Political Geography: Eastern Europe

1. A Possible Ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025: Is the OSCE on Board?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: “Where is the OSCE during Russia’s war on Ukraine?” asked Pál Dunay (Dunay, 2022). To be honest, not in the spotlight. However, changing political realities in 2025 might provide the Vienna organization with renewed legitimacy, fifty years after the signature of the Helsinki Accords that served as its groundwork. After more than 1,000 days of attrition war, several factors may bring the conflict in Eastern Europe to a turning point. Despite both parties’ recent military escalation, there seems to be no end in sight on the battlefield. Neither side has the resources to achieve a decisive victory, a situation that academics describe as “mutually hurting stalemates” (Slantchev & Goemans, 2025). Militarily, Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, but Putin’s goal of defeating the Ukrainian armed forces in open combat and occupying more Ukrainian territory is a “strategic impossibility” (Dickson & Holowinsky, 2024). It is doubtful that 2025, which marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazism, will coincide with a triumphal parade on Moscow’s Red Square. The resilience and morale shown by the Ukrainian armed forces deserve admiration and tribute, but Kyiv knows that it will not recover Crimea and the Donbas by force. After more than two years of grinding conflict, the weariness of its population is becoming evident. Because neither side can achieve its ultimate goals, new approaches to ending the Ukraine war are beginning to surface. Compared to only a few months ago, more actors are ready to look at alternative scenarios.
Topic:: Politics, Ceasefire, OSCE, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

2. Armenian Foreign Policy in 2025: The Return of Geography

Author:: Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2024 and the first months of 2025, coupled with the new US administration’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Russia to end the war, have increased the likelihood that Russia, in the short- to mid-term, will expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. The United States’ shifting focus from Europe to Asia–Pacific, diverging policy views between Washington and Brussels, and the socioeconomic challenges European Union member states face will likely diminish the role of the United States and the EU in the region. Meanwhile, ad hoc partnerships and minilateral groupings prioritizing regionalism prevail over larger, more formal multilateral coalitions. Armenia can only adapt its foreign policy in 2025 to the evolving regional geopolitical landscape and the looming risk of regional instability. The primary goals of Armenian foreign policy should be: ● Continuing negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey; ● Deepening cooperation with Georgia and Iran; ● Establishing a new modus operandi with Russia; ● Exploring the establishment of minilateral groupings1 ; ● Readjusting relations with the United States and the European Union while maintaining the positive momentum of recent years. This approach will allow Armenia to safeguard its sovereignty, navigate shifting power dynamics, and seize emerging opportunities while minimizing the risk of antagonizing regional and global powers.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Armenia

3. The Crisis of Belarusian Sovereignty

Author:: Kaspar Pucek
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Belarus is facing a potentially existential crisis as Russia’s growing influence threatens its existence as a sovereign state. This is to a significant extent a result of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. European policymakers should look for opportunities to strength Belarusian sovereignty and strategic autonomy through pragmatic engagement. Pragmatic engagement should focus primarily on normalising diplomatic relations and targeted sanctions relief.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Sanctions, Pragmatism, Foreign Influence, and Political Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

4. Digital Technologies in the Election Cycle – The Case of Albanian Parliamentary Elections 2025

Author:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:: As digital platforms and AI reshape societies worldwide, their impact on elections is increasingly profound. This brief explores how digital tools were used in Albania’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections, examining the roles of the Central Election Committee, political parties, candidates, and civil society. While technology offers opportunities for voter education, transparency, and participation, it also brings risks such as misinformation, unethical campaigning, and gaps in legal oversight. Drawing on international examples and Albania’s own experience, the brief highlights the need for robust safeguards, legislative alignment with EU standards, and strengthened public awareness to ensure digital means strengthen rather than undermines democratic processes.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Parliament, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Albania

5. A Generation At Risk: Rising youth violence in Albania

Author:: Romario Shehu
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:: Recent data in Albania indicate a growing trend of youth involvement in violence and criminal behavior, reflecting similar patterns observed across Europe and beyond. In response, state institutions have introduced measures such as the deployment of school safety officers, the “School Safety” package, and plans to install surveillance cameras in schools. However, these efforts remain fragmented and short-term. Addressing youth security in a meaningful way requires primarily a systemic, data-driven approach that examines the forms, root causes and contributing factors of youth-on-youth violence and underreported criminal activity, particularly within and around schools. A comprehensive understanding of these dynamics, combined with stronger institutional coordination, investment in preventive education, and the promotion of youth resilience, is essential to ensuring a safer, more inclusive environment for Albania’s young people.
Topic:: Crime, Education, Youth, Violence, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Albania

6. Central and Eastern Europe and the Global Economic Fragmentation

Author:: Jan Boguslawski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Since the 2020s, what the International Monetary Fund calls “global economic fragmentation” (GEF) has intensified, marked by weakening trade coordination, the return of protectionism, and the increasing alignment of trade flows with geopolitical blocs. Key drivers include the war in Ukraine, the long tail of the COVID-19 pandemic, escalating China-US tensions, structural transformations such as the rise of digital services and the green transition, and most recently the second Trump administration’s weaponization of tariffs. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are particularly exposed to the GEF. They benefited substantially from past waves of globalization, building growth models centered on foreign direct investment (FDI), integration into global supply chains, and high export dependence, especially toward Western Europe. The CEE countries can be divided into four clusters based on their trade-growth models. Balanced Exporters combine domestic consumption with moderately diversified exports across manufacturing and services. Germany-Affiliated Industrialists form the high-manufacturing, high-FDI hub tightly linked to the German industrial base. Northern ICT Regionalists rely more on dynamic ICT service exports and have stronger ties to Nordic economies than to Germany. Volatile Resource Economies are marked by weaker industrial bases, lower FDI, and a higher share of raw-goods exports. Not members of the EU, they are characterized in part by political instability and fragile institutions. These different models shape how the CEE countries experience the GEF. Their opportunities include the potential to attract reshoring and friendshoring investment or to act as “connector economies” in a bifurcating global trade system. But they also face major risks. The realignment of the global automotive sector, energy-market disruptions, and the broader slowdown in Germany—all magnified by the GEF—pose structural challenges. The key concern is that fragmentation entrenches CEE’s dependence on Western European supply chains, making it harder to diversify trade, to escape the middle-income trap, or to expand into markets beyond Europe. The Germany-Affiliated Industrialists are the most vulnerable, due to their narrow trade portfolios and exposure to fluctuations in global manufacturing demand. The Balanced Exporters, with larger domestic markets and more flexibility, are better positioned to absorb shocks. The Northern ICT Regionalists and the Volatile Resource Economies sit in between, with specific sectoral and geopolitical sensitivities. Albania, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland illustrate these dynamics. In the emerging geo-economic landscape, size and diversification matter. Larger economies with stronger domestic demand and broader export mixes—such as Poland and Romania—have more tools to manage volatility. Sustained stagnation in the EU core could, however, prompt some CEE states—especially export-dependent ones—to seek deeper economic ties beyond Europe, following Hungary’s lead in cultivating links with China. From the EU’s perspective, supporting CEE’s geo-economic autonomy will require more than cohesion funding. It means helping these economies to move up global value chains, to reduce their overdependence on Western Europe, and to expand their exports to new markets. This would not only future-proof the region’s growth but also help defuse political tensions and temper the appetite in CEE for ‘alternative’ geopolitical alignments.
Topic:: Economy, Trade, Regional Economy, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

7. Central and Eastern Europe’s Role in Ukraine’s Reconstruction: Shared Opportunities, Benefits, and Challenges

Author:: Dominik Istrate
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Ukraine’s reconstruction will be a historic undertaking requiring global leadership and the involvement of the largest economies of the international community. While it is being largely addressed through the expected involvement of the private sector globally and formal channels such as the Multi-Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine or the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference, there have been considerable responses at the level of individual countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well. In the region particularly, the war has had an economic impact, contributing to an already emerged energy crisis and prompting an economic downturn, due to geographic proximity to Ukraine. Several CEE countries have developed a comprehensive policy approach to Ukraine’s reconstruction. What is more, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are at the forefront of reconstruction planning and financial contributions, as well as participating in the early stage of reconstruction, with comprehensive national policies that have total or near-total political support. Others—including Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia—have either expressed a strong interest in participating in postwar reconstruction or have started implementing individual projects, regardless of the level of domestic political support for Ukraine. The majority of CEE countries can claim to have a sustainable engagement with Ukraine. Only in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, whose relations with Kyiv have reached a historic low, is it yet to be seen if or how they will engage with postwar reconstruction. The actions taken by CEE governments in the past three years strongly suggest not only that the countries of the region are well-positioned to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction, but also that some will likely be key players—particularly Poland and Romania, which are positioning themselves as key logistics hubs for this goal. The region’s prospects for playing a key role are also supported by policies introduced in countries such as Czechia, Poland, and the Baltic states that provide various incentives for companies aiming to participate in reconstruction. The subnational and sector-specific approach employed by Czechia and the Baltic states also underscores long-term cooperation and commitment. Other smaller CEE economies are also expressing strong interest. They should formulate a comprehensive approach to support Ukraine and their own business community in one effort. Although the financing of reconstruction remains a key challenge, including regarding the possible use of frozen Russian assets, CEE countries are looking for additional ways and indirect contributions, as well as for policies ensuring that the issue will stay on not only the global but also the regional agenda. Regional cooperation and Ukraine’s EU integration could also prove essential to connect CEE businesses with Ukrainian partners, particularly through the Three Seas Initiative, for which Ukraine’s reconstruction has the potential to become a flagship objective.
Topic:: Reconstruction, European Union, Donors, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

8. How To Help Moldova Secure Its Fragile Democracy

Author:: Laurențiu Pleșca
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: As it approaches its parliamentary elections, Moldova is in a turbulent situation, with ongoing economic and social challenges, society polarized, and the political landscape marked by a split among pro-EU forces while pro-Russia ones appear increasingly united. Moldova is no longer a captured state, but oligarchic networks are still influential. The elections will be decisive for its geopolitical trajectory. Pro-EU actors faces the challenge of overcoming their divisions and forming a credible governing coalition, while pro-Russia and populist forces aim to exploit societal grievances, economic vulnerability, and external disinformation to erode trust in democratic institutions. Vote-buying, illegal campaign financing, and disinformation, particularly via digital platforms beyond the state’s regulatory reach, remain potent tools for those seeking to manipulate the elections’ outcome. At the same time, an active civil society and independent media keep a close watch on democratic backsliding and political shifts. They play an indispensable role in strengthening the country’s resilience, but resource limitations and the termination of US assistance threaten their effectiveness. Moldova’s international environment further complicates its trajectory. The war in Ukraine, the presence of Russian forces in Transnistria, and the frozen negotiation format for solving the situation there heighten security concerns. Russia continues to undermine its EU integration through political pressure, energy leverage, and hybrid influence campaigns. Simultaneously, Moldova has deepened its ties with the EU, the United States, and regional partners such as Romania and Ukraine, receiving substantial financial, technical, and security support. It benefits from the EU’s Black Sea Security Strategy, the European Peace Facility, and a three-year €1.9 billion EU Economic Growth Plan, alongside EU and US military and development assistance. The pro-EU parties are fragmenting and ostracizing each other, while the left-wing and pro-Russia parties are coalescing to be as effective as possible. It will be difficult for a single party or bloc to win an absolute majority. Moldova thus faces three near-term scenarios around the elections, reflecting the political polarization and, in two cases, highlighting the likely fragility of a resulting governing coalition. The most probable outcomes are continuity in government and in EU integration under the PAS or a fragile pro-EU coalition government. The less likely outcome is an unstable broad pro-Russia coalition government that would be destructive for Moldova’s EU path. For the EU, its member states, and other Western actors, supporting Moldova is a matter of reinforcing its democratic resilience. They need to help its institutions withstand pressures in the short term, and to strengthen the political, civic, and security foundations that can anchor the country in Europe in the long run. This requires a wide range of financial, technical, and political measures to give Moldova the tools to resist foreign interference and the confidence to pursue reforms. They include supporting the consolidation of democratic institutions, enhancing electoral integrity, reinforcing civil society, and maintaining a credible path toward EU accession.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Moldova, Eastern Europe, and Black Sea

9. The Changing Face of the South Caucasus

Author:: Teona Giuashvili
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the South Caucasus has been neither linear nor uniform. The war has ushered in a period of interregnum between the earlier regional order and one whose features are yet to emerge. It has shifted political dynamics within the three states of the South Caucasus and has affected the interests and positions of external actors, altering the regional balance of power. In all three countries in the region, the interregnum has amplified trends that predated the war: it consolidated Azerbaijan’s assertive foreign policy, reinforced Armenia’s striving for emancipation from Russia, and accelerated Georgia’s drift away from the West. While Türkiye took advantage of Russia’s distraction from the region and fostered its position in the South Caucasus, the shift in the status quo in the region has penalised Iran’s regional interests. Throughout the last three years, the South Caucasus has witnessed the receding influence of the US and the EU, and the expansion of China’s geoeconomic footprint.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

10. Poland at a Crossroads? Strategic Choices Amid Shifting Transatlantic Security Dynamics

Author:: Marcin Fatalski and Wojciech Michnik
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Poland stands at a pivotal moment, navigating domestic political transitions while adapting to profound changes in the transatlantic security landscape. The outcome of key elections (presidential in 2025 and parliamentary in 2027) will shape the country’s strategic direction, as NATO and the EU confront some of the most significant challenges in their history. A second Trump presidency marks a turning point for European security, amplifying EU-sceptical forces and reshaping the regional balance of power. This Strategic Update examines the key domestic and international factors influencing Poland’s political and strategic decision-making, and Poland’s role in the evolving European security architecture – especially in times of the resurgent populist sentiments on both sides of the Atlantic and increasingly aggressive behaviour of the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Poland

11. Encounters with Bulgarian State Security

Author:: Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Bulgaria today is a parliamentary democracy and EU and NATO member. It maintains friendly, constructive relations with the US. It was not always so, however — as recently as the late 1980s, Bulgaria had a slavishly oligarchic communist regime, was a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, and a Warsaw Pact member.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Memoir, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Bulgaria

12. Serbia Between Brussels, Beijing, and Moscow: A Foreign Policy of Diversification

Author:: Nina Markovic Khaze
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: As global rivalries intensify, Serbia stands at a complex geopolitical juncture. The country is simultaneously pursuing accession negotiations with the European Union (EU), deepening strategic ties with China, and maintaining longstanding relations with Russia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Diversification, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Serbia

13. Global Islamophobia and the Rise of Populism with Audrey Truschke and Ivan Kalmar (Episode 35)

Author:: Audrey Truschke and Ivan Kalmar
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Dr. Audrey Truschke and Professor Ivan Kalmar analyze the alarming global surge in Islamophobic violence and discriminatory policies, particularly in Eastern Europe and South Asia. Our guests explore how economic and political insecurities have fueled dangerous scapegoating of Muslim citizens and refugees, transforming vulnerable religious minorities into targets of state-sanctioned persecution. This thought-provoking episode examines the human cost of populist rhetoric and offers critical insights into one of today's most pressing human rights issues: the systematic marginalization of Muslim communities across national borders. Listen to the conversation on the intersection of religious identity, nationalism, and the global struggle for dignity and belonging. The conversation is based on their contributions to the book Global Islamophobia and the Rise of Populism published by Oxford University Press in 2024.
Topic:: Minorities, Refugees, Populism, Discrimination, and Islamophobia
Political Geography:: South Asia and Eastern Europe

14. The Impact of Trump’s Anti-Immigration Discourse on Asylum Applications in the Balkans (2017–2021)

Author:: Vasil Pavlov and Siddharth Kanojia
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Immigration has become an increasingly contentious political and social issue in Europe over the past decade. The growing influx of asylum seekers has been driven by deteriorating security conditions, armed conflicts, and political and economic instability in various regions, alongside the comparatively higher living standards in Europe. As a global hegemon, the United States has indirectly shaped migration patterns in peripheral regions such as the Balkans. This paper examines how President Donald Trump’s anti-immigration discourse during his first term (2017–2021) coincided with an approximately 45% decrease in asylum applications from the Balkans. Drawing on official statistics and employing Critical Discourse Analysis, the study explores how US rhetoric influenced regional policy emulation. The findings underscore the transnational impact of populist discourse and call for a critical reassessment of migration governance in key transit regions.
Topic:: Migration, Immigration, Populism, Donald Trump, Asylum, and Securitization
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Balkans

15. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms and Promoting Gender Equality: The Case for Binding Quotas on Macedonian Corporate Boards

Author:: Emilija Gjorgjioska, Margarita Janeska, Tatjana Spaseska, and Aneta Risteska Jankuloska
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes gender balance on the boards of companies listed on the Macedonian Stock Exchange (MSE). Despite formal equality, statistics reveal persistent vertical segregation in top management. A comparative assessment places North Macedonia favorably within the Western Balkans and the European Union; however, further progress is still needed. Adopting a legal gender quota, as outlined in Directive (EU) 2022/238, would help close the gap, fulfill obligations under CEDAW, and reinforce the country’s commitment to the United Nations’ fifth Sustainable Development Goal on gender equality, ensuring that fundamental freedoms, gender balance, and equal remuneration are upheld in practice rather than merely acknowledged.
Topic:: European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Corporations, Gender Equality, and Macedonian Stock Exchange (MSE)
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and North Macedonia

16. Moldova’s EU Path: Between Moscow’s Shadow and Brussels’ Promises

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In the ongoing confrontation between the European Union and Russia, the Republic of Moldova occupies a critical—though often overlooked—position. While not as militarily pivotal as Ukraine, Moldova’s struggle is no less consequential: it is a contest over national orientation and the future of the European order. Moldova’s plural identity makes it especially vulnerable to Russian interference, complicating its EU accession process and straining internal cohesion. The country’s trajectory mirrors the broader dilemma facing post-Soviet states still defining themselves amid renewed geopolitical rivalry between East and West. Moldova’s future will depend on the decisions of its leaders and electorate, the course of the war in Ukraine, and the EU’s readiness to honour its commitment to membership. The 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections will reveal whether Moldova’s leadership retains a popular mandate to pursue the European path. This policy brief outlines key aspects of the current situation and sets out how the EU can help safeguard the integrity of Moldova’s upcoming elections and support its pro-European trajectory amid heightened geopolitical risk.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, Foreign Interference, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

17. Instruments of Hybrid Warfare: Dissemination of Pro-Russian Propaganda Narratives Through Populist Politicians in the Slovak Republic

Author:: Martin Solik, Dalibor Velký, and Jan Graf
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This article uses thematic discursive analysis to examine selected pro-Kremlin populist politicians in Slovakia. The enforcement of one-sided propagandist thoughts and opinions, primarily through radical anti-system politicians and 'alternative' media outlets freely available on the internet, has become one of the most important aspects of hybrid warfare in today's world. This paper aims to identify the specific goals of Russian propaganda and clarify how populist politicians spread propaganda on social media through language resources. The results of the analysis are presented at the end of the paper, along with the word resources used by these politicians. The results prove that pro-Kremlin populist politicians use word and language manipulation to help spread unilaterally focused and distorted information in Slovakia. This article aims to build on and complement existing research on pro-Kremlin anti-system politicians and their role in Russia's hybrid warfare in Europe.
Topic:: Politics, Media, Populism, Propaganda, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Slovakia

18. International Diplomacy at the Rambouillet Conference (6 February –18 March 1999)

Author:: Armand Krasniqi
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The Rambouillet Conference, which took place from 6 February to 18 March 1999, was a pivotal moment in international diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis. Convened by the Contact Group, the conference aimed to negotiate a settlement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership amid escalating violence and mounting humanitarian concerns. The proposed agreement included provisions for substantial autonomy for Kosovo and the deployment of NATO forces to oversee its implementation. It was accepted by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, but rejected by the Yugoslav authorities. Led by Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslavia opposed the presence of foreign troops on its territory, viewing it as a violation of sovereignty. Ultimately, the failure of the negotiations resulted in NATO's military intervention on 24 March 1999, marking a pivotal moment in the Kosovo conflict..
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Humanitarian Intervention, Negotiation, and Rambouillet Conference
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Yugoslavia

19. Geopolitically mapping Eastern Europe

Author:: Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The relationships on the European continent and beyond have shifted dramatically following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This policy brief uses Clingendael’s geopolitical mapping methodology to provide an overview of not only the changes that have occurred among the three Eastern European countries considered at the core of this analysis – Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – but also their relationships with the wider region and global powers, and the consequences of those shifts for regional dynamics. It visualises how February 2022 crystallised these countries’ positions vis-á-vis each other and other regional and global actors and discusses the ramifications of the geopolitical dynamics in Eastern Europe for the EU approach, providing several recommendations.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

20. Albania’s TikTok U-Turn: Trading Regulation for a Ban

Author:: Daniel Prroni and Megi Reçi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:: TikTok is being shut down in Albania, marking a significant shift in the country’s approach to regulating digital platforms. This move diverges from the European Union’s policy direction and contradicts the government’s previous commitment to adopting legal measures in line with EU guidelines. Banning social networks does not address the root issues and limits opportunities to educate users and hold platforms accountable. The European Union has emphasized that regulation is the most effective strategy to mitigate the harmful effects of social media and protect fundamental freedoms. The Digital Services Act (DSA) ensures platforms operate in the public interest, establishes clear content moderation rules, and safeguards freedom of speech, providing a more sustainable solution. Read IDM’s publication, which argues that institutions should stay committed to aligning with the DSA and avoid taking counterproductive actions.
Topic:: European Union, Regulation, Social Media, TikTok, and Digital Services
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Albania

21. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:: Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

22. Incomplete Exit: Central and Eastern Europe’s Corporate Decoupling From Russia

Author:: Michal Wyrebkowski
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, companies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) initially were trailblazers in voluntarily withdrawing from Russia, effectively self-sanctioning through voluntary overcompliance with sanctions by leaving, even though operating in the country is still legal. At the same time, CEE countries have enabled sanctions-evasion networks. The historical economic relationship between CEE countries and Russia created the conditions for this paradox. Decades of relying on Russian energy sources masked an asymmetric interdependence: Russia’s military-industrial complex relied heavily on CEE countries for the machine tools, industrial components, and dual-use technologies essential to weapons production. When EU sanctions targeted these critical supply chains, the geographic proximity and established trade relationships that motivated voluntary exit by some companies also enabled systematic sanctions circumvention by others. The EU’s Russia sanctions since 2014 have struggled to match the complexity of the economic networks involved. Early sanctions focused on financial restrictions and high-profile sectors but failed to address the technical vulnerabilities that enable large-scale evasion. Even as restrictions expanded to cover dual-use goods and Russia’s “shadow fleet”, fundamental gaps in classification systems and enforcement mechanisms persisted. The responses of CEE companies have varied across sectors and countries. While investor and consumer pressure drove rapid voluntary exits from Russia in consumer-facing industries, industrial manufacturers found numerous ways to keep supplying it through third-country intermediaries. The behavior of energy companies has reflected the strategic priorities of CEE governments, with some achieving complete diversification from Russia while others reinforced existing dependencies. The variety of corporate responses mirrored the uneven development of national sanctions-enforcement capabilities, ranging from understaffed sanctions departments to insufficiently robust regulatory frameworks; for example, regarding criminalization of violations. The persistence of sanctions evasion through CEE countries reflects systemic failures in the EU’s enforcement architecture. Technical classification systems designed for traditional trade cannot adequately distinguish between civilian and military applications of modern dual-use technologies. Customs officials lack access to the information systems necessary to verify complex ownership structures and end-use destinations. Legal frameworks optimized for territorial jurisdiction are inadequate for regulating globalized supply chains where goods, payments, and corporate structures span multiple jurisdictions. Banking institutions operating across Central and Eastern Europe have become critical actors, with a small number of financial institutions handling substantial portions of Russia’s foreign currency transactions. Their continued operations highlight the limits of EU territorial sanctions, which is confirmed by the extent to which US extraterritorial enforcement has become necessary to police sanctions violations in Europe. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reforms across multiple dimensions. Technical improvements must include supplementary classification systems that incorporate detailed specifications for dual-use goods, while institutional capacity-building demands substantial increases in staffing and expertise at the national and EU levels. Financial-sector monitoring needs real-time automated screening capabilities and dedicated compliance structures, while industrial-sector oversight requires specialized task forces with technical expertise in dual-use technologies.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia and Eastern Europe

23. How To Help Armenia Navigate Its Democracy-Security Nexus

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The 2018 Velvet Revolution was a breakthrough for Armenia’s democracy, but progress has since stalled. The June 2026 parliamentary elections will be a decisive test in a polarized environment dominated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party and an opposition tied to former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. This dominant dichotomy, fueled by both sides, frustrates the attempts of alternative forces to come to the fore. Support for Civil Contract is stable, but the majority of voters are undecided, disengaged, or disillusioned by the trauma of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 2023 ethnic cleansing there as well as by the lack of credible political alternatives. Civil Contract’s political dominance over the last seven years has led to unilateral lawmaking and some controversial actions against opposition figures, media, civil society, and the judiciary. However, recent municipal elections saw the party fail to secure majorities in major cities. While the diplomatic breakthrough in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, marked by the White House deal in August, sets a path for stability in the near term, it is crucial to follow up and to push for a final agreement. Azerbaijan’s continued demands and rhetoric cast doubt as to the extent of its commitment to the process. Similarly, Türkiye still does not meet its commitment to end its blockade of Armenia. Meanwhile, Armenia’s drift away from Russia and pivot to the West has been characterized by its increased ambition to join the EU. It also seeks to diversify its security with the help of its Western partners, advancing with reforms and political alignment with Euro-Atlantic priorities. Until the next elections, Armenia is likely to continue deepening its ties with the West while maintaining cautious cooperation with Russia, while peace talks with Azerbaijan drag on, and relations with Türkiye remain complex. It is likely that Civil Contract will campaign on defending Armenia’s sovereignty and on Western alignment while the fragmented opposition struggles to broaden its support. The most probable scenario is another Civil Contract government with a reduced majority, which will continue efforts toward peace with Azerbaijan and balancing engagement with the West and Russia. Two other scenarios (in descending order of likelihood) are a government coalition of Civil Contract and smaller pro-West parties, which will push a more confrontational stance toward Russia, or an opposition-led government realigning the country with Moscow and further undermining democratization. The EU, its member states, and the United States should support Armenia by helping it strengthen its democratic institutions and its security in order to preserve the public’s confidence in democracy. The country needs a combination of financial, technical, and political assistance to facilitate democratization, to resist external pressures, and to maintain its sovereignty. This includes backing the consolidation of democratic institutions, promoting electoral integrity, encouraging a diversity of democratic actors, and empowering civil society, all against the background of addressing the country’s security challenges. By providing Armenia with the tools to defend its territorial integrity and to pursue democratic reforms, the West can help revive the optimism sparked by the Velvet Revolution and overturn a public disillusionment that could weaken Armenia’s democracy and its ties with Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, and United States of America

24. A Subdued “Last Hurrah” for the (Former) Soviet Union in Romania

Author:: Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Relations between Romania and its large Eastern neighbor–Tsarist Russia, then the USSR, and now the Russian Federation–have been fraught with tension, mistrust, and even enmity. Three examples from the 20th century are illustrative. First, during World War One Romania sent its national “treasure,” consisting of nearly 100 tons of gold plus many other valuables, to Tsarist Russia for safekeeping. When the communist regime came to power there, it effectively confiscated the “treasure,” though some items other than the bullion and gold coins have been returned over the ensuing years. Second, in 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia (contemporary Moldova) and Northern Bukovina (now part of Ukraine) from Romania. The desire to recover those territories was one factor leading Romania to join Nazi Germany in its war against the Soviet Union. Third, that losing effort resulted in Romania having an unpopular communist regime forced upon it, having to pay heavy reparations to the USSR, and “hosting” unwelcome Soviet troops until 1958. The oppressive Ceausescu regime was, indirectly, a result of Soviet influence in post-World War Two Romania.
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Soviet Union, Post-Soviet Space, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Romania

25. Political Humor in Communist Eastern Europe

Author:: Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Political humor was an important aspect of daily life in communist Eastern Europe – – simultaneously an emotional escape valve and cris de coeur. Anti-regime jokes of various sorts were exchanged cautiously, within families and among trusted friends. Some ridiculed communism itself, others Russia/the Soviet Union, and in many cases the local dictator, whoever he was. Others focused on the shortages, hardships, and other privations of daily life. Examples of such political humor often appeared, disappeared, and then reappeared in altered form. Many such jokes prevalent in communist Eastern Europe hopped from country to country and were recycled versions of each other, adapted to the circumstances and personalities wherever they circulated. Where any particular witticism originated was impossible to ascertain, and where it would end up, and in what form, were equally unknowable. Extensive scholarly interest has been paid to such Eastern European humor, including multiple analyses and compendia. The flavor and content of at least some of those works are contained in the title of one such volume, First Prize: Fifteen Years! by C. Banc and A. Dundes. That title is drawn from the following Romanian joke: A competition for the best political joke was announced. Do you know what the first prize was? No. Fifteen years! The joke cleverly encompasses both the risk and “rewards” of indulging in such activity.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Memoir, Soviet Union, and Humor
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

26. Desecuritizing the Belarusian Balcony: Principles for U.S.–Belarus Relations

Author:: Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief outlines a low-cost, low-risk roadmap for sustained U.S. engagement with Belarus that could help to stabilize NATO’s volatile eastern flank, enabling the U.S. to retrench from the European continent and focus on other theaters. In light of governance concerns voiced by Western officials on the heels of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, and especially since Belarus provided support to Russian troops in the opening weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the E.U. and U.S. have adopted a strictly punitive approach to Belarus. Essentially, Belarus has been viewed as an appendage of Russia. However, this approach misses opportunities for the West to take advantage of inherent divisions between the interests of Belarus and Russia. As outlined in previous Quincy Institute research, President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus has long wished to develop a “multi-vector” foreign policy for his country. Such a policy would permit Belarus to maneuver between the East and West to best safeguard its own national sovereignty and interests. While Belarus has moved significantly closer to Russia in recent years, this pivot has in part been in reaction to Western hostility. Lukashenko likely remains open to some degree of cooperation with the West, and has signaled that he does not wish to increase participation in the Russia–Ukraine War. While it is almost certainly impossible to fully remove Belarus from the Russian camp, exploring ways for Belarus to triangulate between Russia and the West could offer significant benefits for U.S. interests and for regional stability. This brief recommends that the Trump administration explore the following bargain with Belarus: In exchange for a Belarusian commitment not to abet, facilitate, or engage in aggression against any NATO state, the U.S. should promise that it will not engage in any effort at an external change of government in Belarus. To firm up the U.S.–Belarus relationship, the U.S. should consider sectoral sanctions relief, including in the Belarusian civilian aviation sector, and U.S. engagement in other non-military investment opportunities, such as the Belarusian electric vehicle industry. The U.S. should also work to restore Belarus’ access to international financial institutions. The U.S. should mediate border issues between Belarus, Poland, and Lithuania toward the goal of deescalation on NATO’s eastern flank. The U.S. should encourage Belarusian efforts both to facilitate Russia–Ukraine peace talks, such as exchanges of prisoners of war and bodies of fallen soldiers, and to contribute to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, North America, Belarus, and United States of America

27. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:: Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

28. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Serbia

29. The Concept of "Putinism" and its Impact on the "Normalization" of Georgian-Russian Relations

Author:: Malkhaz Mikeladze
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In view of the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, the Russian elite is formulating conceptual approaches to justify the inevitability of the escalating confrontation with the West and to encompass the foreign priorities of the Russian Federation. Within expert circles, this combination of approaches is increasingly labeled as “Putinism,” with the belief that its main components will have a decisive impact on Russia’s relations with other countries, including Georgia. Amidst the ongoing polarization of Georgian society, the normalization of relations with Russia emerges as one of the most important issues, a normalization process that has triggered radicalization and sharp confrontation between the government and opposition, further complicating the depolarization process and civil dialogue recommended by the European Union. These challenges themselves seem to be obstacles to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, the article aims to review the basic principles of “Putinism” and provide a pragmatic evaluation for the “normalization” of Georgian-Russian relations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Normalization, Vladimir Putin, and Polarization
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

30. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties

Author:: Mamuka Zhvania
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
Topic:: Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

31. Where Georgia's U-Turn Comes from and Where it is Heading

Author:: Kakha Gogolashvili
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: For 30 years, Georgian governments have pursued European integration, reflecting the will of the majority. They have implemented European standards and reforms, culminating in 2022 with the ‘European Perspective’ and EU candidate status in 2023. Then, unexpectedly, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party began to ignore EU recommendations, prioritizing state sovereignty and independent decision-making. This stance, reminiscent of Putin’s “sovereign democracy,” led to controversial actions like resisting judicial reforms and improving the election code. Instead of aligning with the EU, the government began strengthening its economic ties with Russia, even after the invasion of Ukraine. The most notable action was adopting the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, mirroring Russia’s 2012 law aimed at controlling civil society and the media. This provoked protests, divided society, and alarmed international partners, increasing Georgia’s isolation from the democratic world and its vulnerability to authoritarian powers, especially Russia. Thus, the key questions are: Why has GD chosen this risky path? With most Georgians supporting European integration, how should the EU and the international community respond to GD’s policies steering the country away from Europe?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

32. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
Topic:: Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

33. Toward Innovation-driven Growth: Innovation Systems and Policies in EU Member States of Central Eastern Europe

Author:: Alexandra Bykova, Viktrória Döme, Richard Grieveson, Francesca Guadagno, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This study builds on our previous analyses of a new growth model for the EU member states of Central and Eastern European (CEE), focusing on fostering innovation-driven development. We aim to explain the types of innovation systems and policies that enhance domestic innovation capabilities, drawing on global best practices. A critical evaluation of the current innovation landscape in EU-CEE countries is conducted, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions. The study assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both national innovation initiatives and opportunities provided by EU industrial and technology policy frameworks. Based on these insights, we offer actionable policy recommendations to promote innovation-driven growth, enhance productivity, and boost economic convergence over the medium term, taking into account the unique political and historical contexts of the EU-CEE countries. Additionally, we prepare country-specific briefing notes tailored to the individual development needs and opportunities of each nation.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Innovation, Economic Competition, and Convergence
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

34. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:: George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

35. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:: Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

36. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order

Author:: Faisal Devji
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Topic:: Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

37. "Inventing Eastern Europe" Thirty Years Later: A Conversation with Larry Wolff and Guests

Author:: Malgorzata Mazurek, Larry Wolff, Suzanne Marchand, Emile Greble, and Jan Kubik
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: When Larry Wolff’s book Inventing Eastern Europe was published in 1994, it gave the world a new set of tools for understanding the half of Europe that had recently emerged from behind the Iron Curtain. Most notably, Wolff’s book showed how the conceptual division of the European continent into two distinct civilizations, East and West, although reinforced by the Realpolitik of the Cold War, actually originated in the discourse of philosophes and travelers in the 18th century. Inventing Eastern Europe was revelatory in the mid-1990s, and it has been required reading for serious students of Eastern European history and culture ever since. Please join the East Central European Center and the Harriman Institute for a conversation with Larry Wolff, Suzanne Marchand, Emily Greble and Jan Kubik, moderated by Malgorzata Mazurek, about the genesis, initial impact and continued relevance of this seminal work on the thirtieth anniversary of its publication.
Topic:: Cold War, History, and Philosophy
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

38. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?

Author:: Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

39. Empowering Communities in Kosovo: The Vital Role of Local Government in Advancing Education and Curbing Deviant Behavior

Author:: Islam Hasani and Ferdi Kamberi
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Local communities play an essential role in developing and organizing their lives for joint betterment. Local self-government, through local democratic mechanisms, involves the community as part of the public policies, showing the sign of the development of the local democracy. This research aims to analyze the communication and collaboration between the local government and local communities in Kosovo, focusing on their role in the development of education and the reduction of deviant behavior, intending to create a better social environment for the community. The research methodology employed for this paper is as follows: library research, qualitative research, and the analysis of the laws in power related to the topic. There will be field research working with two focus groups belonging to the municipality of Prishtina, considering their ethnic component. General results show that communities are still in the development and organization phase, whereas their participation in the process of public policies is still under the average level. Social audits can be mechanisms for development, organizing the community, and involvement in local government policies.
Topic:: Development, Education, Democracy, Public Policy, Behavior, Empowerment, Communities, and Local Self-Government
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

40. Beyond Traditional Boundaries: From State-Centric Diplomacy to More Participatory Approaches for a Sustainable Future in the Western Balkans

Author:: Elira Luli and Mirela Metushaj
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The contemporary era has witnessed a significant evolution in diplomacy, transitioning from traditional state-led approaches to more open, multilateral methods and channels. This study evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of the new diplomatic disciplines, particularly in the Western Balkans region, which grapples with numerous structural challenges, ethnic and political divisions, and external interference. The influence of traditional state-centric diplomacy in this region necessitates a shift towards a more participatory, multi-stakeholder approach to promoting positive peace and cooperation. This reframing of diplomacy emphasizes the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism through multi-track diplomacy, involving private individuals, non-governmental organizations, societies, and engaged citizens to foster understanding through dialogue, cooperation, and deeper interaction. The analysis highlights the influence of innovative diplomatic channels interlinked and entrenched through a capillary diplomacy framework essential for regional application while exploring the constraints of traditional methods. It advocates for fresh diplomatic strategies and collaborative initiatives in the Western Balkans through a win-win formula and a participatory model based on multi-track diplomacy – repurposed and redesigned to advance the reconciliation process, rapprochement, and raise public awareness through effective communication in line with the EU integration goals and advancements.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe and Balkans

41. The “Revival” of PiS: The Transformation of Campaign Strategies from the Kaczynski Twins to Andrzej Duda

Author:: Melissa Stolfi
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The paper analyzes the campaign strategies of the PiS political party during the Polish elections from 2009 to 2020. It examines how the gradual modernization of communication strategies and the adoption of a less aggressive narrative contributed to the party’s revival after a decline in support caused by the political crisis of 2007 and the death of leader Lech Kaczynski in 2010. The research aims to identify the changes in campaigning that contributed to regaining electoral success since the 2015 national elections. The analysis is based on audio-visual materials produced by PiS for the elections during both the “crisis” period (2009-2013) and the “revival” period (2014-2020), allowing for a comparative analysis of the main changes between these two periods. Through content analysis of these materials, the study investigates the topics, genres, formats, national and European dimensions, personalization strategies, and use of negative advertising.
Topic:: Communications, Elections, Domestic Politics, Propaganda, Political Parties, and Advertising
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

42. Assessing Success Through Party Label Durability: A Comparative Study of the Democratic Party of Albania and the Homeland Union of Lithuania

Author:: Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This study provided a theoretical framework explaining center-right opposition parties’ evolution in former Eastern Europe. It answered why post-communist center-right parties lacked consistent success and either became marginalized, altered their ideologies, or ceased to exist in the long run. By taking the Democratic Party of Albania as one of the exceptions to the rule and comparing it to the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, we showed the discrepancy with much of the other center-right parties. We followed a most different systems design, where the dominant center-right party of Albania and the dominant one in Lithuania were compared. Although much different in history, political culture, and institutions, they had similar successful trajectories as dominant center-right parties. We argued that the success of these parties depends upon the durability of party labels as a critical determinant of a party’s success historically, which takes priority over party strategy, mobilization power, social base, and the behavior of the center-right party toward political institutions. Overall, we emphasized party labels as cues of party identification and success.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Lithuania, and Albania

43. The Changing Conceptual Landscape of the Russian War in Ukraine (2014-Present) and Syria (2011-Present)

Author:: Piotr Pietrzak
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The main goal of this paper is to present and compare the main developments in the Russian wars in Ukraine and Syria by considering the main patterns, parallels, and changing trajectories that could shed more light onto both of these war zones, which are highly interlinked due to Russia’s leading role in both. It analytically, comparatively, and contemplatively approaches those developments by highlighting multiple similarities and the main differences in global responses to these conflicts. Both conflicts should be seen as highly unpredictable, dynamic, and unnecessarily extended asymmetric proxy wars in which global powers test their new military doctrines and their competitors' responses to their unconventional actions and other unsolicited and indirect interferences in the local dynamism of both wars. Unlike in Syria, the Ukrainian war zone is wholly transformative and ready for the adoption of partial hybridization and the utilization of the new software-defined warfare in combination with conventional weapons.
Topic:: International Relations, Conflict, Syrian War, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Syria

44. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?

Author:: Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

45. The Washington Summit: NATO and the Baltic Region

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the second brief of the series, Toms Rostoks focuses on NATO’s role in defence and deterrence in the Baltic region. There has been good progress through the steps taken by the Baltic states and by their Allies, but substantial shortcomings remain in the Alliance’s posture on the north-east flank. The Baltic region thus remains a vulnerability for NATO.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

46. Rethinking Industrial Policy for Central and Eastern Europe

Author:: Michal Hrubý
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is increasingly important in the EU’s manufacturing landscape. The region’s export-oriented economies became an integral part of it through foreign direct investment—supported primarily by EU funding, including Cohesion Policy programs for regional and industrial development, and by national state spending. With its competitiveness at stake, the EU now focuses on industrial policy for cutting-edge technologies with high capital intensity. Many of its new regulations loosen state aid rules to allow generous support by governments to attract investors, which poses a problem for member states with less fiscal room to do so, including the CEE countries. This report discusses the opportunities and challenges for CEE countries to build manufacturing with potential to grow and to increase domestic value-added. It examines two case studies in the region: batteries and semiconductors, and their position in the value chains in Czechia and Hungary. Hungary has become one of the EU’s leading battery industry hubs and plays a key role in the drive toward self- sufficiency in this field. Its success came principally through government spending on investment promotion. Key issues have arisen regarding the environmental sustainability of new investments, the decision to attract cheap foreign labor without any appropriate long-term labor policy, and the lack of knowledge spillover from multinational companies to small and medium domestic ones to improve their value-chain position. New large investments announced by Chinese companies also raise geopolitical and security issues. With its broad innovation and R&D strategy and record low unemployment, Czechia did not make attracting large investments a priority before the COVID-19 pandemic. This has changed and its semiconductor industry is well- placed to draw in new investments in the micro- and nanoelectronics value chain. Czechia has started to support the industry through state aid for a handful of domestic and foreign companies, due to its strategic importance, its high value-added in production output, and the opportunity for stimulating R&D and high-skill employment. These case studies reveal key takeaways for Central and Eastern Europe. First, industrial policy based on state aid in small open economies are costly and will not generate long-term benefits if it is oriented solely at production tasks as in the past. Investment must bring innovation and R&D. Second, CEE countries should make financing innovation and R&D the priority, not subsidizing new manufacturing projects. They should rationalize their policy objectives and update and stick to their national strategies. Third, tight budgets and financial consolidation put pressure on selecting projects for state aid. Governments should not provide this aid without a solid cost-benefit analysis of the investments. Fourth, the CEE countries should consolidate the too broad innovation priorities within their national strategies and analyze their long-term growth potential. Fifth, industrial policy must be accompanied by appropriate labor and education policies to support the green and digital transition.
Topic:: Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

47. 178th mBank-CASE Seminar Proceedings: Immigration and the Labour Market in Poland

Author:: Jan Bazyli Klakla and Maciej Duszczyk
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:: Over the last dozen years Poland became an immigration country. The 178th mBank-CASE Seminar proceedings is devoted to this process – from various perspectives. The data speak for themselves. Immigration provides significant support for the Polish labour market. Poland is facing a rapid population decline. According to projections by the Ministry of Finance in 2022, by 2030 the population of Poland could decrease from the current 37.75 million to 36.6 million, and by 2050 to 34.1 million. The percentage of people of working age will decrease, while the elderly population will increase. Immigration may provide a solution to this problem. In 2022, around 100,000 people from Belarus arrived in Poland, most of them actively participating in the labour market. In addition, there are 1.2 million Ukrainians who stayed in Poland after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is therefore necessary to develop a long-term immigration, education and social policy to retain immigrants and integrate them into society and the labour market. This is what eminent experts who have been researching migration processes for years write about in the first two chapters of these Notebooks: Dr Maciej Duszczyk, as well as Dr Agata Górny and Dr Paweł Kaczmarczyk, from the Centre for Migration Research, operating within the University of Warsaw. The third chapter is devoted to the situation of female domestic workers.
Topic:: Immigration, Labor Market, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

48. WEER 2023 | Ukraine at War: Why did it happen, when will it end? (Full Issue)

Author:: Henryk Litwin, Yevgeniya Gaber, Mykola Riabchuk, Ola Hnatiuk, and Aliaksei Kazharski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:: Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:: From June 28th to June 30th, 2023, the nineteenth Warsaw East European Conference “Ukraine at War” took place. It was attended by a diverse group of scholars from Belarus, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, the United States, Finland, and Estonia. The conference opened with an inaugural lecture titled “Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters?” delivered by Professor Marius Janukonis, Director of the Strategic Management and Analysis Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. The closing presentation, titled “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Where Are We Now and What Next?”, was prepared by Professor Yevgeniya Gaber from Ukraine, representing the Atlantic Council in Turkey. The highlight of the conference was three round table discussions. On the first day, Professor David Sacko moderated a discussion on “Ukraine at War. Security in the Region.” On the second day, there was an exchange of views on “Rebuilding Ukraine. Key Challenges for the War and Post-War Period,” led by Dr. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz. Finally, on the closing day of WEEC, Professor Mykola Riabchuk chaired a round table titled “The Toxic Spell of ‘Imperial Knowledge’ and Challenges of Decolonization.” Throughout the event, there were 13 panel discussions during which 41 papers were presented. The titles of the panels reflect the breadth of thematic discussions during the conference, listed in the order they occurred: 1. Around Ukraine. Post-Soviet Space Before and During the War 2. Challenges and Diagnoses of the Future 3. Consequences of the War 4. Public Diplomacy 5. Russia towards the War 6. Ukraine – Sources of Resistance 7. Ukraine and Security Problems in the Continental Dimension 8. Ukraine in the Eyes of Russia. Ukraine in the Eyes of Europe 9. War Migrants 10. Belarusian Memory Policy. Report on “European Network for Belarus” project 11. Migration from Post-Soviet countries in Poland: trends, challenges, and prospects 12. War Narratives in the Media. Unfortunately, only a portion of the conference participants submitted their article texts to the organizers based on their presentations. Therefore, only partial materials from WEEC 2023 are published here. Readers will find the concluding lecture by Prof. Yevgeniya Gaber and a report on the round table discussions “The Toxic Spell of ‘Imperial Knowledge’ and Challenges of Decolonization,” comprising texts from the participants, containing the main theses of their presentations. Additionally, 10 articles from panel participants are included. While this compilation may not provide a comprehensive account of the conference, it serves as evidence of its thematic diversity and provides a glimpse into this significant event for Eastern European studies.
Topic:: History, Geopolitics, Colonialism, Ideology, Decolonization, Totalitarianism, Vladimir Putin, Armed Conflict, Identity, Soviet Union, Public Diplomacy, Forced Migration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

49. Northern Kosovo: Asserting Sovereignty amid Divided Loyalties

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Tensions are rising in Kosovo’s restive Serb-majority north, as Pristina enforces its writ against the backdrop of continuing disputes with Belgrade. The parties and outside supporters should first work on defusing the short-term risk of violence and then look for ways to foster lasting stability.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Political stability, Domestic Politics, and Violence
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

50. Ukraine: How to Hold the Line

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: The gruelling war in Ukraine continues, with Russian forces creeping forward amid fierce fighting. To stop Russia’s immediate momentum and withstand its assault, Kyiv and its backers will need to move quickly to fix problems that have hindered the Ukrainian effort to date.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS