Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 25 Years / Topic: Military Affairs

1. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:: J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

2. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:: Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

4. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:: Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

5. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

6. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Author:: Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
Topic:: National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

9. China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security

Author:: John R. Deni, Chris Alden, Erik Brattberg, Roger Cliff, Mark Duckenfield, R. Evan Ellis, Nicholas Nelson, and Laura Speranza
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Given the depth and breadth of the pandemic-induced recession in Europe, private companies in need of capital and governments looking to shed state-owned enterprises may be tempted to sell shares, assets, or outright ownership to investors with liquidity to spare. Of greatest concern is the role that China might play in Europe, building Beijing’s soft power, weakening allied geopolitical solidarity, and potentially reprising the role it played in the 2010s, when its investments in Europe expanded dramatically. More specifically, there is concern over China’s investments in infrastructure and sensitive technologies relevant to American and allied military operations and capabilities. Whether Europe is prepared and able to parry Beijing’s economic statecraft is somewhat unclear, given varied attitudes toward China and the patchwork of investment screening mechanisms across the continent. Regardless, the outcomes will have significant implications for US security and for the Defense Department specifically. In support of US European Command (EUCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled an interdisciplinary team to examine these issues and offer actionable policy recommendations for military leaders and decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Economy, Investment, Transatlantic Relations, COVID-19, State-Owned Enterprises, and Recession
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

10. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. China Maritime Report No. 24: Incubators of Sea Power: Vessel Training Centers and the Modernization of the PLAN Surface Fleet

Author:: Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building modern surface combatants faster than any other navy in the world. Before these new ships can be deployed, however, their crews must learn how to effectively operate them across the range of missions for which they were designed. In the PLAN, this “basic training” largely occurs at specialized organizations called Vessel Training Centers (VTCs). Since their creation in 1980, VTCs have played a key role in generating combat power for the fleet. But as China’s naval ambitions have grown, the VTCs have been forced to adapt. Since the early 2000s, and especially since 2012, they have faced tremendous pressure to keep pace with the rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN surface fleet and its growing mission set, improve the standards and quality of vessel training, and uphold the integrity of training evaluations. This report argues that the PLAN’s VTCs have generally risen to the challenge, ensuring that new and recently-repaired ships can quickly reach operational units in a fairly high state of readiness.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Maritime, Seapower, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

12. INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Author:: Chuong Nguyen, Binh Nguyen, Hiep Tran, and Mi Le
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The XXI is considered by major countries in the Asia-Pacific region as ‘the century of sea and ocean’ and is accompanied by fierce competition among the nations to gain interest in the sea regions. On the basis that previously only considered the competition for military objectives, geostrategic bases and traffic channels through the straits, nowadays, countries worldwide have stepped up the competition for economic interests and marine resources. The development of military power and the competitive activities for resources at sea show clear the tendency to use the sea to contain the continent. In that context, the Indian Ocean, as the world’s third largest ocean, has an important geographic location and rich and diverse natural resources; the arterial sea route is gradually becoming the center of new world geopolitics and an important area in the strategic competition between two ‘Asian giants’ - India and China. The competition between these countries in the Indian Ocean is growing and profoundly impacts the region’s stability and security. This article focuses on the position and important role of the Indian Ocean in the policies of India and China, the fierce competition between the two countries in nearly two decades of the XXI century.
Topic:: International Relations, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Indian Ocean

13. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

14. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Entangling alliances? Europe, the United States, Asia, and the risk of a new 1914

Author:: Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: How has alliance formation and maintenance changed since the Cold War? As Russia invades Ukraine, China threatens Taiwan, Iran harasses Gulf States, and Turkey’s neighbors worry about Ankara’s designs, it is a good time to reassess the validity of alliances for global security. Some believe that traditional military alliances are getting weaker or outmoded, and will increasingly be replaced by looser ad hoc groupings such as the Quad, the defense-alliance trio known as AUKUS, or coalitions for given operations such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. However, standing alliances are proliferating (increasing in numbers), widening (welcoming new members), and deepening (reinforcing solidarity and cooperation). The result is a network of interlocking defense relationships, to which an ever-thicker layer of new security groupings and quasi alliances is being added. The emerging system is complex, and policymakers would do well to think through possible future crises to imagine how the various moving parts would end up interacting. They should avoid drawing on the Cold War as a guiding epoch, as it was a comparatively stable and predictable bipolar order. Alliances will also be consistently tested as well, because, as alliances are created or reinforced, adversaries react and probe their limits. Will this expanding network of alliances create more stability or more instability? Does alliance proliferation reduce or increase the risk of war? And if war erupted somewhere, what would be the risks of escalation? The dawning multipolar world, featuring an increasingly dense network of security arrangements, uncomfortably remind us of the years 1912-1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I. A definitive answer may be impossible to arrive at, but evidence suggests that the current proliferation of alliances is, on balance, more stabilizing to world order than not. The broad set of alliances, suballiances, and security arrangements act as a “safety belt” for world order, rather than as a “conveyor belt” to catastrophe.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Alliance, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and United States of America

16. China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5). An increase in Beijing’s defense budget raises red flags for China’s neighbors and the U.S. given the growing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas. However, in Chinese eyes, as Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu argues, the budget is “proper and reasonable” (Global Times, March 5).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, and Transparency
Political Geography:: China and Asia

17. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces

Author:: Brian Waidelich
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

18. Europe’s Area of Maritime Interest in Northeast Asia

Author:: Philip Shetler-Jones
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Participation in the monitoring of UN sanctions on North Korea is Europe’s most prominent operational contribution to Indo-Pacific security, but is also characterised by a fragmented, bilateral approach that contradicts the trajectory of recent European policies that strive for a more meaningful and coordinated investment in this area. A coordinated European presence in the region built around the sanctions monitoring task is within reach, and steps taken to achieve it would dramatically enhance the policy coherence and impact of European action on Northeast Asian security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

19. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:: Lech Drab
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

20. Ottoman Campaigns in the First World War

Author:: Edward J. Erickson
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Unlike the British or the Americans, the Turks do not officially designate or name military campaigns in their official histories. This article presents the author’s appraisal of which operations might be considered as the Ottoman army’s campaigns in the First World War. The Ottomans fought a large number of operations and battles in the war but an analysis of these in terms of defining them at the operational level is absent from the extant historiography. The article also presents an appraisal of the various offensive and defensive campaigns that the Ottoman army conducted in the First World War as well as identifying a new vocabulary that distinguishes the army’s deliberate campaigns from its campaigns of opportunity and expediency.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and World War I
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Ottoman Empire

21. WHY STATEBUILDING DIDN’T WORK IN AFGHANISTAN

Author:: David A. Lake
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The collapse of the Afghan government illustrates the larger dilemma in all statebuilding attempts. The statebuilder wants to build a government strong enough to stand on its own. To do this, the new state must win the support of the people it hopes to rule. This need not be the entire population of a country—no government wins universal praise—but it must be a sufficiently large share of the population that it has room to maneuver, favoring some groups with a policy, and other groups with another policy, but not always sitting on the knife’s edge between repression and rebellion. In short, the statebuilder wants to build a state that is legitimate.
Topic:: War, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, War on Terror, and State Building
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Asia

22. ‘A careful foot can step anywhere’: The UAE and China in the Horn of Africa: Implications for EU engagement

Author:: Jos Meester and Guido Lanfranchi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Over the last decade, the UAE and China have vastly expanded their economic, political and military footprint in the Horn of Africa, and their actions now have the potential to shape developments in the region. Room for cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Beijing exists on issues such as maritime security, regional stability, and economic development. Moreover, the two countries’ interaction could lead to improvements in the Horn’s underdeveloped infrastructure by triggering a race to investment. Yet, development and stability in the region might suffer if the strategic interests of external players take precedence over local ones, or if local elites (mis)use external support for narrow domestic political calculations. The EU and its member states have high stakes in the Horn’s stability. To optimise their engagement, European policymakers should be aware of the implications of the Emirati and Chinese presence, and they should strive to improve cooperation among the wide range of external players active in the Horn.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Affairs, Economic Development, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Horn of Africa

23. Increasing Support for U.S.‐Japan Alliance in Okinawa is Not a Pipedream

Author:: Hillary C. Dauer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The ongoing political impasse between Japan’s central government in Tokyo and the Okinawa prefectural government over U.S. military basing threatens the long-term stability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In spite of the friction between the central government and the prefecture, and the much decried “burden” of U.S. bases on Okinawa there is relatively little deep-seeded resentment among the Okinawan people toward the U.S. military presence or the U.S.-Japan Alliance as a whole, especially among those born after the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Surveys also show that Okinawans desire more dialogue with U.S. service members based in Okinawa. But a fraught Okinawan history with mainland Japan and economic marginalization have so far undermined the strong potential for good-faith dialogue that could break the impasse. The relocation of U.S. military bases is essential to the U.S. and Japanese governments’ security policy vis-à-vis emerging threats in the region. Both governments realized in the 1990s that Okinawa could not remain a key power projection node in the Western Pacific if the bases remained a flashpoint of political controversy due to their proximity to densely populated communities. This potentially volatile situation was brought under intense scrutiny with the 1995 rape committed by three U.S. service members against an Okinawan junior high school student and the resulting agreement to close the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. Moreover, the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility also factors into subsequent U.S. Pacific maritime realignment strategy. Further delays could leave Japan less secure and impair U.S. attempts to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Fall 2021 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS SONG YANHUA, SHEN XINGCHEN, WANG YINGXUE INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE STRATEGIES DURING THE PANDEMICS THROUGH THE LENSES OF MOZI AND GALTUNG ............... 5 DAVIT AGHABEKYAN TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY AND IDENTITY: THE CRIMEAN ARMENIANS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA ........................... 24 KARINE MKHITARIAN PUBLICLY DECLARED POSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KARABAKH PROCESS: PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY ....................................................................................................... 43 LOUISA KHACHATRYAN MEDIA FRAMING AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA IN ARMENIA DURING THE 45-DAY ARTSAKH WAR ........................................................... 65 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................................... 84 ANNEX .................................................................................................................. 85
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Asia, and Armenia

25. Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”

Author:: Huba Wass de Czege
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Does The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 lack a clear theory of victory? A comparative analysis of the development of MDO and the historical concepts of Active Defense and AirLand Battle reveals the necessity of greater insight into sources of Russian and Chinese behavior and countering mechanisms, what constitutes effective deterrence, and greater clarity regarding the political will of Allies to assist in this deterrence.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Senior Conference 55—The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions, and Decisions

Author:: Terry Babcock-Lumish, Tania Chacho, Tom Fox, and Zachary Griffiths
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: As the Indo-Pacific region enters a period of uncertainty, this monograph details the proceedings of West Point’s 2019 Senior Conference 55. Scholars and practitioners convened to discuss and debate strategic changes, and experts shared thoughts during keynote addresses and panels on economics, security, technology, and potential futures in this critically important region.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

27. Sustaining the Undersea Advantage: Transforming Anti-Submarine Warfare Using Autonomous Systems

Author:: Bryan Clark, Seth Cropsey, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Submarines have posed a challenge to naval forces for more than a century, enabling weaker maritime powers to launch surprise attacks ashore or cut an opponent off from the sea. But submarine threats, and the difficulty of countering them, increased substantially for the United States and its allies during the past decade. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is modernizing its fleet with conventional air-independent propulsion submarines (SSPs) that support its broader sensor and weapon networks. It is also fielding nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of longer or more distant deployments. New generations of Russian Federation Navy (RFN) SSNs are difficult to track and could be employed for conventional or nuclear strikes during a conflict. Both countries are augmenting their submarine fleets with large autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) incorporating submarine like capabilities. Modern submarine technology has also proliferated, with the North Korean and Iranian navies using submarines and AUVs to level the playing field with their larger regional competitors and the United States. Unfortunately, the current US and allied approach to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is unlikely to cope with the probable scale of undersea threats in a crisis or conflict. US Navy ASW concepts rely on fixed seabed sensors such as the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) or Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships to detect and initially track submarines. Multiple maritime patrol aircraft and guided missile destroyers (DDGs) then track each adversary submarine before potentially passing it to an SSN for longerterm surveillance. This approach works when opposing submarines deploy infrequently but is likely to break down during a large-scale submarine deployment or as submarines become quieter and harder to track. When manned platforms and expendables such as sonobuoys or torpedoes run out or are needed elsewhere, ASW operations will necessarily collapse to a defensive strategy protecting high-value targets, instead of suppressing enemy submarine operations closer to the adversary’s waters. This may result in unlocated adversary submarines operating in the open ocean, where they could threaten US and allied shipping and maritime operations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Maritime, Automation, and Submarines
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Catching Up: China’s Developing Military Power

Author:: Ian Williams
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: For decades, China has engaged in a fervent game of “catch-up” with U.S. military capabilities. This effort, which has ballooned China’s defense spending to 620 percent of its 1990 level, is beginning to bear real fruit. While still far from achieving military parity, China’s military technology and doctrine are quickly coalescing into a coherent form of warfare, tailored to overpowering the U.S. military in a short, sharp conflict in the Eastern Pacific. This strategy of “informationized” warfare focuses first on eroding U.S. situational awareness, communications, and precision targeting capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, Military Spending, Conflict, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Little is known about how China’s growing defence budget is allocated, particularly following recent structural reforms. In the absence of publicly available information and new research on Chinese defence economics, outside observers consider the official data to be incomplete. Publications addressing Chinese defence spending often claim that ‘it is widely believed’ official Chinese statistics exclude key categories of military-related spending. For instance, in 2003, one analyst wrote that ‘it is widely accepted that the official budget released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual defense spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure are believed to be missing from official figures.’ The methodologies employed by research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to estimate China’s total military spending date back to the late 1990s. Furthermore, existing estimates do not take into account China’s recent military reorganisation under President Xi Jingping’s direction, which began in 2015, and a wide range of defence reforms. For example, in 2018, the Chinese authorities integrated the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the maritime militias into the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) command structure. It is currently unclear how this restructuring has affected China’s defence spending. In addition, China’s defence spending could have been affected by the increasing fulfilment of weapons procurements by domestic firms. Therefore, a reassessment of China’s defence spending and the methodologies employed is required.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:: China and Asia

30. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

31. China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint

Author:: Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms.
Topic:: Economics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Port, and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, Djibouti, and East Africa

32. China Maritime Report No. 5: China's Dreadnought? The PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment

Author:: Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China’s naval modernization, a process that has been underway in earnest for three decades, is now hitting its stride. The advent of the Type 055 cruiser firmly places the PLAN among the world’s very top naval services. This study, which draws upon a unique set of Chinese-language writings, offers the first comprehensive look at this new, large surface combatant. It reveals a ship that has a stealthy design, along with a potent and seemingly well-integrated sensor suite. With 112 VLS cells, moreover, China’s new cruiser represents a large magazine capacity increase over legacy surface combatants. Its lethality might also be augmented as new, cutting edge weaponry could later be added to the accommodating design. This vessel, therefore, provides very substantial naval capability to escort Chinese carrier groups, protect Beijing’s long sea lanes, and take Chinese naval diplomacy to an entirely new and daunting level. Even more significant perhaps, the Type 055 will markedly expand the range and firepower of the PLAN and this could substantially impact myriad potential conflict scenarios, from the Indian Ocean to the Korean Peninsula and many in between. This study of Type 055 development, moreover, does yield evidence that Chinese naval strategists are acutely aware of major dilemmas confronting the U.S. Navy surface fleet.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

33. At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash

Author:: Toby Dalton and Tong Zhao
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: While both countries may think the situation is under control, dismissive attitudes and misperceptions could end up fueling a dangerous competition. On June 15, 2020, a lethal military conflict over disputed territory in the Himalayas shook the edifice of China-India relations. The clash in the Galwan Valley along their shared border is the gravest military confrontation the two nuclear powers have faced in fifty years. This event and ongoing tensions focus attention on the long-standing but tempered competition between China and India. One of the most interesting puzzles of that relationship is why nuclear weapons, which both possess, have not played a more important role. With the potential for a major reset in China-India ties after the Ladakh crisis, are Beijing and New Delhi finally approaching a long-anticipated crossroads in their nuclear relations? The findings reveal that while Indian security analysts give serious attention to China’s nuclear policy and capabilities, Chinese analysts maintain a dismissive attitude about the relevance of nuclear weapons in China-India relations. The attitude stems from a widely held view that India’s indigenous military technologies are significantly behind China’s and that China will continue widening the gulf between the two countries’ conventional and nuclear capabilities. However, Chinese analysts do not appear to fully appreciate the long-term destabilizing implications of this growing gap. India may feel pressure to build out its nuclear arsenal, and this could further threaten the fragile stability between India and Pakistan. Chinese experts tend to underestimate the role Beijing may have in shaping New Delhi’s threat perception and nuclear strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

34. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

Author:: Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

35. The pandemic and the military: towards total defence?

Author:: Antonio Missiroli and Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out in December 2019 in the Chinese city of Wuhan and quickly spread across the globe, will have a lasting impact on worldwide economic, political and strategic developments. Some observers question whether the different approaches by nations to the pandemic may benefit or hinder global economic competition. Others worry that some states may exploit the pandemic as a pretext to curtail individual freedoms. Still others note the emergence of an outright "battle of narratives" on the origins of the virus and the correct approach to bringing it under control, adding fuel to an already lingering "systemic" contest.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and Global Focus

36. The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas

Author:: Roderick Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted the fifth iteration of its “ZHANLAN” far seas training series (Ministry of National Defense, February 2, 2019). [1] The PLAN established ZHANLAN in 2016 as an annual far seas training event, with each iteration growing in complexity (Ministry of National Defense, May 27, 2016). Live fire and combat training often draws the most attention during such PLA training events, but the critical highlight of ZHANLAN-2020A was the training focus on combat support, rather than kinetic operations. The key takeaway from this training event is that the PLAN is developing the proficiencies to sustain limited offensive strikes against U.S. forces—perhaps as far out as Hawaii. This article argues that the PLAN is close to being able to execute offensive naval operations outside of the first island chain (and perhaps beyond the second island chain) in a wartime environment. The PLA has long discussed the concept of conducting offensive naval operations beyond the first island chain, and by comparing observables from the ZHANLAN-2020A training event with the list of proficiencies necessary to conduct deep strike, the PLAN is likely close to operationalizing this concept. The ZHANLAN-2020A training task force consisted of four vessels: DONGDIAO-class AGI (AGI-857); FUYU class (Type 901) support ship CHAGAN HU (查干湖) (AOR-967); LUYANG III class (Type 052D) guided missile destroyer HOHHOT (DDG-161); and JIANGKAI II guided missile frigate XIANNING (FFG-500). A fifth vessel, the ocean-going tug NANTUO-195 (南拖-195), took part in a limited role during the task force’s return journey.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

37. China Maritime Report No. 9: Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas, The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform

Author:: Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been laying the organizational groundwork for far seas operations for nearly two decades, developing logistical and command infrastructure to support a “near seas defense and far seas protection” strategy. In the context of such a strategy, the PLAN’s ability to project power into the far seas depends upon its ability to dominate the near seas, effectively constituting a “sword and shield” approach. Along with the rest of the PLA, the PLAN’s peacetime command structure has been brought into line with its wartime command structures, and in terms of near seas defense, those command structures have been streamlined and made joint. By contrast, the command arrangements for far seas operations have not been clearly delineated and no one organ or set of organs has been identified as responsible for them. While this is manageable in the context of China’s current, limited far seas operational presence, any meaningful increase in the size, scope, frequency, and intensity of far seas operations will require further structural reforms at the Central Military Commission and theater command levels in order to lay out clear command responsibilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, Maritime, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

38. The Relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan: 1950 to 2018

Author:: Michael MacArthur Bosack
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United Nations Command is the multinational headquarters that led the allied forces in the Korean War. The command’s Military Armistice Commission supervises the Armistice Agreement. While the United Nations Command and its activities are common knowledge in the Republic of Korea, the command’s long-standing organization and functions in Japan are less well known. This relationship began in 1950 and is codified in the 1954 United Nations-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The command’s rear area headquarters, the aptly named United Nations Command-Rear Headquarters, has managed this relationship since 1957. After decades of few changes, the United Nations Command and its Sending States broadened traditional roles and missions from Japan beginning in the early 2000s. This led to expanded activities within the legal framework and security mandate governing the United Nations Command’s relationship with Japan, strengthening Japan’s ties with the command’s member states, and supporting the “maximum pressure” campaign against North Korea. This paper examines the relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan, beginning with the institutions and interests underpinning the relationship. Next, it describes the Status of Forces Agreement and how the relationship functions. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant policy issues, limitations to greater cooperation, and opportunities for expanded roles within the framework of the relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Military Affairs, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, United Nations, and United States of America

39. The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This “war against the West” actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

40. Parameters VOL. 49 NO. 1–2 Spring–Summer 2019

Author:: Antulio J. Echevarria II, Sam J. Tangredi, Mathieu Boulegue, Keir Giles, C. Anthony Pfaff, Karen J. Finkenbinder, Massimo Pani, Richard A. Lacquement Jr., and John F. Sullivan
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Our 2019 Spring/Summer issue of Parameters features three forums. In the first forum, A2/AD Myths: Chinese & Russian, Sam Tangredi’s “Anti-Access Strategies in the Pacific: The United States and China” puts Beijing’s A2/AD capabilities in perspective and encourages the United States to consider developing an anti-access strategy of its own to deter possible Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue’s “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined,” explode some of the myths concerning Russia’s A2/AD capabilities and recommend ways to promote a stronger defense of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. The second forum, Enhancing Security & Stability, considers how to address emerging and periodic challenges in regional and functional stability. In “Human Security in the Arctic: Implications for the US Army,” Tony Pfaff explains the growing importance of Arctic security for Army strategists. The challenges of climate change will require the Army, including the Alaska National Guard, to reallocate forces to this important region. In “Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command,” Massimo Pani and Karen Finkenbinder propose methods NATO could use to project a stability force to crisis situations within 5 days, to be augmented with additional police forces and command elements within 30 days. Our third forum, On Strategic Foundations, offers two articles that explore the reliability of some of the conceptual foundations of our strategic thinking. Richard Lacquement Jr. discusses the use of historical analogies as one of humanity’s most important adaptive techniques in “Analogical Thinking: The Sine Qua Non for Using History Well.” He suggests pattern recognition may aid in clarifying context and in guiding action in unfamiliar intellectual terrain. In “Reconsidering Sun Tzu,” John Sullivan challenges readers to be more critical of orthodox interpretations of Sun Tzu’s Art of War. After all, the unexamined theory is not worth teaching.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

41. Grand Strategy is Attrition: The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict

Author:: Lukas Milevski
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

42. A Guide to Japan’s Space Policy Formulation: Structures, Roles and Strategies of Ministries and Agencies for Space

Author:: Takuya Wakimoto
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Japanese government’s organizational structure and policy processes for outer space programs have evolved over time, and now the government has completed its restructuring. Fifty years ago, the Japanese government restricted national space activities to “peaceful purposes,” which was interpreted as non-military activities. As a consequence, Japan’s space programs, including the government’s utilization of space systems, were rationalized on the basis of scientific purposes. Today, technological advancements and changes in both internal and external political circumstances led the government to accept and pursue a full-spectrum national space policy that includes military usage. The government codified these changes and created the first national law for space in 2008. The law established a Cabinet-level headquarters to develop and lead Japan’s space policy. In addition, organizational reforms in 2012 affected ministries’ and agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and national space policy processes. This paper is a resource for researchers of Japan’s space policy. It will allow them to easily and comprehensively understand how Japan’s national space policy is being formulated. The first section of this paper aims at clarifying the Japanese government’s current organizational structures, roles and strategies in space policy. The second section provides an overview of two national space policy pillars: national military space strategies and commercial space initiatives.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Space, and Space Force
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

43. Arms Flows to South East Asia

Author:: Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: The security environment of South East Asia is making more and more headlines and is increasing cause for concern. While old tensions and conflicts remain, China’s rise as a military power and its claims on the South China Sea not only add a new element of insecurity but also draw other powers into the mix. As this paper documents, states in South East Asia have significantly increased their military spending, their arms acquisitions and their arms inventories over the past decade. This growth has outpaced the global trend and the trends of most other regions. While the growth of military capabilities is not an uncontrollable arms race, there is cause for real concern. The increased size and capabilities of most armed forces in South East Asia—coupled with increased tensions in the region, especially over the South China Sea—lead to more military forces operating in close proximity to ‘unfriendly’ forces. Mechanisms and agreed rules to deal with the overall tensions or with unexpected confrontations of opposing military forces are lacking, which does not make it easy to prevent incidents from escalating. Furthermore, weak transparency in foreign and defence policy poses a risk of misunderstandings about why South East Asian states acquire weapons, what their ‘red lines’ are and what the response to crossing those lines would be.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

44. If You Can’t See ’em, You Can’t Shoot ’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting

Author:: Seth Cropsey
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This report tracks the development of naval and maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR/T) from the Cold War to the present day. It reveals the fluctuating relationship between ISR/T and weapons ranges that have adversely impacted the US Navy’s combat capabilities. While the United States developed longer-range weapons throughout the Cold War and revised tactics and fleet composition to better employ those weapons offensively, the gap that remained between weapons range and targeting information had a negative effect on US Navy combat power. Following the Cold War, while weapons and delivery-system range decreased, ISR/T capacity and capability rose, allowing for precision strikes against ground targets at short and medium range. Finally, the contemporary fleet, facing renewed great power competition, is increasingly receiving long-range strike weapons. However, it lacks the ISR/T complex to identify and hit targets at those ranges in most over-the-horizon combat situations. Second, this report reviews the current ISR/T capabilities to which the US Navy has access, primarily in the Pacific theater, and performs first-order sufficiency analysis to gain an understanding of the impact the current program of record has on operational requirements. Finally, the report concludes with several key recommendations to naval policymakers, civilian and military.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China

Author:: Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States has made a strategic bet: that India will decisively shape the military balance in Asia.1 In an era of avowed great power competition with China,2 at a time when the U.S. military’s edge over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to erode,3 this wager will have an outsized impact on the future trajectory of the region. If India can maintain an advantage over China along its Himalayan frontier and sustain its dominance in the Indian Ocean, U.S. efforts to deny Beijing a regional sphere of influence are far more likely to succeed—as is the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific shared by Washington and Delhi. If India fails to realize its military potential, the United States, caught in between its many global commitments, will struggle to uphold a favorable balance of power. Today, America’s wager has yet to fully pay off. The trend lines in the India-China military equation are broadly negative. Despite very real improvements in Delhi’s defense capabilities and a significant advantage conveyed by India’s maritime geography, its longstanding superiority over China in the Indian Ocean is at risk of slipping away. Beijing has enhanced the capability and capacity of the naval forces it can project into the Indian Ocean and pursued overseas military facilities to support a more regular People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presence there. Moreover, China’s long-range precision strike complex, though constructed primarily with the United States as the intended adversary, extends into the Indian Ocean—presenting a threat to Delhi’s maritime operations. The state of play along India’s Himalayan frontier is more mixed. Delhi possesses a clear advantage in localized military strength, but China has made significant infrastructure improvements in Tibet to enhance PLA mobility to surge troops forward, while folding the entire border with India under a single unified theater command—a major organizational restructuring that could yield an operational edge. India has not stood still amid growing military competition with China. Delhi has sought to provide its forces with greater mobility and operational awareness along the Himalayan frontier, while giving increased focus to maritime domain awareness, logistics, and subsurface monitoring across the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean. To weather a potential PLA attack, India has placed greater emphasis on infrastructure hardening; base resiliency; redundant command, control, and communications systems; and improved air defense. At the same time, India has shifted to a more punitive deterrence posture: Having invested in long-range strike capabilities suitable to both land and maritime warfare, it conducted a recent trial of a new anti-satellite weapon. It has also refined an operational concept for the Himalayan theater that aims to take the battle into China’s territory. Lastly, Delhi has begun taking steps to promote greater military jointness through new forms of defense organization.
Topic:: Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

46. Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: Robert O. Work and Greg Grant
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: During the Cold War, the U.S. military relied on technological superiority to “offset” the Soviet Union’s advantages in time, space, and force size. Our military-technical edge allowed the U.S. Joint Force to adopt force postures and operational concepts that largely compensated for the Soviet military’s numerical conventional advantage without needing to match it man-for-man or tank-for-tank. After the Cold War ended, this same military-technical advantage provided the U.S. military a decisive conventional overmatch against regional adversaries for over two decades. Now, however, the “rogue” regional powers that have preoccupied U.S. attention for so long have been replaced by two great powers with substantially greater capabilities. A resurgent and revanchist Russia and a rising, increasingly more powerful China are taking aggressive actions that threaten regional security and stability and challenge the existing international order. Without question, of these two great-power competitors, China poses the greater challenge over the long term. Since about 1885, the United States never has faced a competitor or even group of competitors with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) larger than its own. China surpassed the United States in purchasing power parity in 2014 and is on track to have the world’s largest GDP in absolute terms by 2030. In comparison, our Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was hobbled by unsustainable economic contradictions that ultimately crumbled under pressure. At the height of its power, its GDP was roughly 40 percent the size of the United States’. If that is not concerning enough for U.S. strategic planners, Chinese technological capabilities are growing as rapidly as its economic power. The Soviets were never able to match, much less overcome, America’s technological superiority. The same may not be true for China—certainly not for lack of trying. Indeed, China is keenly focused on blunting the U.S. military’s technological superiority, even as it strives to achieve technological parity, and eventually technological dominance. Chinese strategists do not explicitly describe their aims in this manner. Nevertheless, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two decades and what they plan to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider the possibility that the U.S. Joint Force is close to becoming the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technical offset strategy. The purpose of this paper is to describe this strategy and outline its key lines of effort.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Cold War, National Security, Military Affairs, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic

Author:: Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s military ambitions in the Arctic, and its growing strategic partnership with Russia, have rung alarm bells in many governments. In May 2019, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military capabilities had a section on China’s military interests in the Arctic and the possibility of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic basin (Department of Defense, May 2019). In August 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised concerns about what he diplomatically referred to as “China’s increased presence in the Arctic” (Reuters, August 7). From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank. The flight path of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at China transit the Arctic. Key components of the U.S. missile defense system are also located in the Arctic. Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability (Huanqiu Ribao, October 28, 2013). China currently operates six nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and fifty diesel attack submarines, with more under construction. If Chinese nuclear-armed submarines were able to access the Arctic basin undetected, this would be a game-changer for the United States, the NATO states and their partners, and the wider Asia-Pacific (Huanqiu Ribao, April 11, 2012). China would be able to target missiles at the United States and Europe with ease; such ability would strengthen China’s military dominance in Asia and bolster China’s emerging position as a global military power.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

48. China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs

Author:: Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s national strategy of military-civil fusion (军民融合, junmin ronghe) has highlighted biology as a priority. [1] It is hardly surprising that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is looking to leverage synergies among defense, scientific, and commercial developments in biological interdisciplinary (生物交叉, shengwu jiaocha) technologies. Chinese military scientists and strategists have consistently emphasized that biotechnology could become a “new strategic commanding heights of the future Revolution in Military Affairs” (军事革命, junshi geming) (PLA Daily, October 2015). Certainly, the PRC is not alone in recognizing the potential of biotechnology on the future battlefield, but the ways in which Chinese research is seeking to integrate developments among industry, academic institutions, and military-oriented programs—including through research collaborations and the procurement of dual-purpose commercial technologies—may prove striking. In particular, China is at the forefront of today’s breakthroughs in CRISPR-Cas, a new technique for gene editing that has demonstrated unique potential and precision despite its current limitations.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Political Geography:: China and Asia

49. China’s Future Naval Base in Cambodia and the Implications for India

Author:: John Foulkes and Howard Wang
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Recent media reports have indicated that Cambodia signed a “secret agreement” giving the PRC use of Ream, where it may station military servicemen and warships, for 30 years (WSJ, July 22). Although Cambodian and Chinese officials vehemently deny the existence of this agreement, gaining access to Ream is broadly consistent with Chinese foreign policy. The PRC appears to be employing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funding to further strategic cooperation with Cambodia through the construction of potential dual-use infrastructure. Ream naval base is the latest in a network of regional security projects—including Cambodia’s Dara Sakor investment zone and Thailand’s Kra Canal—which, taken together, significantly improve Chinese power projection into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). News of the Ream agreement raises the specter of increasing Chinese maritime militarization at a time of intense unease in Southeast Asia. Conspicuously silent in this latest controversy is India, which has significant economic and military interests in Southeast Asia. This article will discuss the security infrastructure China is building in Cambodia and its implications for Indian interests in the region.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, India, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

50. Exiting Afghanistan: Ending America's Longest War

Author:: Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The war in Afghanistan—now America’s longest at nearly 18 years—quickly achieved its initial aims: (1) to destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and (2) to punish the Taliban government that gave it haven. However, Washington extended the mission to a long and futile effort of building up the Afghan state to defeat the subsequent Taliban insurgency.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, War, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and Asia

51. North Korea’s Conventional Military Forces: Relative Strength and Options

Author:: Lutz Unterseher
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: If we can assume that the drive to generate unconventional [nuclear] instruments of deterrence is a response to the lack of options in the conventional realm, it would make sense to come up with policy recommendations aiming to lessen northern concerns.” This paper by German military analyst Lutz Unterseher first assesses the relative conventional military power and potential of North and South Korea, then suggests a number of military restructuring steps the U.S. and South Korea can take to reassure North Korea of its security in the context of denuclearization. Unterseher calls for “…a genuine structural change, shifting the capabilities of the [allied] forces in the direction of a stable, non-provocative defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

52. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Economics of Defense

Author:: Patrick Callaway, James Lockhart, Nikolas Gardner, Rebecca Jensen, Ian Brown, J. Craig Stone, Lauren Mackenzie, and Kristin Post
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: During the past two decades, the U.S. government infrastructure has ground to a halt for a variety of reasons, particularly due to deficit reductions, military spending, health care, and overall party-line budget disagreements, but even more recently on border security and immigration. Regardless of party politics and the daily administrative drama in the White House, how does one of the wealthiest countries in the world prepare for the impact of making war and defending peace within these economic and political constraints? Authors for this issue of MCU Journal address the economics of defense and how those costs impact nations. Aside from the economic costs the United States bears for its defense, the articles in the Spring issue of MCU Journal will demonstrate there are other costs and unique limitations faced by America and other nation-states. For example, smaller nations such as Oman must rely on technologically advanced allies for their defense support. Long-term political costs also may apply to these nations, as James Lockhart’s article on the Central Intelligence Agency’s intervention in Chilean politics discusses. There are also other ways to wage “war” that are discussed in this issue; for example, looking to the past, President Thomas Jefferson attempted to wage a trade war against Great Britain and France to maintain U.S. trade neutrality and, looking to the present and future, governments must address the real costs of cyberwar. Finally, we must consider the political and diplomatic costs associated with U.S. servicemembers and their work in foreign states, but also the relationship repair they must rely on to keep the peace.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Counterinsurgency, Culture, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, Weapons, Economy, Military Spending, History, Coup, Trade, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Augusto Pinochet
Political Geography:: Britain, Afghanistan, China, South Asia, Canada, Asia, South America, North America, Chile, Oman, and United States of America

53. China Maritime Report No. 4: Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection

Author:: Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Seapower, Transportation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

54. Silk Road Diplomacy: Deconstructing Beijing’s Toolkit to Influence South and Central Asia

Author:: Samantha Custer, Tanya Sethi, Jonathan A. Solis, Joyce Lin, Siddharta Ghose, Anubhav Gupta, Rodney Knight, and Austin Baehr
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Many countries engage in public diplomacy—diplomatic instruments used to influence the perceptions, preferences, and actions of citizens and leaders in another country—as a means to win over foreign publics and advance national interests. In a new study and report published by AidData, in collaboration with the Asia Society Policy Institute, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the authors look at the past two decades of China’s relationship cultivation—including efforts to balance negative perceptions of its growing military and economic strength—within its greater periphery, specifically the 13 countries of South and Central Asia. This study collected an unprecedented amount of qualitative and quantitative data on Beijing’s public diplomacy in the South and Central Asian region from 2000 through 2018. In the report Silk Road Diplomacy, the authors analyze this data to illuminate which tools Beijing deploys, with whom, and to what effects within this subregion.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Central Asia, and Asia

55. Exploring the military and security links of China’s universities.

Author:: Alex Joske
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: What’s the problem? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is building links between China’s civilian universities, military and security agencies. Those efforts, carried out under a policy of leveraging the civilian sector to maximise military power (known as ‘military–civil fusion’), have accelerated in the past decade. Research for the China Defence Universities Tracker has determined that greater numbers of Chinese universities are engaged in defence research, training defence scientists, collaborating with the military and cooperating with defence industry conglomerates and are involved in classified research.1 At least 15 civilian universities have been implicated in cyberattacks, illegal exports or espionage. China’s defence industry conglomerates are supervising agencies of nine universities and have sent thousands of their employees to train abroad. This raises questions for governments, universities and companies that collaborate with partners in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). There’s a growing risk that collaboration with PRC universities can be leveraged by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or security agencies for surveillance, human rights abuses or military purposes. Universities and governments remain unable to effectively manage risks that come with growing collaboration with PRC entities. There’s little accessible information on the military and security links of PRC universities. This knowledge gap limits the effectiveness of risk-management efforts. What’s the solution? Efforts to manage the risks of engaging with PRC universities should involve close collaboration between governments and universities. Both share a concern for protecting national interests, ensuring the integrity of research, preventing engagement from being exploited by rival militaries or for human rights abuses, and increasing the transparency of research collaboration. The Australian Government should establish a national research integrity office and refine and enforce foreign interference and export controls legislation. It should use the China Defence Universities Tracker to improve the screening of visa applicants and inform decisions to award research funding. Universities should be proactive in their efforts to concretely improve how research collaboration is managed. The China Defence Universities Tracker is a tool to help universities and researchers understand institutions in China and avoid harmful collaborations. Universities can use the recently published Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector to help review their management of collaboration.2 They should introduce clauses into agreements with PRC entities to terminate those agreements in the case of specific ethical concerns or indications of research going towards a military end use. Universities could demonstrate their commitment to these initiatives by establishing independent research integrity offices that promote transparency and evaluate compliance with ethics, values and security interests, serving as administratively distinct bodies that avoid influence from internal university politics.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Higher Education
Political Geography:: China and Asia

56. The quest for recognition: Taiwan’s military and trade agreements with Singapore under the one-China policy

Author:: Pasha L. Hsieh
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: This article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s relationship with Singapore since the 1960s as a unique case study in the Asia-Pacific. The theoretical concept of recognition in international relations (IR) and its nexus with international law are used to analyze the conclusion of the bilateral military and trade agreements absent diplomatic relations. The article argues that beyond security dimensions, the two states’ struggles for recognition exhibit the formation of national identities, which invigorate the claims for sovereign state status in global politics. First, this article explores the emerging notion of recognition in IR and sheds light on the significance of Taiwan’s presidential visit to Singapore under its one-China policy. Second, it explains Singapore’s pursuit of external sovereignty that led to substantive defense cooperation with Taiwan, as well as the role of Lee Kuan Yew in facilitating Beijing–Taipei negotiations. Finally, it assesses contemporary developments such as the inking of the Taiwan–Singapore free trade agreement and the first-ever summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan in Singapore. Hence, the political and legal analysis of Singapore–Taiwan relations enriches the study of IR and contributes to the understanding of the foreign policy of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Singapore

57. American Public Backs US Military Presence in Japan

Author:: Craig Kafura
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: At the highest level, the relationship between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has been cordial and at times productive. The two leaders have met often, and in October the United States and Japan signed a trade agreement focused on agriculture and digital trade. However, President Trump’s longstanding skepticism toward US alliances and the coming negotiations over Japanese support for American troops in Japan could strain the relationship. Despite the challenges ahead, Americans remain supportive of the US military presence in Japan and say the US-Japan relationship strengthens US security.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Military Affairs, Alliance, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations

Author:: Alastair Iain Johnston
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that there is a singular liberal order and that it is obvious what constitutes a challenge to it. The concepts of order and challenge are, however, poorly operationalized. There are at least four plausible operationalizations of order, three of which are explicitly or implicitly embodied in the dominant narrative. These tend to assume, ahistorically, that U.S. interests and the content of the liberal order are almost identical. The fourth operationalization views order as an emergent property of the interaction of multiple state, substate, nonstate, and international actors. As a result, there are at least eight “issue-specific orders” (e.g., military, trade, information, and political development). Some of these China accepts; some it rejects; and some it is willing to live with. Given these multiple orders and varying levels of challenge, the narrative of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order being challenged by a revisionist China makes little conceptual or empirical sense. The findings point to the need to develop more generalizable ways of observing orders and compliance.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Information Age, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

59. India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities

Author:: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.
Topic:: National Security, Terrorism, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

60. China as a Military Power: Strategic Vision and Global Action

Author:: Marcos Azambuja, Monica Herz, Tatiana Rosito, Andy Mok, Durval Durães Neto, and Rafael Almeida
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At its 14th meeting, the China Analysis Group promoted insightful discussions on the goals and priorities of Chinese security and defense strategy, considering its regional and global implications – as well as opportunities for cooperation with Latin America and Brazil. Against the backdrop of China-US geopolitical rivalry, China’s more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping has often been perceived as a threat by other nations. However, one of the key messages conveyed by Chinese official documents and narrative is the peaceful nature of China’s military ascent, based on a defensive modernization of its armed forces – even though a less conciliatory tone is adopted in regard to Chinese core interests, especially concerning territorial integrity. The speakers at the meeting were Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) Andy Mok; the Brazilian Army Attaché to People’s Republic of China for bilateral exchange Col. Durval Durães Neto; and CEBRI's Trustee Emeritus Marcos Azambuja. The event had as commentators Professor at the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio) Monica Herz and Chief of Staff of the Sixth Army Division, Col. Rafael Almeida. CEBRI's Senior Fellow, Tatiana Rosito, coordinated the meeting.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and United States of America

61. Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons

Author:: Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: On the wall in the entranceway to the personal offices of the Commander, Pacific Fleet, there hangs prominently displayed a life-size portrait of Adm. Chester William Nimitz, the legendary architect of the American naval victory in the Pacific sixty-five years ago. The painting is specially lit, giving the admiral's thoughtful gaze a lifelike glow as if he were present, judging the decisions and actions of his successors in command as these officers find means to preserve regional peace and guard American interests. In the painting's background are the objects of naval war, standing as striking reminders of the heavy price in American blood and treasure paid for the nearly three generations since then during which the Pacific Ocean has been an American lake. It has been this freedom from serious threat that has provided room for American strategic and operational maneuver during the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, that has afforded an avenue for the movement of forces during conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capacity to deter conflict in East Asia, the access needed to assure the security of allies and partners, and the ability to provide support to populations devastated by disaster.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, International Law, Military Affairs, Maritime, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS