Political Geography: Estonia - CIAO Search Results

1. Exploring the Application of AI in the Public Sector: The Case of Estonia and Lessons for Georgia

Author:: Salome Abramishvili
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming societies globally, offering unprecedented opportunities across sectors. The integration of AI into the public sector promises enhanced service delivery, efficiency, and significant decision-making improvements. Nations worldwide recognize AI’s strategic importance and are adopting National AI Strategies (NASs) to guide its development and deployment. This paper explores AI’s evolution and impact in the public sector, focusing on applications and strategic frameworks using Estonia as an example—a pioneer in AI governance within the EU. Estonia’s approach serves as a model for Georgia, a country with post-Soviet roots and EU integration aspirations. By examining Estonia’s National AI Strategy and its implementation, this paper identifies key lessons and recommendations for Georgia to develop its tailored strategy.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Public Sector, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe, Estonia, and Georgia

2. Finland's partnerships as a NATO member: Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework

Author:: Iro Särkkä, Minna Ålander, Joel Linnainmäki, and Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden. It studies defence cooperation through key strategic, military, economic and political factors, such as the perceived threat environment, military capabilities, strategic culture, and the role member states play in the multilateral security framework of NATO. The report compares these six countries with Finland and identifies factors impacting potential future cooperation. The report finds that regional defence cooperation can yield positive outcomes for NATO. Bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation can enhance intra-alliance policymaking and serve as a tool to build trust with key partners and allies, thus facilitating defence integration within NATO.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

3. AI Unleashed or Tamed? Decoding Europe’s Bold Leap with the AI Act

Author:: Arianna Jater
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: 2023 saw a boom in generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, such a rapid expansion revealed the unpreparedness of governments to handle the unprecedented impact AI systems have on the core values of democratic societies. The European Commission’s AI Act has emerged as the first binding legislation of its kind. It is already clear, however, that simply ratifying the Act will not solve the next challenges. Among those, the immediate one is to ensure that the new AI rulebook is enforced on the national level and that Member States have the resources necessary. Then, the Act, and any future AI legislation, will need to constantly adapt to the ever-changing developments in technology, which now seem to move at a faster pace than ever before. Interdisciplinary approaches and new research disciplines will be needed to analyse the correctness and safety of AI systems, as well as to evaluate their impact on society. Last but not least, the private sector — already employing or only exploring the possibility of introducing AI systems — will need strong support to remain compliant. This brief outlines the state of the EU’s AI Act, discusses concerns within Europe, examines the position taken by the Estonian technology sector and government, and explores the future direction the regulation might take.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Legislation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, and European Commission
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

4. An Edifying Tale of Keeping the Lights On: Societal Resilience in an Energy Crisis – the Case of Estonia

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Dmitri Teperik, and Karolin Martinson
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2021–23, Europe experienced a major energy shock due to a number of significant factors in the energy market. As a result of Russia’s strategy to take advantage of Europe’s dependency on its energy supply and coerce the EU into acquiescence to Russia’s geopolitical demands, the most important course-changing trigger has been the Russian war against Ukraine. A raft of urgent policy measures passed at the EU and national levels, quick adaptation of the consumers to the price signals, the availability of LNG from the US, suppressed demand in China, and a mild winter meant that a full-scale disaster was averted. However, the previous crisis being less severe than anticipated does not mean the next one will be less challenging. Estonian society’s resilience to future energy crises may determine not only the country’s internal political dynamics but also its relations with key partners, its reputation in the EU, and even the country’s long-term geopolitical prospects. In order to understand how well-prepared Estonian society is for such future crises, this study identifies and analyses the key public narratives that emerged during the 2021–23 energy crisis and investigates how they reflected on Estonian society’s perceptions and actions. The narrative analysis is complemented by survey data, which indicates how the Estonian public viewed various aspects of the crisis and its resolution, as well as the extent to which public sentiment echoes or runs counter to the identified narratives. The study highlights several key shortcomings in Estonian society’s resilience capabilities. Firstly, the lack of constructive responsiveness to warnings about plausible severe risks (i.e., power cuts) and low scores on preparedness for future energy crises show that the Estonian society does not have a mindset of crisis preparedness. Secondly, society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully navigate such crises has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust and cooperation in similar episodes in the future. Another breakdown in resilience in the response to the energy crisis was related to the failure to maintain a just and equal distribution of risk, vulnerability, and cost. As the narrative related to the profits of the energy companies—especially state-owned ones—shows, the sense of unfair distribution of costs and benefits was pervasive and highly antagonising. As the survey showed, a responsible and competent media, effective government, and an impartial expert community were the most trusted sources of information with respect to coping with the energy crisis. These actors will have to play an important role in rebuilding the confidence lost during the energy crisis, shaping the narratives that inspire steadfast action for forging a better future for energy and climate security, and improving Estonia’s resilience.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

5. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:: Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

6. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

7. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

8. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:: Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Estonia

9. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

10. British Nuclear Policy

Author:: Peter Watkins
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

11. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

12. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:: Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

13. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:: Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

14. The Energy Crisis Requires a Military Solution that Compels NATO to Spend like Estonia

Author:: Leon Hartwell and Guillemette Guicherd
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this LSE IDEAS Strategic Update, the authors focus on the intimate relationship between the Russia-Ukraine war and the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe. It is argued that although Western sanctions against Russia’s energy sector have been a welcome political statement, they have so far been inadequate. Moreover, in the absence of expanding Ukraine’s defence systems, supplying the country with critical equipment to rebuild its energy sector while it is under constant Russian bombardment has limited impacts. Consequently, the authors argue that to solve the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe, NATO and its allies need to “spend like Estonia.” Spending like Estonia would, among others, entail ramping up support for Ukraine to 1.1% of each member state’s GDP. Such an approach could help Ukraine to decisively win the war in 2023, and it would help to avert a potential energy crisis during the next winter. 
Topic:: NATO, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

15. Industrial Policy for a New Growth Model: A Toolbox for EU-CEE Countries

Author:: Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: The EU member states of Central Eastern Europe (EU-CEE) have experienced rapid convergence in the decades following their EU accession, and have built up strong export-oriented manufacturing sectors boosted by foreign direct investment inflows. While this growth model has brought many positives, there are indications that it is hitting its limits. Endogenous limits to EU-CEE’s growth model are exacerbated by exogenous challenges of the ‘twin’ (green and digital) transitions, and the fallout of the pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine. This reinforces the imperative for EU-CEE to transition to a more innovation-driven, new growth model, enabled by a comprehensive industrial policy. However, the EU-CEE countries have not only lacked a stable and strategic approach to industrial policy in their development paths, but also find themselves in a unique position due to EU membership. As a result, innovation and industrial policies are underdeveloped in the region. Based on an in-depth analysis of the industrial landscape and the industrial policy environment of the region, we propose eight pillars for creating a EU-CEE version of the entrepreneurial state.
Topic:: Climate Change, Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Czechia

16. Separatisms and Social Integration Processes on the Example of Estonia

Author:: Agata Włodarska-Frykowska
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article seeks to analyze political and social separatisms in contemporary Estonia and to outline integration processes in the country. The Russian national minority has been a factor that has significantly influenced the existing divisions in the interior of the country since the creation of the independent and sovereign Estonian state. Despite the passage of more than 30 years after regaining its independence, Estonia is still struggling with internal separatist mechanisms, whilst strongly developed and strengthened integration processes have significantly influenced its social consolidation. Changes in Estonian society are apparent, the sense of Estonian identity keeps strengthening and representatives of national minorities, primarily the Russian one, have increasingly improved their linguistic competence in Estonian. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to build Estonian statehood, subjectivity and identity in the shadow of the difficult relations with the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Minorities, Separatism, and Social Integration
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Estonia

17. Time to Leave China’s “16+1” Influence Trap

Author:: Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Last week Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania and quit what used to be known as 16+1, as the Czech Republic and other participating countries become increasingly vocal in their scepticism of the initiative. The 16+1 format, officially known as Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo-Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), was launched in 2012 as a China-centric initiative incorporating 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In 2019, Greece—which is heavily indebted to China—joined, and the platform was briefly renamed 17+1. While it is officially described as an economic cooperation platform, its real achievements and the PRC’s approach to it show that trade and investment were never its true focus. Rather, the PRC used it as a propaganda and influence tool, wasting CEE diplomatic capacity on activities that only benefited Beijing. The lack of benefits and abundance of risks have recently led several CEE countries to reassess their participation in the 16+1 format. The time has come for the rest of the participating countries to join their Baltic neighbours and ditch this PRC influence vehicle.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Soft Power, Propaganda, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Estonia

18. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:: Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

19. Germany’s Position on CSDP: Is There Anything for the Baltics?

Author:: Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the third brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė examine Germany’s approach to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the broader question of Europe’s strategic autonomy and consider whether Germany’s policies align with Baltic views. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Germany not only strengthened its contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, but also took a greater role in shaping EU security and defence policies, a field it had previously shied away from. Germany’s involvement was instrumental in ensuring that the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation was implemented in a form that is more palatable to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the debate on European strategic autonomy was broadened and blunted to be more in tune with Baltic positions. Germany’s policy positions on European defence are unlikely to shift dramatically under Chancellor Scholz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will continue to look to Germany to balance France’s ambitions during its Presidency of the European Council and beyond.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:: Germany, Estonia, and Baltic States

20. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

21. Estonia as an Area of Russian Influence: Analysis and Synthesis of the Kremlin’s Methodology of Exerting Influence on Tallinn’s Political and Social Stability

Author:: Jacek Bil
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Russia's hostile actions against the Estonian state structures take the form of soft power, which can be observed in such areas as the activities of the Russian-speaking minority, media coverage, or through the use of coercion when it comes to fuel sales. This article presents qualitative methods of measuring Russian influence on Estonia. An observable trend in international relations is replacing hard power with soft power, commonly used against states within the sphere of interest of certain geopolitical entities. It is more difficult to identify the latter and prove it results from an aggressor's deliberate actions. Information warfare, including disinformation and propaganda, is one of the means Russia uses to exert political influence. By accepting the offer of a political and military alliance with the Western world, the Baltic States have become a threat to the Kremlin's imperialist aspirations. Russia's direct military actions against Estonia and the other Baltic states would have provoked a strong reaction and could even have led to military confrontation. However, the Russian government wishes to avoid it and, for the time being, limits itself to soft power measures.
Topic:: Hegemony, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, Foreign Interference, and Influence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

22. From Soviet State to Independent Estonia

Author:: Patricia H. Kushlis
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Well before the Soviet Union collapsed, it was clear that the trajectory of the Baltic states differed greatly from that of the Central Asian Soviet republics. In contrast to the Baltic states clamoring to leave the Soviet Union, Central Asian ones had been pretty satisfied with their lot. Removal of the support they had received from Moscow hurled them spiraling into a vast and unpredictable future. For decades, Moscow had been shifting funds from the “wealthier” European parts of the huge country to its poorer and less industrialized provinces East of the Urals, This helped keep Russian rule in place but it also alienated the European population of the USSR – including those in the Russian Republic – who had a better sense of the country’s profound deterioration and their own personal poverty in comparison with far wealthier neighbors to the West and even those in Eastern Europe.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Soviet Union, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Estonia and Baltic States

23. Georgia and the Baltics: Relations Amidst the War in Ukraine

Author:: Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Georgia and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have a history of friendship that is strengthened through the common Soviet past and shared experiences of Russian influence and violence as well as by the common vision of the contemporary Russian threat towards Eastern Europe. All of this creates the shared desire in these countries to put themselves as far from the Russian sphere of influence as possible. The Baltic states along with Ukraine (and Belarus) are neighbors of Russia and the touch point between Europe and Russia1 while Georgia is located between Russia and Turkey and performs a significant role in linking them. The partnership between Georgia and the Baltic states in terms of decreasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe, as one of the joint aims, requires the cooperation to be on the highest of levels in order for it to be successful. The partnership not only stands on the common past of the four countries but also on their common security visions and shared values which can ultimately contribute to making the partnership stable and long lasting.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:: Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Baltic States

24. Book Talk. Contemporary Ukrainian and Baltic Art: Political and Social Perspectives

Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the Ukrainian Studies Program at the Harriman Institute for a presentation of the book Contemporary Ukrainian Art and Baltic Art: Political and Social Perspectives (ibidem Press, 2021). The event will feature presentations by the volume’s editor Svitlana Biedarieva and contributors Ieva Astahovska, Olena Martynyuk, and Margaret Tali with moderator Mark Andryczyk (Harriman Institute). This volume focuses on political and social expressions in contemporary art of Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. It explores the transformations that art in Ukraine and the Baltic states has undergone since their independence in 1991, discussing how the conflicts and challenges of the last three decades have impacted the reconsideration of identity and fostered resistance of culture against economic and political crises. It analyzes connections between the past and the present as seen by the artists in these countries and looks at their visions of the future. Contemporary Ukrainian art portrays various perspectives, addressing issues from controversial historical topics to the present military conflict in the East of the country. Baltic art speaks out against the erasure of past historical traumas and analyzes the pertinence of its cultural scene to the European community. The contributions in this collection open a discussion of whether there is a single paradigm that describes the contemporary processes of art production in Ukraine and the Baltic countries. With contributions by Ieva Astahovska, Svitlana Biedarieva, Kateryna Botanova, Olena Martynyuk, Vytautas Michelkevičius, Lina Michelkevičė, Margaret Tali, and Jessica Zychowicz.
Topic:: Nationalism, Arts, Culture, and Identity
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia

25. Cyber Conscription: Experience and Best Practice from Selected Countries

Author:: Martin Hurt and Tiia Sõmer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Cyber conscription is quite a new phenomenon and there is no common definition of the term. Cyber conscripts may carry out a range of functions including technical cybersecurity and cyber defence, as well as IT support, programming and development. They may also serve in more traditional branches such as communications/signals, intelligence, and even social media. This report aims to identify best practices in the use of conscripts and reservists with information and communications technology (ICT)-related education and/or experience, bearing in mind the limited time that they serve. It examines the selection, training and employment of cyber conscripts and reservists in six countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In the countries analysed, the number of volunteers applying for cyber conscription exceeds the military’s needs—there is no immediate need to increase the attractiveness of this type of service. This may change, however, since several nations plan to increase the annual requirement for cyber conscripts. Interviews conducted for this report found that cyber conscripts receive basic military training that mostly follows a uniform pattern common to all conscripts. Only after completing basic military training are cyber conscripts given more specific training, including on cyberspace operations. Several of the armed forces of the countries studied cooperate with universities and have either developed or are planning to launch partnerships with the private sector. Some also provide cyber conscripts with training that gives them a specialist certificate or university credit points. Our report makes recommendations for military authorities that should benefit the armed forces and the individual conscripts, as well as academia and the private sector.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, and Conscription
Political Geography:: Finland, Norway, Estonia, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden

26. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation

Author:: Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

27. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech

Author:: Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: China and Estonia

28. Small States, Different Approaches: Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council

Author:: Kristin M. Haugevik, Piret Kuusik, Kristi Raik, and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2021, Estonia and Norway served as elected members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both being relatively small states, defending multilateral cooperation and rules-based international order were important common goals. In the last decade, great power tensions have returned to the Security Council, and multilateralism has again come under pressure. The opportunities of elected members to substantially influence the UNSC agenda are arguably limited by power struggles, complex subject matter and inefficient working methods. In spite of these limitations, both Estonia and Norway achieved some important outcomes as members of the Security Council. Their experiences confirm above all the value of diplomatic experience and reputation-building for elected members. To some extent, the two states have also been able to assume ownership of matters on the UNSC agenda. As in any diplomatic setting, knowing how to “play the game” is key to the ability of small states to punch above their weight. Specific methods through which elected members work to influence the UNSC agenda include coalition-building, actively using the presidency function, organising special events, and assuming the penholder role in a specific country or thematic issue. Common priority areas of Estonia and Norway in the UNSC include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, protection of human rights and especially women’s rights, and addressing new security challenges in the fields of cyber and climate. The most significant experience of cooperation during 2021 was the Estonian-Norwegian joint penholdership of the Afghanistan file which brought the two countries to the centre stage of global diplomacy and reinforced their international profile as small states that make an active and professional contribution to multilateral cooperation. Looking at Estonia’s and Norway’s performance in 2021, some interesting differences can be identified. First, the two states assess the relative importance of the UN differently. In Norway’s foreign policy, there is a strong tradition of prioritising the UN and seeing an active role in multilateral cooperation as an important contribution to national interests and security. By contrast, for Estonia, the UN has not been a foreign policy priority in the past, and its contribution to national security continues to be seen as secondary to membership in Western organisations, notably NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Norway has generally worked a bit more behind the scenes, relying on its long experience and reputation as a constructive contributor to peace diplomacy. It has been active on issues such as the UNSC’s normative protection agenda and climate security, but also the Afghanistan, Syria and North Korea files. Meanwhile, Estonia has taken a rather bold approach as a newcomer visibly promoting its priorities, most notably the cybersecurity agenda. It has also focused on controversial issues of regional security, including the situations in Ukraine and Belarus, trying to use the UN to the advantage of national security through promoting its positions and strengthening coalitions with like-minded countries. Coordination between like-minded states is an integral part of the work of the Council. With Estonia and Norway both present, 2021 saw two Nordic-Baltic states concurrently represented in the Council for the first time. In the future, there may be scope for further strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the framework of the UN structures.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, Estonia, and Baltic States

29. Economic Well‐Being under Plan versus Market: The Case of Estonia and Finland

Author:: Anna Bocharnikova
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: This article investigates the dynamics of individual economic well‐being in Estonia and Finland over three periods: (1) 1923–1938, when both countries were similarly situated; (2) 1960–1988, during which Estonia was under Soviet control; and (3) 1992–2018, after Estonian independence. Economic well‐being is calculated using the purchasing power of wages in terms of the affordability of a minimal food basket. The results show that, in 1938, the purchasing power of wages in Estonia was 4 percent lower than in Finland; in 1988, it was 42 percent lower; and, by 2018, the gap had fallen to 17 percent. Consequently, as measured by the purchasing power of wages, well‐being in Estonia and Finland was similar before the Soviet occupation, widely diverged during Soviet rule, and converged after Estonian independence, with the transition from plan to market.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Politics, History, and Culture
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, and Estonia

30. The Three Seas Initiative and Georgia: Perspectives and Challenges

Author:: Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) aims to strengthen ties in the region of the wider Central Europe (between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas) which creates a solid foundation for economic development in terms of energy, transport, digital communication and the economy. It was established as a forum for cooperation between 12 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. The area comprising the countries belonging to the Three Seas Initiative constitutes almost one-third of the total area of the European Union. Over 112 million people live there. The region is experiencing stable economic growth and a limited unemployment rate. The priority for the 3SI is to build a coherent and well-integrated infrastructure in Central Europe which will render the possibility to make up for development lags resulting from historical events. As a result, the infrastructural and economic inequalities of the common European market will be reduced and this will limit the division of the EU into less and more developed areas of integration. The most important added value of the Initiative is the assurance of political support at the highest level of state authorities for investments which have so far been a neglected field of cooperation between the Central European countries. The Three Seas is, therefore, pro-European and complementary to the existing regional cooperation formats (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2020).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Communications, Infrastructure, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Georgia, Croatia, Latvia, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia

31. The Gap that Survived the Transition: The Gender Wage Gap over Three Decades in Estonia

Author:: Jaanika Meriküll and Maryna Tverdostup
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper looks at the gender wage gap throughout the transition from communism to capitalism and throughout a time of rapid economic convergence. The case of Estonia is used, and micro data from the Labour Force Survey from 1989 to 2020 are employed. The communist regimes had highly regulated wage setting and high levels of educational attainment and labour market participation for women. Although the regime was formally egalitarian, the gender attitudes were conservative and the raw gender wage gap was as large as 41% at the end of the communist period in Estonia. The large gender wage gap under communist rule narrowed quickly during the first years of economic transition, but the further decline in the gap has been slow. The paper has two main messages. The first is that there is strong inertia in the gender wage gap persisting through the communist period and economic convergence. None of the known long-run cultural drivers of gender attitudes can explain this. The second is that the decline in the gap is related to the overall decline in wage inequality, the rise in minimum wages, and more egalitarian gender attitudes. The gender attitudes are responsible for a smaller effect than wage inequality is.
Topic:: Economy, Minimum Wage, Post-Soviet Space, Wage Income, Attitudes, and Gender Wage Gap
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Estonia

32. Volunteers in Estonia’s Security Sector: Opportunities for Enhancing Societal Resilience

Author:: Ramon Loik
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This policy paper assesses the involvement of volunteers acting in the public interest under Estonian law in the development of key characteristics of a broad security concept and reflects the main ongoing discussion points for widening their potential for ensuring collective security and public safety.
Topic:: Security, National Security, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Estonia

33. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict

Author:: Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
Topic:: Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia

34. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:: Frank Jüris
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

35. Democracy, ‘Alternative Reality’ and Estonia’s Resilience

Author:: Dmitri Teperik
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The brief explores reasons why the concerns, grievances and perceptions of all vulnerable societal groups should receive adequate attention if further harm inflicted by fact-free and/or fact-twisting ‘alternative realities’ is to be averted. As some intergroup differences fall notably along the lines related to age, levels of educational attainment, overall welfare and life satisfaction, perceptions of inclusion, and geography, the pervasiveness of misconceptions and social myths as well as their impact on the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour of citizens can be considered as reliable indicators of societal resilience in Estonia.
Topic:: Politics, Governance, Democracy, Resilience, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Estonia and Baltic States

36. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies

Author:: Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Estonia and Baltic States

37. Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank

Author:: Artur Kacprzyk and Lukasz Kulesa
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: While the countries of NATO’s north-eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—are correctly putting emphasis in their security policy on strengthening deterrence, they need to take a more proactive stance on arms control. Although current prospects are not promising in the light of Russian violations and circumventions of existing treaties, demand for greater engagement with Russia on arms control is growing among NATO nations. Without a constructive input from the flank countries, NATO’s arms-control agenda and the actions of individual European Allies could become detached from deterrence efforts and weaken NATO cohesion. The north-eastern countries should thus identify and promote balanced solutions that can be used to increase the region’s security.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia

38. Estonia in the UN Security Council: The Importance and Limits of European Cooperation

Author:: Kristi Raik
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In January 2020, Estonia became a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year term. The international environment, meanwhile, is becoming increasingly challenging for multilateral cooperation and a rules-based global order. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the lack of global leadership, previously provided by the US, and inability of the UNSC to mobilise international cooperation. In recent years, European cooperation in the UNSC has increased, while transatlantic tensions and great-power rivalry have grown. Estonia has taken an active role in shaping the joint positions of EU states in the UNSC, for example on issues related to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Ukraine and Syria. The case of the MEPP in particular illustrates that it has become more difficult to reconcile good transatlantic relations with a consistent commitment to the EU, multilateralism and international law. It is in Estonia’s interest to work towards as much consensus as possible between Europe and the US and, on issues where this is not feasible, to avoid exacerbating the tensions. At the same time, Estonia has a strong interest in being consistent on international law, even if at times this means disagreeing with its most important security ally. The dilemma for Estonia and the EU as a whole is how to work to maintain the rules-based order while simultaneously adapting to its erosion and change. The EU should move on from joint statements to more action and the generation of a real ability to enforce international law and resolve conflicts, especially in its own neighbourhood. The need for Europe’s active role in tackling global problems has also been evident during the COVID-19 crisis.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, United Nations, European Union, UN Security Council, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

39. Estonia’s Partners in the EU Coalition Machinery: Maximising Influence in the EU through Coalition-building

Author:: Kristi Raik and Josef Janning
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This policy paper examines Estonia’s partners in the European Union with the aim of identifying ways to enhance its influence on policy-making. Effective coalition-building is also important for the EU as a whole, since it can improve the Union’s capacity to take decisions and act. The paper highlights that: Estonia has a relatively strong position in the EU, considering its small size and limited resources. It is particularly well-connected with the Nordic-Baltic partners and should seek ways to use this grouping more effectively as a means to reach out to larger member states and shape decisions in the Union. The main challenge is to build stronger links with France and Germany, something that has become all the more important due to Brexit. Teaming up with other countries that are better connected to Berlin and Paris, such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, is one way to pursue this goal. It is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the latest change of government in Estonia on the country’s influence and image among partners in the EU. However, the research interviews show some indications of a weakened position. Estonia should avoid losing its reputation as a results-oriented member state that takes into consideration the priorities of others while pursuing its own interests in a constructive manner.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

40. Covid-19 bends the rules on internal border controls: Yet another crisis undermining the Schengen acquis?

Author:: Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Free movement within the Schengen Area has been challenged in recent years by national measures: from internal border checks after the ‘migration crisis’ to the closure of borders in the Covid-19 crisis. This is the first time in the history of Schengen that member states have categorically refused entry to other EU citizens who are not registered residents or cross-border workers. Seventeen Schengen countries have submitted a notification on reintroducing internal border control due to Covid-19: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland. The use of Schengen provisions was creative: 12 states justified their internal border controls as a case requiring immediate action (Art. 28), France and Denmark expanded their already existing internal border controls (Art. 25), Finland appealed to the ‘foreseeable event’ clause (Art. 25), and Slovakia and Poland introduced ‘healthcare-police measures’ (Art. 23) before launching border controls (Art. 28). The crisis illustrates the need to reform Schengen in order to maintain the legitimacy of commonly agreed rules.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Schengen, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Norway, France, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Austria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia

41. GovTech, The New Frontier in Digital Sovereignty

Author:: Clément Tonon
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 crisis has been a catalyst for a surge in the GovTech market, while triggering debate around the use of new technologies in the public health response to the pandemic. More broadly, the health crisis has shed a new light on the strategic importance of some domains relevant to GovTech such as HealthTech, smart cities and EdTech. The French State has developed a comprehensive policy of government digitization but still suffers from a lack of investment in the GovTech sector: so far, it has been unable to nurture a GovTech ecosystem comparable to the French defense technological and industrial base. At the European level, the rise of GovTech solutions could deepen existing divides between member states, as shown by the uncoordinated development of tracing apps by European countries during the crisis. In the long run, the lack of European industrial and political strategy focusing on GovTech could turn Europe into a battleground for Chinese and American actors, which benefit from governmental support at home and abroad. The rise of GovTech companies challenges deeply rooted ideas on the meaning of the public sector and the role of the State. It underlines how technology can affect the values and core principles of democratic societies. In that sense, the growing technological competition between the US, China and Europe means much more than economic rivalry: it is a real threat to European democracy and strategic autonomy.
Topic:: Government, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, COVID-19, Digital Policy, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, France, Estonia, Singapore, and United States of America

42. Chinese influence in the Baltic? Unconvincing, yet lacking an alternative

Author:: Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Brussels is waking up to an assertive Beijing that is seeking influence in EU member states by promising massive foreign investments. In the Baltic states, however, Chinese business is not the problem. An explainer. KEY FINDINGS: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania experience gaps in transportation, energy and digitalisation – Chinese core expertise – and China is offering them its business. However, China is sending mixed signals: apart from economic overtures, it is interfering in domestic politics and cooperating militarily with Baltic arch-enemy Russia – alienating Baltic democracies. As EU attention is tilting ‘outwards’ to China, Denmark and the EU should use this moment to direct attention ‘inwards’ by being the ones delivering on Baltic states’ needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, Investment, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: China, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

43. Estonian corporate tax: Lessons for Poland

Author:: Aleksandr Łożykowski, Anna Leszczyłowska, and Dmitri Jegorov
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:: Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
Topic:: Governance, Tax Systems, Investment, Fiscal Policy, and Corporate Tax
Political Geography:: Eurasia, Poland, and Estonia

44. Willingness to defend one’s country and to resist in the Baltic states

Author:: Māris Andžāns and Andris Spruds
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: This article addresses the question of willingness to defend one’s own country and a similar notion of resistance, should Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia be attacked. The study principally relies on quantitative data from a dedicated nationally representative survey across all three countries. The data acquired thereof reaffirm findings from previous studies concluding that the highest level of willingness to defend one’s own country is in Estonia, while it is lower in Latvia and in Lithuania. Asked if and how respondents would resist in case of an attack, more willingness to resist either non-violently or violently was expressed by respondents in Lithuania, ahead of the number of willing to do so in Estonia and more so in Latvia. Demographic background of the respondents visualized and discussed in the article provides further nuances of both research questions. While situation with the willingness to defend Estonia is relatively comfortable, this should not be treated as a reason for complacency. There is still room for progress within some groups of the society. Meanwhile, valuable lessons could be drawn for policies of Latvia and more so of Lithuania to avert some of the less flattery trends identified in this study.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Resistance, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

45. The Role of Digital Power in Estonia and Taiwan in Combating COVID-19

Author:: Andrey Makarychev, Elizabeth Wishnick, and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Taiwan and Estonia are known as digital democracies. As both face threats from neighbors, their degree of digitization typically has been seen as a vulnerability. The DNS attack from Russia that Estonia faced in 2007 brought home the potential for cyberspace to be used as a domain of war. Similarly Taiwan has faced repeated cyberthreats from the People’s Republic of China. Nonetheless, in their successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan and Estonia have highlighted the strengths of digital democracy in combating a non-traditional security threat without employing the strongarm tactics of authoritarian states. In this article we reexamine the digital vulnerability of democracies and put forward a conception of digital power to explain the success of Estonia and Taiwan in using their digital prowess to combat COVID-19. On the one hand their reliance on cybertechnology make them particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks, but on the other hand their digital power enhances their global stature and domestic capacity to address threats like COVID-19.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Democracy, COVID-19, Non-Traditional Threats, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

46. The Estonia-Russia Border Dispute

Author:: Kinga Raś and Rafał Tarnogórski
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The centennial of the Treaty of Tartu between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia in February 2020 did not end the border dispute. In 1944, the Soviet authorities changed the borders and since then, 5% of the territory of pre-war Estonia remains under Russia’s control. It argues the change was legally justified and that the region has not shown any willingness to adjust its borders back to those of the interwar period. Estonia, though, aims to assert its statehood, and some elites are directly raising claims. This means the continuation of the stalemate over the border, which will negatively impact bilateral relations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: Russia and Estonia

47. A New Cold War: Personal Reflections Regarding Russia’s Missed Opportunities with NATO, Ukraine and Its Western Neighbors

Author:: Keith C. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: President Boris Yeltsin’s imperial views on the “near abroad,” and President Vladimir Putin’s regarding Russia’s alleged “sphere of influence” has left Russia considerably weaker than it would have been otherwise, and the world much more endangered.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Armed Forces, Reform, and Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, United States of America, and Baltic States

48. 2020-2021 UN Security Council Elections and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: Today, 7 June 2019, the United Nations General Assembly elected Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam to the UN Security Council for the period of 2020-2021. With their election, 6 of the 15 members of the Council in 2020 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Human Rights, Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Security Council, and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Vietnam, Estonia, United Nations, Tunisia, Niger, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

49. Estonian-French Defence Cooperation – Where Estonian Pragmatism Meets French Vision

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu and Emile LeBrun
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: ICDS Research Fellow Kalev Stoicescu and Non-Resident Fellow Maxime Lebrun made a thorough analysis of the defence cooperation and partnership between Estonia and France. They concluded that this successful relationship, which evolved in a short time literally starting from mutual neglect, is based both on pragmatism and political vision. It also serves as a very good example of fruitful cooperation between rather different European partners in terms of size, military capabilities, history and culture, geography etc. France contributes to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, a vital deterrence measure for the Baltic states and Poland, and Estonia participates actively in French, EU and UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, France promotes the European Intervention Initiative (in which Estonia participates) and the concept of European Strategic Autonomy (Estonia, as well as other Allies, are not yet convinced of its aims and utility). The analysis offers a comprehensive overview on the matter for those who are interested in the defence policy of Estonia and France, and the development of the defence dimension of the European Union.
Topic:: Defense Policy and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Estonia

50. Russians in Europe: Nobody’s Tool – The Examples of Finland, Germany and Estonia

Author:: Anna Tiido
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This analysis calls for European governments to pay greater attention to the resilience of their societies, starting with the integration of minorities. It is also important to continue work to increase awareness of Russian influence. The paper analyses the issue of Russian speakers in the EU based on the example of Finland, Germany and Estonia. Although the Kremlin’s “Russian World” policy sees all the people connected to Russia as a homogeneous group, the minority groups analysed are quite diverse. The media preferences and habits of Russian-speakers are connected to language, naturally, and these communities are one of the targets of Russia’s actions. At the same time, Russia also targets non-Russian audiences. It promotes propaganda that is tailor-made for specific countries, based on existing conditions. The grievances of Russian-speakers are one such tool, but they constitute one of many available—and not the main one.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Integration, Social Cohesion, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Russia, Finland, Germany, and Estonia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS