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3601. Tehran Meeting on JCPOA

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
On 23-24 June 2019 a delegation from Pugwash travelled to Iran to participate in a specially-arranged two-day meeting organized together with the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran. The central focus of the discussions was the current status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more than one year after the United States withdrew from implementing it, and the ensuing program of ever-tightening sanctions imposed by the US on Iran that has dramatically increased tension in the Middle East. The meeting also put this into context by looking at the regional situation of arms control, as well as Iran’s relations with China, Russia, the EU, and its neighbours including Afghanistan.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3602. Executive Summary: Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior Russia Strategic Initiative-Workshop 3 March 18-19, 2019

Author:
Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
The “Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior” Workshop #3 brought together twenty-five academics and practitioners from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Belarus to discuss strategic issues concerning Russian behavior and policy. This workshop is one in a series of semi-annual events that is hosted by the Marshall Center, funded by USEUCOM’s Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI) office, and is supported by RAND. The workshop ran for two days and consisted of short presentations followed by more lengthy discussions. The international research team examined a variety of topics, including Russia’s strategic behavior in the Arctic as well as in the Nordic-Baltic region, Ukraine, and Syria; Russian engagement with Belarus, Turkey, and Afghanistan; sub-institutional cultures; the impact of U.S.-Chinese strategic competition on Russian strategic behavior; sanctions, and Putin’s relationship with Russia’s elite.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

3603. The Great Puzzle: China in Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Małgorzata Jankowska
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) through the 16+1 economic platform addressed investment needs imposed by the global financial crisis. Despite limited outcomes, it was accompanied by a negative EU narrative towards the sponsor of the program. The main argument has been that the platform undermines EU cohesion and unity. This narrative discouraged bilateral or sub-regional initiatives of CEE states towards China and served to mobilize European Institutions around policies that were primarily shaped by Berlin.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3604. The 1948 German Currency and Economic Reform: Lessons for European Monetary Policy

Author:
Gunther Schnabl
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Twenty years after the introduction of the euro, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is at its crossroads. Following the outbreak of the European financial and debt crisis in 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) took comprehensive measures to stabilize the common currency. Interest rates were cut to and below zero and several asset purchase programs have inflated the ECB balance sheet (Riet 2018). Within the European System of Central Banks, large imbalances have emerged via the TARGET2 payments system, which can be seen as quasi-unconditional credit in favor of the southern euro area countries (Sinn 2018). While the ECB terminated its asset purchase program at the end of 2018 and is expected to increase interest rates in late 2019, financial instability is reemerging. Growing uncertainty about the fiscal discipline of the Italian government has triggered a significant increase in risk premiums on Italian government bonds. In particular, in Italy and Greece, but also in Germany, bad loans and assets remain stuck in the banking systems. In the face of the upcoming downswing, European banks do not seem ready for new financial turmoil. In this fragile environment, the future path of the EMU is uncertain. To enhance the stability of the EMU, a group of German and French economists has called for a common euro area budget, for a strengthening of the European Stability Mechanism as lender of last resort for euro area countries and banks, as well as for a common European deposit insurance scheme (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). In response, 154 German economists have warned against transforming the EMU into what they call a “liablity union,” which systematically undermines market principles and wealth (Mayer et al. 2018). In 2018, a French-German initative to introduce a common euro area budget faced strong opposition from a group of northern European countries as well as from Italy, symbolizing the political deadlock concerning reforms of the EMU. This article explains the different views on the institutional setting of monetary policymaking in Europe from a historical perspective. It begins with a description of the economic and monetary order in postwar Germany. It then discusses the positive implications for the European integration process and the economic consequences of the transformation of postwar German monetary order. The final section offers some economic policy recommendations.
Topic:
Economics, History, Monetary Policy, Reform, European Union, Banks, and Currency
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3605. Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative Recommendations to ensure beneficial and sustainable BRI outcomes

Author:
Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a highly ambitious development effort that would sew together infrastructure projects across more than 70 countries. Estimated to comprise of more than USD $1 trillion in Chinese investment, the BRI is arguably China's broadest economic engagement effort with the rest of the world — enhancing its connectivity through Southeast, South, Central, and West Asia; Africa; Europe; and South America. The Asia Society Policy Institute project – Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative – examines BRI with the aim of setting forth actionable recommendations for how China and partner countries can help ensure that BRI projects yield beneficial and sustainable developmental, economic, environmental, civic, and social outcomes. The project includes a report by the same name, which is available for download below, as well as an interactive visualization of 12 recommended practices and their specific implementation steps, intended outcomes, and relevant Chinese and international precedents. (For interactive content see: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/belt-and-road-initiative)
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Soft Power, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Economic Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, South America, Southeast Asia, and West Asia

3606. Managed competition: Meeting China’s challenge in a multi-vector world

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The world is now witnessing the rise of China, which has a global reach and real implications for the transatlantic community. As new challenges and opportunities unfold, the United States is seeking to formulate an adapted approach to China in cooperation with its closest allies and partners in Europe. In his latest report, Managed Competition: Meeting China’s challenge in a multi-vector world, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow Franklin D. Kramer suggests a strategic approach of “managed competition” to meet the full spectrum of challenges posed by China, including economic and innovation, diplomatic and influence, and security, both hybrid and conventional military. Kramer argues that a successful economics and innovation strategy will require substantially enhanced efforts to support innovation. It will also demand a multi-tier economic approach differentiating strategic sectors and those sectors affected by market distortions from those sectors that would benefit from reciprocal access of commercial products and services to commercial entities allowing for generally free trade in those arenas. In the diplomatic and influence arenas, key elements include multilateral efforts with close US allies and coordination of activities to counter disinformation and subversion. In the security arena, undertaking assurance, resilience, and deterrence measures will be necessary when responding to both hybrid and conventional challenges. Resolution of “one world” challenges, such as climate change, requires the involvement of so significant a factor as China presents. This report is the first publication in a new body of work led by the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative focused on understanding and managing the implications of China’s rise for the transatlantic community.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3607. Thinking foreign policy in Russia: Think tanks and grand narratives

Author:
Anton Barbashin and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the course of the last decade Russian foreign policy has taken critical turns, surprising not only the entire international community but also Russia’s own foreign policy experts. Arguably, the most notable turn came in March 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, setting in motion developments that are continuously shaping Russia, its neighbors, and, to a certain degree, global affairs. Clearly, Russia’s post-Crimean foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum. Its ramifications are colliding with regional and global trends that are effectively destabilizing the post-Cold War international order, creating uncertainties that are defining the contemporary international moment. In this report, we deal with those whose job it is to explain the logic of Russia’s foreign policy turns and to analyze global trends and their meaning for Russia and the rest of the world. Although these experts, as a rule, do not directly influence political decision-making, their debates, as Graeme Herd argues, “set the parameters for foreign policy choices” and “shape elite and public perceptions of the international environment” in Russia.1 Especially in times of crisis and rapid change ideas produced at some earlier stage by experts and think tanks external to the state bureaucracy can suddenly obtain instrumental value and direct policy options. In Part 1, we briefly discuss the role of think tanks in Russian foreign policymaking and present the landscape of Russian think tanks working on foreign policy issues. We distinguish among three basic institutional forms: academic and university-based think tanks, private think tanks, and state-sponsored think tanks. Highlighting the diversity of organizations, we then focus on four state-sponsored think tanks whose size, political contacts, and financial means allow them to dominate the think tank scene in Russia and that represent different ideological angles of a broad, yet also comparatively volatile mainstream: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI). Part 2 follows this selection by looking at Russian foreign policy debates since 2014. We consider how experts writing for these four organizations have approached three major themes: the evolution of the concept of Greater Europe and European Union (EU)-Russia relations, the establishment of the Greater Eurasia narrative in the context of Russia’s declared pivot to the East, and the concepts of multipolarity and the liberal world order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Diplomacy, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

3608. Over the horizon: NATO joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Baltic Sea region

Author:
Mark E. Ferguson, Christopher Harper, and Richard D. Hooker
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, NATO threat perceptions have significantly intensified, particularly with regard to the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that today face the most direct threat of any of NATO’s allies. To deter aggression in the Baltic region, NATO must deploy a credible and effective defense, grounded in a comprehensive understanding of adversary capabilities, actions and intent. A critical element of deterrence and defense is NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance a networked system of sensors, collectors and analysts fielded by the Alliance and its member states to provide situational awareness, early warning and if necessary, decision support for combat operations. Put simply JISR is about getting the right information to the right person, at the right time in the right format. But if a crisis erupted in the Baltic Sea region, is NATO equipped to gather and process the information necessary to give commanders on the ground a clear operating picture? What improvements, if any, could be made to the way NATO and NATO allies collect and process intelligence? To answer these and other questions, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assembled a task force of leading regional security experts, led by co-chairs ADM Mark E. Ferguson, III, USN (Ret.) and AM Sir Christopher Harper, RAF (Ret.) and project director Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr, that examined NATO’s JISR posture in the Baltic Sea region and offers a series of recommendations to improve both collection and processing of vital intelligence so that NATO is ready to meet any challenge that may be waiting over the horizon.
Topic:
NATO, Intelligence, Drones, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Europe, Northern Europe, and Baltic Sea

3609. Play to Win: Sticking to a Playbook in the Competition with Russia

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Russia docks a warship in Havana knowing it will provoke a response from the United States. How dare they. The US Navy dispatched a destroyer to shadow the vessel; after all, the United States has the Monroe doctrine to enforce. A few weeks prior, Russia sent around a hundred troops to Venezuela. This also provoked a response, albeit rhetorical. Despite these US reactions, Russia continues to play strategic games. Why did the United States respond to these actions in these ways? And what is the most appropriate response?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, South America, and North America

3610. Democracy and human rights agency for change: Alternative Democratic Practices in Southeast Europe

Author:
Vedran Dzihic, Gazela Pudar Drasko, Felix Henkel, Irena Fiket, Ivan Stefanovski, and Rastislav Dinic
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Almost twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, initial euphoria about democratic change in many countries in the East and Southeast of Europe has given way to growing mistrust of political institutions and politicians, and an increasing disaffection with democracy itself. This wide-ranging disaffection has many sources. One of them lies in the increasingly weak performance of governments and the fact that »democracy«, whatever the term meant at the beginning of the transition processes, has failed to deliver on its promises. Politicians and governments no longer seem able or willing to deliver tangible results to their voters. Politics in Southeast Europe produces no or too few goods »for« the people and instead of »delivering«, engages in populist nationalism, politics of fear, and serves particular power interests The contributions to this publication discuss several approaches to active engagement and thinking about alternatives. The first paper examines the question if and how the emancipatory energy found in social movements may help in renewing social democracy (Felix Henkel). The next paper combines theoretical thinking about democratic innovations as opportunities for channelling popular discontent with concrete inquiry into the situation in Southeast Europe (Irena Fiket). The third paper provides an analysis of the Sisyphean task of democratizing societies, using the example of North Macedonia (Ivan Stefanovski). Last but not least, the fourth paper focusses on local struggles and actions in the Serbian city of Niš (Rastislav Dinić). The mobilization in Niš, where activists are in everyday contact with citizens at the local level, creates a deeper foundation for political engagement inscribed into the living context of individuals. This »grounding« together with broader societal utopian horizons of progressive thought provides a framework for the democratic renewal of Southeast European societies, a renewal that should be high on the agenda of the EU and all international actors dealing with the region.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Democracy, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Southeast Europe

3611. Young Generations for New Balkans visit EU Institutions

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In December 2019 we had another possibility to present our initiative Young Generations for the Balkans – Vision 2030 by visiting European Union institutions in Brussels. We had two days of fruitful meetings at the European Parliament and the European Commission, exchanging views on areas ranging from the state of democratic freedoms in the region to education policies and student performance in the Western Balkans Six. Furthermore, we presented a policy paper that has been developed as a result of this initiative that over the last two years has grown to include 25 members coming from all six EU aspirant countries plus Croatia. Our meetings in Brussels have proved the European Parliament’s and the Commission’s steadfast commitment to the European integration of the Western Balkans, despite the recent setback in this process when in October 2019 the decision to open the long awaited accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania was blocked by France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The upcoming year 2020 offers a number of opportunities to reinvigorate the integration process. Those opportunities come not without their own challenges and therefore need to be carefully considered. First, Croatia will hold the presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2020. Zagreb has already declared the European integration of the Western Balkans to be its number one external policy priority. The Western Balkans Summit will supposedly be held in May and some significant progress is expected to happen by that time, including the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, as well as visa liberalization for Kosovo. It is nevertheless important for the EU and its member states to be vocal about the setbacks in democratic freedoms that Croatia itself currently experiences. Lack of reaction to these negative trends sets a bad precedent for other EU aspirant countries in the Balkans. Secondly, while the French veto for North Macedonia and the French, Dutch and Danish vetoes for Albania certainly undermined the EU’s credibility in the region, the discussion about these member states’ decision helped bring back the European enlargement back to the top of the EU agenda. The enlargement process, its positive aspects and deficiencies are being widely discussed across the Union and beyond. In this respect, the French proposal of an enlargement process reform has been one of the most discussed ones. It is clear from that document that the French government sets the priority on the rule of law in the Western Balkans Six and conditions any further progress on the integration path on the adoption and implementation of the European law in this area. While rule of law is indeed a special area of concern in the region, with many countries, such as Serbia or Montenegro, backsliding in this respect, it is not possible to make progress in one area of the European acquis without working simultaneously on many others. In other words, the French proposal sees the European integration as a linear process where one chapter of acquis communautaire can be closed after another. However, it does not work this way in reality. Progress on different chapters of the European law must happen in parallel. For example, one cannot complete the law and justice reform without starting reforms in the economic or environmental sectors. In addition, there are concerns about how the French proposal for the enlargement process reform might complicate and prolong it by opening further possibilities for Member States to veto the whole process after taking every new step. Another positive aspect that year 2020 brings for the Western Balkans youth is new educational opportunities in the European Union. The European Commission is set to double its funding of Erasmus+ programs for this region form EUR 33 million to EUR 66 million. National Erasmus+ offices in the region will further promote these opportunities, thereby reaching out to a broader public. This great support in education and training that the EU provides needs to be further enhanced by necessary reforms in the education system at home. In their discussions with the Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission representatives, young experts drew attention to a number of negative trends that will become major problems in future if they are not addressed already today. Thus, democratic backsliding in many countries of the region is worrisome. Journalists are attacked and threatened for expressing opinions critical of the government. In Serbia, for example, the government’s de facto monopoly on television coverage creates erroneous narratives about the role of the EU and its relations with Serbia. It is a common misperception in Serbia that Russia and China are the main foreign contributors to the Serbian economy while in reality and over the years it has been the EU. The EU thus needs to focus more on its communication strategy in the Southeastern Neighborhood. In this context, the Young Generations Initiative also had a discussion with leaders of the Serbian opposition which happened to pay a visit to the European Parliament on the same day. We discussed the intention of the opposition to boycott the next parliamentary elections. We fully shared their criticism of the lack of democratic behavior in Serbia, but many from our group had doubts about the usefulness of boycotting the forthcoming elections that are set to happen in spring 2020. However, it is also a responsibility of the EU to make it clear to President Vučić and his government that the authoritarian way to rule the country – including manipulating the media – is not in compliance with the EU principles and values. Even if progress is made on the issue of Serbian-Kosovar reconciliation, the EU cannot turn a blind eye to the democratic backslides in domestic policy, especially considering that Serbia and Montenegro are accession candidates. A point was raised about the ongoing democratic deficiencies in EU countries, like Hungary and Poland. The situation there is another reason why enlargement is not popular these days. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán is a good friend of Serbian president Vučić, former North-Macedonian leader Nikola Gruevski was granted asylum in Budapest even though he was convicted of corruption in North Macedonia. In addition, the new EU commissioner for enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, is claimed to be a loyal companion of Viktor Orbán. These facts are worrisome for many people active in civil society and endanger their efforts to promote democracy and European values in the region. Another concern is an enormous outflow of (educated) people from the region who migrate primarily to Western Europe in search of a better life. In this sense, European enlargement to the Balkans is already happening. While the countries themselves are not members of the EU, young people from the region emigrate to the EU in large numbers, promting many observers to note ironically that if the EU doesn`t come to the Western Balkans, the Western Balkans will come to the EU. Unlike some decades ago, ‘better life’ is increasingly being defined today not in the material terms (people do not migrate primarily because of higher salaries), but as a demand for a stable political system, just and transparent public institutions, livable healthy environment, proper education and corresponding job opportunities. The governments in the region should thus look into creating incentives for professionals to stay in or return to their home countries. This can be done through special tax incentives, more favorable conditions for running businesses and adjusting education systems to the demands of the labor market. The European Union, in its turn, can encourage and offer its support to the regional governments in promoting circular migration among qualified workers. Education is a further problematic area in the Western Balkans. The latest PISA 2018 survey findings conducted by the OECD place four out of the six countries in the region at the bottom of the list. In Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia every second school student in functionally illiterate, while in Serbia and Montenegro it is every third one. One of the consequences of the failing educational system is the mismatch between what it offers and the demand of the markets. Despite numerous pressing concerns, the youth in the region feel hopeful about their future. They are ambitious and full of ideas, although sometimes they have wrong perceptions of what is possible. Thus, recent polls in North Macedonia indicated that about 60% of young people expect their country to become a part of the European Union. About 75% of those think that it will happen before 2025. This is a very unrealistic assessment that will lead to disappointment and possibly even higher motivation to migrate abroad in the very near future. 5.png6.png In order to create space for young people to realize their ambitions and ideas in the region, without leaving it for the rest of their lives, there is a number of specific issues that can be addressed by the EU as well as regional policy makers already today. In general, political will of the governments in the region is imperative for any genuine reform to be implemented. The EU should encourage this change in the attitude among those governments who still ‘tick the boxes’ just to showcase the result on paper but are not really willing to make thorough changes.
Topic:
Education, European Union, and Youth
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Southeast Europe

3612. Concrete Proposals for the New Balkans in 2030

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The policy paper offers a list of effective, clear-cut, policy-oriented recommendations which blaze the trail for the European engagement with the young generation of the Western Balkans. It paves the way for a reinvigorated and substantial commitment that ensures a more prosperous, EU-oriented vision of the region in the coming decade.
Topic:
Crime, Education, Authoritarianism, European Union, Youth, Regional Integration, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

3613. Political Culture in Southeast Europe. Navigating between Democratic and Authoritarian Beliefs and Practices

Author:
Vedran Dzihic, Gazela Pudar Drasko, Damir Kapidzic, Dario Cepo, Jelena Dzankic, and Jelena Vasiljevic
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The failure of the countries in Southeast Europe in the last three decades to initiate deep political and societal change that would lead them towards the goal of liberal democracy cannot be explained only by the reference to wars and internal conflicts or by external factors related to their peripheral position in Europe. We argue that political culture has to be taken into consideration to help explain the phenomenon of defective or phony democracy in the Western Balkans. A more forceful expression of emancipatory values by youth, along with greater action capabilities provided by economic growth, could create a more democratic political culture and leaders that are more accountable within a generation. However, it is necessary to have knowledge and understand what we want to influence, because simply supporting ›democracy‹ can go hand in hand with support for authoritarian values. It has to be accepted and fully realized that political conditions and practices are not part of the inherited cultural repertoire, but are shaped by highly complex and intertwined structural and socio-economic processes. Then we will be able to respond with adequate (political and structural) propositions and solutions that might »expand popular capacities« (in the words of Stuart Hall) and bring about the desired change in Southeast Europe.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Leadership, and Political Culture
Political Geography:
Europe and Southeast Europe

3614. Beyond evidence versus truthiness: toward a symmetrical approach to knowledge and ignorance in policy studies

Author:
Katharina Paul and Christian Haddad
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Current political developments in established liberal democracies in both Europe and North America have fundamentally called into question the normative relations between truth, knowledge and politics. Whether labeled “posttruth” or truthiness, commentators lament the willful spread and deployment of nonknowledge and ignorance as important political forces. In this paper, we discuss ignorance in its strategic dimension by weaving together insights from the sociology of ignorance with a policy-scientific approach. By means of three empirical vignettes, we demonstrate that ignorance is more than the flipside of knowledge or merely its lack: it is a constitutive feature of the policy process and is thus not uniquely symptomatic of the current era. We conclude by arguing for what we call a symmetrical approach in which ignorance receives the same quality of attention that knowledge has historically received in the policy sciences. To make fully visible the different forms of ignorance that shape policy processes, policy scholars must hone their “agnoto-epistemological sensibilities” to cope with the current challenges and advance a policy science for democracy.
Topic:
Post Truth Politics, Public Policy, Truth, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

3615. The New-Old Elites and their Relations with the EU: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia

Author:
Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Tunisia and Egypt are two countries that have experienced the fall of longstanding authoritarian leaders. Transitions in both countries then took entirely different directions. This paper deals with the question of whether and how political change in the two countries has affected their foreign policy-making towards the European Union (EU). Building on a liberal international relations (IR) perspective and elite theory, the paper focuses on the politically relevant elites (PRE). PRE shape discourses and influence decision-making processes. Building on the assumption that the composition and discourses of the PRE influence policies and positions towards the EU, the paper analyses the structure of the elites and their disputes over power resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, European Union, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

3616. Nationalist Polarization in the Western Balkans and Its Institutional Consequences: A Fate That Can Be changed

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In Southeastern Europe, the process of democratization and Europeanization since the beginning of the 2000s has been seen as a major paradigm shift and made the inter-national community and the EU believe that time of wars and nationalist excesses was in the past. It seemed a sure sign that all countries of the region were set to reach the membership in the European Union soon. In terms of Europeanization and democratization, we can argue that the second decade of the 21st century has brought no substantial progress in Southeastern Europe. Rather, it has seen the region on the path of constant decline of democracy. The latest reports of Nations in Transit, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and other serious academic research prove the continuous trend of de-democratization in the region, with scores either falling or stagnating. Weak democratic institutions often resemble empty facades. Lack of rule of law is evident, the principle has perverted into the rule by law of dominant political parties able to control the judiciary. We see huge deficits in terms of fundamental rights and values including media freedom. Just in April 2019, Re-porters Without Borders published their newest ranking on the freedom of media, listing Serbia as one of the coun-tries in Europe in which the media freedom deteriorated the most. Elections are held, but are dominated by dominant par-ties and are not able to generate genuine political chang-es. All in all, we see a mounting democratic deficit before democracy has even had the chance to become “the only game in town.” On top of everything else – with the excep-tion of North Macedonia – comes a rhetorical democratic and EU-integration mimicry from governing elites, who are also engaged in maintaining or establishing illiberal or semi-authoritarian power structures. Citizens are either disillusioned with the type of governance in their countries or generally frustrated, which results in political disen-gagement or the wish to emigrate. One part of the citizen-ry long ago adjusted to the structures and circumstances, learning to obey or to profit from the clientelist structures. Either way the spaces for political engagement and active participation have been shrinking……
Topic:
Democratization, Nationalism, Governance, Authoritarianism, Citizenship, Polarization, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

3617. The gendered and racialized politics of risk analysis. The case of Frontex

Author:
Saskia Stachowitsch and Julia Sachseder
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This article develops a feminist postcolonial approach to risk analysis as an increasingly central security practice in the EU’s emerging border management and security regime. For this purpose, we theorize risk analysis as a sense-making practice embedded within colonial power relations. As such, risk analysis problematizes migrants and migration in gendered and racializedwaysthatmakethemamenabletobordermanagementandother, potentiallyviolentsecuritypractices,suchasdetentions,returns,surveillance, and Search and Rescue. In an exemplary frame analysis of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s (Frontex) risk analysis report 2016, we show how conceptualizations of risks and solutions by this key actor are informed by gendered and racialized framings of 1) chaos and violence, 2) exploitationoftheEUeconomicandwelfaresystem,and3)humanitarianism towards 'vulnerable'? migrants. With this study, we seek to strengthen feminist and postcolonial interventions into critical security studies on knowledge, power, and expertise. By conceptualizing risk analysis as political, this article pushes critical security theory beyond understandings of security as socially constructed and towards systematically unpacking the meanings of (in)security as implicated in the reproduction of gendered and racialized power relations.
Topic:
Security, Migration, Post Colonialism, European Union, Feminism, Borders, and Risk
Political Geography:
Europe

3618. How extreme is the European far right? Investigating overlaps in the German far-right scene on twitter

Author:
Daniela Pisoiu and Reem Ahmed
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Violent right-wing extremism is a growing threat to Western liberal democracies. At the same time, radical right-wing populist parties and figures across Europe are succeeding electorally by way of increased representation in national parliaments. These gains have been achieved against a backdrop of anti-refugee sentiment, austerity, and disillusion-ment with the European project, with populists on the left and right promising to deliver an alternative and using effective slogans and ‘people’ politics.Ordinarily, we differentiate between the extreme right and radical right: the former posing a threat to the democratic system with their fascist links and overt racism; the latter respecting the democratic system whilst offering a ‘sanitised’ version of far-right politics – namely, adopting a ‘new master frame’ that emphasises culture rather than race. Recent analyses of the far right, however, have indicated social and discur-sive overlaps between the ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ right-wing parties and groups. The findings reported herein challenge this traditional separation within the far-right spectrum, and potentially have deeper theoretical and methodological implications for how we study the far right. The Internet adds another dimension to this threat, as far-right discourse becomes more visible on social media and messaging applications, potentially attracting more people to the cause as well as mainstreaming and legitimising particular narratives prominent in the scene.Existing literature has specifically examined the online sphere, and social media in particular, and these scholars have communicated interesting findings on how the social networks and discourses over-lap, for example identifying the co-occurrences of certain hashtags or analysing retweets and transnational cooperation.The aim of this report is to determine the overlaps apparent in the far-right scene on Twitter, and specifically, to ascertain the extent to which different groups on the scene are indeed talking about the same issues in the same way, in spite of apparent differences in tone and underlying ideologies. We utilise a mixed-methods approach: first, gaining a cursory insight into the extreme right-wing scene on Twitter across Europe; and then applying a detailed frame analysis to three selected groups in Germany to determine the implicit and explicit overlaps between them, thus complementing the quantitative findings to offer an in-depth analysis of meaning.
Topic:
Radicalization, Internet, Social Media, Populism, Ideology, Far Right, and Twitter
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3619. Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Democratization and the Role of Civil Society

Author:
Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Many documents, programs and strategies of the European Union highlight the importance of civil society as an element of democracy promotion. In this short article I deal with the question of what civil society actually is and whether the idea of civil society as a motor of democratization is still a valid presumption. Civil society is an often mentioned but essentially contested concept. As the term is characterized by a plurality of different meanings that depend on the historical, cultural and legal context, there is no single, generally accepted concept that defines civil society. It remains rather unclear whether civil society includes any form of non-governmental organiza-tion (NGO), such as business people’s associations, syndicates or trade unions. Is the media part of civil society or does the concept refer exclusively to NGOs that address specific societal issues? Does the concept only refer to institutionalized and licensed organizations and associations or are social movements, thematic platforms, informal networks and other un-institutionalized forma-tions also part of civil society? After all, they do often fulfill the same functions as civil society organizations (CSOs). And how about religious organizations, are they also part of civil society?
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

3620. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership”

Author:
Sherin Gharib
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The concept of joint ownership has become a buzzword since the 1990s not only in strategies of international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the WorldBank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also in European Union (EU)foreign policy (Ejdus, 2017). Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) in 2004 joint ownership has been defined as one of its main principles.Accordingly, the EU states that “joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners” (European Commission, 2004, p.8). It continues by holding that there “can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country. The endorsement of these plans by the highest instance of the agreements in place will give added weight to the agreed priorities for action” (European Commission, 2004, p. 8). Thus, EU policies should be set within a partnership relation between the EU, and its counterparts and priorities should be defined by common consent. The EU aims to engage “governments and all leading local stakeholders, including national parliaments” (European Commission, 2010c cited in Jonasson, 2013, p. 47). The importance of joint ownership was reconfirmed within the revised ENP in 2015,where the EU has declared that “differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus ofits partnership with the EU” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The goal, as the EUhas claimed, is to increase cooperation with neighbouring countries to an eye-to-eye level and to follow an approach based on “both partners’ needs and EU interests”(European Commission, 2017). The revised ENP again acknowledges the importance of involving relevant members of civil society as well as social partners in consultations(European Commission, 2015a, p. 3). Despite the appearance of joint ownership in several EU documents and its use as an example of an inclusive approach, the definition offered remains quite vague. Thus, it is unclear to what extent governments, local stakeholders, civil society and social partners should co-own certain policies. Whose considerations should count and should joint ownership be operationalised within the decision-making or implementation process?How can the operationalisation of the concept be evaluated? This policy paper critically investigates the EU’s concept of joint ownership. Drawing on two case studies, namely free trade policies and migration management, the paper 7PAPERSIEMed. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership” analyses the implications and limitations of the EU’s partnership relation with its southern neighbourhood. The paper focuses mainly on the Egyptian, Tunisian and Moroccan cases. Due to the vague definition of “joint ownership” and in order to be able to analyse the two case studies, the paper suggests, based on EU documents, two types of ownership: 1) governmental ownership and 2) societal ownership. Using this conceptualisation, the paper analyses the involvement of different stakeholders and the main beneficiaries of EU free trade policies and migration management. It argues that there is a lack of governmental as well as societal ownership within the two EU tools, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and Mobility Partnerships (MP) as it is mainly the EU that sets priorities, norms and standards to be adopted by partner countries. Government representatives and civil society actors from Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) perceive their relationship with the EUas asymmetric rather than based on an eye-to-eye level (personal communication with Tunisian and Egyptian officials and civil society actors, 2016-2017). The perceived reluctance to fully engage MPCs – government officials and social actors – in the implementation of EU policies has led to their growing mistrust of the EU. If ownership is applied at all, then it is often reduced to a state-centric approach even though the EU is rhetorically attached to the inclusion of actors going beyond the government. The lack of “societal” ownership becomes evident as consultative mechanisms suggested and applied by the EU to include grassroots organisations have in most cases no implications for policy-drafting processes. Thus, there seems to be a gap between what the EU refers to in official documents and the implementation on the ground. In this case, both MPs and free trade policies might exclusively serve the interests of the government and linked elites in the region – this depends on their ability to “own” certain policies rather than addressing the needs at the grassroots, such as poverty reduction or the creation of job opportunities. In this respect, the legitimacy and sustainability of EU policies is at risk (Ejdus, 2017;Dworkin & Wesslau, 2015). The paper proceeds as follows: the first part investigates the concept of ownership,illustrates several dimensions of its ambiguity, and analyses the EU’s operationalisation of the concept. Subsequently, the paper sheds light on the limits of ownership in the realm of free trade policies in general and DCFTAs in particular.The following section investigates the concept of migration management and MPs. The analysis is based on primary and secondary literature review as well as interviews conducted by the author with Egyptian and Tunisian officials and civil society actors, as well as with EU representatives in 2016 and 2017.
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Tunisia, and Mediterranean