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11. Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change

Author:
Nicola Leveringhaus
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Dating back to the first test in 1964, the Chinese nuclear force modernization process is motivated by other nuclear powers’ modernization across the years, mostly from the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by domestic factors such as economic debates and tensions in the scientific community. China Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change Download 0.63 Mo At first, technical difficulties and a greater investment in conventional forces prevented the development of a ‘lean and effective arsenal’. However, the end of the Cold War and better economic conditions allowed China to improve its weapons toward a greater duality and mobility, thus reflecting the first tensions between the Chinese no-first-use doctrine and its growing technical capabilities and ambitions. Nowadays, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is bigger than ever, ranking third in size amongst nuclear global powers and with an estimated 1,000 warheads in 2030. The weapons’ efficiency is also reportedly higher, aiming at a fully functioning triad. Furthermore, doctrinal debates are still ongoing, with potential consequences on arms control and risk management.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

12. Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States and Chinese governments, for the foreseeable future, will have the resources to keep each other’s societies vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction. If these governments are not self-destructive, they will want to keep their competition from escalating into armed conflict that could lead to nuclear war. The constructs of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability can help significantly if both governments embrace them and interpret them similarly or even if the leaders of the two countries accurately understand how they differ in their perspectives on them. Unfortunately, to date, on these issues the United States and China are like a quarrelling married couple who tried therapy for one or two appointments, found it dissatisfying, and then alternated in making excuses for not trying again, perhaps with a different therapist or format. Each says they have tried and the other doesn’t listen or understand. Both suspect that the other isn’t saying what they really feel or want; what they really feel is hostility and distrust and what they really want is to get richer and more powerful without being hassled or attacked. It would be easier if they could just go their separate ways, but the property and wealth they depend on will be lost (or at least severely diminished) if they split up or do each other harm. This paper suggests that U.S. and allied interests require persistence in inviting China to dialogue on strategic stability; to demonstrate goodwill, the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability as a fact and necessary policy. The need for both moves is reflected in the fact that neither government has defined what it might mean by stability or mutual vulnerability. To help test intentions and prompt harder thinking, the paper plays the role of therapist and offers definitions of both concepts—strategic stability and mutual vulnerability—so that the two sides can critique them more freely and without recrimination. These definitions are broader and deeper than usual, reflecting the growing problem of managing escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war, the scenario that drives U.S. and Chinese concerns and military posturing. Further, broader definitions are necessary to comprehend the dangers stemming from the entanglement of conventional, cyber, and nuclear weapons and command and control systems. The paper then sketches four benefits of declaring mutual vulnerability, contrary to opponents of the idea, before discussing steps that the United States and China could subsequently take to reflect and build each other’s confidence in such a policy. Finally, if perceived U.S. requirements in the future will be greater than the arsenal needed to deter or defeat Russia or China alone, how will Russia and China be persuaded not to try to build up to balance the additional U.S. force? In other words, if the United States is in two separate but interacting arms races (and deterrence relationships), how could each opponent (China and Russia) be persuaded to negotiate limits on their arsenal lower than the total the United States would insist on possessing to deter two nuclear opponents? Answers to these questions will affect strategic stability and mutual vulnerability of all parties but will take a long time to develop. To begin the process, the paper suggests asking Chinese leaders whether their silence on Putin’s nuclear first-use threats means that China has changed its own policy on nuclear use or that it never took a no-first-use policy seriously in the first place. Is China concerned that the capabilities that the United States and its allies may develop to strengthen defenses against Russia could be used against China too, and if so, might arms control be a wiser approach? Ultimately, the paper suggests that if China and the United States can sustain a process of serious dialogue, they will keep their relationship from worsening even if they cannot formally restrain their competition. And if dialogue leads one to ask the other for deeds to demonstrate goodwill, the paper has suggested some such deeds that could be undertaken with no security hazard and only slight political risk. No one should have the illusion that happiness is in this couple’s future. All this work would be to allow a nonviolent cohabitation that is better than the alternative of destitute divorce or murder-suicide.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

14. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

15. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

16. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

17. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea

Author:
John Park
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly. For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions. In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization. The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United States of America

18. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

19. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. "Systemic Risks": A Conversation on Nuclear Technology and Deterrence with Dr. Vipin Narang

Author:
Dylan Land
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): What do you perceive as the greatest threat to global nuclear security? Where do you see the greatest potential for the outbreak of nuclear war? ​ Vipin Narang (VN): Rather than focusing on regions, I see three trends which I think we should be concerned about. One is the return of a great power arms race, and a lot of this was exacerbated in the Trump administration. Even as we head into the Biden administration—which extended the New START Treaty with Russia for five years—Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces at breakneck speed. They are worried primarily about U.S. missile defenses, which at this point are unconstrained. The United States has a variety of missile defense systems at the regional level which work pretty well, as well as the national missile defense system, which doesn’t…yet. You will often hear that the national missile defense system does not work very well and that is true—the success rate is around 60 percent in simulated tests. It may be difficult to ever get it to work perfectly or even well, but it is the prospect that the United States might get it to work that really drives modernization efforts in Russia and China..... ​
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Risk, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Global Focus, and United States of America