Political Geography: Eurasia - CIAO Search Results

1. Reasons for the West’s Hatred of Russia

Author:: Yury Sayamov
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: Russia as a state and civilization and Russian statehood as an institution have acted for centuries as system-forming factors of the world order. They have, at various times, exerted influence of varying intensity and significance on the shape, character, and content of international relations, while also being influenced by them. The West’s hostility toward Russia arose, took shape, and began to actively manifest itself as one of the constants of this influence, occasionally reaching the level of outright hatred and spiraling into attacks against Russian statehood, which invariably mobilized the country’s peoples to rebuff the aggressors.
Topic:: History, Statehood, Information Warfare, Crusades, and Russophobia
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

2. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:: Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

3. In the Forest of the Blind: The Eurasian Journey of Faxian's Record of Buddhist Kingdoms

Author:: Matthew W. King and Gray Tuttle
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Speaker's Bio: Matthew King is an Associate Professor of Buddhist Studies and Director of Asian Studies at the University of California, Riverside. He is also a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute for 2022-2023. His research examines the social history of knowledge in Buddhist scholastic networks extending across the Tibeto-Mongolian frontiers of the late Qing empire and its revolutionary ruins. Much of his published work has focused on encounters between Buddhist scholasticism, science, humanism, and state socialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. He is also broadly engaged with methodological revision in the study of religion and Buddhist Studies, and in revisionist theoretical projects associated with the critical Asian humanities. King's first book Ocean of Milk, Ocean of Blood: A Mongolian Monk in the Ruins of the Qing Empire (Columbia University Press, 2019), was awarded the American Academy of Religion Excellence in the Study of Religion: Textual Studies book award, the Central Eurasian Studies Society's 2020 Best Book in History and Humanities, and the International Convention of Asia Scholars Book Prize (Specialist Publication).
Topic:: Religion, History, and Buddhism
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Asia

4. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:: Florian Vidal
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:: Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

5. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:: Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

6. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict

Author:: Ariel Levite
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

7. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:: Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

8. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:: Robert Murray
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

9. Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages

Author:: Margarita Assenova, Ariel Cohen, and Wesley Hill
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has had significant economic and political repercussions across the globe, including energy shortages and growing food insecurity. The war has forced Central Asian states to emphasize their independence from Moscow and accelerate their economic diversification. Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has the potential to mitigate global shortages of energy, food, and fertilizers, caused by Russia’s war of aggression. The primary challenges for Central Asia and its Western partners remain diversifying export routes and expanding the capacity of alternative transportation corridors, especially the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Corridor, or the “Middle Corridor.” Kazakhstan is the leading producer of uranium ore in the world, grows 2 percent of the world’s wheat, and has major hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan has the opportunity to lead Central Asia forward on the path to becoming an important supplier of energy, grain, fertilizers, and nuclear fuel to world markets. The energy crisis in Europe spurred renewed interest in the long-planned Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. A potential United States and European Union ban on uranium civilian-reactor fuel exports from Russia could ensure Kazakhstan’s importance as a nuclear fuel exporter to Europe. To do this, Kazakhstan first needs to build its own conversion and enrichment facilities. This would allow it to double its share in the European market while utilizing the Middle Corridor. By encouraging Western investment, the states of Central Asia can become an important force in global commodity markets. To this end, they should implement the recently signed far-reaching regional agreements on cooperation and integration, so that they are less susceptible to “divide and conquer” strategies from predatory foreign powers and can exercise greater leverage when negotiating as a bloc. The US and the EU should also recognize that Central Asia’s energy and agricultural potential and resources make the region an area of strategic interest with promising business opportunities. The Central Asian states need to intensify their Western-oriented diplomatic outreach to attract support from state and private actors for investment and technological partnerships. Geographic proximity to Russia and China means Central Asian countries will always have economic relationships with Moscow and Beijing. But greater Western engagement in the region can diminish the chances for Russo-Sino cooperation in Central Asia. Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position and the Western sanctions on its economy have opened up new opportunities for Central Asia to supply critical energy and food commodities to world markets. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and its largest producer of oil, uranium, and grain, is well-positioned to lead this transition.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

10. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

11. China and the new globalization

Author:: Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID-19 Response in Russia

Author:: Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has called for provision of public goods and services that require a high state capacity, including producing and distributing vaccines, enforcing mask mandates, limiting potential super‐spreader events, and so on. The rationale for public intervention was that private actions, such as getting vaccinated, wearing masks, and avoiding large gatherings, have benefits to broader society, so they are likely to be undersupplied by individuals on their own. In these circumstances, one might expect the power of the state coercing others into compliance to be beneficial. Are authoritarian leaders, less constrained by institutions and less accountable to voters, better equipped to deal with health emergencies?
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Repression, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

13. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

14. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

15. Toughening Financial Sanctions on Russia: Enforcing Energy Sanctions and Reducing Shadow Reserves Effectively

Author:: Guntram Wolff, Benjamin Hilgenstock, and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Financial sanctions are key in enforcing restrictions on Russian energy exports – in particular the G7/EU oil price cap regime –, due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions. While the energy sanctions regime is having an impact on export earnings and budget revenues, evidence for potentially widespread violations is also emerging. Moreover, favorable external dynamics have allowed Russia to accumulate substantial assets abroad – “shadow reserves” –, which need to be kept out of reach of the regime.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

16. Coping with Technology Sanctions in the Russian Financial Sector

Author:: Alexandra Prokopenko
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

17. To Russia with Love? The Impact of Sanctions on Regime Support

Author:: Robert Gold, Julian Hinz, and Michele Valsecchi
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Do economic sanctions affect internal support of sanctioned countries’ governments? To answer this question, we focus on the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 and identify their effect on voting behavior in both presidential and parliamentary elections. On the economic side, the sanctions significantly hurt Russia’s foreign trade — with regional-level variation. We use trade losses caused by the sanctions as measure for regional sanction exposure. For identification, we rely on a structural gravity model that allows us to compare observed trade flows to counterfactual flows in the absence of sanctions. Difference-in-differences estimations reveal that regime support significantly increases in response to the sanctions, at the expense of voting support of Communist parties. For the average Russian district, sanction exposure increases the vote share gained by president Putin and his party by 13 percent. Event studies and placebo estimations confirm the validity of our results.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

18. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:: Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

19. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:: Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

20. Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe

Author:: Mitchell Orenstein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Both before and during its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia cut energy supplies to Europe in an effort to force the continent to abandon Ukraine. Instead, Vladimir Putin accelerated Europe’s transition to green energy, decimating a key market for Russian exporters. Over the long term, Europe is well-positioned to win the energy war with Russia.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Markets, Renewable Energy, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

21. The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: An unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority and a failure to communicate accurate information are the most consequential weaknesses at the state level that have contributed to the Russian military’s subpar performance to date in the war with Ukraine. These characteristics are exacerbated by other historic factors found throughout Russian society, which also permeate the military as a reflection of that society. They include an imperialist national identity, endemic corruption, and societal brutality. To these systemic problems must be added the inherent difficulties of what the Russian military was supposed to achieve in its first major peer conflict since World War Two and elements of simple military incompetence. The unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority is symptomatic of over five centuries of Russian autocracy. It is why Russia lacks an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a top-down command-and-control system, which is slow to provide timely direction to forces at the front. This is exacerbated by a failure to communicate accurate information, especially at the strategic level, which results in decision making based on faulty information and reinforces bad decisions due to inaccurate feedback. These two characteristics create a command, control, and communications system unsuited for modern warfare but congruent with a Russian way of war that has been influenced by a culture of imperialism, corruption, and brutality. Imperialism prevented Russian national security elites from seeing agency in other peoples, which led them to underestimate possible Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve. Corruption compounded personnel and supply challenges for the Russian military. A reliance on brutality to control its own soldiers and assert control over occupied populations exacerbated factors in the Russian military that are detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and unit cohesion and provided additional motivation to Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression. These are not really “weaknesses” of the Russian system but consequences of that system. Furthermore, despite their detrimental impact on military effectiveness, these factors have sometimes “worked” for Russia and provided, counterintuitively, advantages such as the political will to conduct attrition warfare at a cost that no Western society would accept. This is significant because all the above factors are endemic to Russian social and political culture and will continue, barring a major social revolution in Russia of the scale of 1917. This means there will be no permanent solution to the war in Ukraine even if a peace treaty is signed. These cultural factors will eventually drive Russia to regain its military capacity and renew its aggression against Ukraine and hostility to the West. As long as Russia is autocratic with a propensity for self-deception and imperialism, it will try again to assert hegemony over Ukraine and other portions of its former empire. That future war will likely resemble the war in Ukraine, a high-intensity war of attrition where Moscow is willing to make brutal sacrifices to outlast its foes. This is not a case of predicting that history will repeat itself, but that Russia’s basic political nature will. Only if Russia overcomes its history and changes internally, will it ever behave differently externally.
Topic:: Corruption, Autocracy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

22. Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025

Author:: Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the arms expenditures and military budget of Russia skyrocketed and continue to grow for the foreseeable future. However, the military industry is under threat Despite the additional massive financial inflow. The military industry could not—with few exceptions—increase the production capacity significantly nor solve its other major problems of workforce deficit and annual net losses. Moreover, the Western embargo on the supply of components, industrial equipment, and technologies makes the further development of the Russian military industry doubtful. Even reverse engineering has become an impossible task. However, the Kremlin’s choice in this situation would be in favor of more arms expenditures and extending the practices of the command economy.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Budget, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. The War as an Accelerator

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine laid bare the problems with Russia’s domestic governance. The war caught the federal and regional governments unprepared and exacerbated existing bottlenecks in fields such as infrastructure and state capacity. Even before 2022, Russia’s domestic policymaking had prioritized the short-term political interests of a shrinking ruling class and made long-term thinking and deep structural reforms impossible. The invasion completely eliminated long-term policy planning and subordinated policymaking to war aims. One year after the invasion, these problems are causing frictions and elevating domestic political risks for the Kremlin. The botched invasion and subsequent economic sanctions have caused irreversible losses and put significant upfront costs on the Russian state. This stretches Russia’s peculiar, highly centralized system of fiscal and political governance to its limits. In particular, the interlocking challenges of reorienting trade towards Asia without the necessary infrastructure in place, improving an inflexible multi-level public administration system, and turning Russia into a digital securocracy, show how, by starting the invasion, Russia’s rulers contributed to the destabilization of their own country. They also demonstrate how international sanctions impact Russia by increasing domestic risk factors from the Kremlin’s point of view.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Governance, Trade, Domestic Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

24. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

Author:: Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
Topic:: Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

25. New Canal Threatens the Peace Between the Taliban and Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Since their return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have managed to reach an understanding with most of the Central Asian governments to preserve a relative calm along the areas of the Afghan-Central Asian frontier. Disputes over water use have suddenly become an issue that could derail ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Specifically, the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could lead to the loss of water for tens of thousands of people in downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, three people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters along the Afghan-Iranian border over rights to water from the Helmand River.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Water, Taliban, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

26. Russia’s Nuclear Policy After Ukraine

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, generated international concern about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and Russia’s future nuclear policy.[1] Therefore we must ask, will Russia change its nuclear policy due to contemporary strategic developments? This question correctly assumes that the war in Ukraine and all its ramifications, despite their undoubted importance, are not the only factors influencing Russian decision-making on nuclear policy. Accordingly, we analyze those factors—including, among others, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—that will likely influence the direction and nature of Russia’s nuclear policy. Those factors influencing policy, itself the outcome of myriad domestic and foreign pressures, also include Russia’s overall security policies, the global strategic environment, and the lessons Russia learns from recent wars—most prominently its aggression against Ukraine. Russian national security strategy and policy originate in what Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of unceasing conflict.[2] Since the U.S. is Russia’s principal interlocutor, it also is its primary antagonist. Russian security policy is inherently adversarial. It postulates a state of permanent conflict with Washington and its allies where Washington seeks to undermine, if not destroy, the Russian state and prevent it from restoring its empire (i.e., global great power status). As Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov recently stated, “Russia’s foreign policy interests as a great power have a global projection. Our country plays a stabilizing role in various regions of the world.”[3] Allegedly the U.S. employs nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and advanced conventional weapons that could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent to frustrate Russia’s policies.[4] Thus it is an article of faith in Moscow that its nuclear weapons are the main guarantees of Russia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, great power status, and the factor that deters the West from intervening against Russia in Ukraine.[5] Moreover, those weapons, when deployed abroad, also deter NATO’s potential, largely maritime, threats to Russia. Therefore, Russia must conduct a global military—i.e., an expeditionary, nuclear, and military policy.[6] Indeed, Putin has recently and revealingly called nuclear weapons, “the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.”[7] Russian nuclear strategy and behavior also derive from a cognitive universe wholly unlike and unfamiliar to American strategic thought. Identical words often mean entirely different things to Russians and Americans; much Russian rhetoric is politicized, deliberately deceptive, or opaque, and invariably follows state requirements. Yet, despite voluminous and even insightful commentary on war, Russian forces often do not fight as its doctrine stipulates, adding to the difficulties involved in determining what its policy is.[8] Simultaneously, however, Russian strategy and policy are also inherently evolutionary—i.e., they respond to changes in the strategic environment that are then incorporated into doctrine, strategy, official statements, exercises, procurement, and policy. Finally, despite our own difficulties in understanding Russia, either willfully or because it cannot help itself due to the deep-seated paranoia in its political culture, equally misreads the West, wholly misunderstands the West, and habitually ascribes the worst motives to U.S. and Western policies.[9] This misreading of the West repeatedly generates worst-case threat assessments that frequently lead to Russian nuclear threats or procurements. Taking all these factors into account, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it is quite likely if not certain that Russian nuclear strategy and policy will change in the wake of the war in Ukraine, win, lose, or draw. Unfortunately, in most potential outcomes to the war save defeat and collapse of the government, that change points to an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy with no letup in hostility toward the West. The war in Ukraine has been instrumental in fostering still more animosity toward the West and an enhanced role for nuclear weapons.[10]
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

27. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

28. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

29. Takeaways from Russia’s Regional and Municipal Elections

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The Kremlin, for the most part, engineered the results it desired in Russia’s 2023 regional and municipal elections. However, the campaigns showed that a positive portrayal of the war in Ukraine is not necessarily popular among Russian voters. In the occupied territories in Ukraine, elections demonstrated that Russian power remains firm, even in the face of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Since independent observers had virtually no access to these votes and they were held illegally, it is both impossible to verify the authorities’ claims and futile to analyze the results as if real elections had been held. In many regions, the elections saw the demise of the Communist Party as the largest “alternative” party to Vladimir Putin’s ruling United Russia party. A notable exception was the Siberian region of Khakassia, where the incumbent communist governor was able to see off a threat from his Kremlin-supported opponent. The extensive use of a still-opaque online voting system, along with the overt intimidation of election observers and opposition personalities, suggests that the Kremlin is eager to evolve and test its manipulation toolkits ahead of the 2024 presidential election.
Topic:: Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

30. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

31. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Gas, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

32. Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia

Author:: Olga Khvostunova
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Debates about the nature of the Putin regime have intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some experts argue that Russia has turned fascist. While such claims are understandable in the face of Russian aggression, they obfuscate the complexity of the problem and distract from identifying the regime’s actual ideological predisposition. In fact, the Putin regime is conservative, authoritarian, and reactionary, and its core beliefs include anti-Americanism, ressentiment, and Russian messianism. These beliefs operate under the guise of patriotism, Russia’s official national idea, which is used by the regime to rally public support and secure its grip on power.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Ideology, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

33. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

34. Russian Disinformation in Africa: No Door on this Barn

Author:: Dan Whitman
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Recent gains by Russian disinformation in Africa make up one of the quickest propaganda victories in history. Wagner Group-Kremlin narratives work to Russia’s material advantage, and to Africa’s strong disadvantage. Understandably, Western governments are skittish toward employing underhanded tactics to counter Russian lies. An alternative to inaction could be to marry Western government resources with the work of non-governmental organizations in Africa and elsewhere. As is sometimes said about climate change, it may already be “too late” to mount efforts to remedy the situation. But that is hardly a reason for doing nothing.
Topic:: Climate Change, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Eurasia

35. Biden’s Bombs: The Dance of Ethics and Interests

Author:: Dominic Tierney
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: On the same day in July 2023, the Biden administration destroyed America’s last chemical weapon, and also, controversially, announced the supply of cluster bombs to Ukraine. The story of the two bombs shows how America’s view of ethics in war is shaped by an underlying strategic logic. The focus on humanizing war by banning certain weapons may do more to help America on the battlefield than to protect civilian lives.
Topic:: Ethics, Weapons, Civilians, Joe Biden, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

36. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:: Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

37. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:: Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

38. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:: Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

39. Evolution of the World Order and Russia’s Ideas About the Outside World

Author:: A. Bogaturov and O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The idea of the outside world and the role that Russia plays in it has undergone radical changes in Moscow’s official worldviews since 2014. The degradation of the international security situation indicates a deep crisis in the existing world order, which was formed in the spirit of the US’s unipolar hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to turn the UN, the only universal platform for reaching collective decisions on an inclusive and equal basis, into a tool of the collective West for pressuring “revisionist states.” The decline in the culture of global-level dialogue leads not only to the aggravation of military-political conflicts but also to the inability to effectively respond to new challenges and transnational threats.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Global Focus

40. Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future in Turkey and India, and Iran and Russia

Author:: Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The institutions and practices necessary for open and fair competition for political power are eroding across the world. In some countries, such as Turkey and India, the democratic dividend of electoral competition has been steadily undermined by majoritarian autocrats who have proved adept in campaigning for office and winning elections. In others, such as Russia and Iran, political leaders have marginalised or suppressed electoral processes, reducing them to closely managed performances that seek to demonstrate public consent. At least some traces of the mechanisms of electoral competition often remain in place, however, even where genuine public consent has been almost extinguished. This leaves open the possibility that the trend away from competitive electoral politics could be at least partially reversed in future, in the context of political succession or the electoral defeat of incumbents. In June 2023, LSE IDEAS brought together experts from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and other institutions to examine the potential for restoring the democratic dividend of competitive politics in four major countries. Turkey and India were selected for their timeliness—national parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey in May 2023, and national parliamentary elections are due in India in April 2024—and for their similarities: both political systems are characterised by powerful elected leaders with a strong record of performance in national elections, each backed by large political parties based on an appeal to national and religious identity. Iran and Russia were chosen as examples of two states where competitive electoral politics had been temporarily enabled by significant political change—respectively, an impasse in Iran’s theocracy in the 1990s, and the end of the Soviet Union—only to be undermined by the reassertion of autocratic power. Two assumptions underlay the planning of this discussion on ‘Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future’. The first is that the characterisation of political systems as either democratic or autocratic provides an insufficient basis for explaining many differences in the workings of political institutions, or for guiding policy. The second assumption is that while certain institutions and practices appear to be essential to maintaining open competition for political power—including for example, freedom and diversity of comment in major channels of communication like broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and social media—there is no useful empirical example or theoretical formulation of an ideal or perfect democratic political system. The exclusion from the discussion of countries with longer established forms of competitive politics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, was not intended to suggest an implicit comparison with ideal types of functioning democracies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concern about the maintenance of open competition for political power in every country professing to be a democracy. As David Runciman has said of the future of democratic practices: ‘The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no longer notice when they have ceased to work.’ He warns that ‘democracy could fail while remaining intact’.
Topic:: Elections, Political stability, Autocracy, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, India, and Asia

41. Russia’s Cultural Heritage Can Be a Bridge to the Future

Author:: Robert Cox
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Russia has become Europe’s ogre. Beyond the brutality of Moscow’s onslaught on Ukraine looms a harsher ideological backdrop. Too many Russian citizens have been enticed into seeing this invasion as a defence of Russia’s security, national pride and identity, history, Weltanschauung, international standing, and imperial stature. They eulogise Russia’s national church as a defensive shield despite its abuse of spiritual humanity, its soldiers as crusaders. Europeans, in response to this baggage respond with a mixture of fear or unease. Anger, too, along with frustration and ultimately something akin to hatred. With all this comes an inclination in the western world to reject everything Russian. This rejection of a rich culture risks tarnishing our mindset and that of our children. Russian orchestras, dancers and sopranos have been banned from western stages—largely on the pretext that they have not condemned Putin and his acolytes. Ultimately Russian culture risks being airbrushed out of western European mentalities. It is worth pausing for a moment and just looking at what we are rejecting, perhaps unconsciously. Hitherto—and for many Europeans still —Russian culture has had an important place in our education and upbringing. Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Rimsky Korsakov, Shostakovich and the sublime Prokofiev have delighted our concert audiences for decades. Marc Chagall’s imagination has stimulated ours. Ballet in Europe—or the US, for that matter—would not be what it is without the great influence of the ballet russe. Nor, in a related world, would we be so intellectually rich without the heritage of Russian scientists, physicists and mathematicians.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Culture, Literature, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

42. Public Diplomacy Challenges in Reaching Russian Audiences

Author:: Mark G. Pomar
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: U.S. government broadcasters—Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—have always faced challenges in reaching Russian audiences, both during the Cold War and today. Just as we did during the Cold War, today’s VOA and RFE/RL must give exiled Russians the opportunity to speak directly to their compatriots and to challenge the lies and distortions in Russian media. Shortly after joining RFE/RL in 1982 as the Assistant Director of the Russian Service, I met with senior RL editors and visiting former dissidents to discuss the most effective ways of reaching Soviet citizens during the coldest years of the Cold War. I began by laying out several key points of the Reagan administration’s approach to public diplomacy, primarily the need to treat Russians as victims of Soviet communism and encourage them to take pride in the major accomplishments of Russian culture, philosophy, and religious traditions that had been ignored or distorted by the Soviet regime. As I cited examples of Soviet suppression of religion, the banning of conservative philosophers, and the exiling of nationalist writers such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, I could tell by the quizzical expressions on the faces of my interlocutors that my passionate advocacy for a new form of public diplomacy was falling on deaf ears. Finally, one of the older editors who had spent time in the gulag said: “Look, we understand the need to present Russian culture that has been suppressed by the Soviet authorities and, yes, we know that Russians have suffered under Soviet repression, but Russians cannot be seen strictly as victims nor can their political culture be treated in the same way that we would treat Ukrainian, Georgian, Baltic or other national cultures of the USSR.” He stressed that Communism was a dying ideology, but an aggressive form of Russian nationalism was rapidly gaining strength, especially in the KGB and miliary services, and the West would rue the day when that surging Russian imperialism would merge with brutal Soviet practice. Quite presciently, he predicted an evolving Russian State that would assert its dominance over the other nationalities of the USSR in the name of imperial greatness, and not communism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Ideology, Soft Power, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

43. Is there Eurasian Connectivity without Europe?

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Tucked between Russia, Iran, and China, Central Asia is now desperately looking for solutions to cushion the impacts of global tension on its fragile economies, which are deeply tied to sanctions against Russia and a local production slowdown as China recovers from its zero COVID policy. While European diplomacy has come at a crucial time, its Central Asian policy is ambiguous, and commitments misplaced. Central Asia is continuously perceived by the EU as a region in need of developmental assistance, which leads to European regional policies that focus on digitalization and climate issues. What Central Asia needs is the establishment of concrete logistical connectivity that will enable efficient flow of products across Eurasia.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Economics, European Union, Connectivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

44. Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site: Satellite Imagery Update and Call for Action

Author:: David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Nearly three months after the Institute and The Washington Post publicly revealed detailed information on the plans of JSC Alabuga1 (“Alabuga”) to produce thousands of deadly Shahed136 kamikaze drones on Russian soil, satellite imagery indicates that plans are progressing at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga, and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. The information in internal documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, reveals not only detailed timelines for Alabuga’s production of weaponized drones and the establishment of mass production with Iranian assistance, but also multiple pressure points and vulnerabilities. Now, not later, is the time for the U.S. government to take the lead, work with partner governments and industry, and use leverage against those less inclined to cooperate, to hinder Alabuga from succeeding in providing the Russian military with thousands of Shahed-136 drones. With winter fast approaching, and Alabuga’s Shahed output increasing, Russia can be expected to accelerate its Shahed-136 attacks against Ukraine’s vital energy infrastructure, causing brutal living conditions for the civilian population. A key, overdue first step is for the United States and its allies to sanction JSC Alabuga and its associated companies
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

45. Electronics in the Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone

Author:: David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, filled with Western electronics, continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran 2, are produced and assembled at JSC Alabuga facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with assistance from Iran. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga,1 and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. Information in internal Alabuga documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, show a remarkable ability to acquire sophisticated electronic components from the West and build modules aimed at defeating Ukraine’s ability to jam Shahed-136 drones and require Ukraine and its allies to keep deploying additional or more advanced jamming systems. The detailed information on the Shahed-136’s electronic components, with part numbers and manufacturer, provide a valuable opportunity to thwart exports of these specific parts to Russia and its partner Iran, which has to date supplied most of these electronic parts to Alabuga for use in the Shahed-136 drone. Starting next year, however, Alabuga has committed to outfit Shahed136 drones with electronic components it acquires on its own. The danger posed by Alabuga should mobilize governments to apply sanctions and other restrictive measures to Alabuga and the associated companies revealed in the documents. Sanctions on Alabuga would not only be helpful in disrupting Alabuga and associated companies’ procurement efforts, but they would cause stress to a giant drone factory that has to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones on a tight schedule, with little previous experience with drone production, hundreds of new employees on its payroll, and under financial pressure to prove itself as a capable supplier to the military.
Topic:: Sanctions, Weapons, Drones, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

46. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

47. Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era

Author:: Ryan Burkholder
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: To undermine U.S. military strength, state actors are increasingly operating in the ambiguous environment between peace and war known as the “gray zone.” These actions test U.S. response by exploiting the West’s rigid notion of conflict. Soviet actions toward the United States and other nations during the Cold War shared many similarities with contemporary Russian strategy. There is no current uniform definition of the gray zone, and the United States has not developed doctrine to address this challenge. Russia has adapted Soviet Cold War techniques for the digital and globalized age and effectively integrates instruments of power against the United States by targeting seams within culture, maintaining ambiguity, and controlling narratives. Countering these tactics requires that the United States modify its mindset toward conflict and improve integration of its own instruments of power.
Topic:: Cold War, Politics, Conflict, Gray Zone, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

48. Enemy at the Gates: A Strategic Cultural Analysis of Russian Approaches to Conflict in the Information Domain

Author:: Nicholas H. Vidal
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: When studying the strategic behavior of a foreign adversary, the act of mirror imaging one’s own conceptual frames often risks producing inaccurate assessments. To avoid such outcomes, some scholars promote the study of strategic culture as a framework for generating more empathetic analyses of foreign state decision-making. This article maintains that strategic cultural approaches are particularly useful for conceptualizing contemporary Russian understandings of confrontation in the information domain. To this end, it is argued that while contemporary Russian thinkers view information as a crucial asset in their country’s ongoing “struggle” with the West, Moscow’s use of informational nonmilitary means remains ultimately a critical, albeit subordinate element of a broader multidomain coercive strategy.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Strategic Culture, and Information
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

49. European Security, Eurasian Crossroads?

Author:: Zachary Paikin and Christos Katsioulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The NATO summit in Vilnius taking place from 11 to 12 July 2023 marks another step towards deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the collective West. When paired with the EU’s reinvigorated enlargement process, there is a growing tendency to assume that Washington and Brussels can – or even must – set the terms of the European security order without input from Moscow. However, in a world of ‘mega-regions’ and competing visions of international order, cooperative security remains relevant if the EU wishes to salvage some degree of rules-based order in the space that connects Europe with Eurasia. As first steps in this direction, the EU should work to keep the OSCE operational, launch a limited dialogue with Belarus on arms control, and envision a future for the European Political Community that someday includes Russia.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Order
Political Geography:: Europe and Eurasia

50. The Zangezur corridor as part of the global transport route (against the backdrop of power games in the South Caucasus region)

Author:: Piotr Gawliczek and Khayal Iskandarov
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The restoration of historical transport routes and the creation of new ones is a strategic objective of most states in modern times. Located at the intersection of the North–South and East–West transport routes, Azerbaijan is currently recognised as an important transport and logistics hub. Successful cooperation with European Union countries in this field is taking place. The East–West and North–South international transport routes passing through the territory of Azerbaijan are very convenient for cargo transportation in terms of distance and duration. This paper discusses the plausibility of the Zangezur corridor being used (which is mentioned in the tripartite agreement that dates back to 10 November 2020) and highlights its importance as an integral element of the global transit route. A comparative analysis of different transit routes was carried out, and the advantages of opening this corridor for all stakeholders was justified.
Topic:: International Security, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Eurasia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

51. Hazardous Drinking in Privatized Industrial Towns of Russia

Author:: Alexi Gugushvili, Aytalina Azarova, Darja Irdam, and Lawrence King
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Hazardous drinking, defined as the consumption of homemade, unofficially made alcohol and non-beverages, is prevalent and accounts for a high proportion of alcohol-related deaths in Russia. Individual-level characteristics are important explanations of hazardous drinking, but they are unlikely to explain spatial variation in this type of alcohol consumption. Areas that attracted insufficient attention in the research of hazardous drinking are the legacy of industrialization and the speed of economic reforms mainly through the privatization policy of major enterprises in the 1990s. Applying multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions to a unique dataset from 30 industrial towns in the European part of Russia, we find that in addition to individual-level characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education, social isolation, labor market status, and material deprivation, the types of towns where individuals resided such as industrial structure and speed of privatization also accounted for the variance in hazardous alcohol consumption among both males and females.
Topic:: Privatization, Alcohol, Public Health, and Industry
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

52. Rewinding the Clock? US-Russia Relations in the Biden Era

Author:: Bobo Lo
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The escalating crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022 has returned US-Russia relations to center stage. Faced with the prospect of a new Russian military intervention, US President Joe Biden has re-engaged with Vladimir Putin in a manner reminiscent of the diplomacy of the superpower era. But this latest American attempt at accommodation raises more questions than answers. In the intervening three decades the world has changed out of all recognition, the international influence of the US-Russia relationship is much diminished, and their cooperation has sunk to historic lows. Can Washington and Moscow defy gravity and achieve some level of pragmatic engagement? There is good reason for skepticism. Neither side is truly invested in cooperation, but instrumentalizes it to other purposes. The Biden administration hopes to neutralize Russia in order to focus on the all-encompassing challenge of China. The Kremlin looks to undermine American influence as part of its project of promoting Russia as an independent global power. These goals are essentially irreconcilable. Looking ahead, the real question is not whether the United States and Russia can recalibrate their relationship to new “normal”, but whether they can avoid confrontation in an increasingly fluid and disorderly world.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Intervention, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

53. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

54. Cutting Putin’s energy rent: ‘smart sanctioning’ Russian oil and gas

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Guntram Wolff, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Simone Tagliapietra, Axel Ockenfels, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ulrich Schetter
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In the wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, the most efficient way for Europe to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:: Oil, Sanctions, Gas, Vladimir Putin, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

55. The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Global Transport Networks and the Role of Georgia

Author:: Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war has been going on for five months, and it can be said that it is a war that has changed the world, and not only in military and security terms. In this edition of “The Security Review”, we will discuss the food, energy, and transportation aspects of this conflict. Davit Shatakishvili describes the impact of the war on international transportation, and focuses on the changes Georgia has to adjust for.
Topic:: Transportation, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Georgia

56. International Practice of Sanction Evasion and Circumvention Possibilities for Russia

Author:: Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Sanctions play a special role in the economic and political life of the world. Historically, despite their various forms of use, sanctions have acquired an essentially functional substance in the 20th century. The goal of the sanctions is primarily to ensure global peace. In case of violation of market principles, military aggression, or disregard for the rules established between nations, the violator is sanctioned by specific countries and/or groups of states, who, in doing so, aim to bring it back to the norms of international law. Sanctions increase political and economic pressure on the target country, which are reflected in various dimensions and quantitative figures. Consequently, the country loses some of its political leverage and experiences tangible economic regress. For the sake of universal peace and global security, the policy of sanctions has not lost its relevance in the 21st century. As a result of Russia’s aggressive military intervention in Ukraine, the world community has applied an unprecedented package of sanctions against the aggressor, which has spread to almost every industry of the country and is still being added to. In this regard, Russia broke the anti-record and surpassed countries such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Over the decades, sanctioned countries have accumulated extensive experience on how to circumvent the imposed sanctions, so as to at least partially help the country overcome the economic difficulties. It is interesting which ways and schemes such countries use to circumvent the restrictions, and based on that experience, what opportunities there are for the Russian Federation to do the same and evade the sanctions imposed on it, a move which will not only limit but also further pave the way for its aggressive foreign policy and threaten world peace.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Oil, Sanctions, Global Markets, Cryptocurrencies, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

57. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:: Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

58. Assessing the Effects of Trade Liberalization With Third Countries: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union

Author:: Simon Sngryan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The processes of objectively conditioned integration in the economic, political, legal, and institutional spheres of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) Member States took place step by step, starting from preferential trade agreements, passing to the customs union, the common market and other stages of integration. This process is accompanied by the gradual deepening of trade liberalization with potential partners. The selection of potential partners should be carried out through a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the structure and volumes of foreign trade of the EEU Member States (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) with third parties, their markets structure, existing customs regulation, trade barriers, and possible export potential. The research evaluated the EEU's possible enlargement effects on the Member States' economic indicators. The research aimed to assess the possible consequences of EEU expansion and signing free trade agreements, considering Pakistan, Korea, and Malaysia as potential trade partners. Modeling the effect of an FTA assumes horizontal zeroing of tariffs between partners. Then, using the GTAP model, a new state of general equilibrium was calculated corresponding to the changed parameters of customs and tariff regulation. In this case, most variables, such as change in GDP, production output, and export-import volumes, were estimated, manifesting the economic effect of trade liberalization.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

59. The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova

Author:: Dumitru Minzarari
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia could target Moldova by embarking on a limited-scope but overt military invasion; or by pursuing more covert hybrid aggression scenarios. The three most plausible Russian aggression scenarios are: a military action launched from Transnistria; a local, elite-focused rebellion similar to Russia’s exploits in Donbas in 2014, likely centring on the Moldovan region of Gagauzia; and popular unrest stoked by Russia and containing violent elements. The EU and Moldova underestimate the risk of one or more of these happening. The EU’s preferred “resilience” approach to hybrid threats lacks an active component that can effectively respond to, and repel, Russian aggression. Moldova should draw on Western support to implement an “active resilience” policy to better confront and undermine Russian actions. The EU should set up a CSDP mission in Moldova comprising both civilian and military components that helps the Moldovan authorities plan and conduct security threat assessments and protect against military and hybrid risks.
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Hybrid Threats, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Moldova

60. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:: Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

61. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:: Kristi Raik
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

62. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

63. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:: Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

64. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:: Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

65. How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has existed for nearly 30 years, and, during all that time, it had never sent troops into a conflict zone in one of its members states. CSTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had requested assistance in the past, but the organization did not send help as those situations were not part of the CSTO mandate. Faced with unrest that broke out in early January 2022, Kazakhstan’s government requested CSTO assistance to fend off what Kazakhstan’s president said was a threat to the country’s sovereignty from tens of thousands of terrorists. For the first time, the CSTO answered a call for aid and deployed some 2,500 troops to guard key facilities in Kazakhstan—but only in a few cities, and for less than two weeks. It looks now like there were no terrorists, and Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s call for help was not to save his country, but to save himself from elements in the government that were trying to oust him. That makes the CSTO decision to deploy forces more intriguing, as it appears the organization did not send the force to Kazakhstan to defend that country’s sovereignty, but to defend Tokayev and preserve a government that was friendly towards Russia.
Topic:: Security, Sovereignty, Regional Integration, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

66. Control, Development, Legitimacy, and the 2024 Problem: Russia Two Years Before the End of Putin's 4th Term

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: In 2020, the Russian Federation’s legislature adopted constitutional reforms initiated by President Vladimir Putin. The reforms allowed Putin to “zero out” his presidential term count, and thus maintain ambiguity about his plans in 2024. They also set the stage for a radical revamp of governance in the country, with hope to kick-start Russia’s economic growth before 2024 and to ensure that the system could withstand instability stemming from a potential succession crisis. The reforms did bring substantial changes. However, as it is evident from major policies regarding capital investments, public administration, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the reforms left political decision-making top-heavy, poorly informed, short-sighted, and constrained, making it highly questionable whether they could achieve the goal of stimulating growth and stabilizing the regime’s domestic position before 2024. It was amid this set of contradictions and ambiguities that Putin decided to start a war of submission against Ukraine in February 2022. As of March 2022, it is too early to conclusively evaluate the consequences of the war on Russia’s future, and having been finalized in early February, this report cannot attempt to do it. However, by undoing the foundations of economic and social development, the war seems to have set Russia on a course where the regime aims to resolve the contradictions and ambiguities detailed in this report by previously unseen levels of domestic repression and external aggression.
Topic:: Development, Reform, Constitution, Legitimacy, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

67. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:: Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

68. The Rise of Sino-Russian Biotech Cooperation

Author:: Svitlana Lebedenko
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China’s rise as a global innovation power is rooted in the development of a sovereign innovation infrastructure, one that allows China to compete in high-technology races with the United States. This process is complemented by an intensifying science and technology partnership with the Russian Federation. By decoupling from China and Russia, the United States and its allies are pushing China and Russia closer to each other. The paper discusses recent examples of Sino-Russian biotechnology cooperation projects, offering an early account of the emerging integration of two distinct but complementary innovation infrastructures.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

69. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:: Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

70. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:: Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

71. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:: Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

72. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:: Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

73. Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: The Effect of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Turkey’s position in a “post-Western world” is widely debated as Asia emerges as the world’s new demographic and economic focal point. Turkey’s drive for strategic autonomy is crucial to all considerations of Eurasianism as a result of the rise of emerging powers worldwide and the transition to a multipolar international system. The emergence of a revisionist Russia, threatening to destroy the global order in place since the end of the Cold War, sent out a powerful warning to its neighbors, including Turkey. Russian-Turkish relations have not been shaped by shared identity, interest and threat perceptions; instead, they have remained largely instrumental and driven by necessity. The Turkish government cannot afford consistency in its discourse on Turkey as the “protector of the oppressed” when it comes to defending Uyghur rights against the Chinese regime. Ukraine and the West’s response to Russian aggression refuted Turkish Eurasianist claims that Ukraine was “helpless” and that the West had entered a “serious and irreversible decline”.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

74. Moscow’s Strategic Obsession with the Eastern Mediterranean: Lessons from pre-Cold-War history

Author:: Constantine Capsaskis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The vital role of the Eastern Mediterranean has once again come to the fore in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The region has been the site of competition between Russia, and its historical predecessors, and the Anglo-American world for almost 250 years. This paper seeks to glean lessons from the past and help identify the dangers that may face the region today. To do so, a brief, but hopefully thorough, analysis of interactions in the Mediterranean between the British Empire, Russia (in all its iterations) and, to a lesser degree, the United States prior to the Cold War will be presented. It will then seek to use this historical context to examine the present situation in the region. There is a longstanding perception that the Russian Federation, and its historical predecessors (the Russian Empire and the USSR), desired control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The British Empire saw the region as an essential lifeline, connecting the British Isles to India and the dominions of Oceania through the Suez Canal. Britain in the 19th century pursued a policy of directly defending the Canal while also supporting a proxy (primarily the Ottoman Empire) to form a counterweight to the Russian threat. This policy would remain unchanged right up to the beginning of the Cold War. Britain went to great lengths during World War Two to ensure that, following the defeat of the Axis, Greece remain oriented away from the USSR. This included coming to difficult terms with the Soviet Union over the future of Europe and militarily confronting Greek left-wing guerrillas. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been a significant concentration of Russian and NATO warships in the Eastern Mediterranean as Russia recognizes the critical importance attached by NATO to the region and hopes to achieve disproportionate gains with a threatening presence there. These include the complete control of the Black Sea, the pre-occupation of NATO resources in a region peripheral to Russian coastal security, and rendering regional energy sources vulnerable.
Topic:: Cold War, History, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

75. The Akkuyu NPP and Russian-Turkish Nuclear Cooperation: Asymmetries and risks

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: By ratifying the 2016 Paris Agreement, Turkey has vowed to reduce the use of fossil fuels and promote clean and renewable energy production. The Turkish government has embraced nuclear energy as a solution to cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu NPP, is being built by Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, under a Build-Own-Operate contract, the first of its kind in the world. The Akkuyu NPP will reinforce Turkey’s dependence on Russia for the next six decades. The Akkuyu NPP presents considerable environmental risks for the whole Eastern Mediterranean.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Energy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Middle East

76. Supporting Russian Civil Society: A Report of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Since Russia re-invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, repression inside Russia has worsened. The trend toward greater repression predates Moscow’s unprovoked invasion. The Kremlin had already increased its crackdown on all facets of Russian civil society, including targeting journalists and political opposition and tightening the country’s information environment ahead of its parliamentary election in September 2021. Since the invasion, the Kremlin has intensified its repressive efforts to shut down the possibility of dissent and insulate its hold on power from any blowback from the war. Experience from authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia suggests that high levels of repression are here to stay as long as Putin remains in power—authoritarian regimes are unlikely to walk back repression for fear that doing so would indicate regime weakness and embolden activists who advocate for political change. Rising repression inside Russia created immediate risks to journalists, activists, and other Russians who support a freer and more democratic Russia (as well as to their families). In the longer term, it also creates a potential barrier to a less confrontational relationship with a post-Putin Russia. As repression has risen, the Kremlin has doubled down on anti–United States and anti-Western rhetoric and shut down opportunities for exchanges between Russian scientists and academics and their Western counterparts. The Kremlin’s propagation of anti-Western messages and the lack of exchange between Russians and the West—exacerbated by a loss of economic ties amid Western sanctions—engender mistrust and misunderstanding, creating a long-term barrier to a less confrontational relationship. Steps to deny Russian tourists visas and other forms of collective punishment, while understandable, have the potential to sour Russian attitudes toward the West, hurting the prospects for any future improvement in relations with a post-Putin Russia. This policy brief identifies how the United States and Europe together can continue to support Russian civil society despite the dismal state of relations with Russia. It outlines the state of play of the Kremlin’s crackdown on Russian civil society, U.S. and European responses to date, shared interests in coordinated support, and recommendations for what the transatlantic community can do to support Russian civil society in this new era of relations with Russia. Given the barriers to supporting activists inside Russia, this memo’s recommendations focus on assistance to those Russians who have left the country.
Topic:: Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Transatlantic Relations, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

77. Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis

Author:: Akın Ünver and Ahmet Kurnaz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help generate domestic awareness against foreign information operations globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats, and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as primary problems in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policies, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? Using computational methods, this article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, as well as more than 2,000 NATO texts, news statements, and publications since January 2014, presenting an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to investigate the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that NATO’s threat discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by the US’ political lexicon, and that the organization’s word choice changes based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study suggests that the recent disinformation agenda is, in fact, a continuity of NATO’s long-standing Russia-focused securitization strategy and their attempt to mobilize the Baltic states and Poland in support of NATO’s mission.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Elections, Disinformation, and Securitization
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

78. The rise of mega-regions

Author:: Zachary Paikan, Ilke Toygür, Martin Quencez, and Stephen R. Nagy
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: For the past several years, two ‘mega-regions’ have been forming in global politics – Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. Both have become a shorthand for shaping the future rules and norms of international order in the face of a global power shift. ‘Eurasia’ has served to illustrate Moscow’s commitment to deepening its strategic partnership with Beijing and creating a new distribution of influence in world politics – one in which the West lies at the periphery rather than the centre. Meanwhile, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has taken off in response to the deepening Sino-American rivalry and (disputed) assertions of a budding global contest between democracies and autocracies. This CEPS In-Depth Analysis paper offers an overview of these two mega-regions, including the key geopolitical and governance questions that have been shaping them over recent years and whether great power dynamics in these theatres have shifted since the start of the Ukraine War. It concludes with observations on how these shifts stand to structure transatlantic relations beyond the horizon of the current war.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, Transatlantic Relations, and International Order
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Indo-Pacific

79. Taking the road away from Europe – how far could Georgia go (and can it be reversed)?

Author:: Ghia Nodia
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Earlier this year, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and Ukraine were granted official EU candidate status… but not Georgia. Instead, Georgia has been left behind on the waiting list, with its application due to be reevaluated by the EU sometime in 2023. Yet Georgia has an extremely pro-European society highly in favour of their country continuing its journey towards closer integration with the EU. So what happened? This CEPS Explainer argues that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s anti-Western rhetoric and democratic backsliding has actually diverted Georgia down a road away from its key Western allies. Until this is rectified, Georgia may be stuck on the waiting list for some time yet. But all hope is not lost – regardless of the government’s current actions and contradictory statements, Georgia’s highly active and pro-European civil society may hold the key in getting their country back on track towards its European future.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Politics, Democratic Backsliding, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

80. Gender Issues in Russia

Author:: Marina Pisklakova-Parker
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Gender inequality in the Russian Federation has been growing in the past few years due to the lack of a clear state policy addressing the problem and a rise in propaganda of so-called “traditional values”, which are patriarchal attitudes towards role division for women and men. This has resulted in the increased vulnerability of women, including the growth of violence against women, discrimination at work and lack of opportunities in politics. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, this patriarchal role division has made women even more vulnerable, doubling their load of household work and increasing domestic violence. Women’s organisations are at the forefront of providing services to victims of violence, educating the public and advocating for change. The recent so-called “special operation” in Ukraine has also demonstrated that women in Russia are actively protesting, organising themselves to help the Ukrainian people and building resistance.
Topic:: Women, Inequality, NGOs, COVID-19, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

81. Russian Youth: Their Attitude to the Ruling Elite and Political Processes

Author:: Denis Volkov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Young Russians are different from older generations. They are confident Internet users and thus have access to independent media and are exposed to free information and a variety of opinions. They show greater disillusionment with authorities, a greater degree of Westernisation of their tastes and more openness to the world. These differences are well observed in the results of the long-term sociological surveys undertaken by the Levada-Center, an independent polling centre in Moscow. Amidst the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West, Russian youth finds itself pressured between the Russian authorities on the one side, and sanctions from Western countries aimed at isolating Russia from the outside world.
Topic:: Sanctions, Public Opinion, Youth, Elites, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

82. From geopolitical anomie to a syncretic metamodel of the Greater Black Sea Region – “Five Sea Region”

Author:: Alexander Rusetsky
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main goal of this study is to search for new effective mechanisms to assist in preventing the internationalisation of armed conflicts using conventional weapons and the creation of more weapons of mass destruction in the geostrategic region, the Greater Black Sea Region, which includes the countries of the “Five Seas” (Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Arabian Sea, and Mediterranean Sea), positive transformation of conflicts and the creation of a “Black Sea Security Community”. The methodological approach taken is based on the theory of meta-cognitive management, which implies a qualitative expansion of the dimensions for solving those problems that are unsolvable in the dimensions given today; a holistic approach focused on the multi-level and democratic participation of all participants in the process; and the method of geopolitical modelling being applied to discuss new forms and platforms for cooperation between those involved in confrontation in the Black Sea space. Innovation represents a return to the concept of syncretism in the scientific discourse for describing political and geopolitical tasks. The idea of creating a syncretic meta-model of Black Sea security is one way to improve cooperation between parties that have incompatible positions but are aware of common threats and the need to prevent them. Measures need to be taken for the countries of the Five Sea region to be fully integrated into the process and a new architecture created for the Black Sea Security Community. Scientific support is also necessary for the planning and implementation of peacekeeping processes in the Greater Black Sea Region.
Topic:: Security, Politics, International Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Black Sea

83. Economic coercion as a means of hybrid warfare: The South Caucasus as a focal point

Author:: Khayal Iskandarov and Piotr Gawliczek
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The rapidly changing security environment has brought a plethora of non-military measures to the fore. These measures have completely changed the nature of hostilities by giving them a hybrid character. With regard to the South Caucasus region, the chasm among the political courses pursued by particular states makes the overall region more susceptible to diverse external threats of a political, economic, military and cultural nature. This paper focuses on the economic component of the hybrid warfare in the South Caucasus region. The issues are considered from a security point of view and not from an economic perspective. The vulnerabilities of particular nations in the region to economic coercion are highlighted in the paper and suggestions for improving them made. The authors underscore the regional unity in the South Caucasus as a prerequisite for eliminating or at least mitigating economic dependence and healing the “regional fracture” that has lasted for decades.
Topic:: Security, Hybrid Warfare, Coercion, and Economic Dependence
Political Geography:: Eurasia and South Caucasus

84. “Russia’s war in Eastern Europe is a central threat to the international architecture”

Author:: Luca Niculescu
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: n the short, medium and long term, what dangers does Russia's attack on Ukraine pose to the European Union? Is there a different perception of these dangers/threats in Eastern Europe? The Russian aggression in Ukraine, which began more than three months ago, has come at a complex time at both European and global level. Dealing with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic already required a great deal of effort, imagination and mobilisation on the part of states and citizens. Transformations and reforms have been launched to respond to the new reality and to allow for a sustainable, environmentally friendly recovery. It was in this context that we witnessed the return of war to the European continent after 77 years of peace, with unprecedented suddenness and violence. Russia's war in Eastern Europe is not a conflict relegated to the periphery of political reality, but in its present form is a central threat to the international architecture as we know it.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Threat Perception, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe

85. “In Russia today the whole media sphere has been destroyed."

Author:: Katerina Abramova
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What role does media play in informing the Russian population about the war in Ukraine? I would like to emphasise that no problems can be solved until people realise that there is a problem. If independent media and independent journalists stop telling the truth about what is going on in Ukraine some people will just be left with state propaganda, others will just know nothing. Most governments thought the war would not last more than half a year. But it is far from being a short and victorious one as Moscow had planned, so people are starting to ask questions. Some analysts say that in the autumn ordinary citizens will start to feel some of the consequences, as they prepare, for example, their kids for school; they will have to pay more because of inflation and the effects of the sanctions. For the media it is simply very important to give people the opportunity to know what’s going on.
Topic:: Media, Journalism, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

86. Development of the IT Industry and Structural Transformation: Focused on IT Cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Author:: Minhyeon Jeong, Jiyoung Min, and Dongyeon Jeong
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study was designed as a primary study to analyze the economic significance and potential of cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the IT sector, and to derive implications for new directions between Korea and the three countries with the advent of the fourth industrial revolution era. The goal of the study is to discuss what the development of the IT industry means for the three economies, examine the characteristics of each country, and gain policy implications on how cooperation with Korea should proceed in the future. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four components. First, the economic significance of IT technology cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan is viewed from the perspective of structural transformation. Second, the effect of IT cooperation between Korea and Russia on the Russian economy is quantitatively estimated through the analytical framework of structural transformation. Third, to supplement the limitations of theoretical discussions and derive customized cooperation directions for each country, the current status and policies of the IT industry in the three countries are examined in detail. Fourth, IT technology subsectors promising for cooperation between Korea and Russia are identified, from the patent citation analysis and network analysis.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Science and Technology, Industry, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan

87. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:: Pavel Baev
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

88. Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations

Author:: Gavin Wilde
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A review of academic, doctrinal, and journalistic writing covering the last three decades of Russian military theorizing on cyber-related issues yields three hypotheses that may explain the mismatch between the expectations of many Western observers and the reported impact of Russian cyber operations in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.1 By exploring the unique and oft-overlooked facets of Moscow’s conceptualization of “cyber,” this paper provides a foundation for better assessing Russia’s performance in cyberspace in Ukraine in early 2022, along with a more nuanced understanding of its capabilities and possible expectations going forward. These hypotheses are as follows: Russia’s Information Operations Troops—a rough analog to Western military cyber commands—remains in its infancy and appears optimized more for counterpropaganda than for offensive cyber operations. The operational command structure over offensive cyber operations, meanwhile, remains murky and is possibly more political than military in nature. Russia’s premier offensive cyber capacities are housed within agencies focused on intelligence and subversion—the key tool kits used against Ukraine since 2014—rather than combined-arms warfare. Moscow’s secretive and poorly executed February 2022 invasion precluded optimal performance in the initial period of the war, which is particularly pivotal in Russian thinking about effectiveness in the information domain. These are each examined through Russia’s own information warfare prism, which differs in crucial ways from Western conceptions of “cyber”—foremost in that it is more expansive, encompassing and emphasizing the psychosocial impacts of information and communication technologies on both the polity and the public.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

89. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

90. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:: Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

91. Russian economic nationalism and the vectors of Russian foreign policy

Author:: Rafał Lisiakiewicz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: In this article, the author wants to test the impact of economic nationalism on the change in Russia’s foreign policy. The author will refer to neoclassical realism, which shows how to combine the issues of power distribution in international relations with the influence of the domestic level of the state on the process of creation of the foreign policy. In terms of neoclassical realism, economic nationalism is a variable that shapes the perception of the economic challenges facing Russia. The author also points out that economic nationalism is also related to the protectionist policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, it influences the shaping of processes within and outside the country. The author recognizes that in the process of creating the Russian foreign policy decisions, economic nationalism should be linked to other factors, especially security issues and Russia’s general strategic culture, in order to obtain the final set of premises that will determine Russia’s shifts in foreign policy. The tensions related to the role of the EU and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe clearly influenced the level of cooperation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, economic issues in this regard were also extremely important. Russia’s power position was based on the economic potential.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Nationalism, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

92. The American Multi-Domain Operation as a response to the Russian concept of New Generation Warfare

Author:: Tomasz Wójtowicz
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: America’s unipolar balance of power created after the end of the Cold War is inevitably coming to an end. The dynamic economic growth of the People’s Republic of China, lasting uninterruptedly since the 1980s, the reconstruction of spheres of influence by the Russian Federation, the world war on terrorism with the accompanying costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, economic crises systematically weakening the economies of Western countries in 2001, 2007 and 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic – these are just some of the many causes of geopolitical changes. Parallel to the weakening position of the United States, countries such as the Russian Federation are increasingly boldly challenging the current balance of power, provoking armed conflicts and destabilizing countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to present the American Multi-Domain Operation concept as a response to the Russian concept of new generation warfare by which the country successfully led to the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the political destabilization of Ukraine. The main research problem resulting from the assumed goal was to answer the following question: what is a Multi-Domain Operation and how do the United States intend to compete and win in the armed conflict taking place in Central and Eastern Europe with the Russian Federation? The following research methods were used to solve the research problems: the method of cause-effect and institutional-legal analysis, method of examining documents, and the method of analysis and criticism of literature. The monographic and comparative methods were also used. However, the main role was played by deductive reasoning which enables the identification of facts based on an in-depth analysis of source data. Taking into account the preliminary research, the author proposed the following research hypothesis: a Multi-Domain Operation is another American operational concept describing the security environment, and the Russian and American way of war. The USA will achieve victory in a possible armed conflict by locating and neutralizing the enemy’s anti-access – area denial capabilities, and then destroying its forces in the disputed area.
Topic:: Power Politics, Conflict, Multipolarity, Russia-Ukraine War, and New Generation Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

93. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:: Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

94. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:: Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

95. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:: John R. Deni
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

96. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

97. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

98. What Next for Georgia's Foreign Policy

Author:: Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: During the European Council summit on 23 June, Georgia was not granted EU candidate status, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, and received only the prospect of EU accession. Georgia is the most pro-European state in the South Caucasus. The effectiveness of its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course is hampered by internal political polarisation and Russia’s policies towards the region. Georgia’s continued cooperation with the EU and NATO will depend primarily on its willingness to implement reforms and the development of an internal consensus between the government and opposition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Domestic Politics, Polarization, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Council
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Georgia

99. Strategic Opportunity for the Middle Corridor?

Author:: Selcuk Colakoglu
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Connectivity initiatives across the Eurasian landmass have been on global and regional agendas since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the newly independent countries of the Silk Road region prioritizing efforts to reach international markets so as to strengthen their strategic independence from Moscow. Amongst the numerous Silk Road connectivity initiatives, the Middle Corridor has the aim of building an efficient East‑West corridor involving countries located between the European Union and China (except for Russia). This essay analyses the pros and cons of the Middle Corridor project from the perspective of some of the countries most concerned, starting with Türkiye. It also examines how the COVID‑19 pandemic and the 2022 Russia‑Ukraine war have affected the implementation of this initiative.
Topic:: Pandemic, COVID-19, Global Health, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Eurasia

100. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:: Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

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