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21. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

22. Incomplete Exit: Central and Eastern Europe’s Corporate Decoupling From Russia

Author:
Michal Wyrebkowski
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, companies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) initially were trailblazers in voluntarily withdrawing from Russia, effectively self-sanctioning through voluntary overcompliance with sanctions by leaving, even though operating in the country is still legal. At the same time, CEE countries have enabled sanctions-evasion networks. The historical economic relationship between CEE countries and Russia created the conditions for this paradox. Decades of relying on Russian energy sources masked an asymmetric interdependence: Russia’s military-industrial complex relied heavily on CEE countries for the machine tools, industrial components, and dual-use technologies essential to weapons production. When EU sanctions targeted these critical supply chains, the geographic proximity and established trade relationships that motivated voluntary exit by some companies also enabled systematic sanctions circumvention by others. The EU’s Russia sanctions since 2014 have struggled to match the complexity of the economic networks involved. Early sanctions focused on financial restrictions and high-profile sectors but failed to address the technical vulnerabilities that enable large-scale evasion. Even as restrictions expanded to cover dual-use goods and Russia’s “shadow fleet”, fundamental gaps in classification systems and enforcement mechanisms persisted. The responses of CEE companies have varied across sectors and countries. While investor and consumer pressure drove rapid voluntary exits from Russia in consumer-facing industries, industrial manufacturers found numerous ways to keep supplying it through third-country intermediaries. The behavior of energy companies has reflected the strategic priorities of CEE governments, with some achieving complete diversification from Russia while others reinforced existing dependencies. The variety of corporate responses mirrored the uneven development of national sanctions-enforcement capabilities, ranging from understaffed sanctions departments to insufficiently robust regulatory frameworks; for example, regarding criminalization of violations. The persistence of sanctions evasion through CEE countries reflects systemic failures in the EU’s enforcement architecture. Technical classification systems designed for traditional trade cannot adequately distinguish between civilian and military applications of modern dual-use technologies. Customs officials lack access to the information systems necessary to verify complex ownership structures and end-use destinations. Legal frameworks optimized for territorial jurisdiction are inadequate for regulating globalized supply chains where goods, payments, and corporate structures span multiple jurisdictions. Banking institutions operating across Central and Eastern Europe have become critical actors, with a small number of financial institutions handling substantial portions of Russia’s foreign currency transactions. Their continued operations highlight the limits of EU territorial sanctions, which is confirmed by the extent to which US extraterritorial enforcement has become necessary to police sanctions violations in Europe. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reforms across multiple dimensions. Technical improvements must include supplementary classification systems that incorporate detailed specifications for dual-use goods, while institutional capacity-building demands substantial increases in staffing and expertise at the national and EU levels. Financial-sector monitoring needs real-time automated screening capabilities and dedicated compliance structures, while industrial-sector oversight requires specialized task forces with technical expertise in dual-use technologies.
Topic:
Economics, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia and Eastern Europe

23. How To Help Armenia Navigate Its Democracy-Security Nexus

Author:
Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2018 Velvet Revolution was a breakthrough for Armenia’s democracy, but progress has since stalled. The June 2026 parliamentary elections will be a decisive test in a polarized environment dominated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party and an opposition tied to former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. This dominant dichotomy, fueled by both sides, frustrates the attempts of alternative forces to come to the fore. Support for Civil Contract is stable, but the majority of voters are undecided, disengaged, or disillusioned by the trauma of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 2023 ethnic cleansing there as well as by the lack of credible political alternatives. Civil Contract’s political dominance over the last seven years has led to unilateral lawmaking and some controversial actions against opposition figures, media, civil society, and the judiciary. However, recent municipal elections saw the party fail to secure majorities in major cities. While the diplomatic breakthrough in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, marked by the White House deal in August, sets a path for stability in the near term, it is crucial to follow up and to push for a final agreement. Azerbaijan’s continued demands and rhetoric cast doubt as to the extent of its commitment to the process. Similarly, Türkiye still does not meet its commitment to end its blockade of Armenia. Meanwhile, Armenia’s drift away from Russia and pivot to the West has been characterized by its increased ambition to join the EU. It also seeks to diversify its security with the help of its Western partners, advancing with reforms and political alignment with Euro-Atlantic priorities. Until the next elections, Armenia is likely to continue deepening its ties with the West while maintaining cautious cooperation with Russia, while peace talks with Azerbaijan drag on, and relations with Türkiye remain complex. It is likely that Civil Contract will campaign on defending Armenia’s sovereignty and on Western alignment while the fragmented opposition struggles to broaden its support. The most probable scenario is another Civil Contract government with a reduced majority, which will continue efforts toward peace with Azerbaijan and balancing engagement with the West and Russia. Two other scenarios (in descending order of likelihood) are a government coalition of Civil Contract and smaller pro-West parties, which will push a more confrontational stance toward Russia, or an opposition-led government realigning the country with Moscow and further undermining democratization. The EU, its member states, and the United States should support Armenia by helping it strengthen its democratic institutions and its security in order to preserve the public’s confidence in democracy. The country needs a combination of financial, technical, and political assistance to facilitate democratization, to resist external pressures, and to maintain its sovereignty. This includes backing the consolidation of democratic institutions, promoting electoral integrity, encouraging a diversity of democratic actors, and empowering civil society, all against the background of addressing the country’s security challenges. By providing Armenia with the tools to defend its territorial integrity and to pursue democratic reforms, the West can help revive the optimism sparked by the Velvet Revolution and overturn a public disillusionment that could weaken Armenia’s democracy and its ties with Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, and United States of America

24. A Subdued “Last Hurrah” for the (Former) Soviet Union in Romania

Author:
Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Relations between Romania and its large Eastern neighbor–Tsarist Russia, then the USSR, and now the Russian Federation–have been fraught with tension, mistrust, and even enmity. Three examples from the 20th century are illustrative. First, during World War One Romania sent its national “treasure,” consisting of nearly 100 tons of gold plus many other valuables, to Tsarist Russia for safekeeping. When the communist regime came to power there, it effectively confiscated the “treasure,” though some items other than the bullion and gold coins have been returned over the ensuing years. Second, in 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia (contemporary Moldova) and Northern Bukovina (now part of Ukraine) from Romania. The desire to recover those territories was one factor leading Romania to join Nazi Germany in its war against the Soviet Union. Third, that losing effort resulted in Romania having an unpopular communist regime forced upon it, having to pay heavy reparations to the USSR, and “hosting” unwelcome Soviet troops until 1958. The oppressive Ceausescu regime was, indirectly, a result of Soviet influence in post-World War Two Romania.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Soviet Union, Post-Soviet Space, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Romania

25. Political Humor in Communist Eastern Europe

Author:
Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Political humor was an important aspect of daily life in communist Eastern Europe – – simultaneously an emotional escape valve and cris de coeur. Anti-regime jokes of various sorts were exchanged cautiously, within families and among trusted friends. Some ridiculed communism itself, others Russia/the Soviet Union, and in many cases the local dictator, whoever he was. Others focused on the shortages, hardships, and other privations of daily life. Examples of such political humor often appeared, disappeared, and then reappeared in altered form. Many such jokes prevalent in communist Eastern Europe hopped from country to country and were recycled versions of each other, adapted to the circumstances and personalities wherever they circulated. Where any particular witticism originated was impossible to ascertain, and where it would end up, and in what form, were equally unknowable. Extensive scholarly interest has been paid to such Eastern European humor, including multiple analyses and compendia. The flavor and content of at least some of those works are contained in the title of one such volume, First Prize: Fifteen Years! by C. Banc and A. Dundes. That title is drawn from the following Romanian joke: A competition for the best political joke was announced. Do you know what the first prize was? No. Fifteen years! The joke cleverly encompasses both the risk and “rewards” of indulging in such activity.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Memoir, Soviet Union, and Humor
Political Geography:
Europe and Eastern Europe

26. Desecuritizing the Belarusian Balcony: Principles for U.S.–Belarus Relations

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief outlines a low-cost, low-risk roadmap for sustained U.S. engagement with Belarus that could help to stabilize NATO’s volatile eastern flank, enabling the U.S. to retrench from the European continent and focus on other theaters. In light of governance concerns voiced by Western officials on the heels of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, and especially since Belarus provided support to Russian troops in the opening weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the E.U. and U.S. have adopted a strictly punitive approach to Belarus. Essentially, Belarus has been viewed as an appendage of Russia. However, this approach misses opportunities for the West to take advantage of inherent divisions between the interests of Belarus and Russia. As outlined in previous Quincy Institute research, President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus has long wished to develop a “multi-vector” foreign policy for his country. Such a policy would permit Belarus to maneuver between the East and West to best safeguard its own national sovereignty and interests. While Belarus has moved significantly closer to Russia in recent years, this pivot has in part been in reaction to Western hostility. Lukashenko likely remains open to some degree of cooperation with the West, and has signaled that he does not wish to increase participation in the Russia–Ukraine War. While it is almost certainly impossible to fully remove Belarus from the Russian camp, exploring ways for Belarus to triangulate between Russia and the West could offer significant benefits for U.S. interests and for regional stability. This brief recommends that the Trump administration explore the following bargain with Belarus: In exchange for a Belarusian commitment not to abet, facilitate, or engage in aggression against any NATO state, the U.S. should promise that it will not engage in any effort at an external change of government in Belarus. To firm up the U.S.–Belarus relationship, the U.S. should consider sectoral sanctions relief, including in the Belarusian civilian aviation sector, and U.S. engagement in other non-military investment opportunities, such as the Belarusian electric vehicle industry. The U.S. should also work to restore Belarus’ access to international financial institutions. The U.S. should mediate border issues between Belarus, Poland, and Lithuania toward the goal of deescalation on NATO’s eastern flank. The U.S. should encourage Belarusian efforts both to facilitate Russia–Ukraine peace talks, such as exchanges of prisoners of war and bodies of fallen soldiers, and to contribute to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, North America, Belarus, and United States of America

27. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:
Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

28. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Serbia

29. The Concept of "Putinism" and its Impact on the "Normalization" of Georgian-Russian Relations

Author:
Malkhaz Mikeladze
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In view of the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, the Russian elite is formulating conceptual approaches to justify the inevitability of the escalating confrontation with the West and to encompass the foreign priorities of the Russian Federation. Within expert circles, this combination of approaches is increasingly labeled as “Putinism,” with the belief that its main components will have a decisive impact on Russia’s relations with other countries, including Georgia. Amidst the ongoing polarization of Georgian society, the normalization of relations with Russia emerges as one of the most important issues, a normalization process that has triggered radicalization and sharp confrontation between the government and opposition, further complicating the depolarization process and civil dialogue recommended by the European Union. These challenges themselves seem to be obstacles to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, the article aims to review the basic principles of “Putinism” and provide a pragmatic evaluation for the “normalization” of Georgian-Russian relations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Normalization, Vladimir Putin, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

30. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties

Author:
Mamuka Zhvania
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
Topic:
Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe