Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Estonia

21. Industrial Policy for a New Growth Model: A Toolbox for EU-CEE Countries

Author:
Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
The EU member states of Central Eastern Europe (EU-CEE) have experienced rapid convergence in the decades following their EU accession, and have built up strong export-oriented manufacturing sectors boosted by foreign direct investment inflows. While this growth model has brought many positives, there are indications that it is hitting its limits. Endogenous limits to EU-CEE’s growth model are exacerbated by exogenous challenges of the ‘twin’ (green and digital) transitions, and the fallout of the pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine. This reinforces the imperative for EU-CEE to transition to a more innovation-driven, new growth model, enabled by a comprehensive industrial policy. However, the EU-CEE countries have not only lacked a stable and strategic approach to industrial policy in their development paths, but also find themselves in a unique position due to EU membership. As a result, innovation and industrial policies are underdeveloped in the region. Based on an in-depth analysis of the industrial landscape and the industrial policy environment of the region, we propose eight pillars for creating a EU-CEE version of the entrepreneurial state.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Czechia

22. Interview with the Honorable Hanno Pevkur: Minister of Defense of Estonia

Author:
Hanno Pevkur and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
PRISM: Sweden has Total Defense and Finland has Comprehensive Defense. What are the fundamental principles of Estonia’s strategic paradigm? Pevkur: We are quite like Finland in the sense that we have a clear understanding that everyone must be involved in protecting the country. We have a conscript service for the reserve army. This is mandatory for all men and voluntary for women. What we have changed since the full-scale war in Ukraine is that we have increased the number of wartime structures. We had 31,000 fighters before, but now we have almost 44,000. Most of those come from the Volunteer Defense League. The Estonian army is based on the regular army, the reserve army, and the Volunteer Defense League which at the moment has 30,000 people of which 10,000 are combatants. This will be increased this year to 20,000, which brings us to 44,000 combatants in our wartime structure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Interview, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
Political Geography:
Estonia, Baltic States, and Europe

23. Estonia: Size Matters

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Estonia is a very small state, with limited resources to counter hostile Russian activities. Like any small country, it must concentrate on some instruments of national power more than others and use them as intelligently as possible. Estonia has thus followed two complementary approaches to applying elements of national power since regaining independence in 1991: participating in international frameworks and using elements of national power to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions. Within international frameworks, Estonia uses diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal/law enforcement, political, social, and infrastructure (DIMEFILPSI) instruments to counter Russia in two ways. The first is to directly target Russia in coordination with others to create an impact that would be unachievable should Estonia act alone. The second is to enhance Estonia’s profile by influencing allies within the international framework, increasing the chances that these allies will support Estonia’s agenda and interests regarding Russia. Such indirect use of the instruments of national power is frequently seen in small states’ efforts to “punch above their weight” by developing and marketing particular skill sets that may be attractive or useful to others. Estonia’s second, more inward-facing approach to applying elements of national power is to use them to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions.1 This approach might be labeled resilience-building; examples include programs to erase uneven development across Estonia’s regions, as well as strategic communications policies to engage and inform the population about national-security-related activities. The importance of resilience in modern security thinking is evident in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s recognition that it is “an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”2 This second approach is more important for Estonia’s security on a day-to-day basis. Resilience-building measures can increase societies’ abilities to deal with a range of risks, making them able to counter Russian political warfare. Russia has a clear, long-term objective to achieve a more prominent place in the European and global security systems, so it acts to weaken the current Western-dominated architecture. It finds and exploits opportunities that challenge Western security structures and Western cohesion, such as its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, 2008 attack on Georgia, military intervention in the Syrian civil war, and probable orchestration of the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia. Although such major challenges are rare, Russia also pursues its long-term objective by subjecting Western states to a steady stream of low-key antagonistic actions to create uncertainty and confusion, undermining the targeted states’ confidence. Russia’s day-to-day hostile actions against Estonia include regular incursions into its national airspace, cyber intrusions, allegations of discrimination against the 23.7 percent of the Estonian population that is ethnic Russian, and hostile information policies such as alleging that Estonia’s Russophobic attitudes caused the failure to ratify the Estonia-Russia border treaty.3 These actions are well thought out and often well timed. For example, Russian operatives kidnapped an Estonian agent from the Estonian side of the Estonia-Russia border during NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit and just two days after U.S. President Barack Obama’s reassurance-building visit to Tallinn.4 Russia may thus be considered to be waging political warfare—“a form of strategy that leverages all of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities at a nation’s disposal to achieve its strategic objectives”5—on the West. This malign statecraft has the potential to create unease and undermine security in the target states, requiring vigilance and an appropriate response from state authorities.6 DIMEFILPSI instruments provide a range of possible resources.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Resilience, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Estonia

24. Time to Leave China’s “16+1” Influence Trap

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Last week Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania and quit what used to be known as 16+1, as the Czech Republic and other participating countries become increasingly vocal in their scepticism of the initiative. The 16+1 format, officially known as Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (中国—中东欧 国家合作, Zhongguo-Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), was launched in 2012 as a China-centric initiative incorporating 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In 2019, Greece—which is heavily indebted to China—joined, and the platform was briefly renamed 17+1. While it is officially described as an economic cooperation platform, its real achievements and the PRC’s approach to it show that trade and investment were never its true focus. Rather, the PRC used it as a propaganda and influence tool, wasting CEE diplomatic capacity on activities that only benefited Beijing. The lack of benefits and abundance of risks have recently led several CEE countries to reassess their participation in the 16+1 format. The time has come for the rest of the participating countries to join their Baltic neighbours and ditch this PRC influence vehicle.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Soft Power, Propaganda, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Estonia

25. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

26. Germany’s Position on CSDP: Is There Anything for the Baltics?

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė examine Germany’s approach to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the broader question of Europe’s strategic autonomy and consider whether Germany’s policies align with Baltic views. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Germany not only strengthened its contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, but also took a greater role in shaping EU security and defence policies, a field it had previously shied away from. Germany’s involvement was instrumental in ensuring that the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation was implemented in a form that is more palatable to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the debate on European strategic autonomy was broadened and blunted to be more in tune with Baltic positions. Germany’s policy positions on European defence are unlikely to shift dramatically under Chancellor Scholz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will continue to look to Germany to balance France’s ambitions during its Presidency of the European Council and beyond.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Germany, Estonia, and Baltic States

27. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

28. Estonia as an Area of Russian Influence: Analysis and Synthesis of the Kremlin’s Methodology of Exerting Influence on Tallinn’s Political and Social Stability

Author:
Jacek Bil
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Russia's hostile actions against the Estonian state structures take the form of soft power, which can be observed in such areas as the activities of the Russian-speaking minority, media coverage, or through the use of coercion when it comes to fuel sales. This article presents qualitative methods of measuring Russian influence on Estonia. An observable trend in international relations is replacing hard power with soft power, commonly used against states within the sphere of interest of certain geopolitical entities. It is more difficult to identify the latter and prove it results from an aggressor's deliberate actions. Information warfare, including disinformation and propaganda, is one of the means Russia uses to exert political influence. By accepting the offer of a political and military alliance with the Western world, the Baltic States have become a threat to the Kremlin's imperialist aspirations. Russia's direct military actions against Estonia and the other Baltic states would have provoked a strong reaction and could even have led to military confrontation. However, the Russian government wishes to avoid it and, for the time being, limits itself to soft power measures.
Topic:
Hegemony, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, Foreign Interference, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

29. From Soviet State to Independent Estonia

Author:
Patricia H. Kushlis
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Well before the Soviet Union collapsed, it was clear that the trajectory of the Baltic states differed greatly from that of the Central Asian Soviet republics. In contrast to the Baltic states clamoring to leave the Soviet Union, Central Asian ones had been pretty satisfied with their lot. Removal of the support they had received from Moscow hurled them spiraling into a vast and unpredictable future. For decades, Moscow had been shifting funds from the “wealthier” European parts of the huge country to its poorer and less industrialized provinces East of the Urals, This helped keep Russian rule in place but it also alienated the European population of the USSR – including those in the Russian Republic – who had a better sense of the country’s profound deterioration and their own personal poverty in comparison with far wealthier neighbors to the West and even those in Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Soviet Union, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

30. Georgia and the Baltics: Relations Amidst the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Georgia and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have a history of friendship that is strengthened through the common Soviet past and shared experiences of Russian influence and violence as well as by the common vision of the contemporary Russian threat towards Eastern Europe. All of this creates the shared desire in these countries to put themselves as far from the Russian sphere of influence as possible. The Baltic states along with Ukraine (and Belarus) are neighbors of Russia and the touch point between Europe and Russia1 while Georgia is located between Russia and Turkey and performs a significant role in linking them. The partnership between Georgia and the Baltic states in terms of decreasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe, as one of the joint aims, requires the cooperation to be on the highest of levels in order for it to be successful. The partnership not only stands on the common past of the four countries but also on their common security visions and shared values which can ultimately contribute to making the partnership stable and long lasting.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Baltic States