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202. Decisive but Forgotten: Germany’s Missing Technological Zeitenwende
- Author:
- Tim Rühlig and Bjorn Fägersten
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The digital technology transformation is a largely overlooked dimension of Zeitenwende. However, preserving national security, safeguarding core values enshrined in technology, ensuring access to critical technologies, and maintaining competitiveness need to be a policy priorities for Germany and Europe. All of these are integral elements of autonomy and sovereignty in a world increasingly characterized by great power rivalry. The looming policy decisions, however, will have divergent outcomes depending on the prevailing political paradigms.
- Topic:
- National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
203. Conditionality in Migration Cooperation: Five Ideas for Future Use Beyond Carrots, Sticks, and Delusions
- Author:
- Victoria Rietig and Marie Walter-Franke
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Effective migration partnerships with third countries are a declared goal of the European Union. But views diverge on what good migration cooperation looks like. Using carrots and sticks, also known as conditionality, is a controversial strategy to reach the EU’s migration goals. Politicians and experts either frame it as necessary and legitimate, or as post-colonial and counterproductive. Whether one supports conditionality or not, positive and negative incentives have shaped the different types of migration agreements the EU and its Member States have struck in the last decade. Some are formal agreements binding under international law, but most are soft law or handshake deals. They may cover just one specific issue within migration policy, or tie migration to other policy areas. Some are public, others confidential. All these agreements reflect the interests and the leverage which the EU, Member States, and partner countries bring to the table. The three most discussed levers the EU uses to nudge partner countries toward joint migration management are visas, development aid, and trade – the holy trinity of migration conditionality. But the exclusive focus on these three levers is artificial. Europe also uses other levers, such as police or military cooperation and training, diplomatic attention and high level visits, legal migration opportunities, and others. When these levers are used, they generate three kinds of effects: the conclusion of an agreement, common document, or statement (paper), procedural or technical changes (process), and migratory movements (people). But they also bring unintended side effects, such as backlash from the citizens of third countries, or the phenomenon of reverse conditionality, when a third country reacts to threats by reducing border patrols or by supporting irregular onward migration. Lever use of one EU country can also worsen the migration relationship of its EU neighbors with that third country. Despite these high stakes, Europe uses conditionality remarkably inconsistently. Its strategy to create coordination mechanisms to make Member States’ approaches more coherent is hobbled by entrenched realities: The cost of coordination is often disproportionate to its benefits, and turf demarcation hinders cooperation. Thus, the chase for coherent conditionality usage in the EU is at best an uphill battle and at worst a delusion. This report puts forward five recommendations to improve Europe’s migration conditionality use and debate in the future. It draws on case studies that trace the EU’s use of incentives and threats toward Bangladesh, The Gambia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria, and distills lessons from them.
- Topic:
- Migration, European Union, Cooperation, and Conditionality
- Political Geography:
- Europe
204. Protecting the EU’s Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Germany’s Opportunity to Transform Vulnerability into Mutual Resilience
- Author:
- Jannik Hartmann
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Submarine cables handle over 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic, making them essential for everything from finance to foreign affairs. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and increased Russian naval activity brought greater awareness of how European – and German – interconnectedness also brings vulnerability. The urgency of tackling this threat offers Germany an opportunity to take a structural and joined-up approach that shows it can act as a “team power.”
- Topic:
- Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
205. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure
- Author:
- Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia
206. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy
- Author:
- Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
207. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, and Americas
208. The Disruption of Arctic Exceptionalism: Managing Environmental Change in Light of Russian Aggression
- Author:
- Kai Kornhuber, Kira Vinke, Evan T. Bloom, Loyle Campbell, Volker Rachold, Sara Olsvig, and Dana Schirwon
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The Arctic is directly affected by the interaction of two ongoing global crises: climate change and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. With its temperatures rising four times faster than the global average, the Arctic is facing dramatic environmental consequences. Meanwhile, retreating sea ice has led to increased economic interest in the Arctic and its growing geopolitical importance. Thus, understanding and managing the global and local implications of environmental change in this region requires urgent scientific and diplomatic collaboration.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Arctic, and Americas
209. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, and Americas
210. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations
- Author:
- Anthony V. Rinna
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea
211. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea
- Author:
- Alastair Morgan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea
212. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang
- Author:
- Armin Schäfer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany
213. From Coy to Cold Shoulder - The European Union and North Korea
- Author:
- Glyn Ford
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- The European Union (EU)—then 15 member states prior to its 2004 enlargement to 25—formally established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in 2001 after a high-level visit to Pyongyang by Göran Persson, Swedish Prime Minister and then President in office of the European Council of Ministers. There, accompanied by EU security affairs chief Javier Solana and EU foreign affairs commissioner Chris Patten, he met with Kim Jong Il. Less than five years before, Commission officials were under orders not to even speak to officials from North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, at this meeting, the two parties agreed to establish both Political and Human Rights Dialogues; the latter modeled on the EU’s ongoing Human Rights Dialogue with Beijing. This move by the EU followed pressure from President Kim Dae-Jung in Seoul for allies to normalize relations as part of his ‘Sunshine’ policy. Some of the EU’s peripheral member states had long-standing relations with Pyongyang, in some cases dating back to before they had even joined the EU, with Finland, Sweden, and Denmark establishing relations in 1973, Austria in 1974, and Portugal in 1975. However, only Sweden had chosen to establish an Embassy, with the rest represented from Beijing. At the turn of the century, that pressure from Seoul resulted into most of the remaining dominoes falling in place. Italy and the UK jumped the gun in 2000, with Tony Blair and UK Foreign Minister Robin Cook agreeing to extend diplomatic recognition and establish an embassy en route to the Seoul Asia-Europe Summit.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Economics, Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, and North Korea
214. Structural Change, Income Distribution and Unemployment Related to COVID-19: An Agent-based Model
- Author:
- Branimir Jovanovic, Michael Landesmann, Oliver Reiter, and Torben Schütz
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- We study the distributional consequences of COVID-19 by using a stock-flow consistent agent-based model that captures some of the aspects of pandemic-related lockdowns. In particular, the model distinguishes between ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ industries, between jobs that can be done from home and jobs that must be carried out on site, and takes into account that firms need to hire a certain amount of overhead labour. Allowing for government-financed short-time working schemes and loan guarantees, we find that these policies significantly reduce the rise in firm liquidations and income inequality (the ‘Keynesian’ result). However, we also find that the absence of government policies leads to higher levels of productivity and GDP in the aftermath of the crisis, as it means that more of the less productive firms face liquidation during lockdowns (the ‘Schumpeterian’ result). The last finding must be taken with adequate caution as our model is designed to describe the short run, while statements about the long run would require the inclusion of additional features such as technological progress and the entry of new firms.
- Topic:
- Income Inequality, Macroeconomics, Unemployment, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Austria
215. Who Learns More from Afar? Spatial Empirical Evidence on Manufacturing and Services
- Author:
- Nina Vujanović
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- This paper investigates spatial dependence of FDI knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services using spatial panel techniques applied to the 2006-2014 Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus firm-level dataset for Croatia and Slovenia. The paper finds diverse results across the two sectors. The distance between regions does not hinder the absorption of foreign knowledge in manufacturing despite the strong market-stealing effects operating within regions as well as spatially. On the other hand, FDI knowledge spillovers decrease service productivity within regions, because of market-stealing effects operating strongly across a smaller geographical scale. However, its impact is lost as knowledge spillovers from more distant neighbours are accounted for, because the poaching of local labour is impeded by distance due to rising costs of labour mobility. The research indicates that for knowledge absorption, geographic distance plays differing roles in manufacturing and services, due to the different nature of the production process.
- Topic:
- Development, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Manufacturing, Econometrics, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Croatia, and Slovenia
216. Assessing Digital Leadership: Is the EU Losing out to the US?
- Author:
- Dario Guarascio and Roman Stöllinger
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- Since Leontief’s (1953) seminal work on the factor content of trade, the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin-model has been judged not only on the basis of formal tests of the theory but also tested against prior expectation. In this vein, this paper uses the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) approach to investigate whether supposed US leadership in the digital domain can be traced back to digital task endowments embodied in labour services. In a comparison between EU member states and the US, we find that the latter is more intensive in digital tasks than the EU and that this difference is explained by both an intensity-effect (US occupations being more digital-task intensive) and a structural component (relatively more digital-task intensive occupations). Viewed through the lens of the HOV theorem we find that the US is abundant in digital tasks relative to non-digital tasks, while the opposite is true for the EU. The standard tests for the predictive power of the HOV theorem are high and in line with the results for labour in previous literature.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Digitalization, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
217. Employment Effects of Offshoring, Technological Change and Migration in a Group of Western European Economies: Impact on Different Occupations
- Author:
- Michael Landesmann and Sandra Leitner
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- This paper estimates conditional demand models to examine the impact of offshoring, technological change, and migration on the labour demand of native workers differentiated by four different types of occupational groups: managers/professionals, clerical workers, craft (skilled) workers and manual workers. The analysis is conducted for an unbalanced panel of five economies Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, and Switzerland covering the period 2005-2018. Our results point to important and occupation-specific effects: offshoring seems to have beneficial employment effects for native craft workers in this set of economies, while negative effects for native manual workers across a wide set of industries (including manufacturing and services industries) and managers/professionals in manufacturing. Furthermore, there are important distinctions whether offshoring occurs in other advanced economies, in the EU13 or in developing countries. The analysis of the impact of technological change shows the strong positive impact which the additional IT equipment has on most occupational groups of native workers (with the exception of manual workers), while robotisation in manufacturing showed strongly negative impacts on the employment of all groups of workers and especially of craft workers. Increasing immigrant shares in the work forces showed strongly negative impacts on native workers – however, considering only the partial substitution effects and not including the potential for productivity and demand effects – and this is mostly accounted for by immigration from low- to medium-income source countries.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Migration, Labor Issues, Immigration, Foreign Direct Investment, Employment, Competition, Income Distribution, and Offshoring
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria
218. Functional Specialisation and Working Conditions in Europe
- Author:
- Sandra Leitner, Roman Stöllinger, and Zuzana Zavarská
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- Specialisation in value-chain functions is one of the new phenomena introduced by global value chains (GVCs). This report investigates the effects of functional specialisation on labour markets in fabrication and R&D activities as the two polar cases of value-chain functions, whereby the former is associated with factory economies, while the latter is characteristic of headquarter economies. More precisely, a metric similar to revealed comparative advantage is used to study the effect of relative functional specialisation on wages and non-wage working conditions. In line with the GVC literature emphasising power relations and organisational aspects of production networks, we are able to identify differentiated effects for functional specialisation patterns on wages in EU member states at the industry level across time. While relative functional specialisation in fabrication tends to hold back wages, functional specialisation in R&D has a positive effect on wage progression, controlling for labour productivity, GVC participation and numerous labour supply- and labour demand-side factors. The use of a constructed ‘sharp’ instrument allows giving these results a causal interpretation. Conversely, both functional specialisation measures are found to improve some non-wage working conditions, namely workers’ physical environment and their work intensity, which is evidence against a potential ‘race to the bottom’ effect of functional specialisation along GVCs. The effect is stronger for relative specialisation in fabrication than for relative specialisation in R&D.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Labor Issues, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Labor Market, Value Chains, and Wages
- Political Geography:
- Europe
219. Determinants of Functional Specialisation in EU Countries
- Author:
- Aleksandra Kordalska and Magdalena Olczyk
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- This paper aims to identify factors that determine functional specialisation (FS) in global value chains (GVCs) in European Union countries. We focus on fabrication and R&D as two opposite business functions in terms of their character and their potential of creating value-added. To make our results robust two different approaches to measuring functional specialisation are used – an FDI-based approach and a trade-based approach. To assemble a relative functional specialisation index, for each approach we use the same metric – a revealed comparative advantages index. Our results suggest a positive effect of wages on specialisation in an R&D function, and a negative impact on FS in fabrication. Increasing labour productivity boosts both specialisation in fabrication and in R&D. The results are robust to different model specifications and different time intervals. The instrumental variables method allows us to interpret the results as causal relationships. Additionally, human capital and labour skills foster FS in R&D (only in FDI data), and growing employment makes FS in fabrication increase. The growth of GDP per capita positively affects functional specialisation in R&D activities. Among GVC participation measures, we confirm the importance of increasing backward linkages to explain the boost in fabrication activities. Dividing a full sample into a group of EU15 countries and a group of Central Eastern European countries we observe that patterns for the EU15 are similar to those for the full sample, while for CEE countries wages are insignificant and labour productivity affects FS in fabrication only.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Economy, Value Chains, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
220. The Emissions Reduction Potential for Freight Transport on a High-speed Rail Line Along the ‘European Silk Road’
- Author:
- Erica Angers, Aleksandr Arsenev, and Mario Holzner
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- This report estimates the CO2 emissions of freight transport on a hypothetical high-speed rail (HSR) line along the northern route, from Lyon to Warsaw, of a ‘European Silk Road’ (ESR). Using a methodology consisting of predictions regarding the freight-carrying capacity of the future HSR, and the commodity-level switchover, our results indicate that a best-case scenario, at a project lifecycle of 60 years, in which all trains run with 257 tonnes of load, provides for a reduction of 176.2 Mt of net CO2 emissions compared with current levels. These lifespan savings are comparable to a reduction of net emissions by close to 24% of the overall EU transport sector emissions (excluding air transport) of one year (as measured by the net emissions in 2018). The net negative emissions in the optimistic full-capacity scenario will compensate for the construction costs in 13 years. Thus, the potential for emission reduction along the northern route of the ESR is quite substantial, given that this is just one line, with limited capacity. This hints at the importance that bold missions, such as the construction of a pan-European HSR network, could have for the definition of a European Green Industrial Policy that is capable of supporting the fulfilment of the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Infrastructure, European Union, Economic Growth, Transportation, Logistics, Ecology, and Green Economy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
221. The Euro Area’s Achilles Heel: Reassessing Italy’s Long Decline in the Context of European Integration and Globalisation
- Author:
- Dario Guarascio, Philipp Heimberger, and Francesco Zezza
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- This paper analyses how Italy’s decades-long decline turned the country into the euro area’s Achilles heel, the most vulnerable spot in the common currency. We use a structuralist framework to synthesise different (competing) supply-side and demand-side explanations, accounting for long-term processes and sectoral interdependencies. We argue that structural domestic factors that were already present in the decades after World War II (‘original sins’) – low-cost competition and labour fragmentation, many small firms linked to low innovation, and a deep territorial divide – interacted with the policy constraints brought about by globalisation and European integration to exacerbate Italy’s decline vis-à-vis its euro area peers.
- Topic:
- Globalization, European Union, Regional Integration, and Macroeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Italy
222. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries
- Author:
- Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
223. The Future of EU Cohesion - Effects of the Twin Transition on Disparities across European Regions
- Author:
- Ambre Maucorps, Roman Römisch, Thomas Schwab, and Nina Vujanović
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- Closing the prosperity gap between regions has always been a key political aspiration of the European Union – and cohesion policy is the primary means to achieve that goal. Europe is currently undergoing a digital and green transition that is drastically changing the way its economy works. How well prepared are regions to capitalise on the twin transition? And what impact will it have on regional cohesion in Europe? Our study finds that greening and digitalising the economy will likely widen the gap between rich and poor regions in Europe.
- Topic:
- European Union, Economy, Regional Integration, Digitalization, Green Transition, and Regional Development
- Political Geography:
- Europe
224. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?
- Author:
- Zachary Paikin
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
225. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead
- Author:
- Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
226. The Future of European Security
- Author:
- Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
- Topic:
- European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
227. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is
- Author:
- Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
- Topic:
- Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
228. Cost of Violence Study – Switzerland: A Halving Global Violence Report
- Author:
- Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- The aim of this report is to document the prevalence of interpersonal violence and its associated costs in Switzerland, and to identify policies, programs, and recommendations to address the economic impact of violence in the country. Interpersonal violence is understood to be homicide, physical assault, and sexual assault, since much of these are perpetrated in the domestic sphere. In this report, the authors provide separate numbers for domestic violence, which includes intimate partner violence (IPV). Additionally, this research will contribute to the forthcoming Flagship Report of the Halving Global Violence Task Force, and aims to inform national and global discussions about the business case for investments in violence prevention. While assigning monetary values to injuries and death may be seen as morally questionable, it is essential for understanding the magnitude of the issue and informing policy decisions. By quantifying these costs, we can better comprehend the burden of violence. In addition, the cost distribution of different forms of violence can help guide policymakers in allocating resources to tackle the most pressing issues, as well as devising effective violence reduction measures.
- Topic:
- Economics, Violence, and Intimate Partner Violence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Switzerland
229. Women's Security in Local Communities
- Author:
- Lajla Leko and Sabahudin Harčević
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- With the project "Improvement of Women's Safety and Security in Local Communities - AwareBiH", CSS aims to point out the state of security from the point of view of women, therefore it is necessary that some of the biggest cities, namely Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, are bearers of positive changes in the implementation of the project's results. In addition, the project aims to show the ability of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to influence changes that would make their environment safer. This topic is not discussed in BiH as much as it should be, while the security sector is still perceived as a sector dominated by men. Therefore, this project will help society and decisionmakers to better understand the needs and feelings of women in BiH about their own security.
- Topic:
- Security, Law Enforcement, Women, Violence, and Survey
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
230. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part I
- Author:
- Erdin Halimić, Dajana Bašić, and Aleksandar Maletić
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 13 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
231. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part II
- Author:
- Erdin Halimić, Ajla Popović, Haris Vejezović, Aleksandar Maletić, and Dajana Bašić
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 12 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
232. The Return of the Foreign Fighters and Their Families to Their Homeland: Existing Practices and Considerations Regarding Security and Human Rights
- Author:
- Katerina Christoforaki
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Centre for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- The creation of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted an unprecedented flow of thousands of people from more than 100 countries all over the world to join their cause. After the fall of the so-called caliphate, the countries involved have to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and the future threat of the resurgence of ISIS or other terrorist groups. The people who volunteered and joined ISIS might pose a security threat in the future. This paper aims to examine the different approaches that countries have taken regarding the return of foreign fighters (FFs) and their families who joined ISIS to their homeland. This is a multidimensional and complex matter since it has legal, moral, and political implications, and therefore the decisions in this regard are never unanimous, nor do they come without criticism and opposition. On the one hand, it would be easier to just leave the FFs and their families there, prosecute them there and incarcerate them there. It would also be easier to collect evidence and to have testimonies of the witnesses and the survivors, and also it would keep the potential security threat away from their homeland. However, this would only be beneficial for the countries of origin and in the short term as it wouldn‘t solve the problem of radicalization. In fact, it might fuel it even more, and the proximity of the ISIS member in prisons or in camps could benefit them to rebuild their network and plan future attacks. Moreover, leaving them there would be against all human rights norms regarding the death penalty, fair trial, torture, rights of the child, and more. On the other hand, the return of the fighters and their families could indeed pose a danger to the security of the homeland. Not all of the returnees have committed punishable crimes and for those who have, very often there is not enough admissible evidence to the national courts. In fact, in the case of women and children, the countries are more reluctant to their return because they might have not taken part in the atrocities but that does not mean that they are innocent and bear no responsibility. Complicated is also the case of children and teenagers, some of whom have taken part in the atrocities willingly or unwillingly, some were brought by their families, some traveled alone in order to join ISIS, and some were born under ISIS control and risk statelessness.
- Topic:
- Security, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Repatriation
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Syria, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
233. La “Ceguera Marítima”: características, consecuencias y alternativas.Alemania, Brasil y la Organización Marítima Internacionalen comparación
- Author:
- Herminio Sánchez de la Barquera y Arroyo
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- El presente texto parte de tres puntos importantes que darán paso al análisis de la ceguera marítima, sus características y consecuencias desde laperspectiva de las acciones emprendidas por Alemania, Brasil y laOrganización Marítima Internacional(OMI). El enfoque principal de esta investigación es conocer cómo estos tres actores, mediante distintos recursos, tratande contribuir a reducir la ceguera marítimapropia (en el caso de las dos naciones analizadas) y lade países en desarrollo(en el caso de laOMI). Posteriormente determinaremos sus características, medios y objetivos.
- Topic:
- Security, Maritime, Seapower, and Dependency
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Brazil, South America, and Germany
234. El océano azulde la política común de seguridad y defensa
- Author:
- Xavier Torrens
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- El océano azul de la política común de seguridad y defensa (PCSD)de la Unión Europea es el objeto de estudio de esta investigación, desde una aproximaciónbásicamente de policy-making, centrada en el policy design. Como punto de partida, toma contenidos de la geopolítica y las teorías del realismo que analizan por qué es tan problemática la política común de defensa europea.El estudio explica la herramienta del océano azul con el caso práctico de la aeronave F-35. A partir de su comprensión, se describe la estrategia del océano rojo frente a la estrategia del océano azul, contraponiendo unaEuropa en el seno de la OTAN y con dependencia de EEUU ante una Europa como A²E (actor estratégico y autonomía estratégica).Posteriormente, se elabora el esquema de cuatro accionesen la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa. Se estructura la matriz del océano azul, donde se analiza la construcción de una política común de defensa en Europa, presentando aquello que debería eliminarse de la política de defensa, lo que debería reducirse, lo que se debería incrementar y, finalmente, lo que se crearía para alcanzar una política común de seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea (UE). Luego, se plantean las cuatro barreras organizacionales para alcanzar unas Fuerzas Armadas Europeasy los tres componentes clave del cambio a las Fuerzas Armadas Europeas.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
235. Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture
- Author:
- V. Chumakov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- The 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unofficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, namecalling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international officials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, OSCE, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
236. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
237. FACTORING THE SMART POWER IN THE INDIA-EUROPEAN UNION ENGAGEMENTS: A SCOPING REVIEW
- Author:
- Nippun Gupta, Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, and Jaspal Kaur
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- Power is a critical factor in several types of diplomacy. India-EU relations are a classic case of how changing geopolitics prompted diplomatic acumen. This scoping review assesses the changing relations of both partners as a manifestation of Smart Power. The dynamic relations from normative-based to pragmatic and inclusive interests based are evaluated. Their value-based relations are put under international relations theories. Their changing factors of cooperation are used to justify their smart diplomacy, where contemporary relations are less likely to be affected by multilateral interests. To solidify claims of smart power in their relations, the recent TRIPS waiver schism illuminated health diplomacy between the two regions. This health diplomacy discourse promotes smart power diplomacy between India and the EU, where new avenues of cooperation emerge despite pandemic disagreements. The article explores how hybrid power is better than soft and hard power in silos by systematically searching and selecting the existing knowledge in the contemporary context.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Health, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Soft Power, Hard Power, and Smart Power
- Political Geography:
- Europe, South Asia, and India
238. RETHINKING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN TIMES OF NEXT GENERATION EU: NEW DIGITAL AGENDA
- Author:
- Miguel Angel Solsona and Marcin Roman Czubala Ostapiuk
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- The digital transformation of the global economy and society has accelerated after the Covid-19 pandemic. The European Union (EU), compared to China and the United States, is losing its capacity for innovation and control over data and fundamental raw materials and could even lose ground in the regulatory power it has in the digital realm. This paper pays special attention to the situation and progress toward a new European policy to achieve digital strategic autonomy. It also briefly outlines the Recovery Plan for Europe as a possible incentive for its promotion. Both descriptive and analytical methods were employed to gather the data from secondary sources and provide reliable research results. The major findings of this article are that strategic autonomy is an imperative requirement for sustaining and encouraging European integration, forcing the EU to advance faster toward developing critical digital technologies. There is also an urgent need to secure critical parts of supply chains and data protection, intellectual property, and defense against disinformation. Finally, the European Union must improve its resilience to face new crises and lead the digitalization of its economy.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, Autonomy, Digital Policy, and Digitalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe
239. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF CORRUPTION RISKS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN THE LIGHT OF DECENTRALIZATION
- Author:
- Yevheniy Haydanka
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- The article elucidates the relationship between decentralization and corruption risks in the Czech Republic. Economic inequality in the regions inevitably leads to corruption risks. The unemployment rate and the wage level determined the fragmentation of the Czech regions. Most Czech regions (8 out of 14) have an average unemployment rate (of 3-5%). The capital Prague (44 thousand korunas), as well as the Central Bohemian Region (35 thousand korunas), significantly differ from the rest of the Czech regions in wage level (within 31-32 thousand korunas). If the Czech regions are similar in the unemployment rate, there is a noticeable stratification between the capital and other regions. The findings of an expert survey among civil servants and deputies of regional Assemblies identified corruption and anti-corruption measures in the regions. The sphere of public administration is the most corrupt. Partially corrupt is the provision of administrative services. The greatest corruption risks result from the employees’ influence on funding sources (grants, subsidies and grants). On a 10-point scale, the average corruption in the regions is 5,8. More research prospects derive from studying corruption risks at the regional rather than national levels and expanding the geographical framework of the transition countries under research.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Risk, Unemployment, Decentralization, Wages, and Regionalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Czech Republic
240. A New Horizon in U.S. Trade Policy: Key Developments and Questions for the Biden Administration
- Author:
- Trevor Sutton and Mike Williams
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- This issue brief examines some of the key trade initiatives pursued by the Biden administration to date. It then sets out key questions facing U.S. trade policy in a global environment defined by volatility and renewed ambition to tackle the great challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, inequality, and great power competition.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Inequality, Economy, Trade Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Americas
241. Protecting Democracy Online in 2024 and Beyond
- Author:
- Megan Shahi
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- This new report specifically anticipates risks to and from the major social media platforms in the 2024 elections, continuing CAP’s work to promote election integrity online and ensure free and fair elections globally. The report’s recommendations incorporate learnings from past elections and introduce new ideas to encourage technology platforms to safeguard democratic processes and mitigate election threats. In a world without standardized global social media regulation, ensuring elections are safe, accessible, and protected online and offline will require key actions to be taken ahead of any votes being cast—both in 2024 and beyond.
- Topic:
- Politics, Science and Technology, Elections, Democracy, Social Media, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, India, Global Focus, and United States of America
242. Striking evidence: The impact of railway strikes on competition from intercity bus services in Germany
- Author:
- Matthias Beestermöller, Levke Jessen-Thiesen, and Alexander Sandkamp
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- This paper investigates the impact of the largest rail strikes in German history on intercity buses – a then newly liberalised market. Using unique booking data of bus services, we exploit variation in rail service cancellations across routes to show that the disruption in rail transport increases bus ticket sales. Crucially, the effect persists beyond the strike, indicating that travellers do not return to their originally preferred mode of transport. It is particularly pronounced for passengers travelling on weekends. The findings suggest that customers were previously under-experimenting. Beyond transportation, our results highlight the importance of service reliability, as temporary disruptions can cause customers to permanently switch to competitors.
- Topic:
- Labor Issues, Business, Transportation, and Labor Strike
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
243. Carbon Capture and Storage - Publics in five countries around the North Sea prefer to do it on their own territory
- Author:
- Christine Merk, Gisle Andersen, Åsta Dyrnes Nordø, and Torben Helfrich
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has been identified as an essential part of the lowest-cost path toward reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement. In Europe, an accelerated pace of CCS development indicates that a CO2 transport and storage system could be established by 2030. However, we know little about how the public views the market for transport and storage of CO2 currently under development in Europe. In early 2023, we conducted an experimental comparative survey to study public opinions on cross-border CO2 trade for storage in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. The share of respondents that perceive CCS as somewhat positive or very positive varies considerably between the countries; we find the highest share in Denmark (69%), followed by the UK (68%), Norway (67%), the Netherlands (57%) and the lowest share in Germany (49%). Especially concerns about environmental risks and costs lead to more negative views, while perceptions of job creation and economic opportunities lead to more positive evaluations. The experimental results show that importing CO2 for storage is among the least preferred options in all countries, while the storage of CO2 that has been captured in the own country is the most preferred option; the gap in the share of positive evaluations is substantial and amounts to up to 20 percentage points in the UK. Respondents who feel that countries are responsible for reducing national greenhouse gas emissions and storing their own captured CO2 drive the pattern of a more positive evaluation of a domestic CCS value chain and a more negative evaluation of importing CO2.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Trade, Carbon Emissions, and Perception
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North Sea
244. Spatial Wage Inequality in North America and Western Europe: Changes Between and Within Local Labour Markets 1975-2019
- Author:
- L. Baluz, P. Bukowski, M. Fransham, A. Lee, and M. López Forero
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- The rise of economic inequalities in advanced economies has been often linked with the growth of spatial inequalities within countries, yet there is limited comparative research that studies the relationship between national and subnational economic inequality. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to create internationally comparable evidence showing how different countries perform in terms of geographic wage inequalities. We create cross-country comparable measures of spatial wage disparities between and within similarly-defined local labour market areas (LLMAs) for Canada, France, (West) Germany, the UK and the US since the 1970s, and assess their contribution to national inequality. By the end of the 2010s, spatial inequalities in LLMA mean wages are similar in Canada, France, Germany and the UK; the US exhibits the highest degree of spatial inequality. Over the study period, spatial inequalities have nearly doubled in all countries, except for France where spatial inequalities have fallen back to 1970s levels. Due to a concomitant increase in within-place inequality, the contribution of places in explaining national wage inequality has remained fairly constant over the 40-year study period, except in the UK where we document a significant increase. Whilst common global social, economic and technological shocks are important drivers of spatial inequality, this variation in levels and trends of spatial inequality opens the way to comparative research exploring the role of national institutions in mediating how global shocks translate into economic disparities between places.
- Topic:
- Inequality, Labor Market, and Wages
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
245. The Labor Market Effects of Disability Benefit Loss
- Author:
- Anikó Bíró, Cecília Hornok, Judit Krekó, Dániel Prinz, and Ágota Scharle
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Disability benefits are costly and tend to reduce labor supply. While spending can be contained by careful targeting, correcting past flaws in eligibility rules or assessment procedures may entail welfare costs. We study a major reform in Hungary that reassessed the health and working capacity of a large share of beneficiaries. Leveraging age and health cutoffs in the reassessment, we estimate employment responses to loss or reduction of benefits. We find that among those who left disability insurance due to the reform 58% were employed in the primary labor market, 6% participated in public works and 36% were out of work without benefits in the post-reform period. The consequences of leaving disability insurance sharply differed by pre-reform employment status. 81% of beneficiaries who had some employment in the pre-reform year worked, while only 33% of those without pre-reform employment did. The gains of the reform in activating beneficiaries were small and strongly driven by pre-reform employment status. This points to the importance of combining financial incentives with broader labor market programs that increase employability.
- Topic:
- Health, Employment, Economy, Disability, Fiscal Policy, Insurance, Labor Market, and Welfare State
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Hungary
246. Exchange Rate Pass-Around
- Author:
- Matthieu Crozet, Julian Hinz, and Federico Trionfetti
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- In January 2015, The Swiss Franc (CHF) appreciated unexpectedly against the Euro by approximately 15%. We document a new fact: French firms that exported to both the Swiss market and the Eurozone also exhibited a sudden change in their export prices to the Eurozone. We coin this the “exchange rate pass-around” effect. We rationalise this fact with a simple model based on the endogenous decision of some firms to give up pricing-to-market and opt for single-pricing to all markets. An important implication of this finding is that single-pricing may be one of the causes of the incomplete pass-through. This mechanism has so far remained unexplored in the literature, which may have led to overestimating the importance of other factors. Based on monthly French export data, our empirical analysis confirms the existence of the pass-around. Firms directly affected by the CHF exchange rate shock increased their prices in neighboring markets by 0.8% compared to other exporters. The effect was stronger for firms with lower ex-ante price heterogeneity across markets and for firms with smaller trade costs to Switzerland. However, the effect was short-lived. As time passed, exporters tended to decouple the prices they set on the Swiss market from those for the Eurozone, and the pass-around effect faded.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, and Exchange Rate Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
247. Blowback: The Effect of Sanctions on Democratic Elections
- Author:
- Matthieu Crozet and Julian Hinz
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Sanctions are meant to coerce political adversaries through economic measures. However, evidence for their effectiveness is scarce. In this paper we assess the impact of sanctions on a democracy — France — by studying the electoral consequences of the sanctions and countersanctions imposed between Russia and Western countries. Contrary to most of the existing literature we find clear evidence for exposure to the sanctions to cause an increase in the vote share for pro-Russian (and far-right) candidates during the French 2017 presidential election. Locally, the impact on voting is substantial. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that about 16,300 votes for the main far-right candidate can be directly attributed to the sanctions’ impact. This is the total number of votes cast in a medium-sized French city. It is however not nearly enough to have affected the outcome of the election at the national level.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, and Elections
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and France
248. Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms
- Author:
- Holger Görg, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelbock
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine War, and Firm Dynamics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Germany
249. Potential efficiency gains from the introduction of an emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors in the European Union
- Author:
- Wilfried Rickels, Christian Rischer, Felix Schenuit, and Sonja Peterson
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- In the European Union (EU), a second emissions trading system (EU ETS2) covering buildings, road transport and small energy and industrial installations is expected to be introduced from 2027. Until 2030, however, EU ETS2 will not be a separate pillar of EU climate policy, but will support Member States in meeting their national targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR). If there are net regional shifts in emission reductions within the EU ETS2, for example, if companies in one member state buy in aggregated terms net allowances, this must be compensated for at the national level. We study the EU ETS2 for the year 2030 using the general equilibrium model DART. In our analysis, the introduction of an EU ETS2 generates about a quarter of the efficiency gains of a comprehensive emissions trading system, assuming that nation states use the flexibility mechanisms of the ESR and compensate for regional abatement leakage through interstate emissions trading. However, this is only true if there is no extensive price stabilization in the EU ETS2. Our analysis suggests an EU ETS2 allowance price of around EUR 300/tCO2. Stabilizing the EU ETS2 price at the envisaged intervention price of 45 EUR/tCO2 would require about 415 million additional allowances and thus imply additional emissions of the same amount in 2030 alone.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Economy, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- Europe
250. The path of economics research production: Insights into the seesaw between theory and empirics
- Author:
- João Ricardo Faria, Rajeev K. Goel, and Neela D. Manage
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- This paper provides insights into the apparent seesaw between the generation of theoretical versus empirical economics research over time. A dynamic model considers the incentives of researchers to focus on empirical versus theoretical papers. It yields the main characteristics of the path-changing of economics research, from theoretical-intensive to empirical-focused. The model has two equilibria, one with a higher proportion of theoretical papers and another with a higher proportion of empirical papers. Curiously, the equilibrium with greater theoretical papers is stable, while the one with more empirical papers is a saddle point. This suggests that the current trend of increasing empirical research is unlikely to last.
- Topic:
- Economics, Research, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
251. Technology will save the climate! Attitudes towards Norway’s climate policy in four social groups
- Author:
- Åsta Dyrnes Nordø
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- The risk of opposition from the population increasingly plays a role in choosing the climate policy measures to achieve the objective to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Norway, there is a long-standing cross-party consensus that the development of new technologies will be crucial for solving climate challenges. Comparing public opinion surveys, Norwegians are significantly more convinced that new technology will solve problems induced by climate change, compared people in other European countries. A concrete example of such a technology is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Despite discussions about the costs of establishing the technology, there is a cross-party consensus in Norway that CCS is a good and suitable measure for reaching climate policy goals. In this article, we review the historical background that has led to this broad support in Nor-way. Furthermore, we look at how this has been expressed in the political parties’ attitudes towards CCS. There has been a long standing consensus among all major parties that CCS should be developed and deployed. We argue that this lay the foundation for the societal support for CCS. We analyze data from the Norwegian Coordinated Online panels for research on DEMocracy and governance (KODEM) to examine the attitudes toward CCS among citizens and three functional elites, namely elected representatives, bureaucrats, and journalists. We find that CCS receives strong support in all four groups, but that citizens and elected representative are more skeptical compared to bureaucrats and journalists. However, when looking at the factors that influence the perception of CCS, the pattern is the same for all four groups. The more technology optimistic a person is, the more positively they tend to perceive CCS as a method to fight climate change. We also find that those who think the political efforts to reduce greenhouse gases are too great are less positive about CCS com-pared to those who think the efforts are appropriate or too small. Overall, the analysis indicates that all four societal groups are technology optimistic and characterized by the same attitudes toward climate change. We discuss the role of technology optimism in Norway’s climate policy and the reasons for the high degree of political consensus across groups with different societal functions.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Science and Technology, Carbon Emissions, Elites, and Attitudes
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Norway
252. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?
- Author:
- Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
- Topic:
- Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America
253. Exposure to War and Its Labor Market Consequences over the Life Cycle
- Author:
- Sebastian T. Braun and Jan Stuhler
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- With 70 million dead, World War II remains the most devastating conflict in history. Of the survivors, millions were displaced, returned maimed from the battlefield, or spent years in captivity. We examine the impact of such wartime experiences on labor market careers and show that they often become apparent only at certain life stages. While war injuries reduced employment in old age, former prisoners of war postponed their retirement. Many displaced workers, particularly women, never returned to employment. These responses are in line with standard life‐cycle theory and thus likely extend to other conflicts.
- Topic:
- History, Displacement, World War II, Welfare, Prisoners of War, and Labor Market
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
254. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security
- Author:
- Matti Pesu
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea
255. US-EU climate change industrial policy: Pulling in different directions for cooperation, competition, and compromise
- Author:
- Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The United States and the European Union agree on prioritizing policies to address climate change, which includes securing supply chains for components essential to low-carbon technology. Despite this agreement, their policies to address climate change and low-carbon technology could foster competition. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) reflects the competitive advantage of the US to draw in the best talents, capabilities, and resources from outside sources. This leads to a disconnect between the industrial policy benefits of the IRA within the US and the potential competitive impact the IRA has on US relationships with allies. The EU’s policies are shaped by the bloc’s desire to respond to external actors—including China and Russia—while protecting the common market and building up its internal capability to ensure security of supply. This is complicated by individual member-state objectives. The 2024 US presidential election could bring change: A Republican administration might not share the EU’s outlook on climate change, the need for government intervention, or even the close transatlantic relationship seen during the Biden administration.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, and United States of America
256. The geoeconomics of the hydrogen era: Towards a new global energy architecture
- Author:
- Timo Behr
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Clean hydrogen is crucial for ensuring the transition to a carbon-neutral economy, and large quantities of it will be needed in the future. The transition from a hydrocarbon to a hydrogen economy will have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. Due to its unique properties, hydrogen will not become the “new oil”. While oil and gas have encouraged a concentration of power – in the hands of producer countries, major oil companies, and around strategic choke points – hydrogen will favour a dispersion of power. The transition to a hydrogen economy will see strong competition over technologies, raw materials, and regulatory standards. Hydrogen has the potential to make the world energy trading system more balanced, more democratic, and less prone to price fluctuations, but it could equally lead to fragmentation, inadvertently contributing to current geopolitical divisions. For the EU and Finland, the transition towards a hydrogen economy presents both challenges and opportunities. Concerted action and active diplomacy will be needed to prevent Europe from being overtaken by others and slipping into new dependencies.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Governance, Hydrogen, Energy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Finland
257. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience
- Author:
- Markus Holmgren
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Finland
258. Outlining EU-Turkey relations: The impacts of the Ukraine war and Turkey’s crucial elections
- Author:
- Toni Alaranta
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Turkey-EU relations are affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine and its consequences for the EU’s place in the world. Another major factor is Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections held in May, which are defining the prospects for the country’s democratic future and its foreign policy. The second round of the presidential election took place on 28 May. The re-election of President Erdoğan indicates that the unilateral foreign policy and strained relationship with the West is likely to continue, although there is a chance of a short-term burst of cooperation due to Turkey’s economic troubles. There are increasingly divergent views about Turkey in the West, and the EU’s future relationship with Turkey needs to accommodate these different conceptualizations of the country as a state actor. The EU needs to be flexible in the coming months and to find ways to engage with Turkey in a more fruitful manner, irrespective of the election results.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Turkey
259. EU reform is back on the agenda: The many drivers of the new debate on treaty change
- Author:
- Steffen Müller
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Institutional reform is back on the European Union’s agenda, with the European Parliament, the Commission and large member states like Germany and France all supporting changes to the way the EU operates. While opening the EU treaties is not without political risk and there is still no consensus on doing so among member states, this momentum for reform is unlikely to wane in the near future. There are several reasons for the new reform drive. In particular, reforms are intended to strengthen the EU’s democratic credibility, to prevent institutional erosion in a time of permanent crisis, to make the EU more resilient to blockades by individual governments, and to lay the groundwork for the accession of new member states. While some of the proposed changes could be achieved without treaty change, the number and variety of issues at stake entails the risk of getting bogged down in parallel debates and missing opportunities for package deals. The most efficient way to deal with the EU’s reform needs would therefore be the launch of a treaty convention.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe
260. Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
- Author:
- Marco Siddi
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The European Commission has published numerous policy documents concerning the European Green Deal and the energy transition since 2019. Several have an important foreign policy component. Following the Covid-19 crisis and especially Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the discourse and policy objectives of these documents have taken a ‘geopolitical turn’, meaning that the EU’s security, interests and cooperation with Western allies have become more prominent than before. The REPowerEU plan, the new External Energy Strategy and the Green Deal Industrial Plan exemplify this shift by combining green and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s geopolitical turn in external energy politics involves several risks. Third countries could perceive some policies as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘green colonialism’. Domestically, some business actors dislike restrictions on imports of critical raw materials and green technology from abroad, whereas additional mining in the EU may not be compatible with biodiversity and environmental protection. At the same time, ‘offshoring’ mining outside the EU may transfer the ecological consequences to contexts with laxer regulation.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, European Commission, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
261. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition
- Author:
- Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
- Topic:
- European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
262. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism
- Author:
- Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Arctic
263. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?
- Author:
- Margarita Zavadskaya
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
264. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal
- Author:
- Jussi Lassila
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
- Topic:
- Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
265. Centre-right parties in Germany and Sweden: Challenges and strategies in a changing political landscape
- Author:
- Sanna Salo and Tuomas Iso-Markku
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Centre-right parties have played a central role in stabilising European party politics and advancing European integration, but the increased fragmentation of party systems and the rise of the radical right present serious challenges to them. The way that centre-right parties respond has important implications for domestic and EU politics alike. Many European centre-right parties have become divided on their political profile and programme, debating between leaning towards the progressive-liberal or the conservative-authoritarian end of the political spectrum. In Germany, the rise of the radical-right AfD has fuelled disagreements within the CDU/CSU and generated demands to sharpen its profile. However, this has thus far not led to major changes to the CDU/CSU’s platform, as it is also challenged from the political centre by the SPD and the Greens. In Sweden, the Moderates have clearly reshaped their political agenda in the last decade, focusing on immigration and law-and-order issues, as well as adopting positions and rhetoric reminiscent of the SD. This shift culminated in the formation of a Moderate-led coalition government supported by the SD in late 2022.
- Topic:
- Politics, European Union, and Political Parties
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Germany, and Sweden
266. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe
- Author:
- Lauri Tahtinen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America
267. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence
- Author:
- Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia
268. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War
- Author:
- Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America
269. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa
- Author:
- Kristin Adeoti
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Estonia
270. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
- Topic:
- Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
271. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future
- Author:
- Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America
272. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?
- Author:
- Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
273. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?
- Author:
- Steven Blockmans
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
274. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine
- Author:
- Igor Gretskiy
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
275. British Nuclear Policy
- Author:
- Peter Watkins
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia
276. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation
- Author:
- Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States
277. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region
- Author:
- Iro Särkkä
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
278. Military Command and Control
- Author:
- Gintaras Bagdonas
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
279. NATO’s new Defence Plans
- Author:
- Mārtiņš Vargulis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States
280. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership
- Author:
- Henrik Larsen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
281. Defence Spending
- Author:
- Margarita Šešelgytė
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
- Topic:
- NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
282. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests
- Author:
- Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific
283. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?
- Author:
- Tato Kvamladze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
284. French Nuclear Policy
- Author:
- Jean-Louis Lozier
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and France
285. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation
- Author:
- N. Lill
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
- Topic:
- Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Italy
286. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South
- Author:
- Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- 2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
- Topic:
- Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South
287. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
288. Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe
- Author:
- Mitchell Orenstein
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Both before and during its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia cut energy supplies to Europe in an effort to force the continent to abandon Ukraine. Instead, Vladimir Putin accelerated Europe’s transition to green energy, decimating a key market for Russian exporters. Over the long term, Europe is well-positioned to win the energy war with Russia.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Markets, Renewable Energy, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
289. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia
- Author:
- Maximilian Hess
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan
290. The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction
- Author:
- Philip Wasielewski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- An unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority and a failure to communicate accurate information are the most consequential weaknesses at the state level that have contributed to the Russian military’s subpar performance to date in the war with Ukraine. These characteristics are exacerbated by other historic factors found throughout Russian society, which also permeate the military as a reflection of that society. They include an imperialist national identity, endemic corruption, and societal brutality. To these systemic problems must be added the inherent difficulties of what the Russian military was supposed to achieve in its first major peer conflict since World War Two and elements of simple military incompetence. The unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority is symptomatic of over five centuries of Russian autocracy. It is why Russia lacks an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a top-down command-and-control system, which is slow to provide timely direction to forces at the front. This is exacerbated by a failure to communicate accurate information, especially at the strategic level, which results in decision making based on faulty information and reinforces bad decisions due to inaccurate feedback. These two characteristics create a command, control, and communications system unsuited for modern warfare but congruent with a Russian way of war that has been influenced by a culture of imperialism, corruption, and brutality. Imperialism prevented Russian national security elites from seeing agency in other peoples, which led them to underestimate possible Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve. Corruption compounded personnel and supply challenges for the Russian military. A reliance on brutality to control its own soldiers and assert control over occupied populations exacerbated factors in the Russian military that are detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and unit cohesion and provided additional motivation to Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression. These are not really “weaknesses” of the Russian system but consequences of that system. Furthermore, despite their detrimental impact on military effectiveness, these factors have sometimes “worked” for Russia and provided, counterintuitively, advantages such as the political will to conduct attrition warfare at a cost that no Western society would accept. This is significant because all the above factors are endemic to Russian social and political culture and will continue, barring a major social revolution in Russia of the scale of 1917. This means there will be no permanent solution to the war in Ukraine even if a peace treaty is signed. These cultural factors will eventually drive Russia to regain its military capacity and renew its aggression against Ukraine and hostility to the West. As long as Russia is autocratic with a propensity for self-deception and imperialism, it will try again to assert hegemony over Ukraine and other portions of its former empire. That future war will likely resemble the war in Ukraine, a high-intensity war of attrition where Moscow is willing to make brutal sacrifices to outlast its foes. This is not a case of predicting that history will repeat itself, but that Russia’s basic political nature will. Only if Russia overcomes its history and changes internally, will it ever behave differently externally.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Autocracy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eurasia
291. The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint
- Author:
- Raphael Parens, Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, and Kendal Wolf
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- 1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. 2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. 3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. 4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. 5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. 6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. 7. US senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations. 8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability. 9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option. 10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.
- Topic:
- NATO, Sanctions, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
292. Russia’s Nuclear Policy After Ukraine
- Author:
- Stephen Blank
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, generated international concern about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and Russia’s future nuclear policy.[1] Therefore we must ask, will Russia change its nuclear policy due to contemporary strategic developments? This question correctly assumes that the war in Ukraine and all its ramifications, despite their undoubted importance, are not the only factors influencing Russian decision-making on nuclear policy. Accordingly, we analyze those factors—including, among others, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—that will likely influence the direction and nature of Russia’s nuclear policy. Those factors influencing policy, itself the outcome of myriad domestic and foreign pressures, also include Russia’s overall security policies, the global strategic environment, and the lessons Russia learns from recent wars—most prominently its aggression against Ukraine. Russian national security strategy and policy originate in what Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of unceasing conflict.[2] Since the U.S. is Russia’s principal interlocutor, it also is its primary antagonist. Russian security policy is inherently adversarial. It postulates a state of permanent conflict with Washington and its allies where Washington seeks to undermine, if not destroy, the Russian state and prevent it from restoring its empire (i.e., global great power status). As Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov recently stated, “Russia’s foreign policy interests as a great power have a global projection. Our country plays a stabilizing role in various regions of the world.”[3] Allegedly the U.S. employs nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and advanced conventional weapons that could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent to frustrate Russia’s policies.[4] Thus it is an article of faith in Moscow that its nuclear weapons are the main guarantees of Russia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, great power status, and the factor that deters the West from intervening against Russia in Ukraine.[5] Moreover, those weapons, when deployed abroad, also deter NATO’s potential, largely maritime, threats to Russia. Therefore, Russia must conduct a global military—i.e., an expeditionary, nuclear, and military policy.[6] Indeed, Putin has recently and revealingly called nuclear weapons, “the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.”[7] Russian nuclear strategy and behavior also derive from a cognitive universe wholly unlike and unfamiliar to American strategic thought. Identical words often mean entirely different things to Russians and Americans; much Russian rhetoric is politicized, deliberately deceptive, or opaque, and invariably follows state requirements. Yet, despite voluminous and even insightful commentary on war, Russian forces often do not fight as its doctrine stipulates, adding to the difficulties involved in determining what its policy is.[8] Simultaneously, however, Russian strategy and policy are also inherently evolutionary—i.e., they respond to changes in the strategic environment that are then incorporated into doctrine, strategy, official statements, exercises, procurement, and policy. Finally, despite our own difficulties in understanding Russia, either willfully or because it cannot help itself due to the deep-seated paranoia in its political culture, equally misreads the West, wholly misunderstands the West, and habitually ascribes the worst motives to U.S. and Western policies.[9] This misreading of the West repeatedly generates worst-case threat assessments that frequently lead to Russian nuclear threats or procurements. Taking all these factors into account, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it is quite likely if not certain that Russian nuclear strategy and policy will change in the wake of the war in Ukraine, win, lose, or draw. Unfortunately, in most potential outcomes to the war save defeat and collapse of the government, that change points to an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy with no letup in hostility toward the West. The war in Ukraine has been instrumental in fostering still more animosity toward the West and an enhanced role for nuclear weapons.[10]
- Topic:
- National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
293. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe
- Author:
- Philip Wasielewski
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
294. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now
- Author:
- Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
- Topic:
- NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
295. Using Taxation to Fund Military Spending
- Author:
- Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, and Xiao Liang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- World military expenditure is on the rise. To fund their increases in military spending, options available to governments include tax, debt or revenue from natural resources. Each form of financing has its consequences, economic, political or social. Tax is the prevalent source of finance for governments. The use of tax, and the choice among different types of tax, can have an impact on income inequality and economic growth, among other things. However, no scholarly attention has yet been paid to the use of taxation to fund military spending. Using statistical analysis combined with in-depth case studies sheds light on this use of taxation. The findings—based on data for 100 countries between 1990 and 2020 and reinforced by detailed case studies on Burundi and Ukraine—show that countries in conflict tend to resort to indirect taxation to fund military expenditure. This is particularly true for low-income countries and for countries with an autocratic regime. This association can be consequential, considering the accumulated evidence on the impacts of indirect taxation on income inequality.
- Topic:
- Finance, Military Spending, and Tax Systems
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Ukraine, and Burundi
296. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia
- Author:
- Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia
297. The Role of Umbrella States in the Global Nuclear Order
- Author:
- Tytti Erästö
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This paper focuses on countries under extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, or ‘umbrella’ states. The paper explores the ways in which umbrella states both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Europe have supported prevailing nuclear deterrence practices or distanced themselves from such practices. While there is a tendency for these countries to side with their nuclear-armed patron on matters related to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament norms, at times they have taken steps away from the allied mainstream position by advocating for anti-nuclear weapon policies. As long as extended deterrence has a nuclear dimension, allies will need to balance between normative pressures to support nuclear disarmament and alliance commitments that require at least passive support for nuclear deterrence practices.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Alliance, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia-Pacific
298. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Julian Cooper
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
- Topic:
- War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
299. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe
- Author:
- Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
- Topic:
- European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
300. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union
- Author:
- Simone Bunse
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Europe