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1. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

2. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:
Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

3. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

4. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

5. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

6. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

7. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

9. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

10. Toward a New Youth Brain-drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans

Author:
Marjan Icoski
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Youth brain drain is one of the most worrisome problems for the Western Balkan Six countries (WB6)—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. The pace and intensity of youth brain drain, rank the WB6 among the top brain drain leaders in the world, with estimations to lose a quarter to half of its skilled and educated young citizens in the forthcoming decades. A situation that cast serious doubts on the democratic and economic progress of WB6, and their prospective membership into the EU. Youth brain drain is a historically rooted topic in the culture and tradition of the WB6, provoking huge sentiments and heated public debates. Due to its sensitivity, it is prone to politicization and misuse by the political parties that did not manage to find a compromise for its full acknowledgment as a separate policy field. Therefore, to date, the policy approach to youth brain drain is declarative and inconsistent, tackled as part of bigger policy areas such as youth employment, education, and diaspora engagement. Although formally, all WB6 countries have policies and institutional mechanisms in place, youth emigration and the desire to leave are constantly on the rise, underlining their limited scope and impact to keep youth home. This paper analyzes the conceptual shortcomings of the current policy approach. In line with the latest trends and tendencies of youth brain drain, it offers fresh policy options for utilization of the potential of the regional youth diaspora as the new WB6 development doctrine. The paper sees the youth diaspora not only as a source of remittances but also as a source of investments, know-how, skills, and connections as per the examples of several EU member states. The paper further announces the necessary paradigm change grounded in the shift of the public narrative and redesign of return and circulation policies through deepening regional cooperation and establishing a new migration deal with the EU under the framework of the WB6 accession processes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Brain Drain, and Youth
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Central Europe