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81. Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China is the world's leading emitter and a key player in the international community's fight against climate change, but its climate action remains underpinned by a black box of policies, actors, and international influences. As China accelerates action to achieve domestic and international climate goals, it is more important than ever to detangle these webs and peer into the black box, to develop an understanding of what motivates China's decision-makers and how climate policy choices are made. In this insightful new report, Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration, Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics Guoguang Wu conducts an in-depth investigation of China’s climate-related policies, politics, governance, and international relations. He finds that the Xi Jinping administration has paid special attention to climate action by advancing the green technology revolution and reducing energy dependence. However, at the same time, there are signs that China may be relaxing rather than strengthening its climate commitment. By conducting a deep dive into the evolving political actors and departments working on China’s climate agenda, Guoguang finds that ultra-concentrated political power and fragmented governance under Xi and the Chinese Communist Party pose obstacles to China’s climate action over the next five years.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia

82. Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia's Industrial Giants

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Asia’s transformation in recent decades into a global manufacturing hub has fueled economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty. However, this success has also massively increased the region’s emissions footprint, making it essential for Asia’s industries to rapidly transition to green technologies and processes. “Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia’s Industrial Giants” assesses the future potential and trajectory for electrolyzers needed to meet green hydrogen (H2) demand in Asia’s four largest economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The report, which was commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero and carried out by Global Efficiency Intelligence, highlights the role of manufacturers as agents of change in the Asia’s net zero transition. The study focuses on the role of green H2 in three priority industries — steel, ammonia, and methanol — under various decarbonization scenarios. In these sectors, green H2 has the capacity to significantly reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive processes with renewable energy-powered electrolysis. Should the four countries adhere to their declared net zero targets, the collective market potential of electrolyzers for these industries is expected to skyrocket to $180 billion by 2050, with a compound annual growth rate as high as 12% between 2030 and 2040. This is nearly five times as large as the market potential under a business-as-usual scenario. The report offers a suite of recommendations for policymakers, industry players, investors, and think thanks aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of green H2 and electrolyzer manufacturing. These targeted strategies aim to collectively support a robust ecosystem for green H2 production and use in these countries toward a net zero industry.
Topic:
Industry, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

83. The Limits of Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Japan-ROK-China Relations After the Fukushima Wastewater Release

Author:
Daria Kurushina
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
More than a decade after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, causing the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the aftermath of the “triple disaster” continues to shape perceptions of Japan among its neighbors. The Japanese government’s decision to release into the sea more than a million tons of treated radioactive wastewater stored at the wrecked Fukushima plant beginning on August 24, 2023, decisively shifted the narrative of Japan’s experience: whereas the country was once viewed as the victim of one of the world’s worst nuclear disasters, it came to be seen by many in Northeast Asia as an atomic chemical antagonist. Following the announcement of the wastewater release, Japan faced an immediate backlash from neighboring countries and the international community over environmental and health concerns. The decision divided public opinion in both Japan and the broader Asia-Pacific region and threatened Japan’s attempts to position itself as the leader of a free, fair, and open Indo-Pacific. The Japanese government’s decision particularly roiled the public in Northeast Asia, where anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from the collective memory of Japan’s military ambition, colonialism, and atrocities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries persists. Meanwhile, authorities in some countries, especially China, intentionally stirred historical grievances and distrust in an attempt to undermine the trilateral relationship among Japan, Korea, and the United States. However, are concerns about the wastewater release warranted? In a Comprehensive Safety Review[1] the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the United Nations nuclear watchdog – determined that the release had no radiological impact on public health and the marine environment. Emphasizing the Fukushima plant’s compliance with “international safety standards,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi focused on the ongoing process of wastewater release and the Japanese’s government accountability for the water’s treatment, while also expressing concerns about the accumulation of tritium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that cannot be removed) in the water and the importance of further research on the effects of the wastewater on marine life. Driven by health concerns, geopolitical dynamics, and the absence of regional consultation, the Japanese decision provoked a furious public backlash among Asia-Pacific nations, particularly in South Korea and China. Relations among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and China have deteriorated in recent years amid rising security concerns over North Korea’s volatility, tensions between China and the United States, and wartime forced-labor reparations that caused long-term damage to Japan-ROK relations long before the rapprochement of 2023.[2] Participants in the Japan-ROK-China trilateral summit now have wastewater as another contentious topic to discuss during the renewed dialogue, which is scheduled to be convened in 2024. As the nuclear wastewater decision seems to have surfaced many thorny issues among the three countries, this paper seeks to explain the regional reaction to Japan’s decision, why this reaction matters, and how the trilateral relationship might evolve alongside the wastewater issue.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Crisis Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Fukushima

84. China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Southeast Asia stands at a critical juncture in its energy transition, grappling with the need to foster clean energy development while confronting infrastructure and investment challenges. A series of engagements in 2023 organized by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) brought together key stakeholders to strategize on enhancing China's role in the region's shift towards renewable energy, focusing on targeted investments and policy synergy with regional initiatives. This policy report, China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030, introduces the "Clean Prosperity Plan," a blueprint advocating socio-economic and climate resilience through joint China-Southeast Asia efforts. The plan highlights project-specific recommendations, green industrialization, and renewable energy projects expedited by policy support, poised to catalyze investment and job creation, thereby sparking a positive feedback loop that could amplify regional clean energy ambitions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

85. Deterring an attack on Taiwan: policy options for India and other non-belligerent states

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
India has a vital role to play in deterring China from unifying Taiwan by military force, a new Australian Strategic Policy Institute report finds, highlighting New Delhi’s significant economic, diplomatic, legal and strategic narrative levers. The report looks beyond traditional thinking on military preparations to dissuade Beijing from taking the island by force and offers six ways for India, with its great strategic and economic weight, to “help shape Beijing’s calculus away from the use of force”. The author writes that the use of such long-term measures is vital to New Delhi’s own interests, as the economic and regional security impacts of a major war would be devastating for India itself.  India and other “non-belligerent states” could apply a range of measures to persuade Beijing that the time is not right for a military attack. The aim would be to convince Beijing that "its ducks aren’t quite in a row... so that it defers military action to some uncertain point in the future". The report states that China remains deterrable. While it is determined to assume control of the island as a paramount strategic priority, it knows a military invasion would be enormously costly and uncertain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
India, Taiwan, and Asia

86. The geopolitics of water: how the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

Author:
Neely Haby
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations. To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Rivers, Competition, Regional Security, and Brahmaputra River
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

87. Chinese foreign policy in 2024: crisis management and global governance

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This Trend Report examines key aspects of Chinese foreign policy in 2024, emphasizing three critical questions: the Taiwan situation, China’s stance in the Ukraine conflict, and its global governance reform proposals. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains low due to electoral outcomes and various deterrent factors. China is expected to intensify non-physical threats. Economic considerations, including reliance on exports and partnerships with Europe, deter China from escalating support for Russia. The "Global South" is likely to support China’s global governance reforms, driven by resentment against perceived US double standards. European decision-makers are advised to align strategies with China’s nuanced approach, emphasizing reassurances on Taiwan, clear red lines on Russia, and increased engagement with the "Global South" while upholding UN principles.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China and Asia

88. Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic and Military Horizons

Author:
Erik Isaksson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2023, Japan was on a steady trajectory toward a greater military and diplomatic footprint on the world stage, having just announced a new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Buildup Program in December 2022. These were part of a long-term effort to bolster Japan’s military capabilities and international profile, motivated by a ruling party that has sought these goals since its founding in 1955. Particularly since the start of the war in Ukraine these domestic motivations have gained in relevance by virtue of deteriorating international security. In 2024, we are likely to see Japan further develop its military capabilities, military exports and assistance, partly driven by hard security concerns, and partly by these domestic motivations. These motivations can in turn be understood as an effort to boost Japan’s international status.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

89. What Dilemma is Hampering Japan’s Rise to a Major World Power

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On January 1, 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida vowed to propel Japan to the forefront of the international arena amongst nation-states that have a proactive role in key global affairs and issues. In his New Year's address, Kishida affirmed that he will “exert leadership unique to Japan" through summit diplomacy to "overcome challenges," citing issues such as Russia's war on Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict. The Prime Minister’s comments come on the back of official figures released on February 15, 2024, showing that Japan’s economy has slipped to fourth place after being replaced by Germany as the world’s third largest economy. India is projected to overtake both Japan and Germany and become the world's third-largest economy during the current decade. Between Japan's aspirations to become a major global player and its evident economic decline, there are lingering questions about the obstacles it faces in transforming into a significant influential force in a world moving towards multipolarism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Economy, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

90. Forecasting Chinese expansion into Central Asia

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In early April 2024, China signed a two-year enhanced security cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan, which was reached during a meeting between Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Interior Minister Pulat Bobojonov in Tashkent. Some believe this pact was prompted by escalating international and regional competition for Central Asia, mainly because it came amid moves by international and regional powers in the five countries. Moreover, as China expands activities in this region to capitalize on cooperation potentials and opportunities, its influence in the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is steadily rising, mainly encouraged by Moscow's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The development is raising questions about the future of China's presence in Central Asia in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

91. China’s Responsibility, and Ours: The Persecution and Neglect of Stateless North Korean Children

Author:
Rob York, Hannah Cole, and Kaylin Kim
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
What happens to the children of North Korean women who are born in China? What happens when they remain in China, or when they escape to other countries? It is believed that as many as 300,000 North Koreans have fled the country—most of them since the famine of the 1990s, and most of them women. To address China’s “bare branches”—its much larger population of young men than young women—North Korean women are often sold to young Chinese men as brides. The children of these brides will be born stateless, lack legal rights, and face the ever-present danger of their mothers’ deportation back to North Korea because they are considered illegal immigrants in China. These unique challenges persist, despite China being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other international treaties. Even those children that eventually escape to third-party countries are haunted by their status, as their statelessness caused legal hindrances to their ability to settle and, specifically in South Korea, deprives them of government assistance. This study documents the treatment of “stateless” children born to North Korean and Chinese parents. It delineates the factors that contribute to their mistreatment—China’s unwillingness to anger the North Korean government, South Korea’s growing disinterest in North Korean defectors, and a lack of formal networks for North Korean defectors elsewhere. It further finds that, with China openly hostile toward “meddling” in its internal affairs, the most likely source of relief for these children will be a change in attitudes among South Koreans, the United States, and their allies and partners, resulting in conscious effort by their governments and civil societies to help them, both financially and in assisting with their assimilation.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Children, and Statelessness
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

92. Taiwan Strait’s Echo in Korean Peninsula Security and the US-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yerin Yoon
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In recent years, the geopolitical landscape of East Asia has undergone significant shifts, with the Taiwan Strait emerging as a pivotal point of great power competition and regional instability. This paper delves into the intricate dynamics in this evolving scenario, examining the multifaceted implications of Taiwan contingencies and their ripple effects on the security of the Korean Peninsula and the longstanding US-ROK alliance. This study highlights the need for Korea to build strategic plans for a Taiwan contingency by examining the correlation between plausible scenarios and the security challenges of the Korean Peninsula. This paper explores the broader implications of a Taiwan contingency within the context of great power rivalry and international relations. Moreover, it analyzes specific scenarios related to the Korean Peninsula that could unfold around Taiwan, such as maritime blockades and potential Chinese armed attacks on Taiwanese territory. It then emphasizes the influence of these scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, revealing a complex web of economic security, diplomatic, and military challenges. The article thereafter turns its attention to the US-ROK alliance essential to regional security in East Asia. This analysis examines the strategic ramifications of the relocation of US Forces Korea (USFK) and the possible engagement of the ROK military to assess the potential responses by the US-ROK alliance to the Taiwan crisis. It also highlights how crucial it is to comprehend each of the points of view held by the US and the ROK, underscoring the complex intricacies of the alliance. Finally, the paper proposes strategic policy recommendations to enhance Korea’s role in regional security. This includes strategies for maritime security, military readiness against conventional threats, and the strengthening of trilateral relationships with the US and Japan, providing a proactive roadmap for Korea’s foreign and defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

93. Gender in Strategic Competition: A Non-Traditional Strategy for Building Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Charity Borg
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Today’s era is defined by strategic competition with “autocrats [who] are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.”[1] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the leading autocratic force, operating with both the intent to reshape the democratic rules-based international order and the resources to advance those aims. States interested in upholding the international rules-based order must enhance their ability to withstand PRC coercion and invest in cultivating a values-based security alliance against the spread of authoritarianism. International collaboration on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda offers a low-cost, high-return opportunity to bolster national and regional resistance to authoritarian coercion while building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners. Increasing national resilience and building alliances that center on enhancing the security of women is a data-backed approach that ensures elevated state stability, democracy, and economic prosperity while increasing the likelihood of a coalition’s willingness to defend the current international rules-based order from those who seek to dismantle it. An overwhelming body of empirical analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the security of women and the democratic or authoritarian tendencies of a state. That same analysis also finds that women’s security is a precondition for a state’s level of democracy. Otherwise stated, countries with higher levels of gender equality are more democratic, less corrupt, and more stable. Whereas “states with higher levels of violence against women are less peaceful [internally and] internationally, less compliant with international norms, and less likely to have good relations with neighboring states,” they are also more likely to align with autocratic governance structures.[1] Authoritarian states such as the PRC understand the benefits of empowered societies, which is why their actions on domestic and international fronts actively seek to suppress women. They fear that like-minded allies and partners will successfully improve security for fifty percent of the population and, as a result, will ultimately tip the scales of power and influence to preserve the values-based international order they desire to uproot. Interest and investment in the WPS agenda are growing around the globe, but not fast enough. Thus far, 18 Indo-Pacific states and one regional organization have sought meaningful engagement and integration of the WPS agenda by various means, opening a door for cooperation across the spectrum of civil, diplomatic, and military security cooperation engagements.[2] However, several transformative policy and operational measures must be implemented to achieve the desired end states. To be transformative and enable lasting change in governmental and national behavior, the thoughtful implementation of the WPS agenda at all levels, from national and subnational to the community and household, is required. First, domestic and international policymakers need to clearly define the security of women as a national security imperative. Second, implementing WPS in the defense sector should focus on training defense personnel to apply a gender perspective to enhance mission effectiveness. Last, those advancing WPS must take an inclusive, context-specific, and localized approach to its integration. To defend the current rules-based international order, like-minded countries must accelerate change and follow through by investing in women’s security.
Topic:
Security, Investment, Strategic Competition, Resilience, Gender, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

94. North Korea is Winning the Information War

Author:
Jonathan Corrado, Chelsie Alexandre, and Alexander Tufto
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The outside world has been presented with two contradictory images of North Korea’s younger generation. In the outside media, youth are portrayed as rebellious and radical, ignoring the Kim regime’s increasingly harsh crackdowns on foreign media and trends, and instead toting the latest South Korean fashion trends and adopting South Korean lingo. Meanwhile, state propaganda pushes the narrative that North Korean youth are extremely devoted to Kim Jong Un and the regime. Both conceptions of North Korea’s younger generation fail to acknowledge a more complex reality. Kim Jong Un understands the importance of winning over the younger generation to ensure his regime’s survival. Since coming into power, Kim has increased the severity of punishments for importing, distributing, and consuming foreign media. This strangled information environment amplifies the efficacy of a youth loyalty campaign designed to bear hug the younger generation. As a consequence, when compared with older cohorts, North Korean youth have a more favorable view of the regime, juche ideology, and Kim Jong Un himself. In short, the campaign is working. A reinvigorated foreign media distribution strategy is needed to break the impasse and win the battle over hearts and minds. Despite the dangers, North Koreans remain highly interested in foreign media. Research shows that those who consume tend to feel more fondly about South Korea and view the North Korean regime critically. Foreign media provides a powerful basis to cross check regime propaganda and can even lay the foundation for a shared understanding of concepts like human rights and civil society. A reinvigorated strategy should focus on content curation and innovative dissemination methods to maximize utility and minimize blowback for end users in North Korea.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

95. Enhancing the Cooperation between the US and Its Allies in the Mekong Subregion

Author:
Sach Nguyen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Mekong subregion is experiencing heightened geopolitical competition between the US and China, representing a clash between the international rules-based order and a China-led order. While the US and its allies advocate for the rules-based order, China’s intentions for its own order in the region are debated. China’s increased presence and influence in the Mekong subregion, particularly through upstream control of the Mekong water, reflect its pursuit of this order. In response, the US and its allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, have strengthened cooperation with one another to promote a rules-based system. Despite existing coordination, there is potential for further collaboration to enhance their role in mainland Southeast Asia. Stability and prosperity in the Mekong subregion are being challenged. Weakening international norms in governing transboundary waters threaten downstream countries’ security and livelihoods, exacerbated by climate change-induced droughts. China’s growing engagement in the region aims to establish its sphere of influence, primarily through economic development projects like dams and railways, raising concerns over environmental impacts and expanding Chinese influence. Additionally, non-traditional security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber security, and human trafficking further complicate the region’s situation. The engagement of the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion is multifaceted, driven by various interests but united in countering China’s growing influence. The US, through initiatives like the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and later the Mekong-US Partnership, seeks to maintain its relevance and preeminence in the region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia also engage with the subregion, for economic interests and to counterbalance China. Japan, for instance, aims to establish production bases and balance China’s influence through high-standard infrastructure projects. South Korea focuses on economic development and diversification of trade amid US-China tensions, while Australia prioritizes promoting a rules-based order and addressing non-traditional security threats. Despite differences in approach, the US and its allies collaborate through platforms like the Friends of the Mekong and initiatives such as the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, challenges remain in realizing these initiatives, particularly in engaging the private sector and ensuring concrete outcomes amidst competing interests and complex negotiations. Recommendations for enhancing cooperation between the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion include strengthening international norms and rules, expanding economic infrastructure projects, focusing on non-traditional security issues, and fostering track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy to promote mutual understanding and collaboration among all stakeholders, including governments, academia, businesses, and civil society organizations. These efforts, facilitated by the US and its allies, can contribute to a more stable and prosperous Mekong subregion.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, International Order, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Mekong River

96. Both Koreas Ditch Their Border Accord

Author:
Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last third of 2023 was eventful in Korea, especially the two final months. Fall found South Koreans preoccupied with events elsewhere, and their implications for the peninsula. In September, Kim Jong Un’s Siberian summit with Vladimir Putin prompted worries as to how closer Pyongyang-Moscow military ties might affect the ROK. In October, Hamas’ shocking attack on Israel added a new layer of alarm, warranted or otherwise. President Yoon Suk Yeol was among those expressing fear that the DPRK might launch a similar surprise assault. He soon had less hypothetical concerns. In November, in response to Pyongyang’s successful launch (following two earlier failures) of a military reconnaissance satellite, Seoul partially suspended 2018’s inter-Korean military accord—whereupon the North predictably scrapped it entirely. Tensions grew as both sides rearmed at the ironically named Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and talked tough — none tougher than Kim Jong Un, who spoke openly of occupying the South. As the year ended, Kim declared a major change in DPRK doctrine. Dropping its longstanding lip service to reunification, the North now regards the peninsular situation as “relations between two belligerent states.” The implications of this shift remain to be seen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Borders, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

97. Taiwan Voters Choose Independence

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan’s election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen’s management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen’s chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. Washington has expanded its support for Taiwan’s self-defense, though less vigorously than Republican critics in Congress would like. Taiwan and the US have continued to expand trade ties in ways that will benefit Taiwan businesses though without tariff concessions that Taiwan eagerly wants. Now that Taiwan voters have elected William Lai, as the polls predicted, China will likely respond with increasing coercion. Had Hou Yu-ih been victorious, his challenge would have been to navigate between Beijing’s pressure for cross-Strait concessions and Washington’s suspicions of any such steps by Taiwan.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

98. Biden-Xi Woodside Summit and the Slow Rehabilitation of US-PRC Ties

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The “guardrails” that President Biden and President Xi envisaged in Bali in November 2022 began to be emplaced at their November 2023 summit in Woodside, California. In-person, leader-led communication was deepened, reassurances exchanged, and practical—albeit modest—“deliverables” locked down on several fronts, including restarting mil-mil communications, cracking down on fentanyl precursors, addressing the national security harms of artificial intelligence (AI), and increased people-to-people exchanges. The establishment of numerous bilateral working groups will ensure an almost full plate of across-the-board consultations in 2024 as well as the means to troubleshoot irritants on short notice. As stabilizing as the Woodside summit was, it failed to deflect the US-PRC relationship from its larger overall trajectory of “selective decoupling” across a range of advanced technologies and frontier industries (microelectronics; quantum; AI; biomanufacturing; clean energy). Strategic trade controls and other competitive actions were doubled down upon. With a pivotal US presidential election looming in 2024, questions abound on the longer-term durability of a rehabilitating US-PRC relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Xi Jinping, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. Beijing Moderates Criticisms Selectively

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Beijing in this reporting period moderated often shrill rhetoric of the past two years criticizing Joseph Biden administration advances and regional governments cooperating with the US. Emphasizing China’s positive contributions to regional economic growth, Beijing stressed its flexibility, said to be different from Washington in not pressing regional states to choose between the US and China, even as it demonstrated ambitions to develop a new regional and global order favorable to itself. Nevertheless, glaring exceptions included egregious pressures to compel deference to China’s claims in the South China Sea, harsh criticism of the Philippines and Japan cooperating closely with the United States, as well as authoritative foreign policy statements giving regional governments little choice between two paths forward: cooperation with an avowedly beneficial China or America’s purported exploitative, divisive and destructive initiatives. Regarding the Philippines, an unprecedented show of support by the US for the territorial claims of its treaty ally resulted in an equally unprecedented pushback from Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

100. Strategic Dynamism: 50th Anniversary of Relations and New Security Ties

Author:
Kei Koga
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Japan-Southeast Asia relations marked two milestones in 2023-24. The first was the 50th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN Relations, during which Japan and ASEAN emphasized an equal partnership by adopting the keyword “co-creation” to promote economic prosperity and security stability in Southeast Asia and beyond. The second is strengthening Japan-Philippines bilateral strategic ties, not only bilaterally, but also trilaterally with the United States and quadrilaterally with Australia. Japan continuously engages with other Southeast Asian states and strengthens ties with ASEAN to reinforce ASEAN Centrality and unity, yet a challenge remains: how Japan can design a regional architecture in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific by clarifying the roles and division of labor among those institutions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia