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1. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

2. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

3. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

4. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

5. Georgia and the Baltics: Relations Amidst the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Georgia and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have a history of friendship that is strengthened through the common Soviet past and shared experiences of Russian influence and violence as well as by the common vision of the contemporary Russian threat towards Eastern Europe. All of this creates the shared desire in these countries to put themselves as far from the Russian sphere of influence as possible. The Baltic states along with Ukraine (and Belarus) are neighbors of Russia and the touch point between Europe and Russia1 while Georgia is located between Russia and Turkey and performs a significant role in linking them. The partnership between Georgia and the Baltic states in terms of decreasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe, as one of the joint aims, requires the cooperation to be on the highest of levels in order for it to be successful. The partnership not only stands on the common past of the four countries but also on their common security visions and shared values which can ultimately contribute to making the partnership stable and long lasting.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Baltic States

6. Germany’s Position on CSDP: Is There Anything for the Baltics?

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė examine Germany’s approach to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the broader question of Europe’s strategic autonomy and consider whether Germany’s policies align with Baltic views. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Germany not only strengthened its contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, but also took a greater role in shaping EU security and defence policies, a field it had previously shied away from. Germany’s involvement was instrumental in ensuring that the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation was implemented in a form that is more palatable to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the debate on European strategic autonomy was broadened and blunted to be more in tune with Baltic positions. Germany’s policy positions on European defence are unlikely to shift dramatically under Chancellor Scholz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will continue to look to Germany to balance France’s ambitions during its Presidency of the European Council and beyond.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Germany, Estonia, and Baltic States

7. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

8. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation

Author:
Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

9. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
China and Estonia

10. Small States, Different Approaches: Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council

Author:
Kristin M. Haugevik, Piret Kuusik, Kristi Raik, and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021, Estonia and Norway served as elected members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both being relatively small states, defending multilateral cooperation and rules-based international order were important common goals. In the last decade, great power tensions have returned to the Security Council, and multilateralism has again come under pressure. The opportunities of elected members to substantially influence the UNSC agenda are arguably limited by power struggles, complex subject matter and inefficient working methods. In spite of these limitations, both Estonia and Norway achieved some important outcomes as members of the Security Council. Their experiences confirm above all the value of diplomatic experience and reputation-building for elected members. To some extent, the two states have also been able to assume ownership of matters on the UNSC agenda. As in any diplomatic setting, knowing how to “play the game” is key to the ability of small states to punch above their weight. Specific methods through which elected members work to influence the UNSC agenda include coalition-building, actively using the presidency function, organising special events, and assuming the penholder role in a specific country or thematic issue. Common priority areas of Estonia and Norway in the UNSC include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, protection of human rights and especially women’s rights, and addressing new security challenges in the fields of cyber and climate. The most significant experience of cooperation during 2021 was the Estonian-Norwegian joint penholdership of the Afghanistan file which brought the two countries to the centre stage of global diplomacy and reinforced their international profile as small states that make an active and professional contribution to multilateral cooperation. Looking at Estonia’s and Norway’s performance in 2021, some interesting differences can be identified. First, the two states assess the relative importance of the UN differently. In Norway’s foreign policy, there is a strong tradition of prioritising the UN and seeing an active role in multilateral cooperation as an important contribution to national interests and security. By contrast, for Estonia, the UN has not been a foreign policy priority in the past, and its contribution to national security continues to be seen as secondary to membership in Western organisations, notably NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Norway has generally worked a bit more behind the scenes, relying on its long experience and reputation as a constructive contributor to peace diplomacy. It has been active on issues such as the UNSC’s normative protection agenda and climate security, but also the Afghanistan, Syria and North Korea files. Meanwhile, Estonia has taken a rather bold approach as a newcomer visibly promoting its priorities, most notably the cybersecurity agenda. It has also focused on controversial issues of regional security, including the situations in Ukraine and Belarus, trying to use the UN to the advantage of national security through promoting its positions and strengthening coalitions with like-minded countries. Coordination between like-minded states is an integral part of the work of the Council. With Estonia and Norway both present, 2021 saw two Nordic-Baltic states concurrently represented in the Council for the first time. In the future, there may be scope for further strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the framework of the UN structures.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Europe, Norway, Estonia, and Baltic States

11. The Role of Digital Power in Estonia and Taiwan in Combating COVID-19

Author:
Andrey Makarychev, Elizabeth Wishnick, and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Taiwan and Estonia are known as digital democracies. As both face threats from neighbors, their degree of digitization typically has been seen as a vulnerability. The DNS attack from Russia that Estonia faced in 2007 brought home the potential for cyberspace to be used as a domain of war. Similarly Taiwan has faced repeated cyberthreats from the People’s Republic of China. Nonetheless, in their successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan and Estonia have highlighted the strengths of digital democracy in combating a non-traditional security threat without employing the strongarm tactics of authoritarian states. In this article we reexamine the digital vulnerability of democracies and put forward a conception of digital power to explain the success of Estonia and Taiwan in using their digital prowess to combat COVID-19. On the one hand their reliance on cybertechnology make them particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks, but on the other hand their digital power enhances their global stature and domestic capacity to address threats like COVID-19.
Topic:
Security, Cybersecurity, Democracy, COVID-19, Non-Traditional Threats, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

12. Volunteers in Estonia’s Security Sector: Opportunities for Enhancing Societal Resilience

Author:
Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper assesses the involvement of volunteers acting in the public interest under Estonian law in the development of key characteristics of a broad security concept and reflects the main ongoing discussion points for widening their potential for ensuring collective security and public safety.
Topic:
Security, National Security, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia

13. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
Topic:
Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia

14. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

15. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

16. Estonia’s Partners in the EU Coalition Machinery: Maximising Influence in the EU through Coalition-building

Author:
Kristi Raik and Josef Janning
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper examines Estonia’s partners in the European Union with the aim of identifying ways to enhance its influence on policy-making. Effective coalition-building is also important for the EU as a whole, since it can improve the Union’s capacity to take decisions and act. The paper highlights that: Estonia has a relatively strong position in the EU, considering its small size and limited resources. It is particularly well-connected with the Nordic-Baltic partners and should seek ways to use this grouping more effectively as a means to reach out to larger member states and shape decisions in the Union. The main challenge is to build stronger links with France and Germany, something that has become all the more important due to Brexit. Teaming up with other countries that are better connected to Berlin and Paris, such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, is one way to pursue this goal. It is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the latest change of government in Estonia on the country’s influence and image among partners in the EU. However, the research interviews show some indications of a weakened position. Estonia should avoid losing its reputation as a results-oriented member state that takes into consideration the priorities of others while pursuing its own interests in a constructive manner.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

17. Russians in Europe: Nobody’s Tool – The Examples of Finland, Germany and Estonia

Author:
Anna Tiido
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This analysis calls for European governments to pay greater attention to the resilience of their societies, starting with the integration of minorities. It is also important to continue work to increase awareness of Russian influence. The paper analyses the issue of Russian speakers in the EU based on the example of Finland, Germany and Estonia. Although the Kremlin’s “Russian World” policy sees all the people connected to Russia as a homogeneous group, the minority groups analysed are quite diverse. The media preferences and habits of Russian-speakers are connected to language, naturally, and these communities are one of the targets of Russia’s actions. At the same time, Russia also targets non-Russian audiences. It promotes propaganda that is tailor-made for specific countries, based on existing conditions. The grievances of Russian-speakers are one such tool, but they constitute one of many available—and not the main one.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Integration, Social Cohesion, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Germany, and Estonia

18. The Russian Orthodox Church: Faith, Power and Conquest

Author:
James Sherr and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Until recently, the Russian Orthodox Church was a subject that interested few outside expert circles. That dramatically changed in late 2018 when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The reverberations of this decision — religious, political and geopolitcal — underscore the importance that the Church once again plays in Russian policy. In this report, we consider the role that the Russian Orthodox Church has played as an adjunct to an imperial policy stretching back over many centuries. Today, the Russian Federation has a secular constitution. But as much as in tsarist times, the Church regards itself as one of the pillars of Russia’s political order. As much as in the time of Catherine the Great, it is also a protagonist in its wars of identity and the rewriting of the history of former imperial subjects whose experience of the relationship between church and state is different from Russia’s. This diversity is well brought out in the report’s two case studies, Ukraine and Estonia. In both countries, local Orthodox churches embodied distinctive cultural traditions and values until they felt the full force of Russian control, tsarist and Soviet. Since 2014, Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine has revived many historical controversies. It also has raised entirely new security concerns about the borderline between faith and politics. These concerns are summarised at the conclusion of the report, which closes with a section on policy recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Religion, International Affairs, Governance, and Christianity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

19. OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001

Author:
Marianna M. Yamamoto
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented. The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE principles reduced national and international tensions involving minority issues, and increased security. The increase in security was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM. The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national security policy and practice is relevant to all security threats and problems.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Macedonia, and Crimea

20. Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence

Author:
Henrik Breitenbauch, Martin Hurt, Tomas Jermalavicius, Pauli Järvenpää, and Piret Pernik
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Estonian Government began employing an integrated approach to national defence in 2010. Pursuant to the National Defence Strategy, subsequent steps will include submission for Cabinet approval of the non-military sections of the National Defence Development Plan for 2013-2022. These sections deal in a coordinated manner with both military defence and essential non-military activities. The Ministry of Defence is currently drafting a National Defence Act. The report was commissioned in order to document the current state of implementation of the integrated national defence model. The Estonian Government began employing an integrated approach to national defence in 2010. Pursuant to the National Defence Strategy, subsequent steps will include submission for Cabinet approval of the non-military sections of the National Defence Development Plan for 2013-2022. These sections deal in a coordinated manner with both military defence and essential non-military activities. The Ministry of Defence is currently drafting a National Defence Act. The report was commissioned in order to document the current state of implementation of the integrated national defence model. The report identifies conditions for the successful interactions of national security and defence stakeholders in the strategic framework of comprehensive security and integrated defence. It reviews the literature on comprehensive and integrated approaches to complex security and defence challenges and extracts some key factors underpinning the effective whole-of-government and whole-of-society efforts. It then considers experiences of several nations – Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden – in building integrated security and defence systems. Finally, the paper investigates the ‘state of play’ in Estonia when it comes to implementing the concept of integrated defence. It closes with the recommendations to Estonia‘s policymakers.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Government, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, and Netherlands