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41. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

42. Policy Papers by Women of Color: Diverse Voices on Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Security, and Global Health Security Policy

Author:
Wardah Amir, Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Jennyfer Ambe, Rahwa Osman, Seema Gahlaut, Nomsa Ndongwe, Togzhan Kassenova, Kimberly Ma, Jasmine Owens, Celeste Rogers, Sylvia Mishra, Liza Arias, Sumaya Malas, Jessica J. Lee, Jessica Gott, April Arnold, and Takiva Pierce
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
This edition features articles from member sin two of the WCAPS working groups: Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Security; and Global Health Security. A critical goal of WCAPS is to cultivate a new generation of women of color in the areas of peace and security, foreign policy, and national security.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Infrastructure, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

43. At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash

Author:
Toby Dalton and Tong Zhao
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
While both countries may think the situation is under control, dismissive attitudes and misperceptions could end up fueling a dangerous competition. On June 15, 2020, a lethal military conflict over disputed territory in the Himalayas shook the edifice of China-India relations. The clash in the Galwan Valley along their shared border is the gravest military confrontation the two nuclear powers have faced in fifty years. This event and ongoing tensions focus attention on the long-standing but tempered competition between China and India. One of the most interesting puzzles of that relationship is why nuclear weapons, which both possess, have not played a more important role. With the potential for a major reset in China-India ties after the Ladakh crisis, are Beijing and New Delhi finally approaching a long-anticipated crossroads in their nuclear relations? The findings reveal that while Indian security analysts give serious attention to China’s nuclear policy and capabilities, Chinese analysts maintain a dismissive attitude about the relevance of nuclear weapons in China-India relations. The attitude stems from a widely held view that India’s indigenous military technologies are significantly behind China’s and that China will continue widening the gulf between the two countries’ conventional and nuclear capabilities. However, Chinese analysts do not appear to fully appreciate the long-term destabilizing implications of this growing gap. India may feel pressure to build out its nuclear arsenal, and this could further threaten the fragile stability between India and Pakistan. Chinese experts tend to underestimate the role Beijing may have in shaping New Delhi’s threat perception and nuclear strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

44. On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China

Author:
David Santoro and Robert Gromoll
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This material is based on research sponsored by DTRA and managed by the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), and Pacific Forum International under agreement number FA7000-19-2- 0012. The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The opinions, findings, views, conclusions or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the USAFA, DTRA, or the US Government. This paper was written by Dr. David Santoro, Vice President and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum, and Dr. Robert Gromoll, former Director of the Office of Regional Affairs at the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Dr. Gromoll is now retired. Both Drs. Santoro and Gromoll participated in numerous dialogue rounds, and Dr. Santoro was a co-organizer. The paper is based primarily on the contents of the dialogue’s written reports, several of which were authored or co-authored by Dr. Santoro. By and large, the paper draws directly from these reports and reviews how the topics addressed in the dialogue were approached and discussed by the US and Chinese sides over time. (A list of these reports is included at the end of the paper; some have been published, others have not.) The paper is also based on the authors’ broader experience in participating in the Track-1.5 dialogue; the conversations they have had with US and Chinese participants on these issues over the years, both during the dialogue and on the margins; and their own personal research. This paper represents the views of the authors and not those of Pacific Forum or the US State Department.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States and China

45. China’s Role in North Korea Nuclear and Peace Negotiations

Author:
USIP China-North Korea Senior Study Group
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This is the second in the Senior Study Group (SSG) series of USIP reports examining China’s influence on conflicts around the world. A group of fifteen experts met from September to December 2018 to assess China’s interests and influence in bringing about a durable settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This report provides recommendations for the United States to assume a more effective role in shaping the future of North Korea in light of China’s role and interests. Unless otherwise sourced, all observations and conclusions are those of SSG members.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

46. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:
Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

47. Crossed Wires: Recalibrating Engagement with North Korea for an Era of Competition with China

Author:
Kristine Lee, Daniel Kliman, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States’ current diplomacy with North Korea has enduring implications for its strategic competition with China. Yet within the American foreign policy establishment, rising to the China challenge and managing the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea are often treated as two distinct rather than connected strands of the United States’ agenda in Northeast Asia. The rationale for maintaining some degree of bureaucratic and substantive segmentation between the two issue sets is well-founded. Addressing the North Korean threat warrants energy, resources, attention, and expertise independent of the “great power competition” framework delineated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. But excessive stovepiping may, at best, cause Washington to leave opportunities on the table that could advance its regional priorities, and at worst to risk the creation of mutually incompatible approaches to North Korea and China. U.S. negotiations with North Korea have already created strategic openings for China. The “security guarantees” that Pyongyang has demanded include, for example, the cessation of U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea and the removal from the Korean Peninsula of all American “strategic assets” such as nuclear-capable air and naval assets as well as anti-missile systems that could also be leveraged in a military contingency with China. As U.S. negotiators have locked horns with North Korean interlocutors since President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un’s initial diplomatic foray in June 2018, China has touted its role as a champion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while using its relative proximity to Pyongyang to systematically undercut America’s approach. During the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign in 2017, Beijing cast Pyongyang a vital lifeline, facilitating illegal ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean coal and petroleum in 2018, while leading a concerted push with Russia at the U.N. Security Council to try to fragment the North Korean sanctions regime. And China is poised to open the floodgates of investments into North Korea, particularly through strategic infrastructure projects in the event that Pyongyang’s demands for the relief of international sanctions yield results. Despite all of this, U.S. officials at the highest levels have publicly downplayed intimations of China’s counterproductive activities, thereby validating Beijing’s narrative that it has played a constructive role in supporting the United States’ approach to North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

48. Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic

Author:
Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China’s military ambitions in the Arctic, and its growing strategic partnership with Russia, have rung alarm bells in many governments. In May 2019, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military capabilities had a section on China’s military interests in the Arctic and the possibility of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic basin (Department of Defense, May 2019). In August 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised concerns about what he diplomatically referred to as “China’s increased presence in the Arctic” (Reuters, August 7). From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank. The flight path of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at China transit the Arctic. Key components of the U.S. missile defense system are also located in the Arctic. Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability (Huanqiu Ribao, October 28, 2013). China currently operates six nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and fifty diesel attack submarines, with more under construction. If Chinese nuclear-armed submarines were able to access the Arctic basin undetected, this would be a game-changer for the United States, the NATO states and their partners, and the wider Asia-Pacific (Huanqiu Ribao, April 11, 2012). China would be able to target missiles at the United States and Europe with ease; such ability would strengthen China’s military dominance in Asia and bolster China’s emerging position as a global military power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

49. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

50. Iran Looking East: An Alternative to the EU?

Author:
Annalisa Perteghella
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In February 2018, anticipating the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared a policy of “preferring East over West”, thus paving the way for deeper cooperation with Asian powers such as China, Russia, and India. Differently from the “Look East” policy promoted during the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the current Iranian strategy is not only functional to escape the US-led isolation, but it rather seems devoted to the consolidation of a block of power which can commit to security and economic schemes in alternative to the Western-dominated ones. This ISPI report aims to answer few crucial questions: Which are the major initiatives promoted within the Iran’s “Look East 2.0” strategy? To what extent will Tehran succeed in creating a solid Eastern block? What will be the influence of the wider geopolitical context? And finally, what role is left for the EU?
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Economy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and India