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151. The Emerging Structure of International Politics

Author:
Kenneth Waltz
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Abstract:
During the Cold War, the bipolar structure od international system and the nuclear weaponry avaliable to some states combined to perpetuate a troubled peace. As the bipolar era draws to a close, one has to question the likely structural changes in prospect. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, bipolarity endures, albeit in an altered state, because Russia stil takes care of itself and no great powers have emerged yet. With the waning of Russian power, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country. Balance of power theory leads one to assume that other powers, alone or in concert, will bring American power into balance. Considing the likely changes in the structure of international system, one can presuppose that three political units may rise to great-power rank: Germany or a West European state, Japan and China. Despite all the progress achieved by these countries, for some years to come, the United States will be the leading counrty economically as well as militarily.
Topic:
Cold War, International Political Economy, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Germany

152. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea

Author:
Scott Snyder, Bonnie Glaser, and John Park
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea. There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests. Chinese analysts are generally less concerned with North Korea's immediate economic prospects than they were last year, reporting severe but stable conditions. Inflation has subsided and market mechanisms have largely replaced government rations as the primary means for securing a livelihood. In contrast to last year, when Chinese analysts were consumed by the seeming zero-sum choice between stability and reform facing the North Korean leadership, North Korea's slightly improved economic situation seems to have allayed the immediacy of Chinese concerns about North Korea's economic stability. Chinese experts report no fundamental change in North Korea's economic policies following the 2002 reforms. Chinese analysts provide conflicting assessments of whether government attempts to prohibit selling of grain in markets are succeeding and the extent to which the grain rationing system is working. Chinese DPRK specialists are encouraged that the DPRK has haltingly adopted some agricultural and market reforms and allowed greater autonomy to individual factories and enterprises. But they acknowledge that North Korea has not yet allowed farmers to act independently of their work teams, a step China took as early as the late 1970s that raised productivity sharply. Chinese analysts anticipate that reforms will continue as long as they do not threaten central government control. Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured. There are numerous indicators that the Chinese examine to assess stability trends in North Korea. These indicators are grouped in the following manner: 1) factionalism in the regime and potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership; 2) political controls and ideological education; 3) influences from the outside; 4) the general public's loyalty to the Kim family; 5) crimes and illicit activities; 6) the economy, food supply, and economic reform; and 7) Kim Jong Il's health and the leadership succession. Chinese analysts see few signs of immediate instability in any of these areas at present, but they worry that the potential for instability may grow. In the event of instability in North Korea, China's priority will be to prevent refugees from flooding across the border. If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea. China's strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the United Nations (UN) in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability. Contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform at least three possible missions in the DPRK: 1) humanitarian missions such as assisting refugees or providing help after a natural disaster; 2) peacekeeping or “order keeping” missions such as serving as civil police; and 3) “environmental control” missions to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Sino-DPRK border and secure “loose nukes” and fissile material. There is apparent new willingness among Chinese institute analysts and PLA researchers to discuss the warning signs of instability in North Korea and how China might respond if the situation gets out of control and threatens Chinese security. Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion on stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material. Other analysts maintain that such discussions are premature.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

153. Stopping a nuclear arms race between America and China

Author:
Hugh White
Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia's interests in a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region are threatened by the risk of intensifying strategic nuclear competition between the US and China. This may seem a little surprising in the post-Cold War world. We have perhaps allowed ourselves to assume a little too easily that nuclear weapons ceased to matter much in relations between major powers after the Cold War was over. We have worried much more about the risk that they will be acquired by new players – rogue states or terrorists – who might not respond to the incentives and threats that shaped nuclear strategy between major powers during the Cold War.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Australia

154. Osirak Redux?

Author:
Whitney Raas and Austin Long
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The use of military force to halt or reverse nuclear proliferation is an option that has been much discussed and occasionally exercised. In the 1960s, for example, the United States considered destroying China's nuclear program at an early stage but ultimately decided against it. More recently, the key rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the threat posed by Iraq's suspected inventory of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although significant evidence of WMD was not found in the Iraq case, the potential utility of military force for counterproliferation remains, particularly in the case of Iran. The possibility of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities has gained prominence in the public discourse, drawing comments from journalists, former military officers, and defense analysts. This makes the Iranian nuclear program a potential test case for military counterproliferation.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, and Asia

155. North Korea: Negotiations Work

Author:
Leon V. Sigal
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
In a laudable about-face, President Bush has decided at last to accept North Korea's longstanding offer to suspend production of plutonium by shutting down and sealing its reactor and reprocess- ing plant at Yongbyon, halting construction of a larger reactor and not restarting a newly refurbished fuel fabrication plant. In so doing, he is rejecting the counsel of American hardliners who have kept the United States from making and living up to earlier agreements while managing to convince much of America that it is North Korea that has been the one at fault. By negotiating in earnest, Bush has achieved an important goal for U.S. and Asian security.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

156. Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action

Author:
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood. Because this goal remains vital to U.S. and international security, the United States has joined with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in working toward verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK. These six nations have launched a series of negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program. These nations are also attempting to create a plan to dismantle the DPRK’s program in a manner with which all the nations can feel secure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

157. The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Triumph of the Business Lobby

Author:
Subrata Ghoshroy
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
South Asia has come a long way since the days of SEATO and CENTO1 —the U.S.- sponsored pacts to contain China and keep India under check. Gone are the days when the Seventh Fleet flexed its muscle on the Bay of Bengal in support of a beleaguered Pakistan in its military campaign against the “mukti bahini”—the freedom fighters in erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Once the leader of the non-aligned, the Indian government has not expressed even a whimper of protest about what has been happening to Iraq, Lebanon, or Gaza. India and the United States now are “natural allies,” apparently forged primarily by mutual economic interests. But there was the China factor as well. Although left unsaid, China entered in to the calculation of both India and the United States. The Bush administration is careful not to revive the notion of the Cold War policy of containing China, but many in the Congress are not so reticent. At the same time, the Indian government is equally careful to highlight the growing normalization of relations and the growing trade ties with Beijing. But the clamor in the security community in New Delhi is all about countering China—a topic I heard repeatedly during my recent visit to the region. So its importance cannot be discounted. But the economic incentives of the deal have not earned as much scrutiny, a major oversight in the public discourse.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, India, Asia, and North America

158. Waiting for Goldilocks: Getting Japan’s Foreign Policy Just Right

Author:
Richard J Samuels
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Generations of American parents have read their children a story called "Goldilocks and the Three Bears." It is the story of a young girl who wanders into the bears’ home in the woods. Goldilocks sits on chairs that are too big and too small, before find- ing one that is “just right.” She rejects bowls of their porridge as being too hot and as too cold, until she finds one that is “just right.” Like most children’s stories, Goldilocks is metaphorical. Americans use it to describe the process of finding just the right balance between alternatives that are too extreme. This metaphor captures the challenges awaiting Abe Shinzo, Japan’s new prime minister very nicely—particularly in the areas of foreign and secu- rity policy. His predecessor, Koizumi Junichiro, had already been like Goldilocks in his extended effort to find just the right policy toward North Korea. In his 2002 visit to Pyongyang he explored engagement, only to adopt toward a harder, more confrontational line. If the first was too hot and the second too cold, Abe is left with the responsibility to find a policy toward the DPRK that is “just right.” North Korea’s nuclear weapons test in October 2006 and its July 2006 missile tests certainly do not make this any easier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

159. Uses of Ambiguity in North Korea Agreement

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
On September 19, North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear program. As part of the same agreement, which followed the latest round of the Six Party Talks, the United States pledged not to attack or invade North Korea, to coexist peacefully with the country, and to work toward normalized relations. The United States and other parties to the agreement — China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea — offered to put together an energy package for North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

160. Leaders and Laggards: When and Why do Countries Sign the NPT?

Author:
Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar
Publication Date:
02-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was concluded at the end of the 1960s, a decade which saw the drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the height of the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, and the entry of France and China into the club of countries that had tested nuclear weapons. The basic bargain underlying the NPT allows countries to surrender their right to develop nuclear weapons in return for access to international assistance in civilian nuclear technology. Five countries (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) that had tested nuclear devices before 1 January 1967, were conferred the status of Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) by Article IX. All other signatories (Non Nuclear Weapon States or NNWSs) pledged to abjure the development and diffusion of nuclear weapons technology.
Topic:
International Relations, Globalization, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, China, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, and Cuba