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1. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

2. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

3. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

4. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

5. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

6. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

7. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

8. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

9. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

10. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:
Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

11. Russia’s Cultural Heritage Can Be a Bridge to the Future

Author:
Robert Cox
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Russia has become Europe’s ogre. Beyond the brutality of Moscow’s onslaught on Ukraine looms a harsher ideological backdrop. Too many Russian citizens have been enticed into seeing this invasion as a defence of Russia’s security, national pride and identity, history, Weltanschauung, international standing, and imperial stature. They eulogise Russia’s national church as a defensive shield despite its abuse of spiritual humanity, its soldiers as crusaders. Europeans, in response to this baggage respond with a mixture of fear or unease. Anger, too, along with frustration and ultimately something akin to hatred. With all this comes an inclination in the western world to reject everything Russian. This rejection of a rich culture risks tarnishing our mindset and that of our children. Russian orchestras, dancers and sopranos have been banned from western stages—largely on the pretext that they have not condemned Putin and his acolytes. Ultimately Russian culture risks being airbrushed out of western European mentalities. It is worth pausing for a moment and just looking at what we are rejecting, perhaps unconsciously. Hitherto—and for many Europeans still —Russian culture has had an important place in our education and upbringing. Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Rimsky Korsakov, Shostakovich and the sublime Prokofiev have delighted our concert audiences for decades. Marc Chagall’s imagination has stimulated ours. Ballet in Europe—or the US, for that matter—would not be what it is without the great influence of the ballet russe. Nor, in a related world, would we be so intellectually rich without the heritage of Russian scientists, physicists and mathematicians.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Culture, Literature, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

12. Public Diplomacy Challenges in Reaching Russian Audiences

Author:
Mark G. Pomar
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
U.S. government broadcasters—Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—have always faced challenges in reaching Russian audiences, both during the Cold War and today. Just as we did during the Cold War, today’s VOA and RFE/RL must give exiled Russians the opportunity to speak directly to their compatriots and to challenge the lies and distortions in Russian media. Shortly after joining RFE/RL in 1982 as the Assistant Director of the Russian Service, I met with senior RL editors and visiting former dissidents to discuss the most effective ways of reaching Soviet citizens during the coldest years of the Cold War. I began by laying out several key points of the Reagan administration’s approach to public diplomacy, primarily the need to treat Russians as victims of Soviet communism and encourage them to take pride in the major accomplishments of Russian culture, philosophy, and religious traditions that had been ignored or distorted by the Soviet regime. As I cited examples of Soviet suppression of religion, the banning of conservative philosophers, and the exiling of nationalist writers such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, I could tell by the quizzical expressions on the faces of my interlocutors that my passionate advocacy for a new form of public diplomacy was falling on deaf ears. Finally, one of the older editors who had spent time in the gulag said: “Look, we understand the need to present Russian culture that has been suppressed by the Soviet authorities and, yes, we know that Russians have suffered under Soviet repression, but Russians cannot be seen strictly as victims nor can their political culture be treated in the same way that we would treat Ukrainian, Georgian, Baltic or other national cultures of the USSR.” He stressed that Communism was a dying ideology, but an aggressive form of Russian nationalism was rapidly gaining strength, especially in the KGB and miliary services, and the West would rue the day when that surging Russian imperialism would merge with brutal Soviet practice. Quite presciently, he predicted an evolving Russian State that would assert its dominance over the other nationalities of the USSR in the name of imperial greatness, and not communism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Ideology, Soft Power, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

13. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:
Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

14. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

15. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:
Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

16. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

17. What Next for Georgia's Foreign Policy

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During the European Council summit on 23 June, Georgia was not granted EU candidate status, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, and received only the prospect of EU accession. Georgia is the most pro-European state in the South Caucasus. The effectiveness of its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course is hampered by internal political polarisation and Russia’s policies towards the region. Georgia’s continued cooperation with the EU and NATO will depend primarily on its willingness to implement reforms and the development of an internal consensus between the government and opposition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Domestic Politics, Polarization, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Council
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Georgia

18. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

19. Putin Is Doing Xi’s Dirty Work (and the West Is Helping Him)

Author:
William R. Spiegelberger
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic turn to China has been a disappointment for good reason: Beijing is more interested in advancing its own anti-Western interests than in helping Moscow. The more fruitful and natural partnership would be between Russia and the West, since both face a common threat from China and the infrastructure for mutual prosperity is already in place. The main impediment to improved Russian-Western relations is the continued rule of Putin, who is increasingly doing China’s bidding at Russia’s expense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

20. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

21. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:
Régis Genté
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

22. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

24. Russian economic nationalism and the vectors of Russian foreign policy

Author:
Rafał Lisiakiewicz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
In this article, the author wants to test the impact of economic nationalism on the change in Russia’s foreign policy. The author will refer to neoclassical realism, which shows how to combine the issues of power distribution in international relations with the influence of the domestic level of the state on the process of creation of the foreign policy. In terms of neoclassical realism, economic nationalism is a variable that shapes the perception of the economic challenges facing Russia. The author also points out that economic nationalism is also related to the protectionist policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, it influences the shaping of processes within and outside the country. The author recognizes that in the process of creating the Russian foreign policy decisions, economic nationalism should be linked to other factors, especially security issues and Russia’s general strategic culture, in order to obtain the final set of premises that will determine Russia’s shifts in foreign policy. The tensions related to the role of the EU and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe clearly influenced the level of cooperation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, economic issues in this regard were also extremely important. Russia’s power position was based on the economic potential.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Nationalism, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

25. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

26. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:
Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:
The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

27. Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: The Effect of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Turkey’s position in a “post-Western world” is widely debated as Asia emerges as the world’s new demographic and economic focal point. Turkey’s drive for strategic autonomy is crucial to all considerations of Eurasianism as a result of the rise of emerging powers worldwide and the transition to a multipolar international system. The emergence of a revisionist Russia, threatening to destroy the global order in place since the end of the Cold War, sent out a powerful warning to its neighbors, including Turkey. Russian-Turkish relations have not been shaped by shared identity, interest and threat perceptions; instead, they have remained largely instrumental and driven by necessity. The Turkish government cannot afford consistency in its discourse on Turkey as the “protector of the oppressed” when it comes to defending Uyghur rights against the Chinese regime. Ukraine and the West’s response to Russian aggression refuted Turkish Eurasianist claims that Ukraine was “helpless” and that the West had entered a “serious and irreversible decline”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

28. International Practice of Sanction Evasion and Circumvention Possibilities for Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Sanctions play a special role in the economic and political life of the world. Historically, despite their various forms of use, sanctions have acquired an essentially functional substance in the 20th century. The goal of the sanctions is primarily to ensure global peace. In case of violation of market principles, military aggression, or disregard for the rules established between nations, the violator is sanctioned by specific countries and/or groups of states, who, in doing so, aim to bring it back to the norms of international law. Sanctions increase political and economic pressure on the target country, which are reflected in various dimensions and quantitative figures. Consequently, the country loses some of its political leverage and experiences tangible economic regress. For the sake of universal peace and global security, the policy of sanctions has not lost its relevance in the 21st century. As a result of Russia’s aggressive military intervention in Ukraine, the world community has applied an unprecedented package of sanctions against the aggressor, which has spread to almost every industry of the country and is still being added to. In this regard, Russia broke the anti-record and surpassed countries such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Over the decades, sanctioned countries have accumulated extensive experience on how to circumvent the imposed sanctions, so as to at least partially help the country overcome the economic difficulties. It is interesting which ways and schemes such countries use to circumvent the restrictions, and based on that experience, what opportunities there are for the Russian Federation to do the same and evade the sanctions imposed on it, a move which will not only limit but also further pave the way for its aggressive foreign policy and threaten world peace.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Oil, Sanctions, Global Markets, Cryptocurrencies, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

29. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:
Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

30. Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis

Author:
Akın Ünver and Ahmet Kurnaz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help generate domestic awareness against foreign information operations globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats, and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as primary problems in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policies, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? Using computational methods, this article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, as well as more than 2,000 NATO texts, news statements, and publications since January 2014, presenting an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to investigate the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that NATO’s threat discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by the US’ political lexicon, and that the organization’s word choice changes based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study suggests that the recent disinformation agenda is, in fact, a continuity of NATO’s long-standing Russia-focused securitization strategy and their attempt to mobilize the Baltic states and Poland in support of NATO’s mission.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Elections, Disinformation, and Securitization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

31. Russia Defiant of White House’s Foreign Policy Agenda

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Russia received notably high attention in United States President Joseph Biden’s first foreign policy speech, delivered at the State Department last Thursday, February 4. President Vladimir Putin may take pride in earning a personal mention and a place ahead of China; although the latter was specifically recognized as the US’s top peer competitor, while Russia was characterized mainly as the world’s foremost troublemaker (Izvestia, February 5). Biden asserted he is taking a tougher tone with Moscow compared to his predecessor but said he also has to deal with a rather different Putin. Indeed, the accumulation of authoritarian tendencies, exorbitant corruption and aggressive behavior in recent years has produced a new quality to Putin’s maturing autocratic regime, making it less liable to be moved by criticism coming out of Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Protests
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

32. Policy or Pique? Trump and the Turn to Great Power Competition

Author:
Deborah Welch Larson
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
DEBORAH WELCH LARSON analyzes Donald Trump’s policy toward China and Russia and the return of great power competition. She argues that Trump’s personalization of foreign policy undermined his trade war with China, and efforts to improve relations with Russia and that the Joe Biden administration will continue to compete but seek cooperation in areas of shared interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Prospects For Russia’s Policy Towards Afghanistan

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner and Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Taking advantage of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia intends to strengthen its influence in that country by increasing contacts with the Afghan government and the Taliban. The aim is to become a key mediator in the peace process, which will enable it to influence the participants, increase control over the situation in Afghanistan, and use it in relations with the countries of the region. Russia’s policy may make the stabilisation of Afghanistan more difficult and undermine the effects of the efforts made by NATO countries during the stabilisation mission.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

34. Russia’s Peacekeeping Operation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Goals and Challenges

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During a meeting in Moscow on 11 January, the representatives of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan discussed the situation after the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict. The peacekeeping force of the Russian Federation located in NK remains the guarantor of the cessation of the fighting. The practice of Russian conciliation so far differs from that of UN peacekeeping operations and strengthens Russia’s military position in the region. A challenge for it will be Turkey’s growing ambitions in the South Caucasus, as well as the lack of an agreed status for NK, which in the future may lead to the resumption of military operations in this territory.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

35. Russia’s Foreign Policy: The Internal-International Link

Author:
Aldo Ferrari, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, Maxim Matusevich, Marianne Belenkaya, Andrei Kolesnikov, Alicja Curanović, Alexander Graef, and Paola Magri
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
What drives Russia’s foreign policy in Vladimir Putin’s times? Why did the Kremlin decide to annex Crimea, occupy South Ossetia, intervene in Syria, or give its blessing to Nord Stream II? When explaining Russia’s foreign policy, the consolidation of Putin’s autocratic tendencies and his apparent stability despite many economic and political challenges have contributed – at least in the West – to an excessive “Putin-centrism” and the relative neglect of other agents of domestic politics. As a result, many facets of the country’s foreign policy decisions are misunderstood or shrouded under a thin veil of vagueness and secrecy. This Report attempts to fill this gap, exploring the evolving distribution of political and economic power under the surface of Putin’s leadership to assess the influence of different “lobbies” on Russia’s foreign policy. Who decides what in Moscow? The answer, unsurprisingly, is not always “Vladimir Putin”. All of the contributions in the volume underline the complexity of Russia’s decision-making process beneath the surface of a monolithic and increasingly personalistic government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Authoritarianism, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eurasia

36. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:
Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

37. Georgia’s Europeanization challenged from within: Domestic foreign policy discourses and increasing polarization

Author:
Salome Minesashvili
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Georgia`s foreign policy, especially the implementation of international agreements, is best understood in the context of domestic contestation among alternative foreign policy views. • Nativist views exert increasing influence on the Georgian public. Georgia’s European partners should engage the Georgian public through civil society support and people-to-people contacts, to build trust and facilitate open debate. • The exclusive character of differing foreign policy positions further fuels the extreme political polarization. The government and opposition should be encouraged to come together over shared democratic values, instead of playing up the differences. • Pluralism and tolerance should be encouraged in the public and media debate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Public Opinion, Europeanization, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

38. An Ever Closer Union? Ramifications of further integration between Belarus and Russia

Author:
Bob Deen, Sam Roggeveen, and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Union State of Russia and Belarus was forged in the 1990s through a series of bilateral treaties but has largely remained a paper tiger – at least until now. For well over two decades Belarusian President Lukashenko has had a complicated love-hate relationship with the Kremlin, milking the Russian Federation for energy subsidies and other economic benefits while simultaneously zealously guarding his country’s sovereignty and shielding its state-owned enterprises from Russian takeovers. Although co-operation in the military domain has advanced considerably, the more far-reaching provisions of the Union State, such as a joint constitution, monetary union and a single energy market, have never materialized. While Belarus has generally aligned its foreign policy outlook with the Russian Federation and acceded to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, at various moments Lukashenko tried to keep his geopolitical options open as his relations with the Kremlin deteriorated. Among other things, he sought closer relations with the European Union following the 2008 Georgia conflict and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. The EU, in turn, has alternated between defending its democratic values by imposing sanctions on Lukashenko and his regime for human rights abuses, and then lifting those again a few years later, hoping to lure Belarus away from Russia’s sphere of influence. These hopes proved to be in vain. The Presidential elections of August 2020 and their repressive aftermath have again led to a turning point in Belarus’ relations with the West and with the Russian Federation. Relying on Russian support to remain in power and facing a series of European sanctions, Lukashenko is now again under pressure by the Kremlin to make far-reaching concessions and to advance the integration of Belarus and Russia within the Union State framework. As both the stability of the Lukashenko regime and the outcome of the integration process remain uncertain, this report identifies six scenarios for the future of Belarus and further elaborates the consequences of four of them.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

39. Russian Foreign Policy in 2020: Strengthening Multi-vectorialism

Author:
András Rácz and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In 2020, DGAP’s Strategy Group on Russia focused on Moscow’s long-term efforts to diversify its foreign policy portfolio, turn away from Europe, and build-up other non-Western vectors in its diplomacy. Against this background, this report assesses Russia’s relations with the EU, China, and the United States. While Russian relations with the West are unlikely to improve in 2021 – especially ahead of this fall’s Duma election – there is still a chance for limited engagement on issues of mutual interest.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Democracy, and International Order
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

40. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

41. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

42. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

43. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

44. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

45. A Limited Partnership: Russia-China Relations in the Mediterranean

Author:
Jim Townsend, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, David Shullman, and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The last several years have seen a worrisome increase in tensions in the Mediterranean involving age-old rivals such as Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, as well as increased involvement from newer players like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and China, or returning players in the case of Russia. Many analysts have noted an increase in power struggles between some of these actors in the region. It is against this backdrop of competition that observers have questioned whether the Mediterranean will become a new arena for increased collaboration between China and Russia. In the last several years, the two countries have increased their presence and influence in the Mediterranean, creating opportunities for growing cooperation at odds with U.S. interests and objectives in the region. As the authors have argued in previous CNAS research, the increasing depth of Russia and China’s partnership creates challenges for U.S. interests and increases the risk that both countries pose to the United States. For this reason, the United States should not write off Russia-China relations as just an uncomfortable or unnatural partnership. But nor should Washington seek to counter their cooperation in every dimension of their partnership or compete intensely in every region.1 The alignment between Russia and China presents a comprehensive challenge; addressing it will require policymakers to prioritize and address their cooperation in the areas likely to pose the greatest threats to U.S. interests, and conversely, avoid focusing on areas of lesser concern. The Mediterranean is a region where U.S. policymakers should not overstate the potential for Russia-China cooperation, nor the significance of the implications of their partnership. As Russia and China have increased their activities in the Mediterranean, they have done so largely through parallel and complementary efforts, rather than explicit cooperation. Russia and China share an interest in dividing the European Union and NATO and increasing their own image and influence in the region, especially at the expense of the United States’ influence. However, the Mediterranean is not a priority for Russia or China; the two countries have divergent priorities in the region, and they pursue these priorities differently, limiting the common ground for active engagement between them. Russia has prioritized its security presence and relationships, while Beijing is focused on advancing its economic interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Mediterranean

46. Fall 2021 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS SONG YANHUA, SHEN XINGCHEN, WANG YINGXUE INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE STRATEGIES DURING THE PANDEMICS THROUGH THE LENSES OF MOZI AND GALTUNG ............... 5 DAVIT AGHABEKYAN TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY AND IDENTITY: THE CRIMEAN ARMENIANS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA ........................... 24 KARINE MKHITARIAN PUBLICLY DECLARED POSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KARABAKH PROCESS: PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY ....................................................................................................... 43 LOUISA KHACHATRYAN MEDIA FRAMING AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA IN ARMENIA DURING THE 45-DAY ARTSAKH WAR ........................................................... 65 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................................... 84 ANNEX .................................................................................................................. 85
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Asia, and Armenia

47. The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic States: The Trojan Horse that never was

Author:
Sarah Coolican
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Thirty years ago this month, the world shook as one of the only two Superpowers unexpectedly collapsed, creating enormous ramifications for the 25 million ethnic Russians who found themselves as non-titular citizens outside the borders of the newly formed Russian Federation. This ‘beached diaspora’ has been left marginalised and treated with fear, by the Baltic States in their nation-building policies and has left many to think of this community as ‘ripe’ for Russian influence. This Strategic Update will analyse Russian soft power policies and the development of ‘Russkii Mir’ as a tool for utilising this diaspora to further its foreign policy. Tools, which have been seemingly unaffected to a community of autonomy seeking citizens.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diaspora, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Baltic States

48. Russians See Greater Reward than Risk in Closer Relations with China

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
As Russia and China grow closer through economic ties, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship. With China and Russia on the outs with the United States, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have broadened bilateral economic and military cooperation over the last few years. Recent cooperation has included energy and infrastructure projects, and even a little bit of panda diplomacy. While some observers warn about the potential risk that Russia may grow too dependent on Beijing, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Asia

49. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:
Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

50. How to Think About the China-Russia Partnership

Author:
James Sherr and Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the conclusion of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, the balance of power between China and Russia has appreciably shifted in favour of the former, but their common definition of the enemy and the complementarity of their core interests remains as strong as it ever was. If the China-Russia relationship is not an alliance, then what is it, and what are its limits? In the Xi-Putin era, apprehension and ambition have transformed the ‘axis of convenience’ into an axis of necessity. But will ‘strategic partnership’ prove important or irrelevant to potential conflicts in Taiwan, Belarus or Ukraine? How much should be made of divergences of approach in Central Asia and the Arctic, where China’s rise leaves no stone unturned? To what extent will Russia continue to welcome the growth of China’s power — to the point of nuclear parity with the United States and, by extension with Russia itself?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

51. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation

Author:
Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

52. Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S. Foreign Policy

Author:
Nikolas Gvosdev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
During the immediate post-Cold War period, the importance of Lithuania, along with other Central-Eastern European countries, to U.S. foreign policy increased. Lithuania became one of the jumping-off points for further “democratic enlargement” in Europe, Eurasia, and the Greater Middle East. Today, U.S. policy is focused on retrenchment and consolidation—defined by a shift in attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic region and the Greater Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific region—as well as the growing priority of climate change and the environment as central organizing principles. U.S. foreign policy is also increasingly subordinated to domestic political considerations about the costs and benefits of overseas action for constituencies within the United States. In the 2020s, Lithuania’s importance will rest less on the Russia dimension and further Euro-Atlantic enlargement into the post-Soviet space, and more on its ability to play a greater role in European affairs, to assist in the rebalance to Asian affairs more generally, and to contribute to energy, supply chain, and environmental security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Lithuania, and United States of America

53. Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?

Author:
Rob Lee
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
During March and April 2021, the Russian military conducted a large-scale buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media sites showing Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The United States Department of Defense’s spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Russian buildup was even larger than during the peak of the fighting in 2014. Ukrainian officials estimated that the Russian military buildup would reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops with more than fifty-six battalion tactical groups (BTG). United States defense officials gave a lower estimate that 48 BTGs had moved into the border area and 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders. To put this in perspective, the Russian military has approximately 850,000-900,000 servicemembers in total, and 168 constant readiness BTGs, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. If these estimates were accurate, the Russian military massed roughly 10-15% of its total manpower and approximately one third of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. In response to the buildup, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all called their Russian counterparts to discuss the situation. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status to its highest level. The buildup also coincided with an increase in fighting along the line of contact, with at least 36 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in 2021. The movement of Russian forces led to intense speculation about Russia’s intentions, including fears of a large-scale ground invasion. However, U.S. intelligence indicated that a large-scale ground invasion was unlikely because of a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics necessary for such an operation. Likewise, EUCOM commander General Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks. On April 22, after the end of a large-scale exercise at the Opuk training area in Crimea, which included an amphibious landing, a helicopter air assault operation with two companies, and a multi-battalion airborne operation with more than two thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the winter verification tests for the Western and Southern Military Districts had been a success and the troops would return to their permanent bases. However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and other heavy equipment, would remain at the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise in September. Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly whether all of the equipment and units deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside of Crimea would also return to their bases, nor how those units were employed during the snap inspection. Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, U.S. defense officials said that Russia had removed only “a few thousand” troops and that there were approximately 80,000 servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, despite Shoigu’s order for most of those units to return to their permanent bases by May 1. Thus Russia can still escalate rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the immediate threat of a serious escalation of fighting in the Donbas appears to have passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Engaging Russia over Syria: Managing Peripheral Conflict and Narrowing Interests

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States is examining how to narrow core objectives in the Middle East to focus on improving military readiness and increasing the number of low-density, high-demand assets available for deployment in Asia and Europe. To free up more forces and to help improve readiness, Washington should explore selective engagement with Moscow about securing a formal ceasefire in Syria’s northwest and reaching agreement on a “no-foreign forces zone” in Syria’s south. This policy would not alter the status quo in Syria, but seek to use diplomatic tools to allow for the reallocation of certain resources now tasked with protecting U.S. ground forces. This engagement with the Russian Federation would elevate a key U.S. interest and use counter-terrorism capabilities based in Jordan to disrupt plots against the homeland. It would also seek to use diplomatic tools to create conditions to remove forces that do not directly support this counter-terrorism effort. This approach would retain U.S. forces in the Middle East, but in a way that allows for certain assets to be repositioned in either the United States, Indo-Pacific, or Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

55. Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting

Author:
Johan Norberg and Natalie Simpson
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
According to press information, on 10 September 2021, the Russian Armed Forces plan to start the one-week-long active phase of this year’s annual strategic-level exercise (STRATEX), Zapad (West) 2021, a bilateral large-scale Russo-Belorussian strategic-level exercise, primarily in Belarus and Russia’s Western Military District (MD, see map 1). Large-scale Russian exercises understandably attract much attention and speculation both in Russia and abroad. Most Western comments about Zapad 2017 addressed Russian and international political aspects and detailed several capabilities employed in the exercise and its scenarios or steps and phases. Few, if any, addressed what it meant for the potential of Russian forces to fight wars, which these exercises are all about actually. Russia’s warfighting potential is important for the West writ large for several reasons. Tensions between Russia and NATO are increasing. Russia perceives a growing military threat in its west. Russian strategic documents re-emphasise the importance of military power. Russia actually uses military force to achieve its geopolitical goals, such as in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

56. Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton and Anna Mikulska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The relationship between the Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Eurasia today. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) original adversary and one of its earliest members have in recent times veered sharply between cooperation—often against NATO’s interests—and competition so intense that it seemed war between them was possible. Politically, their leaders and their systems of government share a basic compatibility predicated on authoritarianism and resistance to what they claim is Western meddling in internal affairs. Militarily, Moscow and Ankara have at times cooperated closely. For instance, the two have worked to marginalize the U.S. military’s influence in Syria, and Turkey has purchased and deployed Russian S-400 air defense systems, putting its defense relationship with the United States in jeopardy. At other times, such as in the military escalation in Idlib (Syria), the Libyan Civil War, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, the two have found themselves backing different sides and had to work assiduously to prevent a direct military clash. Economically, the relationship has been historically unbalanced in Russia’s favor, but Turkey’s increasing trade in services and emergence as an important energy storage and transport hub may change this. The two economies share a basic complementarity, with few areas where they compete in the production of goods and services. This dynamic may increase the ability of their economic relationship to act as a “shock absorber” and minimize the impact of disruptions in other facets of their ties. Overall, Moscow and Ankara have worked to emphasize areas of cooperation and “compartmentalize” areas of difference. Policymakers in Western capitals will need to develop an understanding of the drivers of the Russian-Turkish relationship and their effects on Western interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

57. Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-days war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various countries. The CSP’s new issue includes 5 articles, 2 commentaries and 1 book review. In the framework of post-war cooperation situation, the CSP’s current authors analysed the economic difficulties of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s enhancing role in the region and existing geopolitical confrontations, performance of peacekeeping activities, as well as economic cooperation opportunities emerged in the post-war period.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, War, Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Guam

58. Eurasia goes to Africa

Author:
Amanda Paul, Ivano di Carlo, and Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Any new Africa policy from the EU and US should take into account the growing influence of China, Russia and Turkey in the continent and aim to even the scales. To succeed, they must develop a new narrative on Africa and finally recognise it as a genuinely equal partner on the global stage. Africa is a dynamic and diverse continent going through fundamental economic, political and security changes. While the EU and the US remain important partners for Africa, they are no longer the only players in town. New – and not so new – actors have recognised Africa's potential and are trying to use it to their advantage. China, Russia and Turkey in particular, whose presence has broadly been welcomed by African nations, have all been steadily expanding their political and economic clout in the continent over the past few years. The EU and US must, therefore, adapt their policies and approaches to the new reality that is unfolding in Africa. To better understand China’s, Russia’s and Turkey’s objectives, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's (FES) EU Office in Brussels and the European Policy Centre (EPC) set out to conduct an in-depth analysis of the three countries' ties with Africa. The results of this research project, entitled “Eurasia goes to Africa”, are collected in this book. The authors take a closer look at China's, Russia's and Turkey's economic and political interests in the continent; their involvement in the security landscape; the effectiveness of their soft power tools, including in education, media, religion, and humanitarian and development aid; and how Africans judge their growing presence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Economy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, Turkey, and United States of America

59. Russia’s Shift from “Greater Europe” to “Greater Asia”

Author:
Emil Avdaliani
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Though analysts tend to portray Russia’s foreign policy as truly global (that is, independent of Europe, the US, and China), the country is plainly tilting toward Asia. The Russian political elite does its best to hide this development, but the country is accumulating more interests and freedom to act in Asia than in Europe or anywhere else.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Global Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

60. Palestine in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia is strengthening its relations with both the Palestinian Authority leadership and Hamas in Gaza Strip. It is part of Russia’s consistent strategy towards the Middle East to build a network of influence among regional actors and boost its image as an attractive political partner. In developing relations with the Palestinians, Russia exploits Israel’s sensitivity to Russian activity in Syria, poor relations between Palestine and the U.S., and the deadlock in the peace process.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

61. The Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Outside its borders, Russia has military bases in the post-Soviet space and in Syria. The main goal is to increase Russian military security and political influence in countries in which these bases are located. Despite economic difficulties related to the drop in oil and gas prices and the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia will maintain its network of bases, which it considers an important element of influence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Military Strategy, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

62. Russia Strives for an Oil and Gas Resurgence

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the global economy—animated by the arrival of multiple COVID-19 vaccines—hopes for the first signs of recovery, expectations also rise in Russia for an accompanying surge in demand for oil and natural gas and renewed prominence of energy geopolitics in foreign policy-making. President Vladimir Putin is a firm believer in hydrocarbons as the world’s main energy source and a sceptic of “green agendas,” even if Chinese President Xi Jinping has subscribed to the pledge to curtail emissions (TASS, September 30). Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035, approved in June 2020, sets ambitious goals for expanding oil and gas extraction and defines the shifts in the world markets toward carbon-neutral energy production as a major challenge (Vedomosti, May 19; see EDM, June 2). Mainstream Russian experts dismiss the European Union’s post-crisis recovery plans that include new incentives for developing zero-carbon-emission energy sources; defiantly, they project that Russian energy exports to the European market will continue to expand (Kommersant, December 3).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

63. Russia and Iraq Deepen Energy, Military Ties

Author:
John C. K. Daly
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the United States hastens its drawdown of troops in Iraq before the January 20 inauguration of President-elect Joseph Biden, Russia is seeking to fill the developing geopolitical vacuum there. On November 25, following discussions in Moscow with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Russia’s top diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, remarked that Russian energy firms have invested billions of dollars in the Iraqi oil industry. “When it comes to energy, the largest Russian companies are working in Iraq together with their partners. These are Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom-Neft and Bashneft. All four have invested more than $13 billion in the Iraqi economy,” Lavrov told journalists (Interfax, November 25). He added that Moscow was also prepared to increase arms deliveries to Baghdad, stating, “We are ready to meet any Iraqi needs for Russian-made military products. Our country has traditionally played and continues to play a very important and significant role in ensuring Iraq’s defense capability and equipping its army and security forces, including in the context of continuing terrorist threats” (Mid.ru, November 25).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Eurasia, and Middle East

64. Turkey's NATO Future: Between alliance dependency, Russia, and strategic autonomy

Author:
Jakob Lindgaard, Moritz Pieper, and Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Turkey-NATO relations are still sufficiently strong to keep the relationship from the brink, a new DIIS-report finds. But more dynamics are also gaining strength to render further troubles increasingly likely. The future of Turkey’s NATO membership has been the subject of heated debate of late, from both outside and within Turkey. What ramifications will Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air anti-missile system have for Turkey’s NATO future? Has the Syrian conflict exposed deep strategic differences between Turkey and other key NATO members? In response to such questions, a number of foreign policy practitioners as well as researchers and long-standing Turkey watchers have cautioned that a number of centripetal forces – dynamics that keep member states together - remain sufficiently strong at a structural level to keep Turkey-NATO relations on track. There seems to be widespread agreement on both sides that the alternative is simply worse. At the same time, the report also argues that these centripetal forces are losing their strength, and that centrifugal forces pulling the alliance apart are gaining strength and salience. Barring wild card developments, the net result is that this will increase the likelihood of further troubles ahead for Turkey-NATO relations The report is based on an analysis of the published policy commentary, scholarly literature, as well as a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with practitioners and academic experts during the course of 2019.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Denmark

65. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Eurasia is squeezed between a rising China and an aggressive and unpredictable Russia. The United States should remain engaged with the region to help it resist Russian advances. Since 2014, Russia has redoubled its efforts to build a sphere of influence, operating frequently under the flag of Eurasian integration. Its undeclared war in Ukraine and hardball tactics vis-à-vis other neighbors demonstrate the lengths to which it is willing to go to undermine their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Moscow has pushed hard to expand the membership and functions of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the formal vehicle for cross-regional integration of political and economic activity. However, Russia’s limited economic resources and lack of soft-power appeal; the engagement with the region by other outside powers, including the European Union, China, Turkey, and the United States; and societal change in neighboring states are creating significant long-term obstacles to the success of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and exposing a large gap between its ends and means. Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia are buffeted by unfavorable trends that are frequently overlooked by analysts and policymakers. Russia’s own heavy-handed behavior contributes to both regional upheaval and instability as well as to the creation of diplomatic headwinds that constrain its own room for maneuver.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

66. U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030

Author:
Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does, even if it takes a decade. U.S.-Russian relations are at the lowest point since the Cold War. Almost all high-level dialogue between the two countries has been suspended. There are no signs that the relationship will improve in the near future. However, this situation is unlikely to last forever—even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a limited but meaningful dialogue; the two countries eventually will reengage, even if mostly to disagree, and new U.S. and Russian leaders could pursue less confrontational policies. What is the agenda that they will need to tackle then—perhaps as far in the future as 2030?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

67. The Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Outside its borders, Russia has military bases in the post-Soviet space and in Syria. The main goal is to increase Russian military security and political influence in countries in which these bases are located. Despite economic difficulties related to the drop in oil and gas prices and the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia will maintain its network of bases, which it considers an important element of influence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, COVID-19, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

68. Putting A Spoke In The Wheel: Russian Efforts To Weaken U.S.-led Alliance Structures In Northeast Asia

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Russia is widely accused of employing a range of instruments—both overt and covert—to undermine Western unity. However, to what extent is Russia engaged in comparable activities to weaken the South Korean and Japanese alliances with the United States? This paper answers this question by assessing Moscow’s actions in the domains of diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. It finds that Russia is indeed aiming to encourage Seoul and Tokyo to distance themselves from Washington and from each other. In particular, Moscow is committed to deterring U.S. allies from facilitating the deployment of additional units of U.S. missile defense systems within the region. Across the four domains, it is only in the economic field that Russia is found to lack leverage. Overall, Moscow has achieved several tactical victories, but has yet to seriously damage U.S.-led alliance structures within the region. All the same, Seoul and Tokyo must remain watchful of Moscow’s activities, especially since there are signs of increased cooperation between Russia and China in exploiting wedge issues between the United States and its allies, thereby potentially combining China’s economic weight with Russia’s skills in influence operations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

69. Moscow's Maneuvres for Mediterranean Bases and ME Markets

Author:
Zaki Shaikh
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
By carrying on the activities of the Russian military contingents in Syria and with its backing of Libya’s renegade general Khalifa Haftar, Moscow seeks to reassert its role in the Mediterranean and leverage a strategy for generating low-risk yet high yield wins.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Libya, Syria, and Mediterranean

70. “Engaged Opportunism”: Russia’s Role in the Horn of Africa

Author:
Samuel Ramani
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After spending nearly three decades as a marginal player in the Horn of Africa, the Russian Federation has made significant progress towards recapturing its great power status in the region. Russia has engaged with all countries in the Horn of Africa and refused to take sides in the region’s most polarizing conflicts, so Moscow can be best described as an “engaged opportunist” on the Horn of Africa. Russia is principally focused on establishing itself as the region’s leading arms vendor, but prospectively, has one eye on constructing a Red Sea base. Russia’s resurgence in the Horn of Africa has generally dovetailed with the People’s Republic of China’s regional aspirations, but has placed it increasingly at odds with France and the United States. Looking ahead, Russia’s ability to link its Horn of Africa strategy to its aspirations in the Middle East will shape the future trajectory of its involvement in the region. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Horn of Africa

71. U.S. Troops Injured in Altercation with Russian Forces: What It Means for the War in Syria

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On August 26, Politico reported that U.S. service members were injured after an altercation with Russian forces in northeast Syria. This pattern of Russian challenges to U.S. forces was enabled by the Trump administration’s decision to retreat from parts of northern Syria in 2019, allowing Russia to fill the void. Until this decision was made, the two countries had agreed to make the Euphrates River the deconfliction line to keep U.S. and Russian forces separated. Russia stayed on the west side of the river, and the United on the east side, where this incident took place. Robert Hamilton, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, commented on the story and warned that it will not be a one-off incident: “We need to respond to this immediately and forcefully. Russian forces deliberately escalated against U.S. partners when I was running the ground deconfliction cell for Syria in 2017, but tended to be careful when U.S. forces were present. Unless we make it clear that we’ll defend ourselves, these escalations will continue with dangerous and unpredictable results.” Below, we offer readers an excerpt from a chapter written by Robert Hamilton from a forthcoming edited volume on Russia’s Way of War in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and North America

72. Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?

Author:
Julie Wilhelmsen
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

73. National Security Strategy of Armenia

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The National Security Council of the Republic of Armenia approved a new national security strategy on July 10, 2020. The work on this document has been going on for almost a year. By the order of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, on July 17, 2019, an interagency commission was set up under the leadership of the Secretary of the National Security Council. It was instructed to develop a working version of the new national security strategy within one year. The previous National Security Strategy was approved by the National Security Council of Armenia a while ago on January 26, 2007. Thirteen years is quite a long period and the renewal of the national security strategy, in principal, should have happened earlier. Such a long pause indirectly indicates that the process of national security policy planning in the Republic of Armenia is not going appropriately. The purpose of this publication is to juxtapose and highlight the main differences between Armenia's national security strategies for 2007 and 2020 and also assess Armenia's external security environment based on the 2020 strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Armenia

74. The Russia policy conundrum: Who blinks first?

Author:
Hugo Klijn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On 28 September the Netherlands’ Russia policy was debated in Parliament. This policy (updated most recently in the government’s ‘Russia letter’ of December 2019) boils down to a twin-track approach of, on the one hand, exerting pressure through EU sanctions and NATO deterrence and, on the other hand, identifying common ground dossiers and engaging in people-to-people contacts. To date, this long-standing policy has not led to satisfactory outcomes. The debate took place against the backdrop of a Clingendael opinion poll indicating that the Dutch public has different threat perceptions of Russia. Anyway, the debate was rather uneventful and lawmakers focused mostly on topical issues such as the ongoing MH17 trial, Belarus, developments around Nagorno-Karabakh and the poisoning of Alexey Navalny. It may be a source of comfort that the Netherlands is not the only country struggling with its Russia policy. The list of accusations and grievances against Russia is growing, but its leadership flatly denies all wrongdoing and does not seem much impressed by Western responses which have not resulted in a change of behaviour. Under a veneer of unity, European countries are divided on Russia and the debate often hovers between two, typically Russian, eternal questions: kto vinovat (who’s to blame) and chto delat’ (what to do).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Netherlands

75. Between Eurasia and the Middle East: Azerbaijan’s New Geopolitics

Author:
Svante Cornell
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s geopolitics have changed considerably in the last decade, along with the growing general instability in its neighborhood. Gone are the days symbolized by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline’s construction, when a relatively stable balance existed between a loose Russian-led alignment including Iran and Armenia, and an informal entente between the United States and Turkey, which supported the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia and the construction of direct energy transportation routes to Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

76. Against ‘the Blob’: America’s Foreign Policy in Eurasia’s Heartland is Becoming its Own Greatest Enemy

Author:
Michael A. Reynolds
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
As this article goes to press, America and the world are in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. The pandemic’s end remains invisible, yet it has already wreaked extraordinary economic disruption around the globe. Inevitably, political upheaval will follow. Indeed, the strain of the pandemic has now catalyzed social and political unrest throughout the United States on a level not seen in half a century.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
United States and Eurasia

77. Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations: A Shared Imperative to Look Ahead

Author:
Robert F. Cekuta
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship remains important to both countries, but it is time to reevaluate and update how they engage with each other. The Second Karabakh War is the most visible of the reasons for such a reassessment, given Azerbaijan’s military successes, Russia’s headline role in securing the November 2020 agreement that halted the fighting, and the need to undertake the extremely difficult work of avoiding a new war and building a peace. But China’s high profile economic, diplomatic, and security activities across Eurasia, coupled with the results of the November 2020 election in the United States, have also significantly altered the diplomatic environment. Lastly, multinational challenges—such as the economic, social, and other ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic or the realities of climate change—make the need for revaluation, dialogue, and mapping out new directions in the two countries’ relations even more apparent.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Eurasia, and Azerbaijan

78. Emerging from the political crisis in Belarus: with or without the intervention of external actors?

Author:
Ekaterina Pierson-Lyzhina
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The protests against Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, which have continued beyond the August 9 presidential election, have been surprising in terms of their scale and level of politicization. The protest promises to be long-lasting bringing together people of all ages and professions, but the authorities are refusing to recognize it and are not satisfying any of its demands: to organize new this time democratic elections, to stop repression, to release detainees and political prisoners, to investigate crimes committed by the representatives of law enforcement agencies. Quite the opposite is happening: the crackdown orchestrated by Lukashenka’s regime, after a certain lull between August 12 and 16, is intensifying with hundreds of arrests per day, the repression against the emerging leaders and journalists (from the private media) who report the facts. What are the scenarios of the development of this crisis which seems to have reached an impasse? Can Belarus emerge from it without resorting to foreign mediation? What role could the European Union play?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, and Protests
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Belarus

79. Russia's Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s

Author:
Ekaterina Stepanova
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As Russia has become a major external player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to its military engagement in Syria since 2015, it has acted as a balancer and mediator in several regional controversies and has continued to serve as a security guarantor for the Syrian state. This course has brought Moscow some practical dividends, such as growing economic and military-technical cooperation with select MENA countries, and has spurred its broader international profile. However, entering the 2020s, the risks of more active engagement in the Middle East have also mounted, making Russia’s balancing act more difficult. In three cases where Russia’s involvement has been visible (Syria, Libya and the Israeli-Palestinian problem), evolving developments challenge Moscow’s acquired influence and multi-vector approach, but also create new opportunities for its engagement and mediation. Above all, the 2020 US–Iran crisis catalysed the urgent need for structured regional dialogue, especially across the Persian Gulf. While this requires direct interaction between the region’s main antagonists, the initial impulse to unlock the trans-Gulf impasse might need to come from the outside. A process-oriented blueprint for inclusive multilateral security in the Gulf proposed by Russia in 2019 is a step in the right direction, but to be activated it may need to come as part of some broader international initiative.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, and Syria

80. Understanding Russia’s Interest in Conflict Zones

Author:
Paul M. Carter Jr.
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia’s global ambitions have steadily increased, including in unstable areas of the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. For the most part, Moscow’s activities in these and other areas run counter to Western interests and undermine efforts to mitigate conflict through broad-based, transparent processes. This report outlines the factors that appear to be motivating the Kremlin’s conflict-zone interventions and places them within the larger context of Russian foreign policy interests.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

81. Spring 2020 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS LILIT HARUTYUNYAN THE NEW IMAGE OF THE BUSINESS ELITE IN LEBANESE POLITICS: RAFIK AND SAAD HARIRI, NAJIB MIKATI AND ISSAM FARES .......................................................................................... 4 YEVA HARUTYUNYAN JAPAN’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN CENTRAL ASIA ........................................................................................................ 25 LILIT MAYILYAN UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS OF TURKISHAZERBAIJANI RELATIONS: “ONE NATION, TWO STATES?” ...... 39 ASTGHIK HAYRAPETYAN MANIFESTATIONS OF NEOCONSERVATISM IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-2009) ............................................................................ 68 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................... 87 ANNEX ................................................................................................... 88
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Business, Economic Cooperation, and Neoconservatism
Political Geography:
Japan, Central Asia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, and Lebanon

82. Russia's Forays into Sub-Saharan Africa: Do you want to be my friend, again?

Author:
Giovanni Faleg and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 1977, the Soviet Union’s leadership was in a jubilant mood as Ethiopia had just switched sides to the socialist camp. By the time of this event, the Kremlin had been conducting a renewed offensive on the continent for several years, propping up socialist regimes and ‘liberation movements’ in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Yet contrary to warnings that the Soviets might eventually ‘swallow’ all of sub-Saharan Africa, by 1990 the offensive had fizzled out: ideologically and financially broken, Moscow cut military aid, suspended credit lines, wound down diplomatic representations, closed cultural centres and ultimately withdrew political support. When rebel forces advanced towards Addis Ababa in 1991, Moscow stood idly by as the Derg regime – its former poster child – disintegrated. Over the course of the next two decades, post-Soviet Russia showed little interest in the sub-continent and only in the late 2010s did the Kremlin once again display the ambition to play a greater geopolitical role: sub-Saharan Africa remerged in Russian political discourse and trade and diplomatic traffic picked up. Simultaneously, Moscow revived alumni associations of Africans who studied in the Soviet Union and launched initiatives to lure more students to Russia. The Wagner Group – a military enterprise connected to the Russian state – also expanded its radius of action south of the Sahara. But what is driving Moscow’s renewed activism? How different it is from its previous diplomatic thrusts? Can a coherent strategy be discerned behind this push? Finally, how is sub-Saharan Africa reacting to Russia’s overtures and what does it mean for the EU?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

83. The Russian Way of War in Syria: Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation’s intervention in Syria is a watershed event. However the war there ends, its impact on Russia is likely to be profound. For the first time in its post-Soviet history, Russia’s military is fighting outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In doing so, it is exercising military capabilities that had atrophied from long lack of use. Moscow is also rebuilding its diplomatic muscle through its role in Syria by managing a diverse coalition, leading a parallel peace process, and forcing the United States to take the Kremlin’s preferences into account when making decisions in the Middle East. Through Syria, Russia has reemerged on the geopolitical stage. The war is not over, and there are many ways in which things could still go badly for Russia. Moscow may find that a return to geopolitical prominence entails costs and risks at least as great as the rewards that status brings. Nevertheless, the West will be dealing with a Russia that has changed fundamentally through its experience in the war. Understanding these changes and their implications for Western governments is the focus of this conclusion chapter. It is structured around two questions. First, what does Syria tell us about how Russia fights its wars? Second, how has Russia’s experience in Syria affected the capabilities of its armed forces? Answering these questions should increase our understanding of Russia as a geopolitical actor and allow Western governments to make more effective policy on issues where Russia is a factor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

84. The Expanding China-Russia Defense Partnership

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia and China’s relationship is increasingly strengthened by arms sales, joint military exercises, and mutual diplomatic support. With growing frequency, the two countries hare expressing joint concern towards “threatening” U.S. military capabilities and security policies. China’s growing ability to deny foreign navies access to waters and airspace is connected to the sophisticated defense platforms provided by Russia. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are seeking a closer defense partnership, which could take the form of integrated military operations, collaboration on battlefield technology, or a joint missile defense system. Through joint military exercises, China is learning from Russia’s military experience in Crimea, gaining operational knowledge on expeditionary logistics and how to protect military bases in foreign countries. In 2021, the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship expires. Its renewal could introduce new dynamics to the China-Russian relationship, and the possible inclusion of collective defense provisions like those between the U.S. and Japan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

85. The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition: Prospects for U.S.-Israeli Cooperation

Author:
Douglas J. Feith and Seth Cropsey
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This is a study of Eastern Mediterranean security and how the United States and Israel can improve cooperation to protect their common interests. The study’s particular focus is the maritime domain. Few things in world affairs survive for millennia. It’s also true that few are ever really new. In the Eastern Mediterranean, what has endured for thousands of years is the strategic attention of great powers. The region retains it today, commanding interest not only from local and regional actors, but also from global players. As Iran works to extend its reach to the Mediterranean, Russia, as it has for centuries, strives to exert its influence across the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, has been signaling a desire to reduce its involvement in the region. Remarkably, China too has become a player. Its increasing presence in the Middle East reflects commercial and strategic motives and signifies its rise as a force competing for global economic and military predominance. China is at once a security challenge and a close economic partner. It is the world’s major rising and disruptive power and plays a huge role in global trade and investment.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Spending, Maritime, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Israel, United States of America, and Mediterranean

86. Working paper on the relations between Russia and China

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Working paper by the independent economic analyst Jens Bastian, focusing on relations between China and Russia is published by ELIAMEP. More specifically, in the text entitled “The Embrace Between the Russian Bear and the Panda Bear: An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis” it is argued that: “The depth and momentum of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is deepening and accelerating. Defense and security, the various bilateral energy arrangements, the synergies resulting from the combination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflect the wider range of joint activities of the two states”.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Eurasia

87. Straightening Out Russian Foreign Policy

Author:
Emil Avdaliani
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Russian foreign policy since the mid-2000s tends to be perceived in contradictory terms: as either a negative for Russia or the product of a grand strategic vision on the part of the Russian leadership. It is also often falsely perceived as representing a break with the past. Moscow’s foreign policy moves need to be viewed with a balanced perspective and should be placed in their historical context.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

88. Debating Eurasia: Political Travels of a Geographical Concept in Turkey

Author:
Lerna K. Yanik
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This article reviews the ways in which various actors in Turkey have used the terms ‘Eurasia’ and ‘Eurasianism’ since the end of the Cold War. It presents two arguments. First, compared to Russian Eurasianism, it is difficult to talk about the existence of a ‘Turkish Eurasianism’. Yet, the article employs the term Turkish Eurasianism as a shorthand to describe the ways in which Eurasia and Eurasianism are employed in Turkey. Second, Turkish Eurasianism is nothing but the use or instrumentalization of Eurasia to create a geopolitical identity for Turkey that legitimizes its political, economic, and strategic interests primarily in the post-Soviet space, but, from time to time, also in the Balkans and Africa. Various Turkish state and non-state actors have used Eurasia to mean different things and justify different goals: reaching out to Turkic Republics, being pro-Russian, creating a sphere of influence in former Ottoman lands, or, recently, cloaking anti-Western currents.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

89. Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater

Author:
Inan Rüma and Mitat Çelikpala
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Russia and Turkey have been involved in remarkable redefinitions of their foreign policies while navigating through turbulent times in the Post-Cold War era. This has manifested in a search of being recognized as a great power. The tragic civil war in Syria has been the theatre of these ambitions of these two states in highly controversial ways. They have been on the opposite sides until recently on the essential question of the regime change in that country. The risk of a direct fight has even been observed when Turkish air force got a Russian jet down. However, a rapid rapprochement started due to Turkish priority shift from the regime change to the prevention of Kurdish autonomy and the alienation from US; and Russian enthusiasm to get the cooperation of an ardent anti-regime NATO member like Turkey. It can be said that Russia and Turkey have been more process-oriented than result-oriented because they have been compelled to see the limits of their power and influence. As a result, they seem to prefer to focus on the process since they seem to reach their primary objective of showing their salience. All in all, one can only hope for a peaceful and democratic life for Syrians whom tremendously suffered also as a result of an imbroglio of all these global and regional powers’ policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Political Activism, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

90. Constructivism, Identity, ‘Manufactured’ Citizens: Russia’s Citizenship Policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Author:
Didem Ekinci
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper discusses through a Constructivist perspective that the aim of maintaining influence via great power identity in the Near Abroad which preserved its significance in the post-1991 Russian foreign policy under the statist/pragmatist and civilizationist schools’ influence, is reinforced through citizenship policies due to established collective identities with certain actors. The fact that Russia’s conferral of citizenship to certain peoples through old collective identities via long-time great power identity is not a newly invented and ephemeral policy but that its roots reflect influence-driven subjecthood/citizenship policies since the Tsarist times, strengthens the assumption that the Near Abroad is an irreplaceable region for Russia which may practice similar policies towards other actors in the Near Abroad in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia

91. Thinking foreign policy in Russia: Think tanks and grand narratives

Author:
Anton Barbashin and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the course of the last decade Russian foreign policy has taken critical turns, surprising not only the entire international community but also Russia’s own foreign policy experts. Arguably, the most notable turn came in March 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, setting in motion developments that are continuously shaping Russia, its neighbors, and, to a certain degree, global affairs. Clearly, Russia’s post-Crimean foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum. Its ramifications are colliding with regional and global trends that are effectively destabilizing the post-Cold War international order, creating uncertainties that are defining the contemporary international moment. In this report, we deal with those whose job it is to explain the logic of Russia’s foreign policy turns and to analyze global trends and their meaning for Russia and the rest of the world. Although these experts, as a rule, do not directly influence political decision-making, their debates, as Graeme Herd argues, “set the parameters for foreign policy choices” and “shape elite and public perceptions of the international environment” in Russia.1 Especially in times of crisis and rapid change ideas produced at some earlier stage by experts and think tanks external to the state bureaucracy can suddenly obtain instrumental value and direct policy options. In Part 1, we briefly discuss the role of think tanks in Russian foreign policymaking and present the landscape of Russian think tanks working on foreign policy issues. We distinguish among three basic institutional forms: academic and university-based think tanks, private think tanks, and state-sponsored think tanks. Highlighting the diversity of organizations, we then focus on four state-sponsored think tanks whose size, political contacts, and financial means allow them to dominate the think tank scene in Russia and that represent different ideological angles of a broad, yet also comparatively volatile mainstream: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI). Part 2 follows this selection by looking at Russian foreign policy debates since 2014. We consider how experts writing for these four organizations have approached three major themes: the evolution of the concept of Greater Europe and European Union (EU)-Russia relations, the establishment of the Greater Eurasia narrative in the context of Russia’s declared pivot to the East, and the concepts of multipolarity and the liberal world order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Diplomacy, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

92. US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality

Author:
William F. Wechsler
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

93. Same Ends but Different Means: Change, Continuity and Moscow’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Mark N. Katz
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Islamism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

94. Iraqi-Russian Relations amidst US Security-Focused Engagement

Author:
Abbas Kadhim
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Iraq has a long and complicated history with the United States, and security and military engagements have been the primary driver of the relationship. Iraq’s relations with Russia, on the other hand, have been more transactional and economically-oriented. At a time when there are signs of US disengagement from the Middle East and North Africa while Russian and Chinese activities in the region are increasing, it is useful to trace the past US and Russian strategies in Iraq and assess how the United States could better tailor its strategy toward Iraq in the future in order to achieve durable outcomes that would bring benefits to both sides such as a responsive government, a thriving economy, and security. This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

95. The Baltic Sea Region after the Ukraine Crisis and Trump: A Russian perspective

Author:
Alexander Sergunin
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This DIIS Report identifies Russian national interests in the BSR (Baltic Sea Region) and discusses whether there are continuities and changes in these interests in the post-Crimea era. The Russian discourse on the BSR is explored, including Russian foreign policy schools and official foreign policy and national security doctrines. Different aspects of Moscow’s BSR strategy - political, economic, sub-regional, environmental and military - are examined. The chances for Russia’s participation in the BSR multilateral cooperative framework are assessed. This DIIS Report authored by Alexander Sergunin, professor at St. Petersburg State University, is an outgrowth of a defence and security project on 'The Baltic Sea Region after Crimea and Trump' with Sergunin and Hans Mouritzen, senior researcher at DIIS, as participants (see also DIIS Working Paper 2019:1).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Crimea, and Baltic Sea

96. Hybrid Threats in EaP Countries: Building a Common Response

Author:
Kakha Gogolashvili, Valeriu Pasa, Mikayel Hovhannisyan, Viktor Ohiienko, and Julya Sahakyan
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Four non-governmental organisations from Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine conducted a joint study assessing hybrid threats that the EaP countries are currently facing. The project aimed to study the hybrid threats which affect Eastern Partnership states and elaborate recommendations to actively engage civil society in countering them. The project envisaged the creation of a team of experts from Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine, which would travel to the capital cities of the mentioned states and meet all relevant stakeholders from government, parliament and civil society. The meetings resulted in the collection of all necessary information, opinions and ideas on the state of institutional and legal measures taken in the countries on countering existing hybrid threats. The team of experts also undertook desk research based on accessible open sources and interviews conducted with different stakeholders, among them government officials, experts and civil society organizations. The research and study visits provided the ground for four country reviews to be written by the experts. Their reports have been integrated mutatis mutandis into the present policy paper, followed by a comparative analysis of threats and institutional responses, similarities and distinctions in the policies of the four mentioned countries. The paper also explores the role and areas of potential engagement of civil society. To effectively counter the hybrid threats, a joining of efforts of official bodies and non-state actors is required. It also needs reinforced international cooperation on a government and civil society level. The paper recommends the governments establish active cooperation among and with the EU countries with the aim of analyzing, exchanging knowledge and countering jointly, where appropriate, hybrid threats. The cooperation should target the development of an appropriate legal environment and adequate institutional capacity. Civil society itself should become more organized and consolidated. The paper advises the EaP CSF to conduct work on consolidating the efforts of civil society in the direction of strengthening the resilience of EaP countries, especially in countering attacks aiming to discredit and weaken the Europeanisation of the mentioned countries. It was advised that the EaP CSF contribute to facilitating the capacity building of civil society organizations so as to help them to actively engage in countering hybrid threats. Despite the existing differences between EaP partner states as regards their foreign policy priorities and geopolitical orientation or trade arrangement, all of them seek closer cooperation with the European Union, peaceful co-existence, and the chance to develop efficient economic ties within the wider region. Continuation of Europeanisation and interaction with EU institutions, supporting democratic transformation, economic and regulatory convergence, social cohesion and human capital development, institutional and state build up, has become irreversible thanks to the success of the EaP. The sources of the new hybrid threats predominantly aim at discrediting and weakening the motivation of the EaP partner states to further integrate with the EU. Indeed, EaP partner states understand the importance of this cooperation and are interested in countering, jointly where possible, any adverse action or attempt to disengage them from that process. Based on the results of the study, we propose a set of recommendations for the governments of EaP states, EU and NATO institutions and their member states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia

97. Lecture: China's and Russia's Sharp Power

Author:
Christopher Walker, Andrew J. Nathan, Alexander Cooley, and Takako Hikotani
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Introduction by Takako Hikotani, Gerald L. Curtis Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Columbia University Speaker: Christopher Walker, Vice President for Studies and Analysis, National Endowment for Democracy Discussants: Andrew Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Alexander Cooley, Claire Tow Professor of Political Science and Director of The Harriman Institute for the Study of Russia, Eurasia and Eastern Europe at Columbia University
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Political Science
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

98. The last of the offended: Russia’s first post-Putin diplomats

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s new generation of foreign policy professionals bring with them a shift in attitudes that challenges the centrality of “the West” in Russian foreign policy. Today’s young professionals are often bitterly affected by “disillusionment” with the West, but the youngest of them – people in their 20s – are free of such emotion, harbouring an outlook that is sharply realist and pragmatic. Russia’s young foreign policy professionals are neither Putin loyalists nor Western-style liberals: they are wary of ready-made ideologies, and prefer to attend to their own consciences. Young diplomats’ ability to shape policy will depend on the balance of power between ‘civilian’ and ‘power’ ministries in Russia (such as, respectively, the foreign and defence ministries), with the former in retreat lately. These shifts mean the West should not hold out hope for the optimism of the 1990s to return once Putin departs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

99. Winter 2018 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Ruben Safrastyan
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
SECURITY ISSUES IN EURASIA ARTSRUN HOVHANNISYAN ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER IN FOCUS: COMPARISON OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF NEAR-PEER COMPETITORS, CURRENT ISSUES ...........4 TINA KHARATYAN THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF AZERBAIJAN: ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND POLICY IMPLICATION ...............21 HRANUSH DERMOYAN THE 2016 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: A RESULT OF CHANGING CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE IN TURKEY .........................41 LIANA HAYRAPETYAN RADICAL ISLAM IN RUSSIA: THE CASE OF TATARSTAN ..................61 THE ARAB WORLD IN TRANSITION ARAKS PASHAYAN SAUDI ARABIA-QATAR. FROM COOPERATION TO CONFRONTATION ................................................................................80 GOR GEVORGYAN THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE U. S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND EGYPT ..................................................................................90 MUSHEGH GHAHRIYAN THE KURDISH FACTOR IN IRAQ-GULF ARAB STATES RELATIONS .....................................................................100 SOUTH CAUCASUS: REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES LILIT GALSTYAN RUSSIA AND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: SPOILING THROUGH MEDIATION? ...................................................... 114 ZURAB TARGAMADZE CONFLICTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONALISM: CASE OF GEORGIA ...................................................................................133 KRISTINE MARGARYAN AZERBAIJAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ......................................................................................................................146
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Islam, Military Affairs, Weapons, Conflict, Coup, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, South Caucasus, and Asia-Pacific

100. Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical wins, strategic setbacks

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the last few years, news about Russia’s conduct in the Western Balkans has resembled dispatches coming from the trenches of political and economic warfare: Moscow has slashed gas supplies, banned imports of agro-food products, conducted coordinated disinformation campaigns, nurtured nationalist organisations, deployed Cossack paramilitary groups, tested cyber defences and allegedly even tried to overthrow legitimate governments. This flurry of disruptive operations caught Europe by surprise and generated debate: does this resurgence herald Russia’s return to the region and if so, what is driving the comeback? What does Moscow want to achieve? What is the Russian modus operandi in the region? Is it confined only to coercion, as the headlines suggest, or is there a softer side to Russia’s power? Finally, looking retrospectively, did Russia’s approach bear fruit? This Brief addresses this set of questions in greater detail, with two key findings. First, Russia’s policy in the region is executed by a network of Russian state and non-state actors who are blurring the traditional lines between the public and private domains. This allows the Kremlin to tap into the resources of informal institutions and hide behind a fog of deniability. Second, Russia has raised the cost of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO by exploiting the region’s political and economic vulnerabilities. That said, although Moscow was able to slow down the process, it has hitherto failed to alter the region’s steady drift towards Western institutions, at least for now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Balkans