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1. A Possible Ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025: Is the OSCE on Board?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“Where is the OSCE during Russia’s war on Ukraine?” asked Pál Dunay (Dunay, 2022). To be honest, not in the spotlight. However, changing political realities in 2025 might provide the Vienna organization with renewed legitimacy, fifty years after the signature of the Helsinki Accords that served as its groundwork. After more than 1,000 days of attrition war, several factors may bring the conflict in Eastern Europe to a turning point. Despite both parties’ recent military escalation, there seems to be no end in sight on the battlefield. Neither side has the resources to achieve a decisive victory, a situation that academics describe as “mutually hurting stalemates” (Slantchev & Goemans, 2025). Militarily, Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, but Putin’s goal of defeating the Ukrainian armed forces in open combat and occupying more Ukrainian territory is a “strategic impossibility” (Dickson & Holowinsky, 2024). It is doubtful that 2025, which marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazism, will coincide with a triumphal parade on Moscow’s Red Square. The resilience and morale shown by the Ukrainian armed forces deserve admiration and tribute, but Kyiv knows that it will not recover Crimea and the Donbas by force. After more than two years of grinding conflict, the weariness of its population is becoming evident. Because neither side can achieve its ultimate goals, new approaches to ending the Ukraine war are beginning to surface. Compared to only a few months ago, more actors are ready to look at alternative scenarios.
Topic:
Politics, Ceasefire, OSCE, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

2. Armenian Foreign Policy in 2025: The Return of Geography

Author:
Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2024 and the first months of 2025, coupled with the new US administration’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Russia to end the war, have increased the likelihood that Russia, in the short- to mid-term, will expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. The United States’ shifting focus from Europe to Asia–Pacific, diverging policy views between Washington and Brussels, and the socioeconomic challenges European Union member states face will likely diminish the role of the United States and the EU in the region. Meanwhile, ad hoc partnerships and minilateral groupings prioritizing regionalism prevail over larger, more formal multilateral coalitions. Armenia can only adapt its foreign policy in 2025 to the evolving regional geopolitical landscape and the looming risk of regional instability. The primary goals of Armenian foreign policy should be: ● Continuing negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey; ● Deepening cooperation with Georgia and Iran; ● Establishing a new modus operandi with Russia; ● Exploring the establishment of minilateral groupings1 ; ● Readjusting relations with the United States and the European Union while maintaining the positive momentum of recent years. This approach will allow Armenia to safeguard its sovereignty, navigate shifting power dynamics, and seize emerging opportunities while minimizing the risk of antagonizing regional and global powers.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Armenia

3. The Crisis of Belarusian Sovereignty

Author:
Kaspar Pucek
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Belarus is facing a potentially existential crisis as Russia’s growing influence threatens its existence as a sovereign state. This is to a significant extent a result of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. European policymakers should look for opportunities to strength Belarusian sovereignty and strategic autonomy through pragmatic engagement. Pragmatic engagement should focus primarily on normalising diplomatic relations and targeted sanctions relief.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Sanctions, Pragmatism, Foreign Influence, and Political Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

4. Digital Technologies in the Election Cycle – The Case of Albanian Parliamentary Elections 2025

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
As digital platforms and AI reshape societies worldwide, their impact on elections is increasingly profound. This brief explores how digital tools were used in Albania’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections, examining the roles of the Central Election Committee, political parties, candidates, and civil society. While technology offers opportunities for voter education, transparency, and participation, it also brings risks such as misinformation, unethical campaigning, and gaps in legal oversight. Drawing on international examples and Albania’s own experience, the brief highlights the need for robust safeguards, legislative alignment with EU standards, and strengthened public awareness to ensure digital means strengthen rather than undermines democratic processes.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Parliament, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Albania

5. A Generation At Risk: Rising youth violence in Albania

Author:
Romario Shehu
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
Recent data in Albania indicate a growing trend of youth involvement in violence and criminal behavior, reflecting similar patterns observed across Europe and beyond. In response, state institutions have introduced measures such as the deployment of school safety officers, the “School Safety” package, and plans to install surveillance cameras in schools. However, these efforts remain fragmented and short-term. Addressing youth security in a meaningful way requires primarily a systemic, data-driven approach that examines the forms, root causes and contributing factors of youth-on-youth violence and underreported criminal activity, particularly within and around schools. A comprehensive understanding of these dynamics, combined with stronger institutional coordination, investment in preventive education, and the promotion of youth resilience, is essential to ensuring a safer, more inclusive environment for Albania’s young people.
Topic:
Crime, Education, Youth, Violence, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Albania

6. Central and Eastern Europe and the Global Economic Fragmentation

Author:
Jan Boguslawski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since the 2020s, what the International Monetary Fund calls “global economic fragmentation” (GEF) has intensified, marked by weakening trade coordination, the return of protectionism, and the increasing alignment of trade flows with geopolitical blocs. Key drivers include the war in Ukraine, the long tail of the COVID-19 pandemic, escalating China-US tensions, structural transformations such as the rise of digital services and the green transition, and most recently the second Trump administration’s weaponization of tariffs. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are particularly exposed to the GEF. They benefited substantially from past waves of globalization, building growth models centered on foreign direct investment (FDI), integration into global supply chains, and high export dependence, especially toward Western Europe. The CEE countries can be divided into four clusters based on their trade-growth models. Balanced Exporters combine domestic consumption with moderately diversified exports across manufacturing and services. Germany-Affiliated Industrialists form the high-manufacturing, high-FDI hub tightly linked to the German industrial base. Northern ICT Regionalists rely more on dynamic ICT service exports and have stronger ties to Nordic economies than to Germany. Volatile Resource Economies are marked by weaker industrial bases, lower FDI, and a higher share of raw-goods exports. Not members of the EU, they are characterized in part by political instability and fragile institutions. These different models shape how the CEE countries experience the GEF. Their opportunities include the potential to attract reshoring and friendshoring investment or to act as “connector economies” in a bifurcating global trade system. But they also face major risks. The realignment of the global automotive sector, energy-market disruptions, and the broader slowdown in Germany—all magnified by the GEF—pose structural challenges. The key concern is that fragmentation entrenches CEE’s dependence on Western European supply chains, making it harder to diversify trade, to escape the middle-income trap, or to expand into markets beyond Europe. The Germany-Affiliated Industrialists are the most vulnerable, due to their narrow trade portfolios and exposure to fluctuations in global manufacturing demand. The Balanced Exporters, with larger domestic markets and more flexibility, are better positioned to absorb shocks. The Northern ICT Regionalists and the Volatile Resource Economies sit in between, with specific sectoral and geopolitical sensitivities. Albania, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland illustrate these dynamics. In the emerging geo-economic landscape, size and diversification matter. Larger economies with stronger domestic demand and broader export mixes—such as Poland and Romania—have more tools to manage volatility. Sustained stagnation in the EU core could, however, prompt some CEE states—especially export-dependent ones—to seek deeper economic ties beyond Europe, following Hungary’s lead in cultivating links with China. From the EU’s perspective, supporting CEE’s geo-economic autonomy will require more than cohesion funding. It means helping these economies to move up global value chains, to reduce their overdependence on Western Europe, and to expand their exports to new markets. This would not only future-proof the region’s growth but also help defuse political tensions and temper the appetite in CEE for ‘alternative’ geopolitical alignments.
Topic:
Economy, Trade, Regional Economy, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

7. Central and Eastern Europe’s Role in Ukraine’s Reconstruction: Shared Opportunities, Benefits, and Challenges

Author:
Dominik Istrate
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Ukraine’s reconstruction will be a historic undertaking requiring global leadership and the involvement of the largest economies of the international community. While it is being largely addressed through the expected involvement of the private sector globally and formal channels such as the Multi-Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine or the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference, there have been considerable responses at the level of individual countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well. In the region particularly, the war has had an economic impact, contributing to an already emerged energy crisis and prompting an economic downturn, due to geographic proximity to Ukraine. Several CEE countries have developed a comprehensive policy approach to Ukraine’s reconstruction. What is more, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are at the forefront of reconstruction planning and financial contributions, as well as participating in the early stage of reconstruction, with comprehensive national policies that have total or near-total political support. Others—including Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia—have either expressed a strong interest in participating in postwar reconstruction or have started implementing individual projects, regardless of the level of domestic political support for Ukraine. The majority of CEE countries can claim to have a sustainable engagement with Ukraine. Only in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, whose relations with Kyiv have reached a historic low, is it yet to be seen if or how they will engage with postwar reconstruction. The actions taken by CEE governments in the past three years strongly suggest not only that the countries of the region are well-positioned to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction, but also that some will likely be key players—particularly Poland and Romania, which are positioning themselves as key logistics hubs for this goal. The region’s prospects for playing a key role are also supported by policies introduced in countries such as Czechia, Poland, and the Baltic states that provide various incentives for companies aiming to participate in reconstruction. The subnational and sector-specific approach employed by Czechia and the Baltic states also underscores long-term cooperation and commitment. Other smaller CEE economies are also expressing strong interest. They should formulate a comprehensive approach to support Ukraine and their own business community in one effort. Although the financing of reconstruction remains a key challenge, including regarding the possible use of frozen Russian assets, CEE countries are looking for additional ways and indirect contributions, as well as for policies ensuring that the issue will stay on not only the global but also the regional agenda. Regional cooperation and Ukraine’s EU integration could also prove essential to connect CEE businesses with Ukrainian partners, particularly through the Three Seas Initiative, for which Ukraine’s reconstruction has the potential to become a flagship objective.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Donors, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

8. How To Help Moldova Secure Its Fragile Democracy

Author:
Laurențiu Pleșca
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As it approaches its parliamentary elections, Moldova is in a turbulent situation, with ongoing economic and social challenges, society polarized, and the political landscape marked by a split among pro-EU forces while pro-Russia ones appear increasingly united. Moldova is no longer a captured state, but oligarchic networks are still influential. The elections will be decisive for its geopolitical trajectory. Pro-EU actors faces the challenge of overcoming their divisions and forming a credible governing coalition, while pro-Russia and populist forces aim to exploit societal grievances, economic vulnerability, and external disinformation to erode trust in democratic institutions. Vote-buying, illegal campaign financing, and disinformation, particularly via digital platforms beyond the state’s regulatory reach, remain potent tools for those seeking to manipulate the elections’ outcome. At the same time, an active civil society and independent media keep a close watch on democratic backsliding and political shifts. They play an indispensable role in strengthening the country’s resilience, but resource limitations and the termination of US assistance threaten their effectiveness. Moldova’s international environment further complicates its trajectory. The war in Ukraine, the presence of Russian forces in Transnistria, and the frozen negotiation format for solving the situation there heighten security concerns. Russia continues to undermine its EU integration through political pressure, energy leverage, and hybrid influence campaigns. Simultaneously, Moldova has deepened its ties with the EU, the United States, and regional partners such as Romania and Ukraine, receiving substantial financial, technical, and security support. It benefits from the EU’s Black Sea Security Strategy, the European Peace Facility, and a three-year €1.9 billion EU Economic Growth Plan, alongside EU and US military and development assistance. The pro-EU parties are fragmenting and ostracizing each other, while the left-wing and pro-Russia parties are coalescing to be as effective as possible. It will be difficult for a single party or bloc to win an absolute majority. Moldova thus faces three near-term scenarios around the elections, reflecting the political polarization and, in two cases, highlighting the likely fragility of a resulting governing coalition. The most probable outcomes are continuity in government and in EU integration under the PAS or a fragile pro-EU coalition government. The less likely outcome is an unstable broad pro-Russia coalition government that would be destructive for Moldova’s EU path. For the EU, its member states, and other Western actors, supporting Moldova is a matter of reinforcing its democratic resilience. They need to help its institutions withstand pressures in the short term, and to strengthen the political, civic, and security foundations that can anchor the country in Europe in the long run. This requires a wide range of financial, technical, and political measures to give Moldova the tools to resist foreign interference and the confidence to pursue reforms. They include supporting the consolidation of democratic institutions, enhancing electoral integrity, reinforcing civil society, and maintaining a credible path toward EU accession.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Moldova, Eastern Europe, and Black Sea

9. The Changing Face of the South Caucasus

Author:
Teona Giuashvili
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the South Caucasus has been neither linear nor uniform. The war has ushered in a period of interregnum between the earlier regional order and one whose features are yet to emerge. It has shifted political dynamics within the three states of the South Caucasus and has affected the interests and positions of external actors, altering the regional balance of power. In all three countries in the region, the interregnum has amplified trends that predated the war: it consolidated Azerbaijan’s assertive foreign policy, reinforced Armenia’s striving for emancipation from Russia, and accelerated Georgia’s drift away from the West. While Türkiye took advantage of Russia’s distraction from the region and fostered its position in the South Caucasus, the shift in the status quo in the region has penalised Iran’s regional interests. Throughout the last three years, the South Caucasus has witnessed the receding influence of the US and the EU, and the expansion of China’s geoeconomic footprint.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

10. Poland at a Crossroads? Strategic Choices Amid Shifting Transatlantic Security Dynamics

Author:
Marcin Fatalski and Wojciech Michnik
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Poland stands at a pivotal moment, navigating domestic political transitions while adapting to profound changes in the transatlantic security landscape. The outcome of key elections (presidential in 2025 and parliamentary in 2027) will shape the country’s strategic direction, as NATO and the EU confront some of the most significant challenges in their history. A second Trump presidency marks a turning point for European security, amplifying EU-sceptical forces and reshaping the regional balance of power. This Strategic Update examines the key domestic and international factors influencing Poland’s political and strategic decision-making, and Poland’s role in the evolving European security architecture – especially in times of the resurgent populist sentiments on both sides of the Atlantic and increasingly aggressive behaviour of the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Poland