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31. Book Talk. "Orbánland" by Lasse Skytt

Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
From Europe to America, political landscapes have shifted in recent years in a way summed up in microcosm no better than by the trajectory of one small country, Hungary—whose leader, Viktor Orbán, has gained outsized international notoriety as the bad boy of the European Union for his steadfast alternative to the liberal democracy that has dominated the Western world since 1989. Orbánland is the fascinating story of a Danish journalist who moves to Hungary to gain an insight into the political complexities of this divisive European country. Along the way, he encounters people from all walks of life, and he learns as much about the Hungarians as about himself. In a narrative as absorbing and as it is vital for the lessons it carries as America prepares for its 2020 presidential elections, he asks: Can we get along with those on the other side of the fence? Is it worth even trying? His answers are surprising. By guiding us through a polarized landscape of differing opinions, Lasse Skytt delivers a broader perspective on Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, one that suggests possibilities for the future of Europe and America. His journey will leave us questioning our own truths, and, ultimately, which side we are on.
Topic:
Politics, Authoritarianism, Liberal Order, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary

32. Early warning: How Iraq can adapt to climate change

Author:
Nussaibah Younis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Iraq is at high risk of suffering the worst effects of the climate crisis, including soaring temperatures and acute water scarcity. As land suitable for farming shrinks and rural jobs disappear, ordinary Iraqis are moving to cities in search of work. This increases pressure on services, pushes up food prices, and exacerbates social tensions, leading to protests and even violence. Iraq’s weak internal governance prevents it from improving water management, managing inter-provincial and inter-tribal conflict, and attracting investment and expertise to create new green-economy jobs and adapt to the changing climate. Public awareness of climate risks is growing, but too few political leaders prioritise the issue. Iraq has long struggled to reach agreement on water issues with upstream states Turkey and Iran, which are building dams that affect supply to Iraq; they also believe that Iraq manages water badly. Similar issues complicate relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan region. Iraqis and Europeans should work together to improve Iraq’s poor governance and consider measures such as establishing an ‘early warning’ system about potential conflict arising from climate effects.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

33. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

34. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

35. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

36. European politics in times of crisis: Developments in Germany, France and Italy, and consequences for the EU

Author:
Marco Siddi, Niklas Helwig, and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine and the long-term consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have put the spotlight on important political developments in the three largest EU members, Germany, France and Italy. In Germany, the new coalition government led by Olaf Scholz is trying to adapt the country’s foreign, energy and fiscal policies to the new international scenario, relinquishing some of its long-term tenets. France has just re-elected Emmanuel Macron as President, who is likely to advocate more flexibility in EU fiscal rules and strategic autonomy in foreign, defence and energy policy. Mario Draghi’s government has attempted to steer Italy out of the economic and health crisis and has sought closer cooperation with France. Italy will hold a general election by June 2023, with four parties vying for pre-eminence. In the wake of Brexit, Berlin, Paris and Rome have tried to revive the integration process. In the near future, it is expected that they will continue to drive EU politics, even if sometimes with different priorities, in close consultation with European partners.
Topic:
Politics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Leadership, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, and Italy

37. Inclusion and Exclusion in International Ordering: An Interview with Glenda Sluga

Author:
Glenda Sluga and Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
The image of two men, sitting awkwardly across each other in a solemn conference table, suddenly sprouted everywhere in my Twitter feed last winter. As a terrifying war erupted over competing visions of eastern Europe’s place in the international order, this somewhat surreal picture of the rulers of France and Russia conferencing offered little respite. It was precisely at this time that I had the pleasure to converse with the incoming Toynbee Prize Foundation President Glenda Sluga about her most recent monographThe Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon (Princeton University Press). As the so-called international order comes under increasing pressure in Ukraine and beyond, Sluga’s timely book invites us to engage with the “two centuries of multilateral principles, practices, and expectations” to understand the promises and limits of our contemporary arrangements (p. xi). It places the recent meeting between Macron and Putin in the context of the rise and consolidation of “a new professional, procedural, and bureaucratic approach to diplomacy, based on the sociability of men” (p. 6). After all, our modern notions of international “politics” or “society” were forged in the aftermath of a previous European-wide conflagration that had France and Russia at its helm: the Napoleonic wars. Sluga’s account does not aim to blindly celebrate nor to categorically condemn this modern political imaginary of international ordering. Others have dismissed the post-Napoleonic diplomatic constellation as reactionary or have lauded it as protoliberal. Sluga, above all, is interested in questioning it. She invites us to: reflect on for whom this order has been built; push against the ways it narrows our perspective; and grapple with its inner tensions and contradictions (p. 282). At the heart of the book, I would suggest, lies a concern about the paradoxical record of European modernity: a project that “has offered an expansive horizon of political expectations but delivered a voice only for some” (p. 7). By taking women, non-Europeans, and “non-state” actors seriously as political agents, she shows how bankers, Jews, or ambassadrices were ironically crucial in the making of a system that came to exclude them from the historical record. And, unsurprisingly, these exclusions lead to tensions that threaten to upend international order from within and without—from 1821, 1848, or 1853 to 2022. In our conversation, we attempt to make sense of these paradoxes, contradictions, and ambiguities of international ordering.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, History, Exclusion, International Order, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe

38. Who are the populists and how to respond to them: Evidence from mainstream European Parliament parties

Author:
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The main research questions of this paper are how mainstream European Parliament parties conceptualize populism, and how they respond to the rise of populism. The paper, which has come out of the Horizon 2020 project “Demos”, is based on semi-structured interviews with top officials of non-populist parties in the European Parliament (“Europarties”), such as the ALDE, EPP, the Party of European Socialists and the European Greens. The research technique of the paper is thematic analysis, performed on the responses obtained from the aforementioned interviews. Europarty officials identified populist parties by associating them with core themes such as anti-migration, Euroscepticism, and the tendency to make undeliverable policy promises. As for the effectiveness of anti-populist strategies, the interviewees converged on the idea that the problems posed by populists cannot be ignored and that clear and concrete policy solutions are what mainstream parties need, if they are to defend themselves against the evasive political discourse of populist parties. Non-populist parties in the European Parliament may use three strategies to prevent the rise of populists, namely clashing with, marginalizing, or co-opting the populists. Non-populist parties may prefer to incorporate selected questions raised by the populists into their political agendas, and provide non-populist replies to them. Mainstream parties seem aware that while populists may not win arguments over concrete policy measures, they might win voters’ hearts.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Populism, Domestic Politics, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe

39. The beginning of the European Political Community

Author:
Corina Stratulat
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The European Political Community (EPoC) idea was floated by President Macron back in May to encourage dialogue and cooperation among like-minded EU and non-EU countries on matters of common interest. It will be formally launched in the margins of the upcoming informal European Council summit in Prague, organised by the Czech EU Presidency. With the meeting just days away, the EU is under growing pressure to give some substance to Macron’s bold initiative. For the EPoC to set in motion a positive dynamic for the Union in the unfolding Zeitenwende, participating governments and leaders must take their preparations for the summit seriously. This Discussion Paper lays out short, but concrete checklists for all the essential players: Prague should organise bilateral consultations with the different invitees and collect ideas ahead of the summit. The agenda of this initial EPoC meeting should only include a limited number of substantive issues that reflect common concerns in the new geopolitical context transformed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The organisers should also ensure that participants reserve time to discuss how the new format will run its affairs in the future. The details of the EPoC’s operational and governing structure will depend on the level of ambition that the initial participants will choose for the initiative. Establishing a community for dialogue and coordination among partners who might have diverging views and interests but also share security and economic concerns is in itself a valuable rationale for the initiative. And yet the EPoC should aspire to become more than ‘just’ a geopolitical forum for high-level dialogue. Current and potential new members in the future should aim to work in small or broad formations to align their positions in response to challenges that demand joint international action, like the energy crisis, the looming global recession and growing inequality, climate change, shifting demographics, and destabilising technological trends. EU leaders should be careful not to turn geography or democratic credentials into exclusion criteria for participants. A more legitimate and effective approach would be for the EU to rhetorically decouple its efforts to contain authoritarian Russia and rethink Europe’s role in the new global order from its desire to defend democracy and serve justice – or risk looking hypocritical in the process. Nor should EU leaders use the initiative as an excuse not to deal with internal EU reform or deliver on enlargement. Mustering the courage to embark on a European Convention that might lead to Treaty change would not only help the cause of EU hopefuls – especially if it deals with the Union’s absorption capacity, unanimity principle and lack of democratic acquis – it would also strengthen the credibility of the EU’s efforts to encourage political coordination beyond its borders. That being said, nothing stops the Balkan countries, together with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, from using their leverage in the EPoC format to negotiate in the margins of this and future EPoC meetings their progress in the accession process.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Politics, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Europe

40. Understanding the Red Wall: Politics and identity in the new electoral battlegrounds

Author:
Paula Surridge and Alan Wager
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The 2019 general election gave birth to a new term for understanding electoral geography, the Red Wall. This report, ‘Understanding the Red Wall: Politics and identity in the new electoral battlegrounds’, focusses on a series of focus groups conducted by Ipsos on behalf of UK in a Changing Europe with voters in seats across Yorkshire and Humberside, that had either been won by the Conservatives in 2019 or held by Labour with a significantly reduced majority.
Topic:
Politics, Public Opinion, Brexit, and Society
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe