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2. A critical juncture: Sustaining and strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
- Author:
- Chris Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- As Australia navigates an increasingly complex security landscape, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stands at a crossroads. With cyber threats, foreign interference, grey-zone competition, and the prospect of Indo-Pacific conflict reshaping our national security, the need for robust, adaptive oversight of intelligence agencies has never been more pressing. This report from ASPI’s Statecraft and Intelligence Policy Centre underscores the need to reform and reinforce the PJCIS to ensure it remains an effective pillar of democratic accountability for Australian intelligence. Key to that reform will be refocusing the future work of the committee back towards intelligence oversight. Strengthening the PJCIS’s structure, clarifying its remit, and enhancing its resources are essential to maintaining public trust and ensuring effective oversight of the national intelligence community. The reforms outlined in this report offer a roadmap for renewal – one that the next chair of the PJCIS can seize with urgency and resolve.
- Topic:
- Security, Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Asia-Pacific
3. Shifting the needle: Making Australia’s research security ecosystem work smarter
- Author:
- Brendan Walker-Munro
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Since 2018, the Australian Government has made serious strides in countering espionage and foreign interference, including introducing policy and legislative reforms aimed at protecting the research and university sector. That was necessary. Foreign states have actively targeted Australia’s research ecosystem—seeking to influence research agendas, extract sensitive information and exploit institutional vulnerabilities. However, the threat landscape hasn’t remained static. It has evolved—and rapidly. Seven years on, adversaries are no longer simply stealing data or cultivating informal relationships. Today, we’re seeing deliberate efforts to insert malicious insiders, target researchers through transnational repression, exploit data and cyber vulnerabilities, and manipulate legal frameworks through lawfare. Those methods are more sophisticated, more targeted and more integrated than ever before. Responding to them requires more than a continuation of current practice—it demands a fundamental shift in mindset. Security must now be built on persistent adaptation and shared responsibility, not one-off compliance measures. Yet the tools available to respond are lagging. Australia still lacks a clear, consistent national definition of ‘research security’—a gap that has bred confusion, resistance and fatigue across the university and research sectors. For many, security remains synonymous with red tape, rather than resilience. Meanwhile, government controls are fragmented across portfolios and jurisdictions, with no centralised leadership akin to the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce. Heavy reliance on ministerial discretion and legislative blunt force undermine the goal of shared, sector-wide ownership. At the same time, we must acknowledge that universities aren’t government agencies. They’re complex, competitive, globally connected institutions working under immense financial pressure and regulatory complexity. Building sustainable research security means recognising those realities—not as excuses, but as critical inputs into any effective framework. Encouragingly, there is some movement. The Group of Eight has stepped forward with a national security and defence committee, co-chaired by Major General (Ret’d) Paul Symon and Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Rick Burr, to strengthen trust and coordination with government. But those are early steps. To protect Australia’s sovereign research capability into the future, we need more tailored, practical and scalable approaches to research security. They must be clear in purpose, flexible enough to adapt to changing threats, and sensitive to the day-to-day realities of research collaboration. Above all, they must be nationally coherent and built on partnership—not paternalism. The integrity of our research ecosystem isn’t just a matter of academic ethics. It’s a matter of national security, future capability, and Australia’s ability to compete in a world increasingly shaped by strategic technologies and knowledge dominance. This requires a set of consistent, coherent and high-level principles that informs strong applied policy guidance. This report outlines Australia’s comprehensive and globally leading approach to research security. However, it also makes clear that the threats that are confronting Australia are adapting, and so Australia’s approach will similarly need to adapt. The report argues that Australia’s research security posture must evolve, moving beyond the narrow lens of countering foreign interference and espionage to a broader, more integrated and risk-based framework.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Research and Development
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Asia-Pacific
4. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11
- Author:
- John Coyne and Susan Thomson
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence, 2. Critical minerals, 3. Supply chain resilience, 4.Environmental disaster preparedness, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 11 also features a foreword by Senator the Hon Nita Green, Assistant Minister for Northern Australia. Senator Green calls readers attention to the Federal Government’s commitment to the North, while pointing to the rich opportunities available to northern Australia with the right continued investment. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term and the articles work together to create an overarching narrative that centres northern excellence. Thus, facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Northern Australia
5. Mapping India-Pakistan military power
- Author:
- Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Security competition between India and Pakistan, rooted in the territorial dispute over Kashmir, has persisted since the partition of British India in 1947. Since the 1990s, Pakistan’s support for insurgent and terrorist groups in Indian-administered Kashmir has posed a persistent challenge to Indian security. While both countries have maintained nuclear arsenals since the late 1980s, the threat of escalation has historically constrained India’s responses. However, India’s posture has shifted in recent years, with a growing willingness to conduct overt cross-border strikes and covert operations targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. This evolution has been marked by key incidents, including the 2016 Uri attack and India’s surgical strikes, the 2019 Pulwama bombing and Balakot air strike, and the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which triggered a series of retaliatory strikes by both sides. India’s targeting of major Pakistani air bases in 2025 marked a significant escalation, raising concerns about strategic stability. China’s role further complicates the regional picture. As Pakistan’s close ally and India’s primary military rival, China’s growing involvement—through arms transfers and strategic coordination—has led Indian planners to seriously consider the possibility of a two-front war. This ASPI brief provides a overview of the current military balance between India and Pakistan, with a focus on quantitative comparisons of defence spending, conventional military capabilities, and strategic assets. India has consistently maintained a superior conventional military force, particularly in terms of major equipment categories, shaping the strategic calculus on both sides.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, South Asia, India, and Asia-Pacific
6. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2025-2026
- Author:
- Marc Ablong
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Australia faces a perilous strategic environment with multiple threats overlapping and, in some cases, converging. We’re confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, multiple conflicts around the world, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyberwarfare. Our largest trading partner, China, is increasingly aggressive militarily and has growing control of critical technologies integral to our societies. In Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, rearmament is underway, including increased prospects of nuclear proliferation. Australia is a part of that rearmament, though others are moving much faster. Great powers flout the international rules-based system, either seeking to expand their spheres of influence, as Russia and China are doing, or pursuing a transactional and user-pays form of vassalage in the case of the US under the Trump administration. To be clear: the actions of the US are not comparable to those of Russia and China, but the administration’s tendency to treat all countries the same, without separating friend from foe, is causing unhelpful disruption and adding to global uncertainty. Many countries’ politics are become more partisan and prone to populist movements, fuelled by social-media outrage and demagoguery. Hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure, internet-connected systems and the political foundations and institutions of states are becoming more common. Trust in public institutions is eroding, and cynicism is rising and often turning into belief in conspiracies. We’re reminded in the ministerial forewords to almost all public national-security documents that there’s no greater responsibility for the government than defending Australia. Part of that most fundamental responsibility is the obligation of government to resource the national-security community appropriately to prepare the nation for the challenges it faces. That’s why, this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has broadened its budget brief, The cost of Defence, beyond its traditional focus on the budget of the Department of Defence. The security challenges that Australia faces cannot, and should not, be borne by Defence and our armed forces alone. For too long, Australian governments have partitioned Australia’s security and failed to deliver a comprehensive approach to national security. ASPI has been vocal in calling for comprehensive national-security planning, and now we reflect that by examining the government’s national-security spending as a whole. Moreover, The cost of Defence: ASPI defence budget brief 2025–26 thoroughly examines the government’s progress with, and spending on, the 2024 National Defence Strategy. The core of the strategy is the concept of national defence, defined as ‘a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’. This year’s Cost of Defence therefore asks some more fundamental and strategic questions and evaluates whether the government is paying enough attention to the traditional strategy calculation of ends, ways and means. Has it identified and articulated the objectives that meet Australia’s strategic intents, as set out in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy? Has it chosen the best plans for meeting those objectives? And has it allocated enough resources for those plans? We also examine whether the government is giving enough attention to the nation’s preparedness and resilience. This is a major theme for ASPI in 2025. The 2025 ASPI Defence Conference: Preparedness and Resilience will focus on those challenges for Australia, including how they bear on our industry, civil society and relationships with international partners. This year’s Cost of Defence provides ASPI’s views as a lead-in to that conversation. Another issue is whether the government is too focused on future equipment acquisitions, rather than the preparedness and readiness of the current force. Given that most of the major acquisitions won’t arrive until well into the 2030s and 2040s, we must ask the unnerving question of whether the ADF is too hollow for military operations this decade. Can the ADF we have now deter adversaries from attempting military domination in our area of primary interest? The issue has been on the country’s mind since a Chinese flotilla this year sailed close to Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea and rehearsed strikes on Australia’s cities, national infrastructure and joint military facilities. Finally, this year’s Cost of Defence asks the hard questions about whether the government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation investment in defence and about the criticality of Australia’s defence industry base, national economic base and resilience is being matched by resources. This includes money in the latest Budget for 2025–26 and the forward estimates and, perhaps more importantly, human capital in the form of a larger skilled workforce. There are also the strategies, concepts and interagency, intergovernmental and international engagements that government must be delivering. We argue, as we did last year, that resourcing isn’t matching the rhetoric. We suggest that, in part, that’s because the implementation of strategy has been frustrated by bureaucratic, time-consuming and inefficient processes. In a first for the Cost of Defence series, we recommend ways for the government and the Defence Department to shift the dial towards agility, adaptability, effectiveness and efficiency. That includes increased and more effective messaging on why defence investment is needed. Whatever percentage of GDP the government spends on defence, it is a large number, and not enough has been done to foster public support for the defence spending required to deter the types of conflicts we see in Europe and elsewhere. Governments shouldn’t wait for public pressure to make security decisions, but a measure of social licence is needed for defence investment, and that in turn takes candour about the gravity of the threats we face. ASPI’s charter requires us to inform and nurture public debate on defence and security and to provide alternative advice for the government. The cost of Defence does so objectively, sharing the government’s and Defence’s aim of strengthening Australia’s long-term security, prosperity and sovereignty. It’s never been more important for experts inside and outside the Australian Public Service to speak truth to power frankly and fearlessly in order to give decision-makers the strongest possible suite of options. We don’t expect all readers to agree with our positions. Indeed, we welcome debate and disagreement in the hope that Australia will be stronger, more prepared and more resilient for the challenges we confront now and will face in the future.
- Topic:
- Economics, Armed Forces, Artificial Intelligence, Defense Industry, Research and Development, and AUKUS
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific
7. Building national preparedness: A road map for Australia and what we should learn from Finland
- Author:
- Marc Ablong
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Australia faces increasing threats from natural disasters, pandemics and geopolitical tensions—including the increasing likelihood of conflict and war—necessitating robust preparedness mechanisms. But Australia lacks a comprehensive national preparedness framework that’s fit for purpose against the broad range of threats that the nation is likely to face soon and in the foreseeable future. Beyond a narrow range of potential crises, Australia remains poorly prepared, and little government attention is currently paid to understanding or resourcing national preparedness for threats, beyond annually reviewed natural-disaster arrangements. The Australian Government isn’t doing enough to prepare Australian citizens for the more volatile and uncertain strategic environment that we face. There’s no regular public discourse about the national risks to Australia, there’s no planning or capability development for mitigating such risks, and there’s no regular program for educating, training or exercising Australia’s communities to deal with them. National preparedness isn’t just a task for a national government; it’s a truly whole-of-society activity and a shared responsibility of all within the nation, including all three levels of government, businesses, civil society and the citizenry at large. This report recommends a road map of immediate, near-term and longer term initiatives that the Australian Government should embrace as it builds the capabilities and capacities needed to fully prepare the nation. The roadmap is split into two parts, the first focuses on building an effective national preparedness system, while the second part focuses on the capabilities and capacities needed for national preparedness. The road maps contain recommendations for Australian policymakers, industry, civil society, critical infrastructure owners and operators, the Defence organisation and the defence industry. By implementing these initiatives across all sectors, Australia can build and maintain a robust national preparedness and resilience framework capable of meeting all threats, up to and including war, thereby safeguarding its security, prosperity and way of life. The Republic of Finland is an excellent exemplar of what a nation can do to build and maintain national resilience and national preparedness against all hazards, including the risk of conflict and war. Finland’s Comprehensive National Security model and ‘total defence’ strategy, which integrate civilian and military preparedness, offer valuable insights for strengthening Australia’s national preparedness framework. Australia and Finland have the opportunity to work together to build and maintain more robust national preparedness systems that help each country to address future crises. That can be done by fostering collaboration in knowledge exchange, policy development, intelligence sharing and bilateral cooperation on issues such as crisis management and civil defence; military preparedness and defence cooperation; disaster management and crisis response; cybersecurity; social resilience and public preparedness; and international collaboration and multilateral engagement.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, European Union, Resilience, and Research and Development
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Australia, and Asia-Pacific
8. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world
- Author:
- Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
- Political Geography:
- Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
9. South Korea and Australia in space: Towards a strategic partnership
- Author:
- Sangsoon Lee
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Space cooperation between Australian and South Korea remains stuck in its infancy and, to some extent, is treated as an end in itself. This report argues that the time is ripe for both Australia and South Korea to embark on joint projects and initiatives that would deliver tangible and practical outcomes for both countries. For South Korea and Australia, space cooperation and space development serve as key pillars of the bilateral relationship. The two nations elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2021, incorporating space development into core areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, innovation and technology. As a part of that elevation, the leaders of both countries agreed to strengthen joint research and cooperation between space research institutes and industries. Following that, in 2022, South Korea and Australia established a Space Policy Dialogue. A greater bilateral focus on expanding the scope and opportunities for space cooperation could deliver foreign-policy, national-security, defence and economic outcomes for South Korea and Australia. This report argues that there are opportunities in the bilateral relationship to boost both space cooperation (the collaborative efforts between nations to leverage space advancements for mutual benefit and to foster diplomatic ties and intergovernmental collaboration) and space development (the advancement of space-related technologies, infrastructure and industries) and is pivotal in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management. This report first analyses the space development strategies of South Korea and Australia and examines the environmental factors that can increase the potential for cooperation. It then proposes areas where the two countries can combine their technologies and resources to maximise mutual benefits and offers eight policy recommendations to the governments of both countries. Scott Pace, former Executive Secretary of the US National Space Council, has emphasised that ‘International space cooperation is not an end in itself, but a means of advancing national interests.’ The South Korea – Australia partnership aligns with that principle, and it’s time to realise the opportunity.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Cooperation, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Space
10. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia
- Author:
- Rodrigo Duton
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
- Topic:
- National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific and United States of America
11. Harvard Project Releases Second Discussion Brief on Climate-Change and Trade Policy
- Author:
- Valerie J. Karplus
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Valerie Karplus explores relationships between trade and climate-change policy, with a geographical focus on China, the United States, and Europe. She asks how, “[a]gainst a backdrop of escalating trade tensions and signs of softening climate ambition…we can make progress — or at least minimize backsliding” on climate action. She responds by citing the need for “safe spaces”: “…in trade: could certain key inputs to the green economy be potentially exempted from tariffs, without thwarting the ambitions of protectionist programs?” “…for the emergence and diffusion of decarbonized energy technologies” “…that support infrastructure and systems necessary for decarbonization.” Karplus concludes by “…offering a few ways these safe spaces might be established.”
- Topic:
- International Relations, Climate Change, Environment, Renewable Energy, Trade Policy, Energy, and Green Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific
12. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific
- Author:
- Mike Sweeney
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
13. Come and (Re)discover China: Staunchly Patriotic, Sincerely Religious, and Eager to Further Engage with the World
- Author:
- Bart Dessein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- While elderly women and men are happily singing and dancing on the shores of Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, grandparents are taking their grandchildren out for a stroll and a boat trip on the lake. Buddhist monasteries in the vicinity of Ningbo, a coastal city south of Shanghai that has recently been elevated to a ‘new first-tier city,’ are teeming with monks who have retreated from every-day life and devote themselves to the word of the Buddha. On a daily basis, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens visit Putuoshan, an insular sanctuary just off the coast of Ningbo, devoted to Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist god(ess) of compassion. In a small place in the neighborhood of Ningbo, the local monastery has newly built the ‘Avalokitesvara’s Dharma-world,’ a temple complex in full marble, ornamented with precious stones and gold leaf, venerating the same Buddhist god(ess). Also in early morning Beijing, hundreds of people are queuing up, waiting for the gates of the Lama temple to open, so that they can enter to pay their respect to the Buddhist deities. Meanwhile, the number of European tourists – despite the extended visa free travel possibilities of up to one month for many European citizens – can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in cities such as Shanghai where, judging from the attendance in the breakfast room of an international hotel, the foreign guests are of Indian or Near-Eastern descent, and where shops that have closed down business and commercial spaces for rent in newly built high-rise buildings catch the eye. Also in Hangzhou (equally a new first-tier city), top-end restaurants and small street stalls alike are waiting for customers. This picture is repeated in Anyang, a provincial town in Henan Province, where waitresses and waiters brave the freezing cold to lure customers into their restaurants.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, and Tourism
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia-Pacific
14. Copper Sector Expansion in Mongolia: Opportunities and Challenges
- Author:
- Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan and Zoljargal Naranbaatar
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
- Abstract:
- Copper has long been a pillar of technological and economic progress, and its importance continues to grow with the global energy transition. Its unique properties make it essential for renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles (EVs) and modern power grids. The increasing demand for decarbonization presents a significant opportunity for Mongolia, with its vast copper reserves, to strengthen its position as a key player in the global copper value chain Mongolia’s copper production is currently anchored by two major projects—the Erdenet mine and the Oyu Tolgoi mine—both producing and exporting copper concentrate to China. However, the number of projects in the pipeline remains limited, requiring increased investment in exploration. At the same time, Mongolia exports nearly all of its copper production as raw material or copper concentrate, with limited domestic production of value-added products such as copper cathode. To advance new copper exploration, mining and processing projects, the government must provide clear and targeted policy support. This includes setting clear regulations on ownership, taxation regime, environmental standards, transparency and economic benefits. The government should also address the geopolitical risks and opportunities that come with copper production. Additionally, policies should promote the sector's integration with other sectors, while ensuring infrastructure to support the sector’s growth. Moving forward, the development of the copper sector’s policy should involve open discussions with multiple stakeholders, ensuring that projects are implemented with public oversight. The government and relevant regulatory bodies must pay particular attention to projects involving state ownership or requiring budgetary funding. As the copper sector expands, it is important to balance economic benefits with environmental protection.
- Topic:
- Copper, Energy Transition, Critical Minerals, and Value Addition
- Political Geography:
- Mongolia and Asia-Pacific
15. Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Elections: Campaigning for Continuity
- Author:
- Juliette Loesch
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- Indonesia is gearing up for its next general election on February 14, with a potential runoff scheduled in late June. This major electoral process will determine the nation’s next president and vice-president since incumbent President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, will step down after ten years in office in compliance with the constitutional limit of two terms. Voters will also decide on nearly 20,000 representatives at the national, provincial, and district levels. Another provincial election is set for November this year, although discussions are currently unfolding in the Parliament to advance it to September. This proposed timeline has triggered concerns about possible interference from the current administration, given that the new one will only be appointed in October. Indonesia’s general election will determine the nation’s next president and vice-president. A turnout of 204 million voters, over a total population of 277 million, is expected to show up at the polls. The election features a three-way race between prominent political figures Prabowo Subianto, Ganjar Pranowo, and Anies Baswedan. All three candidates have affiliations with the current administration of President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, with Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto even competing for his legacy. As of early February, Prabowo, Jokowi’s defense minister, and his vice-presidential pick Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s eldest son, are leading the polls. Experts nonetheless foresee a probable runoff, which is set in late June 2024. Concerns have surfaced regarding Jokowi’s interventions in the campaign, which seem to support the Prabowo Gibran ticket. While such interference is not inherently unlawful, certain actions undertaken by the administration to support Prabowo and Gibran raise more serious concerns about election
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Presidential Elections, and Continuity
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Asia-Pacific
16. Guam in Washington, 1972-Present: The Overlooked Strategic Implications of Congressional Polarization
- Author:
- Mirabai Venkatesh
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
- Institution:
- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
- Abstract:
- Contrary to the long-held logic that giving Guam a stronger, more autonomous voice will undermine U.S. strategic interests, failing to provide Guam with a stable pathway of interest advancement beyond Congress hinders its development and with it the federal government’s ability to achieve soft-power advantages and basic military readiness in the Indo-Pacific theater. Since the United States assumed responsibility for administering the territory of Guam in 1898, it has treated the prospect of Guam’s status improvement as detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. This has informed its chosen method of territorial administration, which places U.S. territories under the authority of the Department of the Interior. Each territory is then given only one formal representative in Congress, specifically the U.S. House of Representatives, but without full-voting rights. This paper will explore how Guam has managed to advance its interests in Washington since 1972, highlighting how congressional representation has become Guam’s most successful pathway of interest advancement with the federal government to date. However, the agency and success of Guam’s congressional delegates must be framed within a broader discussion of the fragility of the U.S. approach to territorial administration, which has relegated Guam to a pathway of interest advancement incredibly vulnerable to political sea change. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate how Guam’s main pathway of interest advancement in Washington is quickly narrowing at the expense of U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, History, Soft Power, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam
17. Q&A: The Worsening Trend of Violence in Papua New Guinea
- Author:
- Deborah Alois
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- On Sunday, 18 February, intertribal violence in the remote Highlands of Papua New Guinea resulted in the death of at least 49 people. This is the worst death toll in an escalating cycle of violence and political unrest in the past year. In this Q&A, Deborah Alois, ACLED’s Pacific region researcher based in the capital, Port Moresby, suggests that the trend will likely persist.
- Topic:
- Violence, Tribes, and Civil Unrest
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific and Papua New Guinea
18. Marcos-Duterte Alliance: Of Broken Ties and Vows
- Author:
- Jan Carlo B. Punongbayan
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- In the Philippines, political alliances are often driven by personalistic ties and mutual benefits rather than ideological alignment. The alliance between President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Vice-President Sara Z. Duterte-Carpio exemplifies this, with both camps leveraging their regional strongholds and familial legacies to maintain political dominance. Heralded in 2022 as the “Uniteam,” the Marcos-Duterte tandem epitomized the strategic coalition-building often necessary in a fragmented political environment characterized by strong regional identities and political dynasties. This coalition can be analyzed through the lens of maximizing electoral prospects and consolidating power. The Marcos-Duterte alliance was a very strategic merger of the North (Ilocos Region) and the South (Davao Region), aimed at securing a broad electoral mandate. The unusual strength of their tandem in 2022 stands now in stark contrast with the recent and increasing tensions between the Marcos and Duterte camps. Not only does this breakdown present an important case study in the fragility of political alliances, but also, more importantly, it will have significant implications for governance and economic stability in the Philippines.
- Topic:
- Governance, Domestic Politics, Ideology, Economic Stability, and Coalition
- Political Geography:
- Philippines and Asia-Pacific
19. Regional security and Pacific partnerships: recruiting Pacific Islanders into the Australian Defence Force
- Author:
- Bec Shrimpton and Zach Lambert
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The security and stability of the South Pacific and Australia are deeply intertwined. Australian Government policies have for more than a decade consistently prioritised the Pacific for international engagement, including in defence, development and diplomacy. The Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Step-up’, first announced in 2016, delivered a heightened level of effort by Canberra in the region, as did Australia’s strong support for the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration. The Albanese government’s increased policy focus on the region, and on a coordinated whole-of-government approach to the Pacific, demonstrates the centrality of our immediate region to the Australian Government’s strategic planning. Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) outlined the need for innovative and bold approaches to recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which is seeking to grow by 30% by 2040 but is not yet hitting existing recruitment targets. Budget figures released for 2023 show that ADF personnel numbers dropped by more than 1,300, or more than 2% of the total force. The Budget projections for 2024 to 2026 indicate that the government requires more than 6,000 additional personnel—in addition to replacing those lost through attrition in the next three years—to meet stated growth requirements. In the context of a competitive recruitment environment in Australia, especially for skilled labour, that trend indicates that the Defence organisation will struggle to meet forecast requirements using existing recruitment options and will need to seek alternatives. This challenge of competition for talent and to retain skilled workers is not limited to defence nor Australia. It is an economy wide issue, and global. As a result, there has been an ‘on-again, off-again’ public debate about whether the Australian Government should consider the recruitment of foreigners into the ADF, with a specific focus on Pacific islanders. Obviously, such an initiative could help the ADF’s recruitment numbers, but, importantly, it could open up economic, skills and training opportunities for Pacific islanders. It could also provide a powerful cultural and practical engagement opportunity for the ADF, while also providing Australia with avenues to help shape the region’s security environment in positive and culturally relevant ways. Such recruitment—especially if it involves bilateral agreements between governments—would also put Pacific Island governments in a unique position to inform Australia’s security assessments and contribute to shared outcomes. Those outcomes could include enhanced regional interoperability, especially for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and supporting combined stability operations, and stronger two-way cultural and social engagement, bolstering familiarity and understanding between the ADF and Pacific Island countries (PICs). There are, of course, arguments against such recruitment. For example, the recruitment of Pacific islanders to fight for Australia could be viewed by some as ‘colonialist’ in a region understandably sensitive to that history. But this concern could be addressed through PICs retaining agency through bilateral arrangements. In addition, any scheme seeking to relocate workers to Australia could be seen as taking skills from a much smaller nation, and risking brain and skills drains. We look at these, and other, considerations in this report. Below, we identify and assess the key recruitment and retention problems faced by the ADF that foreign recruitment, particularly the recruitment of Pacific islanders, may help to resolve. Our report then delves into various arguments for and against the recruitment of Pacific islanders into the ADF including background information that contextualises the current debate. Ultimately, there are many benefits to opening up pathways for Pacific islanders to serve in the ADF, with the clear caveat that any process to formally establish a program must be culturally and politically sensitive, be informed by detailed risk and impact assessment, and have strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place. We then explore three options for the recruitment of Pacific islanders: Direct recruiting from the Pacific region into the ADF Closer integration and operation between existing Australian and PIC forces A broader partnership model drawing on lessons from the US’s ‘compacts of free association’ and from the UK’s defence recruitment initiatives. We analyse key impacts that those options may have, both in the Pacific and for the ADF. The potential policy options offered aren’t exhaustive. However, they are plausible and represent different approaches (which could be combined) to achieve outcomes related to ADF recruitment and retention as well as to improved regional collective security. A critical consideration in developing these options was a two-way flow of benefit: from the Pacific to Australia and from Australia back to the region. For example, we recommend that, where possible, Pacific recruits receive focused training in HADR, which would help build sovereign PIC capabilities and facilitate the application of learned skills upon recruits’ return to their home countries. An important part of this research was ensuring that PIC military and security personnel were engaged and could feed into and shape the development of this research report, including the three options put forward for potential recruitment. This occurred in multiple ways. We collected feedback and perspectives through a dedicated roundtable discussion, in a series of interviews and then during the research process to ensure that this report was informed by regional, cultural and local considerations (see details regarding some of that data collection on page 16). The report captures five specific insights from the Pacific island military and security community that are relevant in considering the implementation of any of the three recruitment options. Finally, we acknowledge that further research is needed to resolve the complexity of some of the policy and legal issues associated with the options suggested. We nominate some specific areas that warrant further investigation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Asia-Pacific
20. Reclaiming leadership: Australia and the global critical minerals race
- Author:
- Ian Satchwell
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Climate policy, geopolitics and market forces are coalescing to deliver Australia a global leadership opportunity in critical minerals. To grasp that opportunity, Australia needs both to utilise its domestic mineral endowment and its mining knowledge and technology and to leverage the global footprint of Australian companies to help build a global supply chain network. How Australia responds will not only determine economic benefits to the nation but will also affect the world’s ability to achieve minerals security and the sustainability required for the global energy transition and inclusive economic growth. The global energy transition and other high-technology applications have increased demand for critical minerals, particularly in countries that have strong complex manufacturing industries. At the same time, the concentration of production of many critical minerals, the dominance of China in supply chains and its actions to restrict supply and influence markets, are disrupting both minerals production and availability. In response, developed nations have formulated critical minerals strategies and entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, involving supplier nations and customer nations, to build alternative supply chains that are more diverse, secure and sustainable. Australia has committed in multiple agreements to work with like-minded nations to achieve this. This report is intended to provide the government with a road map to ‘step up’ to (re)activate Australia’s global mineral leadership.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Science and Technology, Leadership, Alliance, Emerging Technology, Minerals, and Energy Transition
- Political Geography:
- Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America