway in African markets. Fortunately, there is a third way, both for African countries looking to avoid the crossfires of US-China competition, and for US policymakers seeking to bolster US competitiveness and influence in the region. The solution hinges on closer cooperation with emerging powers, notably South Korea and India, which have recently demonstrated their determination to better understand Africa’s challenges and prospects, and to figure out how their citizens could collaborate with African businesses and governments. For example, in his 2018 address to Uganda’s parliament, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined “ten guiding principles for India-Africa engagement” that center on cooperation in digitalization, clean-energy technologies, and cybersecurity—a marked detour from the policies that have historically shaped India-Africa ties. South Korea-Africa relations under President Moon Jae-In have also entered a new phase, with an emphasis on commercial linkages and people-to-people collaboration. Both South Korea and India are rapidly expanding their technological capabilities, and their foreign policies also align well with US interests in the region, and vis-à-vis China. For Washington, cooperation with these emerging powers could keep the door open to US influence in Africa, and could help ensure that Beijing’s strategic foothold in the continent does not deepen. For African countries, such partnerships could help bypass the “either-or-ism” implicit in US-China competition, while encouraging greater diversity and agency in their foreign affairs. There is real opportunity for African states to realize the potential that such alliances could create, and to become significant multilateral actors, able to leverage their distinct assets and pursue their own interests. This report explores how.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Business, Space, and Innovation
Political Geography:: India, Korea, and Africa

482. De-Risking the India Relationship: An Action Agenda for the United States

Author:: Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In the wake of a sharp deterioration in U.S.–China and India–China relations, there is an increasing emphasis in U.S. relations with India on military-to-military ties and bloc formation over other forms of relationship-building. Washington is steadily militarizing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” a four-member security group that is intended to counter Beijing, of which New Delhi is a member. This, combined with India’s stalled economy and the outlook for longer-term post-pandemic weakness, is accentuating a risk-prone asymmetry in U.S.–India relations. There also remain key divergences in the specifics of U.S. and Indian interests, even on the question of countering China. Over-militarized U.S.–India relations could help push Asia closer to a paradigm of military blocs, frontline states, and zero-sum games, while also planting seeds for a nationalist backlash against the United States in South Asia as a whole. The United States should therefore reorient its vital partnership with India according to these four recommendations: Limit the relationship’s increasing militarization and instead emphasize nontraditional areas of security cooperation such as climate change and peacekeeping, which lend themselves to inclusion rather than exclusion. The Quad should be returned to its original political-normative focus; Create conditions favorable to India’s comprehensive development, particularly in the energy, environmental, and supply-chain spaces, as a lower-risk path toward catalyzing a multipolar Asia; Drop demands on India to scale back ties with U.S. adversaries such as Russia and Iran; Resist the temptation to use India as a force-multiplier to pressure smaller South Asian states as to their global alignments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: United States and India

483. Japan’s Role in India’s Infrastructure Journey: ODA, Technology, and Partnership for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

Author:: Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: Asia’s current security map finds itself being reimaged in the midst of the evolving regional re-alignments in a post-Covid-19 pandemic scenario that has caused unprecedented damage to humanity. The idea of ‘Asia-Pacific’ that seemed apt as a regional framework at least till the late 20th century now encompasses a far broader scope geographically. The regional order matrix has been instrumental in paving the way for the “Indo-Pacific” region at large. As a region including maritime Asia at its core, the IndoPacific finds itself coupled with geographical boundaries that extend from the eastern coast of Africa, through the Indian Ocean, to the Western Pacific. Asia’s tectonic shifts in power politics shall continue to challenge future stability in the region with festering territorial and maritime disputes, worsening resource competition, fast-rising military expenditures, and polarizing waves of domestic nationalism only make more germane efforts towards arriving upon a common understanding and approach for an Indo-Pacific definition of Asia
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Partnerships, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:: Japan, India, and Asia

484. Japan, Hikari Kikan, and Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army: The Defining, Yet Unfinished 1940s Connect

Author:: Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: India gained freedom from the British rule following a long, protracted independence struggle, which had many phases, and defining moments. A significant one amongst them was the role of the Indian National Army (INA) under Subhash Chandra Bose with crucial assistance and aid from Imperial Japan. Bose’s view of India’s struggle for independence differed radically from Mahatma Gandhi’s. For him, the war presented a golden opportunity to reach out to the adversaries of Britain, namely Germany and Japan, and seek their assistance to free India from under the oppressive British rule. Gandhi opposed this realist mode of thought and as a consequence Bose found himself marginalized within the Congress. Subhash Chandra Bose, popularly known as Netaji (Respected Leader) among Indians the world over, became the undisputed leader of this militant wing of India’s nationalist movement, over the disagreement of using force against the British Empire with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Notably, despite the opposition of Gandhi, Bose was elected President of the Indian National Congress in 1938, and once again in 1939.
Topic:: History, World War II, Army, and Independence
Political Geography:: Japan, India, and Asia

485. The Crisis after the Crisis: How Ladakh will Shape India’s Competition with China

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: The still-unresolved Ladakh crisis has created a new strategic reality for India, marked by renewed political hostility with China, and an increased militarisation of the Line of Actual Control. This new strategic reality imposes unequal costs on India and China. India is likely to defer much-needed military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean — which would impair its ability to compete strategically with China. In contrast, China incurred only marginal material costs; it was probably more concerned with the prospect of continued deterioration in its relationship with India. Even that cost was more threatened rather than realised, and largely reduced when the disengagement plan was agreed.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Strategic Competition, Militarization, and Disengagement
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

486. Catalyzing India’s Climate Ambition

Author:: Patrick Suckling
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China’s recent commitment to reach carbon neutrality before 2060 means that for the first time ever, India is on track to become the world’s largest emitter. At a time that demands urgent action if we are to stay within the goals of the Paris Agreement, this brings into contrast India’s traditionally bifurcated approach that it has used to guard against taking greater action in light of the responsibility of the developed world to lead the way. Nevertheless, in recent decades, a political appetite for climate action has been growing in India, including reinforcing its global leadership credentials at the behest of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Climate-related disasters have also driven public support for more constructive engagement by Delhi. However, this appetite does not yet match growing international expectations for Indian action, as momentum for global climate action and ambition accelerates rapidly around the world in the lead-up to the COP26 Climate Conference in Glasgow in November 2021. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden and recent commitments to net-zero by other Asian economies such as Japan and Korea underscore the weight of growing expectations on India. A sophisticated and holistic strategy to catalyze climate ambition from India is needed if the world is to succeed and help the country navigate a new low-carbon development model. India’s recent establishment of an Apex Committee on the Implementation of the Paris Agreement and its commitment to produce a long-term strategy to reduce emissions provide two particular openings for this even if signals elsewhere are mooted, including the impact of India’s economic response to COVID-19. And at a geopolitical level, India’s relations with China can help reinforce the need for action, and so too can India’s shifting relations with the G77 group of developing nations. This strategy must involve a mix of both greater political and policy engagement and deeper technical and financial support to help accelerate action — including through helping unlock greater private finance domestically. The recently announced U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership is an excellent first step in this regard. This Asia Society Policy Institute issue paper, Catalyzing India's Climate Ambition, authored by Senior Fellow and former Australian High Commissioner to India and Ambassador for the Environment Patrick Suckling, sets out how the wider international community should sensitively, constructively, and intelligently now work with India to catalyze greater climate ambition in the lead-up to COP26 and beyond.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, and India

487. Nature and Nurture: How the Biden Administration Can Advance Ties With India

Author:: Anubhav Gupta
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The state of the U.S.-India relationship is strong, but two critical developments in 2020 have created a new inflection point for the relationship. Growing apprehension in both New Delhi and Washington about Chinese aggression has created the strategic convergence long sought by a U.S. defense establishment eager to enlist India to balance China. On the other hand, devastated by the Covid-19 global pandemic, the United States and India face challenging economic recoveries amid growing protectionist sentiments at home that could diminish the relationship’s promise. Having won the U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden has an opportunity to consolidate and accelerate the relationship by creating a substantive and broad partnership with India, which can undergird U.S. policy in Asia and support U.S. global interests for decades to come. this paper provides a blueprint for how the Biden administration can actualize what previous presidents have deemed a “natural partnership.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, COVID-19, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, India, and United States of America

488. Mitigating the risk of a China–India conflict

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: More than a year has passed since Chinese troops began to occupy previously Indian-controlled territory on their disputed border in Ladakh. The crisis has cooled and settled into a stalemate. This report warns that it could escalate again, and flare into a conflict with region-wide implications. The report assesses the risk of conflict by analysing its likelihood and consequences. A possible war would be costly for both India and China. But a possible war could also risk stirring Indian distrust of its new partners, especially in the Quad – Australia, Japan, and the United States. The report outlines some conditions under which a war would disrupt or dampen those developing partnerships. The report concludes by offering a framework for policymakers to shape India’s expectations and the strategic environment before and during a possible war.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, India, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

489. Pragmatic Adaptation: American Surrender and Regional Acceptance After Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Ousted Afghan president Ashraf Ghani left Afghanistan on August 15th when the Taliban reached the outskirts of the capital Kabul. At the time, a source close to Taliban stressed that the two sides reached an agreement whereby Ghani should step down and hand over power to a transitional administration. While the United States and the European Union might well consider the use of sanctions as a weapon against the Taliban, if the movement does not live up to its commitment not to target US and European citizens leaving Afghanistan, it should be noted that most of Afghanistan’s neighbors expected the collapse of the Afghan government – although not this fast- and even began to open up to the Taliban. Irreversible US Withdrawal The United States defended its decision to pull out of Afghanistan rebuffing criticism both at home and abroad. It reiterated that kept forces in Afghanistan twice as long as the Soviets. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said remaining in Afghanistan is “simply not in the national interest.” He added that the US succeeded in the mission of reducing attacks on its soil and interests. The US withdrawal will leave wide repercussions both regionally and internationally.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Taliban, European Union, Refugees, Humanitarian Crisis, Adaptation, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, South Asia, Turkey, India, and United States of America

490. Reforming Patent Law: The Case of Covid‐19

Author:: Michele Boldrin and David Levine
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Ashort time ago the debate over the proposal to temporarily waive intellectual property rights on Covid‐19 vaccines was raging worldwide; and the suspension of those rights seemed imminent. Public attention reached its peak in May 2021 when the Biden administration endorsed the idea and committed itself to pursuing it under the World Trade Organization–World Intellectual Property Organization (WTO-WIPO) procedural rules for waiving intellectual property (IP) protection. By suspending IP rights, the administration sought to help low‐income countries to start producing vaccines more quickly, reducing the rising and dramatic worldwide vaccine inequality.
Topic:: Intellectual Property/Copyright, Inequality, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Patents
Political Geography:: Africa, India, and Latin America

491. Impact of Colonial Institutions on Economic Growth and Development in India: Evidence from Night Lights Data

Author:: Priyaranjan Jha and Karan Talathi
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Many cross‐country studies find that quality of historical institutions is a major cause of disparity in present‐day economic development as measured by income per capita. Due to the unavailability of data on a comprehensive measure of development such as per capita income, studies examining the role of historical institutions on development at the subnational levels use alternate proxies of economic well‐being in their analysis. We examine the long‐term effects of British colonial institutions on overall economic development within India using satellite night lights data.
Topic:: Development, Economic Growth, Colonialism, Economic Policy, and Institutions
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

492. Democratic Backsliding in India

Author:: Neelanjan Sircar
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Once considered the most populous democracy in the world, recent developments in India show that India is set on a path to losing its title. Analyses conducted by the Freedom House and the V-Dem Institute claiming that India’s democracy has lost its integrity is not a surprise to India-watchers observant of the recent trajectory of the Indian government. In this Issue Briefing, Neelanjan Sircar, Assistant Professor at Ashoka University, looks into the demotion of India’s status in various democratic indices. An investigation into Prime Minister Modi’s BJP government shows that the execution of anti-democratic laws and practices, prevalent throughout India’s history, has increased. The sedition law and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act have been used to stifle voices of opposition against the government. Additionally, not only has the mass media been increasingly biased towards the BHP, but the government has resorted to internet (and phone data) shutdowns and harassing key opposition leaders when it senses threat. Amid such troubling developments, the author calls upon the necessity for India to refrain from using legal machinery and harassing critics of the government. If such practices continue, prospects for the restoration of democracy in India will remain bleak.
Topic:: Democracy, Narendra Modi, Democratic Backsliding, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

493. Water and Federalism: Working with States for Water Security

Author:: Srinivas Chokkakula, Avani Kapur, and Arkaja Singh
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:: India’s poor water security indicators are partly a result of the poor translation of federal spirit in governing its water resources. The limited scholarship on the subject recognizes the vacuum in federal water governance and the weak articulation of Centre’s role to work with states in pursuing India’s long-term development and security goals. Besides, coherent federal responses are critical to address the new governance challenges and emerging risks such as those linked to climate change, floods, dam safety, etc. Yet the national discourse on water federalism is dominated by interstate river water disputes. The study breaks new grounds by going beyond the narrow frame to engage comprehensively with the idea of water federalism in India. It explores the range of policy, institutional, legal and financial instruments for improved water governance. Conceptualised as the Centre’s leverage, the study investigates into these instruments to explore opportunities for the Centre to work with states for improved outcomes. Using mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative approaches, the study looks at the transforming Indian federal state from two contrasting viewpoints: the shifting stakes of the Centre and states in water resources development; and the converging forces of development goals and security concerns. The analysis is supported by case studies of Maharashtra, Punjab and Karnataka states revealing the diverse territorial imaginations and priorities of water resources development and, their implications for national water security. It also examines the experiences of central schemes through intergovernmental fiscal transfers and federal water governance practices internationally to incentivize states’ progressive pathways in water resources management. Identifying federal consensus-building about the Centre’s role and autonomous institutional architecture for data as the two foundational pillars, the study makes concrete recommendations to improve federal governance for long-term development and water security.
Topic:: Security, Development, Water, and Federalism
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

494. Lessons from the Covid Care Centers in West Bengal

Author:: Jishnu Das, Patrick Agte, Abhijit Chowdhury, Parthasarathi Mukherjee, and Satyarup Siddhanta
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:: With the continuing emergence of Covid-19 variants, there is underlying concern in all countries, including India, that another surge will occur in the coming months. In case of a surge like that experienced with the Delta variant, a strategy that deserves further attention for the provision of care in rural areas is the use of off-hospital sites for patients who are not severely ill. We discuss one such effort from the state of West Bengal, the lessons from which may be relevant for the management of surge cases for generalized pandemic planning. In March 2021, India experienced a large surge in Covid cases and the spike in patients led to a shortage of hospital beds and oxygen cylinders around the country. Following a notification by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare that allowed organizations to set up care centers for the treatment of Covid-19 patients outside the hospital setting, the Liver Foundation and the Covid Care Network established eight Covid Care Centers in rural West Bengal. These centers were operational between May 2021 and September 2021, which coincided with the post-peak phase of the second Covid-19 wave in India. This report describes the project, summarizes the performance of the centers, and discusses the challenges faced during the project. We conclude that temporary facilities like the Covid Care Centers can be a viable option to provide urgent care during health emergencies.
Topic:: Health Care Policy, Crisis Management, Public Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

495. Strengthening India’s Ambient Air Quality Standard-Setting Process

Author:: Bhargav Krishna
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:: The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) provide the basis for assessing air quality nationally, determining pollution control priorities, and defining what we consider to be acceptable air quality to protect public health. They are framed and issued by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) under the Air Act (1981). In August 2021, the CPCB announced that a revision of the NAAQS would be undertaken over the next year under the leadership of faculty from IIT Kanpur, with representatives from other institutions. The wide-ranging remit for this committee includes revisiting the existing standards for criteria pollutants, potentially expanding the base of pollutants being measured, determining the effects of air pollution on human health and vegetation, designing, and setting up of monitoring networks, and reviewing the air quality index. These revisions to the NAAQS will serve to define the discussion around air pollution for the next decade in India. Making the standards more ambitious will be based on our understanding of risk associated with exposure and how that has evolved over time. It will have implications for how that risk is communicated by the government to citizens through the Air Quality Index (AQI) and will provide a basis for regulating certain point sources. More ambitious standards can also provide a useful benchmark against which to measure the progress of our initiatives to improve air quality. Given the import of these standards as a means of protecting public health, engaging in risk communication, and tracking progress against our air quality goals, it is essential that the process followed by the NAAQS revision committee is clearly laid out and guided by a series of fundamental principles. These include ensuring their relevance by committing to predefined periodic reviews, basing policy decisions on a solid foundation of science by engaging a broad range of experts, centering health in air quality policy making, and building trust with civil society and other stakeholders. Reinforcing institutional processes are a long-term challenge, and we recognize that significantly altering the parameters of work of a committee whose work is already underway may not be possible. The principles and actions laid out in this framing note can form the basis for future work in this area by the CPCB. In our recommendations, we also outline several immediate actions that can be taken by the CPCB and the NAAQS committee as they proceed with the revision of the NAAQS.
Topic:: Regulation, Public Health, and Air Pollution
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

496. Airing Differences? Reading the Political Narrative on Air Quality Management in India

Author:: Santosh Harish, Mandakini Chandra, and Sahithi Uppalapati
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:: Air pollution exposure is a year-round, nation-wide public health crisis in India. This paper presents a careful reading of nearly eleven hours of discussions on air pollution that took place in the upper and lower Houses of Parliament in November 2019. The discussions provide unique insight into the emerging political narrative around air quality governance in India. The parliamentarians constructed an overly peak-oriented and Delhi-centric view of the problem. Contrary to the long-held scepticism of the environment ministry, parliamentarians across political parties cited global evidence on the adverse health impacts of air pollution exposure, especially on children. In addition, they drew on themes like intergenerational responsibility, equity, and Indian cultural heritage while signaling the need to act with urgency. As the discussions were dominated by crop residue burning, the Delhi government received significant criticism for blaming farmers, and parliamentarians across the board expressed solidarity with farmers as they proposed various alternative interventions to penalties. Legislators highlighted a variety of institutional, legal, and financial opportunities to strengthen Indian air quality governance, but demonstrated relatively limited engagement with the nuances of sectoral mitigation measures. Reflecting on an issue of growing political salience in India, this paper also offers insight into significant developments and gaps in the political discourse on air pollution in the two years since these discussions, and into the present day.
Topic:: Governance, Crisis Management, Public Health, and Air Pollution
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

497. South Asia Security and Kartar Pur Border: A Path to Peace OR?

Author:: Nabeila Akbar and Arshad Syed Karim
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: South Asia has been a unique geographical region where all member states share commonality of interests in history, politics, economics and socio-cultural aspects due to close geographical proximity. Because of this uniqueness, South Asia is considered a single geographical unit where security issue has a cross border dimension. For Sikh community, Pakistan has opened the Kartar Pur border between India and Pakistan. It is a step forward to bring peace across the region. Though it has also raised many questions on the security of South Asia; would tension between Pakistan and India be diluted or escalated? Would it trigger peace or security threat across the region? What would be behavior of India and Sikh community in the new scenario? How a sovereign state can establish relations with a community group (religious community) of neighboring sovereign state by passing later? How it would affect the pattern of state relations at regional level as well as at international level? The research paper is mainly based on an attempt to answer these queries. The descriptive and analytical method is used along with the primary sources in the form of indepth interviews and focus group activities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, and India

498. India Turns an Electoral Autocracy

Author:: Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Naheed S. Goraya
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This article is a critical appraisal to the findings of Sweden based Institute V-Dem1 , the Democracy Report 2021 ―Autocratization Turns Viral‖. This report elucidates that India is no more among the list of democratic countries, terming India as an ―Electoral Autocracy‖. This statistically quantified analysis puts a big question mark on the face of Indian democracy where human rights are no more respected. The Indian democratic backsliding has largely occurred due to Modi‘s promotion of Hindu-nationalist agenda that has hollowed Indian democracy leading country to a polarized and intolerant society. Personality cults have historically been the hallmarks of totalitarian regimes. The cult of Modi has been complemented by a deepening majoritarianism, as the ruling party assaults and threatens religious minorities in its effort to build a theocratic Hindu state. Empirically the study focuses on critical analysis of this report while discussing Hindutva Ideology and Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The present research tries to answer the question how current situation of democratic backsliding will impact Indian politics. The paper will argue the impact it has vis-a-viz regional and global peace.
Topic:: Elections, Autocracy, Democratic Backsliding, and Hindutva
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

499. Labour Reforms in the Indian State of Rajasthan: a boon or a bane?

Author:: Sourabh Paul and Diti Goswami
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Sustainable Employment, Azim Premji University
Abstract:: The authors examine the impact of labour law deregulations in the Indian state of Rajasthan on plant employment and performance. In 2014, after a long time, Rajasthan was the first Indian state that introduced labour reforms in the Industrial Disputes Act (1947), the Factories Act (1948), the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act (1970), and the Apprentices Act (1961). Exploiting this unique quasi-natural experiment, the authors apply a difference-in-difference framework using the Annual Survey of Industries longitudinal data of India’s manufacturing establishments. Their results show that reforms had an unintended consequence of the decline in labour use. Also, worryingly, the flexibility resulted in a disproportionate decline in the directly employed worker. Evidence suggests that the reforms positively impact the value-added and productivity of the establishments. The strength of these effects varies depending on the underlying industry and reform structure. These findings prove robust to a set of specifications.
Topic:: Economics, Labor Issues, Reform, Employment, and Regulation
Political Geography:: India

500. Can a Machine Learn Democracy?

Author:: Rajendran Narayanan, Sakina Dhorajiwala, and Chakradhar Buddha
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Sustainable Employment, Azim Premji University
Abstract:: The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) provides up to 100 days of work in a year for every rural household at a minimum wage. The Act has several landmark worker-centric provisions. For the implementation of MGNREGA, for the first time in the country, a transaction-based Management Information System (MIS) has been made available in the public domain; a feather in the cap of transparency. However, there are several critical questions to be examined in this regard. Our main focus in this article is to explore the tensions between technocracy and democratic values/participation in the context of MGNREGA and its associated MIS. We use our action research on information-based interventions in several states to examine whether the MGNREGA MIS incorporates democratic values, whether it has been inclusive or if it has widened the existing inequities. We use specific examples to illustrate how such an information system has been used to subvert the legal rights of workers. We underscore that technological interventions, with a compassionate human-centred design are potentially powerful tools for transparency, accountability, and grievance redressal. However, technology alone can neither enhance participatory democracy nor reduce socio-economic inequalities.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Democracy, Employment, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: India

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS