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161. Considering China as a Potential Member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Andrew Prosser
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
In January 2004, China formally requested to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal multilateral export control regime that aims to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the coordination and implementation of guidelines which govern transfers of nuclear material and technology. The NSG's membership comprises the principal nuclear supplier states in Europe and the Americas, as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and a number of former Eastern Bloc states, including Russia. The group's decisions, including those concerning the admission of new members, are made on a consensus basis, but the informal nature of the organization means that its decisions cannot be construed as legally binding upon its member countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand

162. The World's Nuclear Arsenals

Author:
Ali Chaudhry and Andrew George
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
Though the exact size of China's nuclear arsenal is unknown, current best estimates are that China has about 280 strategic weapons, and a smaller number — about 120 — of tactical weapons. The weapons are based on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers, with a naval component under research.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China

163. North Korea's Nuclear Ambition: Causes and Consequences

Author:
Mustafa Kibaroglu
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Abstract:
Because of the inferiority complex first against Japan, then against the United States, the North Korean leadership embarked upon nuclear weapons development program from the inception of their state. Due to the tangible and comprehensive support provided by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the field of nuclear science and technology, North Korea has seemingly passed a significant threshold on the way to become a de facto nuclear weapons state. As of 2004, it is widely believed that North Korea has already extracted enough plutonium for a couple of nuclear warheads. Combined with its 1,350 kilometer-range ballistic missile capability, North Korea stands as one of the most significant threats to regional and global security and stability. In the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks on the United States, Russia and China have greatly reduced their support to North Korea and intensified their efforts to mend the differences between that country and the US, just like Japan and South Korea did for long, with a view to not to pave the way to the escalation of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Soviet Union, and Korean Peninsula

164. Getting to “Yes” on Missile Defense: The Need to Rebalance U.S. Priorities & The Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation

Author:
Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl
Publication Date:
01-2004
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
At the end of the day, missile defense is and should be here to stay as a key element of U.S., and in all likelihood, European defense strategy for the twenty-first century. The threats are real and there is an emerging consensus about creating defenses against it. While the “macro” issues of ABM withdrawal and initial fielding of the U.S. midcourse segment are behind us, there are very legitimate issues that warrant debate on both sides of the Atlantic. We now need to focus on making the right choices to provide a better balance of capabilities between various strategic, regional, force protection, and homeland security needs. Moreover, U.S.-European engagement on missile defense is potentially, but not inevitably, a win-win proposition—binding alliance partners together geo-politically, creating a layered, multi-national plug and play “system of system” architecture, and enhancing our ability to fight wars together. And, an enhanced coalition war fighting capability is likely to have beneficial spillover effects on the broader Transatlantic relationship; it is axiomatic that countries that fight wars together tend to have congruent interests in a range of areas. But for this to happen, Europe needs to begin to seriously consider its missile defense needs soon and apply resources to the task and the United States needs to resolve the underlying technology transfer issues and questions of roles and responsibilities. Thus, with hard work and good will, multi-national cooperation between the United States and its allies offers “win-win” from the standpoint of strengthening the alliance and our mutual security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

165. The Bush Administration's Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for China's Security

Author:
Tian Jingmei
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
Since the Bush administration took office, and especially since excerpts of the Nuclear Posture Review were released, there have appeared in America some heated arguments about the Bush administration's changes to the Clinton administration's nuclear strategy, what consequences these changes would produce, and what influences they would exert on international and regional security. Different people have different views. The purpose of this working paper is to find solutions to these key issues. The effects of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy on China's security are also discussed.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
China, America, and Asia

166. The Global Nuclear Balance: A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia retains a significant strategic nuclear force capability, despite the decline in overall force size since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and despite apparent defense budgetary shortfalls and system aging. Russia also inherited sizeable biological and chemical warfare establishments from the FSU, and some components of these programs remain largely intact. Russian entities have exported various nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to states of proliferation concern, and Russia also remains a source for offensive biological and chemical warfare technologies and expertise.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

167. The Asian Balance of Weapons of Mass Destruction A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Beijing continues to emerge as an increasingly active player in the region. Therefore, it is focused on becoming a world - class industrialized power through a countrywide modernization effort, which includes economic, technological, and military components of national power. Beijing already wields significant international influence by virtue of its permanent membership on the United Nations (UN) Security Council and its economic influence. China's public support for nonproliferation regimes is motivated by several factors, including a desire to enhance its image as a responsible world power and support for nonproliferation objectives.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, Beijing, and Asia

168. US and Russian Nuclear Forces and Arms Control After the US Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The reporting of START accountable warheads has led to serious confusion between START accountable warheads and actual warheads.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, South Asia, Middle East, and Asia

169. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

170. The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment

Author:
Michael M. May, Alastair Iain Johnston, W.K.H. Panofsky, Marco Di Capua, and Lewis R. Franklin
Publication Date:
12-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
The Cox Commission of the U.S. Congress was established in June 1998 to investigate concerns over Chinese acquisition of sensitive U.S. missile and space technology in connection with the launching of U.S. civilian satellites using Chinese launchers on Chinese territory. The investigations were broadened in October 1998 to include alleged security problems and possible espionage at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Some conclusions were released in January 1999 by the White House together with the administration's response. The full declassified (redacted) version of the report of the Cox Commission was released on May 25, 1999.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia