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1. New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

Author:
Patrick Heller, Perrine Toledano, David Mihalyi, and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate crisis and the global energy transition. This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries. The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic contributor over the long term. This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the uncertainty associated with the energy transition. Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed.
Topic:
Gas, Transparency, Contracts, Monitoring, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Picture This: Social Distance and the Mistreatment of Migrant Workers

Author:
Toman Barsbai, Vojtech Bartos, Victoria Licuanan, Andreas Steinmayr, Erwin Tiongson, and Dean Yang
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We experimentally study an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino over?seas domestic workers (DWs) by their employers. Encouraging DWs to show their employers a family photo while providing a small gift when starting employment reduced DW mistreatment, increased their job satisfaction, and increased the likeli?hood of contract extension. While generally unaware of the intervention, DWs’ fam?ilies staying behind become more positive about international labor migration. An online experiment with potential employers suggests that the effect operates through a reduction in employers’ perceived social distance from their employees.
Topic:
Migration, Labor Issues, Labor Market, Migrant Workers, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Philippines and Global Focus

3. Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century

Author:
Marc Flandreau, Stefano Pietrosanti, and Carlotta E. Schuster
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper explores the reasons why sovereign borrowers post collateral. Such behavior is paradoxical because conventional interpretations of collateral stress repossession of the assets pledged as the key to securing lenders against information asymmetries and moral hazard. However, repossession is generally difficult in the case of sovereign debt and in some cases impossible. Nevertheless, such sovereign “hypothecations” have a long history and are again becoming very popular today in developing countries. To explain sovereign collateralization, we emphasize an informational channel. Posting collateral produces information on opaque borrowers by displaying borrowers’ behavior and resources. We support this interpretation by examining the hypothecation “mania” of 1849-1875, when sovereigns borrowing in the London Stock Exchange pledged all kinds of intangible revenues. Yet, at that time, sovereign immunity fully protected both sovereigns and their assets and possessions. Still, we show that hypothecations significantly decreased the cost of sovereign debt. To explain how, we stress the pledges’ role in documenting sovereigns’ wealth and the management of revenue streams. Based on an exhaustive library of bond prospectuses collected from primary sources, matched with a panel of sovereign bond yields and an innovative measure of sovereign fiscal transparency, we show that collateral minutely described in debt covenants served to document and monitor sovereign resources and development prospects. Encasing this information in contracts written by lawyers served to certify the quality of the resulting data disclosure process, explaining investors’ readiness to pay a premium.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, History, Innovation, Contracts, Sovereign Debt, and Collateral
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? Contract, Status, and the Question of Consent

Author:
Ruth Dukes and Wolfgang Streeck
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper revisits the notions of contract and status found in classical sociology, legal theory, and labour law. Adopting an historical perspective, it explores the fragmentation of the status of industrial citizenship during the neoliberal period and discusses the enduring usefulness of the status/contract distinction in analyzing current trends in the regulation of working relations, including the spread of “gig” or platform-mediated work. Elements of status, it is argued, must always be present if work is to be performed and paid for as the parties require it. Claims to the contrary – for example, that the gig economy creates a labour market without search frictions and only minimal transaction costs: contracts without status – assume an undersocialized model of (monadic) social action that has no basis in the reality of social life (Durkheim, Weber). Still, status may come in a variety of forms that are more or less desirable from the perspective of workers, businesses, and society at large. The paper traces what it conceives as the privatization of status via contracts between employers and workers under the pressure of marketization and dominated by corporate hierarchies. Towards the end of the twentieth century, sociologists observed the division of workers into two groups or classes – core (with relatively well-paid and secure employment) and peripheral (low-paid and insecure). Thirty years later, gross inequalities of wealth and conceptions of the neoliberal self as ever-improving, everperfectible, are combining to create novel forms of status not fully anticipated by the literature.
Topic:
Democracy, Entrepreneurship, Citizenship, Economy, Industry, Contracts, Precarity, and Corporatism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. The Principles on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts

Author:
The Working Group on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Transparency by design: Transparency should be the norm for all government contracts, particularly regarding information on what is being exchanged and for what price. Contracting systems should be designed to support proactive publication of contracts as open data. Public contracting should be designed for transparency and efficiency. Full contract publication should be the norm. Information needed to judge value for money should be disclosed. Exceptions in the public interest: Redactions on the basis of commercial sensitivity should only be justified where the public interest in withholding information is greater than the public interest in having that information published. The assessment should take into account both any commercial harm to the contractor and the broader benefits of transparency to markets and public trust. Where exceptions to publication are considered: Information should only be redacted for reasons of commercial sensitivity when the public interest in withholding information is greater than the public interest in disclosure. The public interest test should take into account the wider economic benefits of the sharing of commercial information, as well as the case for accountability and the public’s right to know. All redactions should be clearly marked with the reason for redaction. A clear and robust process: Governments should issue detailed guidance on commercial sensitivity principles and exemptions, put in place systems to support publication, ensure that redaction is time-limited, and use other oversight mechanisms to compensate for information withheld from publication. Governments should issue clear guidance to public entities, agencies, and firms on contract publication and when information may be exempted from publication for commercial sensitivity reasons. Where redaction is potentially allowed, there should be a clear process for determining what is redacted, why, for how long, and with what appeals process. There should be a system for ensuring that contracts and contract information are in fact disclosed in practice. Where exemption to disclosure of information is granted for commercial sensitivity reasons, this should be grounds for increased scrutiny through other oversight mechanisms.
Topic:
Government, Transparency, Public Service, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Global Focus