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1. Estonia’s Role in the Changing Architecture of Development Cooperation

Author:
Merili Arjakas, Hille Hanso, Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Kai Kaarelson, and Solveig Niitra
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Development cooperation is a tool of soft power for states that enables them to promote their values, build relationships with partner states, and reduce global poverty. Since development cooperation is impacted by changes in the norms and power dynamics of international politics, it is essential to analyse Estonia’s use of development cooperation up to now and the directions it may take in the future. Firstly, bilateral development cooperation is becoming more interest- and business-based, with development cooperation by western countries also being increasingly shaped by the goal of promoting their own goods and services. For example, Sweden – one of the European Union’s key donor countries – is increasingly focusing on its exports. At the same time, it is hoped that economic growth in the global south will offer solutions to the global north’s security and welfare challenges, including migration. Another significant trend in the area is the growing influence of non-democratic donor countries that use development cooperation not to empower local populations but to consolidate or expand their spheres of influence. This shift is exacerbated by substantial cuts in development aid budgets in several western countries, including the United States – the largest contributor to aid – which leaves more room for China and other states offering an alternative to western governance models. Estonia has primarily focused its development cooperation on sharing its transition experience with countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, who have shown interest in the lessons Estonia’s example can offer and whose development directly affects Estonia’s security. These reform efforts include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and a favourable business environment, along with a strong emphasis on education-related development cooperation. More recently, Estonia has expanded its efforts to share its expertise in digital governance and digital education, particularly with African countries. A new area of focus is the export of Estonia’s education model, which might help address the high global demand for quality education, though there is still no national consensus on what the priorities in this sector should be and who the suitable actors are. The overarching aim of Estonian development cooperation has been to support target countries and their populations. At the same time, it has also served as a means to advance Estonia’s own security, reputation, and economic interests. Compared to larger donor countries, Estonian development cooperation resources are very limited, yet it has distinct strengths that should be better recognised internally and more widely promoted internationally. Estonia conducts strong bilateral development cooperation with relatively little fragmentation, in which it takes advantage of its strengths: digitalisation, flexibility, personal engagement, low coordination costs, and reform expertise. Thus far, Estonian development cooperation has focused on so-called smart cooperation (reforms, IT, and education) and supporting human development in middle-income countries. This approach should continue, rather than shifting towards infrastructure development in the world’s poorest nations. The reconstruction of Ukraine is an exception, where Estonia is both taking a leading role that sets an example for others and supporting a key security partner.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Poverty, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

2. Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe and Estonia

Author:
Stephen Kimoita
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Kenya’s foreign policy towards Europe is largely motivated by the need to promote its national interests through trade and investment, as reflected in its 2014 Foreign Policy document (revised 2024). This paper explores Kenya’s relations with Europe and Estonia in areas of security, multilateralism, education, culture, and the diaspora. Despite having already achieved a close partnership, there is room for growth in Europe-Kenya relations. To maximise foreign policy gains, Kenya should fully leverage existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Meanwhile, Europe needs to customise its exports to Kenya’s needs and pursue well-targeted trade and investment opportunities in areas like manufacturing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, Investment, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, Europe, and Estonia

3. Energy Security in the Baltics: Perceptions in the Midst of the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Leon Hartwell and Agnė Rakštytė
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Amidst the geopolitical complexities of Eurasia, the strategic employment of energy resources has emerged as a potent tool for projecting power. Since coming to power, Vladimir Putin has wielded energy security as a means to exert influence across the region, with the pinnacle of this influence underscored during the February 2022 escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war. This paper delves into perceptions on energy in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania amidst the RussiaUkraine war, specifically focusing on attitudes towards energy security, renewable energy sources, and energy efficiency. Drawing upon insights from a comprehensive mixed-methods study that involved eight focus groups and a survey of approximately 4,500 individuals (over 1,500 from each Baltic state), the research illuminates key similarities and differences in public perceptions across these nations. Key findings reveal a shared concern for energy security in all three countries, coupled with a desire for sustainable and self-sufficient energy solutions. While there is broad support for a transition to renewable energy sources, preferences for specific energy types vary. The research also identifies widespread public scepticism towards government energy strategies, and varying levels of willingness to pay higher prices for environmentally friendly energy. This analysis informs nuanced policy recommendations for Baltic states and European policymakers geared towards enhancing energy security across the region. Recommendations include more effective communication of long-term energy strategies, tailored campaigns to address scepticism towards renewable energy, and economic incentives to promote affordability and adoption of sustainable solutions.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Renewable Energy, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

4. Democratic resilience in Europe in a polarised world

Author:
Jean-Dominique Giuliani
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
I am particularly happy to be here once more at the University of Tartu[1], which I had the honour of visiting a long time ago, back in 2003. One of the oldest universities in Europe, it plays a significant role in your country and throughout the continent in providing the very highest level of education. I even had earlier the privilege of meeting and having lunch with Lennart Meri, President of the Republic, and I have very fond memories of our conversation. I was particularly impressed by his analysis of Russia, which takes on a whole new dimension today with the return of the Russian threat. There has been a very strong relationship between Estonia and France since the founding of your Republic, which was established here in 1920 by the Treaty of Tartu. French soldiers are now fighting alongside yours in a demonstration of solidarity that has never ceased to be in our hearts. We never recognised the Soviet occupation. You should know that France has a deep attachment to Estonia, which continues to show in our fraternity every day. I mention this because the subject you have asked me to explore, which I hope will serve as a basis for our discussions, reflects a legitimate concern regarding European determination to resist Russian aggression, a concern that is heightened here, a few kilometres from Lake Peipus (in Estonian: Peipsi-Pihkva järv), which sometimes witnesses a fluctuation of its borders in the eyes of your large neighbour. I will begin with the definition of resilience, a term that comes from physics and is very fashionable in intellectual circles and in politics. Resilience is the ability to withstand a brutal ordeal and to draw strength from it.
Topic:
Democracy, Resilience, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Estonia

5. Exploring the Application of AI in the Public Sector: The Case of Estonia and Lessons for Georgia

Author:
Salome Abramishvili
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming societies globally, offering unprecedented opportunities across sectors. The integration of AI into the public sector promises enhanced service delivery, efficiency, and significant decision-making improvements. Nations worldwide recognize AI’s strategic importance and are adopting National AI Strategies (NASs) to guide its development and deployment. This paper explores AI’s evolution and impact in the public sector, focusing on applications and strategic frameworks using Estonia as an example—a pioneer in AI governance within the EU. Estonia’s approach serves as a model for Georgia, a country with post-Soviet roots and EU integration aspirations. By examining Estonia’s National AI Strategy and its implementation, this paper identifies key lessons and recommendations for Georgia to develop its tailored strategy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Public Sector, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe, Estonia, and Georgia

6. Finland's partnerships as a NATO member: Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework

Author:
Iro Särkkä, Minna Ålander, Joel Linnainmäki, and Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden. It studies defence cooperation through key strategic, military, economic and political factors, such as the perceived threat environment, military capabilities, strategic culture, and the role member states play in the multilateral security framework of NATO. The report compares these six countries with Finland and identifies factors impacting potential future cooperation. The report finds that regional defence cooperation can yield positive outcomes for NATO. Bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation can enhance intra-alliance policymaking and serve as a tool to build trust with key partners and allies, thus facilitating defence integration within NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

7. AI Unleashed or Tamed? Decoding Europe’s Bold Leap with the AI Act

Author:
Arianna Jater
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
2023 saw a boom in generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, such a rapid expansion revealed the unpreparedness of governments to handle the unprecedented impact AI systems have on the core values of democratic societies. The European Commission’s AI Act has emerged as the first binding legislation of its kind. It is already clear, however, that simply ratifying the Act will not solve the next challenges. Among those, the immediate one is to ensure that the new AI rulebook is enforced on the national level and that Member States have the resources necessary. Then, the Act, and any future AI legislation, will need to constantly adapt to the ever-changing developments in technology, which now seem to move at a faster pace than ever before. Interdisciplinary approaches and new research disciplines will be needed to analyse the correctness and safety of AI systems, as well as to evaluate their impact on society. Last but not least, the private sector — already employing or only exploring the possibility of introducing AI systems — will need strong support to remain compliant. This brief outlines the state of the EU’s AI Act, discusses concerns within Europe, examines the position taken by the Estonian technology sector and government, and explores the future direction the regulation might take.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Legislation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

8. An Edifying Tale of Keeping the Lights On: Societal Resilience in an Energy Crisis – the Case of Estonia

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Dmitri Teperik, and Karolin Martinson
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021–23, Europe experienced a major energy shock due to a number of significant factors in the energy market. As a result of Russia’s strategy to take advantage of Europe’s dependency on its energy supply and coerce the EU into acquiescence to Russia’s geopolitical demands, the most important course-changing trigger has been the Russian war against Ukraine. A raft of urgent policy measures passed at the EU and national levels, quick adaptation of the consumers to the price signals, the availability of LNG from the US, suppressed demand in China, and a mild winter meant that a full-scale disaster was averted. However, the previous crisis being less severe than anticipated does not mean the next one will be less challenging. Estonian society’s resilience to future energy crises may determine not only the country’s internal political dynamics but also its relations with key partners, its reputation in the EU, and even the country’s long-term geopolitical prospects. In order to understand how well-prepared Estonian society is for such future crises, this study identifies and analyses the key public narratives that emerged during the 2021–23 energy crisis and investigates how they reflected on Estonian society’s perceptions and actions. The narrative analysis is complemented by survey data, which indicates how the Estonian public viewed various aspects of the crisis and its resolution, as well as the extent to which public sentiment echoes or runs counter to the identified narratives. The study highlights several key shortcomings in Estonian society’s resilience capabilities. Firstly, the lack of constructive responsiveness to warnings about plausible severe risks (i.e., power cuts) and low scores on preparedness for future energy crises show that the Estonian society does not have a mindset of crisis preparedness. Secondly, society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully navigate such crises has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust and cooperation in similar episodes in the future. Another breakdown in resilience in the response to the energy crisis was related to the failure to maintain a just and equal distribution of risk, vulnerability, and cost. As the narrative related to the profits of the energy companies—especially state-owned ones—shows, the sense of unfair distribution of costs and benefits was pervasive and highly antagonising. As the survey showed, a responsible and competent media, effective government, and an impartial expert community were the most trusted sources of information with respect to coping with the energy crisis. These actors will have to play an important role in rebuilding the confidence lost during the energy crisis, shaping the narratives that inspire steadfast action for forging a better future for energy and climate security, and improving Estonia’s resilience.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

9. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

10. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

11. Defence of Baltic States, Poland Runs into Ottawa Treaty on Mines

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner and Stefania Kolarz
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
By deciding to build a defence line on the border with Russia and declaring the possibility of using anti-personnel mines, representatives of the Estonian parliament have opened the debate on possible withdrawal from the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines. This step may be necessary for the Baltic States to protect their territories from aggression, as they are faced with a lack of operational depth. However, for other states, including Poland, which have other power-projection capabilities, it is a last resort.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Landmines, and Ottawa Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia, Poland, Estonia, and Baltic States

12. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

13. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

14. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

15. British Nuclear Policy

Author:
Peter Watkins
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

16. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

17. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

18. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:
Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

19. The Energy Crisis Requires a Military Solution that Compels NATO to Spend like Estonia

Author:
Leon Hartwell and Guillemette Guicherd
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this LSE IDEAS Strategic Update, the authors focus on the intimate relationship between the Russia-Ukraine war and the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe. It is argued that although Western sanctions against Russia’s energy sector have been a welcome political statement, they have so far been inadequate. Moreover, in the absence of expanding Ukraine’s defence systems, supplying the country with critical equipment to rebuild its energy sector while it is under constant Russian bombardment has limited impacts. Consequently, the authors argue that to solve the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe, NATO and its allies need to “spend like Estonia.” Spending like Estonia would, among others, entail ramping up support for Ukraine to 1.1% of each member state’s GDP. Such an approach could help Ukraine to decisively win the war in 2023, and it would help to avert a potential energy crisis during the next winter. 
Topic:
NATO, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

20. Separatisms and Social Integration Processes on the Example of Estonia

Author:
Agata Włodarska-Frykowska
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article seeks to analyze political and social separatisms in contemporary Estonia and to outline integration processes in the country. The Russian national minority has been a factor that has significantly influenced the existing divisions in the interior of the country since the creation of the independent and sovereign Estonian state. Despite the passage of more than 30 years after regaining its independence, Estonia is still struggling with internal separatist mechanisms, whilst strongly developed and strengthened integration processes have significantly influenced its social consolidation. Changes in Estonian society are apparent, the sense of Estonian identity keeps strengthening and representatives of national minorities, primarily the Russian one, have increasingly improved their linguistic competence in Estonian. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to build Estonian statehood, subjectivity and identity in the shadow of the difficult relations with the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Minorities, Separatism, and Social Integration
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Estonia