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41. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

42. Democracy, ‘Alternative Reality’ and Estonia’s Resilience

Author:
Dmitri Teperik
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The brief explores reasons why the concerns, grievances and perceptions of all vulnerable societal groups should receive adequate attention if further harm inflicted by fact-free and/or fact-twisting ‘alternative realities’ is to be averted. As some intergroup differences fall notably along the lines related to age, levels of educational attainment, overall welfare and life satisfaction, perceptions of inclusion, and geography, the pervasiveness of misconceptions and social myths as well as their impact on the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour of citizens can be considered as reliable indicators of societal resilience in Estonia.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Democracy, Resilience, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

43. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

44. Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk and Lukasz Kulesa
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
While the countries of NATO’s north-eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—are correctly putting emphasis in their security policy on strengthening deterrence, they need to take a more proactive stance on arms control. Although current prospects are not promising in the light of Russian violations and circumventions of existing treaties, demand for greater engagement with Russia on arms control is growing among NATO nations. Without a constructive input from the flank countries, NATO’s arms-control agenda and the actions of individual European Allies could become detached from deterrence efforts and weaken NATO cohesion. The north-eastern countries should thus identify and promote balanced solutions that can be used to increase the region’s security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia

45. Estonia in the UN Security Council: The Importance and Limits of European Cooperation

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In January 2020, Estonia became a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year term. The international environment, meanwhile, is becoming increasingly challenging for multilateral cooperation and a rules-based global order. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the lack of global leadership, previously provided by the US, and inability of the UNSC to mobilise international cooperation. In recent years, European cooperation in the UNSC has increased, while transatlantic tensions and great-power rivalry have grown. Estonia has taken an active role in shaping the joint positions of EU states in the UNSC, for example on issues related to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Ukraine and Syria. The case of the MEPP in particular illustrates that it has become more difficult to reconcile good transatlantic relations with a consistent commitment to the EU, multilateralism and international law. It is in Estonia’s interest to work towards as much consensus as possible between Europe and the US and, on issues where this is not feasible, to avoid exacerbating the tensions. At the same time, Estonia has a strong interest in being consistent on international law, even if at times this means disagreeing with its most important security ally. The dilemma for Estonia and the EU as a whole is how to work to maintain the rules-based order while simultaneously adapting to its erosion and change. The EU should move on from joint statements to more action and the generation of a real ability to enforce international law and resolve conflicts, especially in its own neighbourhood. The need for Europe’s active role in tackling global problems has also been evident during the COVID-19 crisis.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, United Nations, European Union, UN Security Council, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

46. Estonia’s Partners in the EU Coalition Machinery: Maximising Influence in the EU through Coalition-building

Author:
Kristi Raik and Josef Janning
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper examines Estonia’s partners in the European Union with the aim of identifying ways to enhance its influence on policy-making. Effective coalition-building is also important for the EU as a whole, since it can improve the Union’s capacity to take decisions and act. The paper highlights that: Estonia has a relatively strong position in the EU, considering its small size and limited resources. It is particularly well-connected with the Nordic-Baltic partners and should seek ways to use this grouping more effectively as a means to reach out to larger member states and shape decisions in the Union. The main challenge is to build stronger links with France and Germany, something that has become all the more important due to Brexit. Teaming up with other countries that are better connected to Berlin and Paris, such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, is one way to pursue this goal. It is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the latest change of government in Estonia on the country’s influence and image among partners in the EU. However, the research interviews show some indications of a weakened position. Estonia should avoid losing its reputation as a results-oriented member state that takes into consideration the priorities of others while pursuing its own interests in a constructive manner.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

47. Covid-19 bends the rules on internal border controls: Yet another crisis undermining the Schengen acquis?

Author:
Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Free movement within the Schengen Area has been challenged in recent years by national measures: from internal border checks after the ‘migration crisis’ to the closure of borders in the Covid-19 crisis. This is the first time in the history of Schengen that member states have categorically refused entry to other EU citizens who are not registered residents or cross-border workers. Seventeen Schengen countries have submitted a notification on reintroducing internal border control due to Covid-19: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland. The use of Schengen provisions was creative: 12 states justified their internal border controls as a case requiring immediate action (Art. 28), France and Denmark expanded their already existing internal border controls (Art. 25), Finland appealed to the ‘foreseeable event’ clause (Art. 25), and Slovakia and Poland introduced ‘healthcare-police measures’ (Art. 23) before launching border controls (Art. 28). The crisis illustrates the need to reform Schengen in order to maintain the legitimacy of commonly agreed rules.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Schengen, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Norway, France, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Austria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia

48. Estonian corporate tax: Lessons for Poland

Author:
Aleksandr Łożykowski, Anna Leszczyłowska, and Dmitri Jegorov
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
Topic:
Governance, Tax Systems, Investment, Fiscal Policy, and Corporate Tax
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Poland, and Estonia

49. The Role of Digital Power in Estonia and Taiwan in Combating COVID-19

Author:
Andrey Makarychev, Elizabeth Wishnick, and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Taiwan and Estonia are known as digital democracies. As both face threats from neighbors, their degree of digitization typically has been seen as a vulnerability. The DNS attack from Russia that Estonia faced in 2007 brought home the potential for cyberspace to be used as a domain of war. Similarly Taiwan has faced repeated cyberthreats from the People’s Republic of China. Nonetheless, in their successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan and Estonia have highlighted the strengths of digital democracy in combating a non-traditional security threat without employing the strongarm tactics of authoritarian states. In this article we reexamine the digital vulnerability of democracies and put forward a conception of digital power to explain the success of Estonia and Taiwan in using their digital prowess to combat COVID-19. On the one hand their reliance on cybertechnology make them particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks, but on the other hand their digital power enhances their global stature and domestic capacity to address threats like COVID-19.
Topic:
Security, Cybersecurity, Democracy, COVID-19, Non-Traditional Threats, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

50. The Estonia-Russia Border Dispute

Author:
Kinga Raś and Rafał Tarnogórski
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The centennial of the Treaty of Tartu between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia in February 2020 did not end the border dispute. In 1944, the Soviet authorities changed the borders and since then, 5% of the territory of pre-war Estonia remains under Russia’s control. It argues the change was legally justified and that the region has not shown any willingness to adjust its borders back to those of the interwar period. Estonia, though, aims to assert its statehood, and some elites are directly raising claims. This means the continuation of the stalemate over the border, which will negatively impact bilateral relations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Russia and Estonia