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1. Diplomacy and the War against Ukraine

Author:
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Normally, diplomacy is meant as the set of rules and processes that preside over international relations to prevent or resolve disputes and conflicts, or even as a special skill in dealing with complex issues and finding compromises. If this is the case, one may be tempted to conclude that diplomacy has so far failed with respect to the year-long conflict in Ukraine. But perhaps it is worth analysing the issue more closely.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

3. Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Neither NATO nor US policy caused the Ukraine war. The invasion was Moscow’s unforced choice. But that doesn’t settle the issue of provocation. Although neither provocation nor “facilitation” amount to “cause,” such dynamics might have played a role in moving us toward this war. And knowing what role US or NATO policy may have played in bringing the world to this juncture can help illuminate ways to end the conflict (short of prosecuting it to its bitter end – however long that might take and at whatever cost it might entail).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict

Author:
Steven J. Klein
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s decisive de­feat of Armenia in the Second Karabakh War is certainly cause for optimism that any remaining issues be­tween the two countries can be resolved through diplomacy rather than military might. After all, Azerbaijan managed to re­cover all the territories outside the Karabakh enclave captured and occupied by Armenia since the 1990s—as well as parts of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself—in addition to forcing Armenia to withdraw all its troops from sovereign Azerbaijani terri­tory. However, past indisput­able successes in other conflicts indicate that Azerbaijan must be careful not to overestimate its capabilities to translate the recent military triumph into full resolution of the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. While it is tempting to declare the conflict over and to talk strictly of post‑conflict construction and development, a handful of coun­tries have painfully learned that such declarations can be prema­ture. For instance, in August 1982 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin predicted that the immi­nent defeat of the Palestine Liber­ation Organization (PLO) in Leb­anon portended 40 years of peace; and in May 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” after ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Both of these declarations came back to haunt the respective countries that had believed they had put behind them the conflict at issue. The crucial element that both of the aforementioned leaders had missed was that they did not control completely the fate of the conflict they chose to treat as being resolved. In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated to Tunis, from where it was able to rebuild its power base and receive support from the Soviet Union, while Hezbollah—which didn’t even exist at the time of the defeat of the PLO in 1982—arose with the sup­port of Iran to become a much more formidable and menacing force in southern Lebanon than the PLO had been. In the case of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re­sulting power vacuum allowed nu­merous external forces to enter the picture and disrupt the plans of the United States. Moreover, corruption and disorganization within the gov­ernments established with American help contributed to the deterioration of stability in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

5. Focussing European Cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa on Social Contracts

Author:
Mark Furness and Markus Loewe
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
2021 is proving to be a key year for cooperation between Europe and its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As the European Union (EU) launches its new multiannual budget, the COVID-19 pandemic has demanded a rethink of the political, economic and social priorities that the EU and its member states should pursue with MENA countries. Europe’s potential for positive influence on state–society relations in MENA countries has yet to be realised. The latest European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) South Communication, published in February 2021, promises a “new agenda” for cooperation with MENA countries. It does not, however, address conflicts between its own objectives, especially between liberal–democratic political and economic reforms, accountable government and respect for human rights on the one hand, and restrictive trade practices, migration management and security cooperation on the other. Furthermore, there is little bilateral policy coordination among EU member states. Focussing cooperation on social contracts would help overcome such conflicts, which are inherent in cooperation targeting short- to medium-term goals, such as migration management, resilience and private investment. In authoritarian contexts, these measures tend to strengthen the state at the expense of society, and thereby increase prospects for conflict, rather than the stability they promise. The social contract perspective is long-term. Social contracts rely on the state’s delivery of the “3 Ps”: protection (of citizens), provision (of economic and social services) and participation (in decision-making). The social contract provides an analytical tool and a set of organising principles for joint EU and member state priorities and activities. The social contract lens shows how the 3 Ps work together as a framework for social cohesion, peaceful relations and political stability. In practical terms, its use would help improve the effectiveness, coherence and coordination of EU and member state cooperation with MENA countries. Some EU member states prefer to focus on trade and economic cooperation, some on political reform and human rights, and others on migration management. If all take a more long-term perspective, they will realise that sustainable social contracts in MENA countries are good for all of their aims. All European actions should support reforms in MENA countries that aim to make social contracts more acceptable to the contracting parties – governments and social groups. Ideally, such reforms result from negotiations of social contracts between parties on equal terms. In practice, how¬ever, the negotiation power of social groups is often limited – one reason why Europe should ensure that its programmes strengthen societies at least as much as governments. This paper discusses four key cooperation areas which are potential drivers of change for social contracts: • Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction; • Post-COVID-19 recovery: health and social protection; • Participation at local, regional and national levels; and • Mutually beneficial migration and mobility. The EU and its member states, by working together on the 3 Ps in these four areas, can influence positive change in the MENA region.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, COVID-19, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

6. TIME TO STEP UP EU MEDIATION?

Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
The need and scope for conflict resolution and mediation is going up. The numbers of people affected by violence and conflict is increasing. The world is disfigured by prolonged, internationalised civil wars and growing civil unrest. Great power politics are resurgent, the conventions regulating states’ behaviour are fraying, and international law and human rights are being eroded. Profound demographic and climatic changes, the emergence of new technologies and of threats are changing the global landscape in ways that should bring humanity together but too often are exploited for commercial and political gain, driving insecurity and a sense of injustice. The EU has an enormous role to play in this context. It is a powerful global actor pursuing multiple objectives on the world stage. It is committed to human rights, gender equity, sustainable development and a rules based global order, and to supporting others that are taking action, whether inter- governmental and regional bodies such as the UN and AU, or civil society including at the very local level. But the EU also recognises, as the High Representative has put it, the need to learn “to use the language of power”, to deploy its capabilities, whether political, security, economic or regulatory, more strategically to shape reality, address the agents and drivers of violence, and secure peace. So what should the EU’s role in mediation be in this context? The review of the EU’s concept on mediation provides an excellent opportunity to generate debate and to define the parameters of the future of EU mediation frameworks. This study provides a snapshot of the views within the Brussels diplomatic and policy community. Even within this relatively confined universe, there is a very broad diversity of opinions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Human Rights, Peacekeeping, European Union, Sustainability, Mediation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Europe

7. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America

8. Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: The EU in Palestine

Author:
Dimitris Bouris
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The existing literature on state-building has focused mainly on post-conflict cases and ‘conventional’ examples of statehood, without taking into consideration the particularities of states that remain internally and/or externally contested. The EU’s engagement in Palestinian state-building through the deployment of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah has generated various types of unintended consequences: anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative, desirable and undesirable, some of which fulfill and some of which frustrate the initial intention. These have important reverberations for the EU’s conflict resolution strategies in Israel and Palestine, the most important being the strengthening of power imbalances and the enforcement of the status quo.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, State, State Building, and Police
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Palestine, and European Union

9. Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking

Author:
Muriel Asseburg, Nimrod Goren, Nicolai von Ondarza, Eyal Ronen, and Muriel Asseburg
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Over the last 40 years, since the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty (that alluded to but did not solve the Palestinian question) and the European Community’s 1980 Venice Declaration, Europe has been seeking ways to help advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The task was not an easy one, mostly due to United States of America (US) dominance of peace negotiations and negative Israeli attitudes towards Europe as a mediator. Thus, while Europeans were key in shaping international language on the conflict, they have remained in the back seat when it comes to shaping dynamics on the ground. Since the collapse in 2014 of the John Kerry initiative to advance the peace process, the task has become even more difficult for the Europeans. Realities on the ground, such as a right-wing government in Israel lacking interest in advancing a peace process, expanded settlement construction, as well as the internal Palestinian split and governance deficiencies in the Palestinian Authority, make the two-state solution ever more difficult to achieve. In addition, Israel’s leadership has worked to weaken and divide the EU in order to limit its role on the issue. In this endeavor, it has profited from different interests and priorities among EU Member States as reflected in discussions and decision-making processes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These trends have increasingly intensified in recent years, and it is the goal of this publication to analyze them, assess their impact on European capacities and policies, and devise recommendations to tackle and perhaps even reverse them. The publication includes three analytical chapters focusing on internal European dynamics, on Israel’s foreign policy towards the EU, and on EU policy-making regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict/peace process.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

10. European Parliament President, Antonio Tajani

Author:
Antonio Tajani
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Columbia University World Leaders Forum
Abstract:
This World Leaders Forum program features an address by European Parliament President Antonio Tajani, titled "United States and Europe Must Stand Together to Better Defend our Shared Values", followed by a question and answer session with the audience.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Migration, European Union, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
New York, Europe, United States of America, and European Union