Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 5 Years / Topic: Geopolitics

1. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:: Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

3. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:: Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

5. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:: William Piekos
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

6. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

7. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

8. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

9. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:: Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

10. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

11. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

12. México en la rivalidad China-Estados Unidos: Las limitaciones de China en la competición comercial

Author:: Lucía Ramírez Bolívar, Gleider I. Hernández, and Nalia María Rochín
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El objetivo del artículo es documentar la rivalidad entre China y Estados Unidos en México. Se argumenta que el actual enfrentamiento posee connotaciones geopolíticas y geoeconómicas que tienen implicaciones importantes en el plano global. El artículo explica las peculiaridades de la política comercial de México con respecto a China, los avances y limitaciones en función de los tratados comerciales con Estados Unidos y Canadá. Se realiza un recuento de los principales momentos que han marcado dicha rivalidad y se concluye que, aún en medio de esta pugna por el liderazgo mundial, hasta el momento parece ser que el gobierno mexicano se ha concentrado en consolidar las relaciones con su vecino del Norte, pero es posible que pueda sacar ventaja de estas tensiones, ya que ambos países son de enorme importancia para México.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Geopolitics, Trade Wars, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Mexico, and United States of America

13. Brasil-Estados Unidos-China en el orden global a principios del siglo XXI: Un análisis desde la perspectiva de la política exterior brasileña

Author:: Maria da Luz Ramos, Carla Guapo da Costa, and Gabrieli Gaio
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este artículo aborda las diversas orientaciones de la política exterior brasileña (PEB) en el siglo XXI teniendo en cuenta el contexto de las relaciones establecidas entre Brasil y dos importantes actores del orden geopolítico contemporáneo: Estados Unidos (EEUU) y China. Desde una lectura geopolítica Norte-Sur del orden global, se analiza la(s) forma(s) en que el PEB y sus actores construyen sus representaciones sobre dichos actores y estructuran, en consecuencia, su agenda externa en relación con ellos.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, South America, United States of America, Global South, and Global North

14. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

Author:: Emily Kilcrease
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:: Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

16. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

17. Evolution of the World Order and Russia’s Ideas About the Outside World

Author:: A. Bogaturov and O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The idea of the outside world and the role that Russia plays in it has undergone radical changes in Moscow’s official worldviews since 2014. The degradation of the international security situation indicates a deep crisis in the existing world order, which was formed in the spirit of the US’s unipolar hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to turn the UN, the only universal platform for reaching collective decisions on an inclusive and equal basis, into a tool of the collective West for pressuring “revisionist states.” The decline in the culture of global-level dialogue leads not only to the aggravation of military-political conflicts but also to the inability to effectively respond to new challenges and transnational threats.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Global Focus

18. China’s smart cities and the future of geopolitics

Author:: Valentin Weber
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this latest Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explores Chinese scientific research and industry application of smart cities, with ‘city brains’. The geostrategic implications for these complex Chinese smart city construction projects outside of China – particularly surrounding surveillance and artificial intelligence – and a potential future ‘world digital brain’ must be considered by policymakers, even if we are far away from an eventual bifurcation of the global internet.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:: China and Asia

19. Deciphering Pakistan Navy’s Role in CPEC Security: A Comprehensive Security Approach

Author:: Shabana Fayyaz and Nabeel Hussain
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Contemporary geo-political and geo-economics potentialities creates new horizons for the bilateral relations between states. These potential arrangements require security as a pre-requisite, both traditional and nontraditional domain. Pakistan Navy is dealing with these security threats from a comprehensive security approach. Through Task Force-88 and Task Force-150 as well as the Force Protection Battalion (FPB) for the security of CPEC from foreign actors, it has made enormous efforts to protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from new challenges and threats. This demonstrates that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Pakistan Navy might accomplish compressive security through joint efforts. The protection and defence of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and the maritime-based economy are also enshrined in Pakistan's maritime doctrine. The Pakistan Navy's active engagement in Pakistan's security sector has also opened doors for the improvement of bilateral ties between various countries through the AMAN Exercises, a global collaboration of 45 nations to combat rising security threats.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Non-Traditional Threats, and CPEC
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and South Asia

20. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:: Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

21. Where is China heading?

Author:: Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: China is ambitious, it is making this known and everyone is beginning to realise it. So much so that today a growing number of observers fear that it will take greater risks to achieve its objectives and fall into the famous "Thucydides' trap"; in short, that it will launch into a war, notably around Taiwan, which would inevitably involve the United States. Isn't its goal to supplant America and become the world's leading power? If, by 2028 or 2030, the Chinese economy were to exceed the US economy in terms of GDP, it is doubtful that it will succeed in removing the US from its pedestal. This is likely to be lower and more contested. But rather than a power transition, the world is witnessing the emergence of new, permanently asymmetrical bipolarity and, no doubt, a new Cold War[1].
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. Geopolitical Risk in the Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition and Economic Security

Author:: Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Recently, the intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition, spread of COVID-19 infections, and the Russia-Ukraine war are disrupting the global supply chain and increasing instability in the global economy. The resulting instability in the supply of semiconductors, medicines, food, and energy is leading to an economic downturn, and the U.S., China, Japan, and EU are actively pursuing strategies to strengthen economic security. The key to recent economic security is the U.S.-China strategic competition. Because the United States is re-tightening economic-security links that were loosened in the post-Cold War era to counter China's economic rise. And the concept of recent economic security largely includes the elements of economic statecraft, economic resilience, and building mutual trust.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Economic Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:: Alice Pannier
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

24. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:: Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

25. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:: Camille Morel
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

26. The United Arab Emirates and Sino-American Competition: Towards a Policy of Non-Alignment?

Author:: Jean-loup Samaan
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In just under five years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has accelerated its rapprochement with Xi Jinping’s China, to the point of becoming the first Gulf country to find itself at the heart of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington. Although benefiting from a large US military presence, the UAE has made its partnership with the Chinese regime a new priority that goes beyond energy and trade. Over the past five years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has used its economic and strategic rapprochement with China as a tool to diversify its foreign policy. If this Chinese policy of the UAE - which has traditionally been Washington's partner in the region - mirrors the erosion of American influence in the Gulf, the sustainability of Abu Dhabi's strategy should be questioned. Despite its aspirations for strategic autonomy, the UAE remains heavily dependent on US security guarantees, meaning that tensions between Washington and Abu Dhabi over its growing partnership with Beijing in sensitive areas (5G network, defence cooperation) could undermine its security foundations. While the energy crisis ensuing from the war in Ukraine allows the Gulf oil-producing countries to be in a powerful position vis-à-vis Western consumers, Abu Dhabi now seems determined to maintain its balancing act between Washington and Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

27. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:: Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

28. Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS

Author:: Marcos Caramuru, José Mário Antunes, and Tatiana Rosito
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: The project “Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS - 2022”, developed by CEBRI at the invitation of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, aimed at mapping trends and defining concrete strategies and proposals to, from a Brazilian perspective, inform the agenda and improve the joint action and international projection of the group, whose rotating presidency is held by China in 2022. The development, coordination, and results of the project were the responsibility of CEBRI and, beyond the original objective, constitute a contribution to the debate on BRICS in Brazil. The project brought together about 30 high-level Brazilian specialists from various areas (academia, civil society, private sector, and public sector) in three closed meetings. This Executive Summary presents a synthesis of the discussions.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

29. The Indo-pacific and Southeast Asia: The Impact of External Strategies on Southeast Asia and Asean’s Response

Author:: Gracia Abad Quintanal
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific concept is imprecise and designates more a geopolitical reality than a geographical space, but it is not, as is often suggested, a recent creation of the US, nor of the Trump administration. On the contrary, several actors have used it before the United States itself. And the US will not be the last actor to adopt it, either. On the contrary, it has gradually been adopted by other actors, including ASEAN, which tries to turn the concept in its favor in a way that reaffirms the importance of the group in the region as a whole and does not put in question neither “its centrality or its unity”, something that is far from being achieved.
Topic:: Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

30. China en África: Objetivos, instrumentos e implicaciones estratégicas

Author:: Fernando Delage
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Desde el fin de la Guerra Fría, cuatro grandes prioridades definieron la estrategia de la República Popular China hacia África: el acceso a recursos naturales y materias primas; la consecución de mercados para sus exportaciones de manufacturas; la obtención de apoyo a sus objetivos políticos; y la consolidación de un estatus como líder del mundo en desarrollo. A partir de la primera década del siglo XXI China se ha convertido asimismo en un importante socio financiero y en impulsor del desarrollo de infraestructuras en el continente, a la vez que ha adquirido una creciente presencia militar. La relación multidimensional construida por la China de Xi Jinping con África forma parte integral de su estrategia de ascenso global, con implicaciones económicas y geopolíticas que han atraído la atención de las restantes potencias.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Globalization, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa and China

31. China and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Economic and Political Perspective

Author:: Zhang Yunling
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: This paper studies China’s policies and participation in East Asian economic integration and cooperation. The progress of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is remarkable in the time when global as well as regional economies are facing so many challenges. China as the largest economy in East Asia plays a key role in sustaining regional dynamism. China is active and constructive in initiating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+1) free trade agreements (FTAs) and an integrated framework of FTAs in East Asia. As RCEP was initiated by ASEAN and supported strongly by China it is essential to keep East Asian economic dynamism: the conclusion of the RCEP negotiations and the implementation has great effects. China’s gains from RCEP are not just economic, but also political. Whilst this paper focuses on economic gains for China, it also analyses the political gains for China, for example, against ‘decoupling’ and political division, which is harmful to East Asian integration and cooperation. The novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is still ongoing, so the timely enforcement of RCEP is important as it gives confidence to the region to keep the region open and to work together to make East Asia dynamic in facing the challenges. Some challenges for East Asia are (i) how to rebuild the supply chains that are either weakened or broken by the pandemic; (ii) how to overcome the new barriers created by government policies in the name of ‘national security’ both in trade and investment areas; and (iii) how to overcome the new divisions created by the United States’ policy under its comprehensive strategic competition with China that leads to the exclusive arrangements in East Asia. East Asian economic integration and cooperation are based on two basic principles: openness and inclusiveness. As a region with great diversity, it is crucial to provide opportunities for all parties with difference. China will continue its open policy and actively participate in multilateral and regional arrangements, and as the largest economy in East Asia it serves as a key pillar to be a centre of the global economy. China will take RCEP as an essential framework to enhance its interest and role in East Asia, as well as in the Asia-Pacific against a politically oriented Indo-Pacific initiative.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and ASEAN

32. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

33. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

34. China's Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: While the war in Ukraine is a game changer for international and in particular European security, China appears to be marching on. And, in some ways, it is true. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, under Xi’s leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests. The Report examines China’s current approach to foreign policy, and the drivers of the country’s shift away from tradition. What are the main characteristics of China’s foreign policy in the wake of the Ukraine war? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

35. The Digital Asset Battlefield Between the United States and China

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: United States dollar dominance has underpinned American economic and geopolitical leadership since the Second World War. The tremendous structural and geopolitical advantages the United States derives from the hegemony of the dollar have contributed substantially to Washington’s military power, alliances, and strong hand in trade relations with other states. However, the convergence of a shifting international balance of power and the accelerated digitalization of the world economy will have major implications for this pillar of American strength.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Currency, Strategic Competition, and Digitization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

37. Finland and the Demise of China’s Polar Silk Road

Author:: Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Only a short time ago, considerable enthusiasm existed in Finland regarding Beijing’s efforts to forge an “Arctic corridor” of railroads and undersea tunnels, satellite ground stations, an airport for scientific expeditions, and massive biorefineries. In this, Finland was not alone but represented only a small branch of China’s comprehensive thrust to permanently establish a presence above the Arctic Circle. Yet, with the recently emerging geopolitical turbulence, China’s Arctic expansion is facing a standstill, even in Finland, which long seemed like its most viable partner in the region. By applying for NATO membership along with Sweden, Finland is turning westward, practically closing the gates on China’s Arctic expansion beyond Russia. Its story serves as an interesting microcosm on the rise and demise of China’s Arctic policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Finland, and Arctic

38. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

39. The Enemy of My Friend Remains My Friend: China’s Ukraine Dilemma

Author:: Horia Ciurtin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: State media in China remains equivocal about the level of destruction and mayhem caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Chinese government has stated it will meet the challenge of overcoming strained global supplies resulting from the conflict, and has emphasized that the nation’s food security will be ensured (People’s Daily, June 2; China News Service, May 27). Nevertheless, given Ukraine’s position as a global agricultural supplier, China has not fully appreciated the scope of the problem. At a broader level, the war is a litmus test for China’s ability to navigate geopolitical troubles along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the conflict has underscored the difficulties facing China in moving beyond convenient cordialities to play the role of a benign ‘balancer’ in global politics. In its relationships with Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing is entangled financially with both sides. Furthermore, China is now exposed to secondary sanctions due to its economic entanglement with Russia. At the same time, its investments, construction projects and supply chains that traverse Ukraine risk destruction as the war drags on.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

40. Impact of CPEC on Pakistan’s Economic Outlook

Author:: Sajid Mehmood Shahzad
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan‟s vital geopolitical position is an advantage for this South Asian nation. It is located at the apex of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the People‟s Republic of China has setup the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with a futuristic strategy to gain long-term benefits. This planning is not random at all. It is a cohesive plan to revitalize the financial system of its long-standing collaborator and ally through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is currently the talk of the town. The present study analyzes how Pakistan‟s conventional economic outlook can be transformed through the CPEC. While harnessing the power of Pakistan as a „trade route‟, the CPEC has the potential to reshape transport & security options, increase the cost-effectiveness of goods, and widen the scope for new and existing businesses. it will develop a networking coherence among agricultural & industrial hubs and connect special economic zones (SEZs) with the rest of the country and beyond. This paper evaluates the CPEC‟s fiscal footprint on Pakistan‟s economy and examines the correlation between overcoming economic shortcomings and increasing future gains through a cause-and-effect relationship.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

41. Taking the low road: China's influence in Australian states and territories

Author:: John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: In November 2020 a Chinese official passed a list of 14 grievances to Australian journalists, highlighting what Beijing regarded as missteps in the Australian government’s relations with China. A striking feature of the list is that many concern Australian Government attempts to limit Chinese engagement with the states and territories, or state-based institutions such as universities. Why did state and territory relations with China concern Canberra? This study explores the changing nature of China’s engagement with Australian states and territories, local governments, city councils, universities, research organisations and non-government organisations, all nested in Australian civil society. What emerges is the astonishing breadth and depth of China’s engagement, much of it the welcome outcome of Australia’s economic and people-to-people engagement with China over many decades. But it’s equally apparent that China has made covert attempts to influence some politicians and overt attempts to engage states, territories and key institutions in ways that challenge federal government prerogatives and have brought the two levels of government into sharp public dispute. Here we provide a detailed analysis of how China has worked to build its political influence and build dependence through trade and economic ties with each Australian state and territory. In addition, unique cross-cutting chapters review the impact of Chinese engagement with Australian universities and show how Beijing’s ‘United front’ organisation is designed to build influence. We assess the impact on Australian businesses and the constitutional challenges presented by Chinese engagement with the states and territories. The study methods and analytical approaches adopted in this book will be a model for similar research in many parts of the world. Understanding the nature of Chinese engagement with subnational jurisdictions is an important way for national governments to shape their security policies and to resist covert and, indeed, unwanted overt interference. This book provides original insights into the scale of the challenge and distils practical policy recommendations for governments at all levels to consider and adopt.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

42. The geopolitics of digital financial technologies: A chance for Europe?

Author:: Brigitte Dekker, Arief Hühn, Pim Korsten, and Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Geopolitical tensions are permeating the digital domain. During the 1990s, the emergence of the internet still involved optimism and high hopes for digital technology as a force for openness, connectedness and freedom for all. Yet contrary to these promises, a trend of centralization, is prevalent in the digital economy. This trend of centralization, with the subsequent problems of gatekeeping, ecosystem lock-in, disproportional rent-seeking and monopolists that set market rules, is now also evident in the financial industry. Whereas smaller financial technology (fintech) companies, including many European firms, revolutionized the financial sector in the 2000s – disrupting traditional banks and their vested interests – we now witness a concentration of power and data in this sector, either in incumbent firms or within Big Tech companies. In response, governments in China, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are devising regulations, while at the same time technology innovators are building a radically new infrastructure to underpin our financial sector: Decentralized Finance (DeFi). The geopolitical implications of this disruptive transformation of the financial sector – through both fintech and DeFi – require forward-looking government responses that protect and promote European interests in the long term. This Clingendael Report first reflects on these trends of centralization in digital finance and decentralization in ‘traditional finance’. The paper examines the relationship between geopolitics and finance and looks at the position of the EU and its member states. The analysis considers the medium to longer-term implications in the following three domains: economic competitiveness and innovation; financial–economic and social stability; and inclusivity and equality. Data governance, data protection and data portability between financial services are key concepts in each of these areas. Building on these insights, the report argues for a push towards greater awareness among European policymakers on the potentials of DeFi to counter Big Tech’s rising influence in the European financial system with a decentralized, human-centred and value-based system. At the same time, the regulatory and security risks of DeFi – and the trend of decentralization in general – must be addressed. The report also highlights the need to help people to develop digital skills and become responsible and resilient digital citizens, and calls for enhanced dialogues with officials and technology company executives in like-minded countries on current developments. New approaches, such as multi-stakeholder consultations and increased rapprochement with the open-source and crypto-communities, are needed to facilitate knowledge exchange and best practices that will improve (regulatory) responses.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Internet, and Digital Finance
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

43. Investors beware: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China

Author:: Ties Dams and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China, and therefore to China-related geopolitical risk. This risk is only set to increase in the coming years, as geopolitical tensions between China, the US and the EU are not expected to decrease. Moreover, case studies of LVMH, HSBC, ASML and BMW show that some of Europe’s biggest listed firms could and should offer investors more transparency on their risk-management strategies. Intelligence on China and geopolitical risk exposure is key for investors, and investors that get ahead of the curve may have the edge in the long term. This report is aimed at investors in Europe’s biggest listed firms. It argues that investors have a growing need for transparency amongst European biggest companies with regard to their strategies in dealing with China-related geopolitical risk. Even investors without direct interests in China are or will be affected by China-related geopolitical risk due to the various forms of exposure of companies in the European home market. This means that investors may be increasingly exposed to the risks linked to great power competition, without having the knowledge necessary to anticipate geopolitical changes. As geopolitical tensions between China, the US and the EU are not expected to decrease, investors would be wise to seek greater transparency about European companies’ exposure to the Chinese market – and indeed get ahead of the curve and gain a competitive advantage by investing in those firms that have forward-looking geopolitical strategies in place. This report aims to put this point on investors’ strategic agenda by making the following three points: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China. China-related geopolitical risk is spreading. Case studies suggest that Europe’s top firms may not be sufficiently transparent about geopolitical risk management.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Business, Investment, and Risk
Political Geography:: China and Europe

44. Economic Equidistance is Not an Option: Germany and the US-Chinese Geo-Economic Conflict

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Intensifying US-Chinese rivalry will increase pressure on Germany to support a more hawkish US geo-economic policy. The new German government should give Washington support in as far as US policies seek to create an economic level playing field vis-à-vis China. Given its dependence on international trade and investment, Germany should seek to resist a broader politicization of international economic relations.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Germany, and United States of America

45. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

46. From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity? The Dynamics of South Korea’s Navigation of US-China Competition

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Clint Work, Nonresident Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center's 38 North Program, explains that while President Yoon has made it clear that he will opt for strategic clarity amidst a growing US-China rivalry, he must navigate the challenges all previous ROK presidents have faced in dealing with Beijing
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

47. The Geopolitical Dimensions of Chinese Infrastructure

Author:: David M. Lampton
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: David M. Lampton is Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins--SAIS. Immediately prior to his current post he was Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2019-2020. For more than two de- cades prior to that he was Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Lampton is former Chairman of The Asia Foundation, former President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and for- mer Dean of Faculty at SAIS. Among many written works, academic and popular is his most recent book (with Selina Ho and Cheng-Chwee Kuik), Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, 2020). He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University in political science where, as an undergraduate student, he was a firefighter. Lampton has an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies. He is a Life Trustee on the Board of Trustees of Colorado College and was in the US Army Reserve in the enlisted and commissioned ranks.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Interview, and Railways
Political Geography:: China and Asia

48. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

49. EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: For better and for worse

Author:: Europeum
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: for better and for worse, you can read the report from the debate written by Šárka Váchalová. During the debate these questions were discussed: As tensions with authoritarian powers such as Russia and China amplify, how can the EU and ASEAN partnership remain strong moving forward? What are the areas that the two regions can strengthen given the ongoing geopolitical tug of war?
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

50. The Geopolitical Consequences of COVID-19: Assessing Hawkish Mass Opinion in China

Author:: Joshua Byun, D. G. Kim, and Sichen Li
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: JOSHUA BYUN, D.G. KIM, and SICHEN LI examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes. Drawing on original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the global pandemic, they find that ordinary Chinese citizens are optimistic about China’s future global position, and that this optimism corresponds with the widespread perception that the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating China’s rise relative to the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Survey, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS