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1. Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

Author:
Yu-hwan Koh
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yu-hwan Koh, the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, acknowledges the progress made in maintaining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime and bolstering extended deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear threats through the Washington Declaration. Nevertheless, he underscores the lack of a fundamental solution to halt further advancements in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Koh emphasizes the importance of establishing normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, particularly considering that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and is unlikely to return to denuclearization talks. In response, he reiterates the significance of the ROK-US alliance in strengthening the Three-Axis system and developing new weapon systems that can effectively counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

2. North Korea’s Space Development: The Gap Between Ideal and Reality

Author:
Cheol-wun Jang
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Cheol-wun Jang, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, emphasizes that while North Korea has made significant strides in long-range ballistic missiles, it has not been successful in the area of artificial satellites. Up until now, Pyongyang has had limited engagement in exchanges with major advanced countries involved in space development. Dr. Jang predicts that North Korea is expected to continue its independent pursuit of space development, which will hinder the country’s progress in the satellite sector in the near future.
Topic:
Development, Nuclear Weapons, Space, Kim Jong-un, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. The South Korea-U.S. Summit and Measures to Enhance Bilateral Cooperation on North Korea

Author:
Jechun Kim
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jechun Kim, a professor at Sogang University, points out that the Biden administration appears to prioritize competition with China, the Taiwan issue, and the Ukraine War, despite the growing threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In response, Kim underlines the importance of issuing a “2023 US-ROK Joint Statement on North Korea” after President Yoon’s visit to the White House. Given the fading interest and support for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Professor Kim emphasizes the significance of addressing the rapid advancement in DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. He then suggests that South Korea needs to create a conducive environment for peaceful reunification through strong support from the U.S. for the “Audacious Initiative.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

4. Re-Declared “Frontal Breakthrough”: North Korea’s Nuclear First Line in 2023 and Its Limitations

Author:
Walter G. Park
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Won Gon Park, Chair of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University) stresses that North Korea's persistence to pursue its nuclear-first line will lead Pyongyang to a severe crisis as the line would cripple its economy while boosting the U.S. efforts to establish enhanced alliance security cooperation based on the concept of "integrated deterrence." Dr. Park suggests that the South Korean government establishes measures to assist North Korea's transition to an "economy first" state and to prepare an innovative measure that could guarantee the survival of the regime while not jeopardizing the national security of South Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. North Cranks up Nukes—and Slams Down the Phone

Author:
Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:
Mason Richey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

7. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

8. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:
Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

10. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines

Author:
Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

12. China Maritime Report No. 31: China's Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Industry, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

13. Commercial Satellite Use Catalyzes Nuclear-Armed States to Combat: A Wargame After-Action Report (Occasional Paper 2306)

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Recent reports of Elon Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use his satellites to help it mount strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea pose a basic question: Just how sustainable might military use of commercial satellites be? So far, the United States and other spacefaring nations have deferred or taken a hands-off approach to dealing with this issue. When it comes to space, states are roughly where they were with sea power in the 1600s and air power before World War I: dramatic acts of air war and naval piracy were about to ensue, but instituting national or international regulation hardly seemed urgent… until they were. How prepared are we to deal with such a transition in space? Can we keep non-state and state actors from using space to intensify the pace of military air and ground operations? Or are space Lusitanias, in which the world’s major powers get dragged into wars, more likely? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) designed and conducted a wargame this summer tailored to this purpose. SpaceNews published the game’s results (see below). The game’s play begins in 2027 with a Pakistani terrorist group’s hijacking of “commercial” Chinese satellite services to mount an attack against an Indian nuclear base. The terrorists’ aim is to drag Pakistan into a war with India to help decide the status of Kashmir. Through a number of twists and turns, the game ends with intensified ground operations between Pakistan and India and China and the United States engaging in space combat against a set of each others’ commercial space satellites. Are we ready for this future? The short answer is no. The long answer can be teased from the game’s report and its key takeaways below.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Space, War Games, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

14. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

16. Dominating the Superpower: A Bounded Rationality Approach to Nuclear Proliferation and Inhibition in the U.S. / North Korea Dyad

Author:
Sercan Canbolat and Stephen Benedict Dyson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Leadership, and Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

17. Divining the North Korean Nuclear Problem in a Multipolar World

Author:
Taesuh Cha
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
China and Russia vetoed U.N. Security Council draft resolution condemning North Korea's missile crossing the Northern Limit Line. Taesuh Cha, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University, claims that this signifies that great power competition will ultimately shape the trajectory of the North Korean nuclear problem. He expects that North Korea will highly likely continue its provocative behavior with confidence, given its political backing from China and Russia. As the evolving strategic conditions make the prospect of denuclearization much dimmer than they already are, Dr. Cha highlights the need to observe Washington's new approach to the North Korean issue, instead of pursuing a policy of strategic patience toward North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Denuclearization, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

18. Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Force Policy Act: Intentions and Drawbacks

Author:
Ildo Hwang
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Recently promulgated “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces” reveals North Korea’s intention to use nuclear weapons in a war-fighting capacity. Ildo Hwang, Associate Professor of Korea National Diplomatic Academy, points out the similarities between North Korea’s nuclear policy and Russian 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence and the possibility of Pyongyang’s adoption of Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy on the Korean Peninsula. However, Dr. Hwang argues that North Korea is not likely to gain any leverage through this new Policy Act, given that Pyongyang is yet to secure the Assured Retaliation capability in the eyes of Washington. Nevertheless, Dr. Hwang claims that North Korea’s attempts to lower the nuclear threshold can lead to the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, thus jeopardizing the security of North Korea as well as the stability of Northeast Asia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

19. Evaluation and Suggestion on the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group Meeting

Author:
Jungsup Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jungsup Kim, Vice President of Research and Education at the Sejong Institute, evaluates ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting held on September 16, 2022. He claims that the clear warning of an “overwhelming and decisive response” to any North Korean nuclear attack and Washington’s ironclad commitment to drawing on the full range of its military capabilities to provide extended deterrence for South Korea are positive outcomes. However, he indicates that they did not elaborate on how the “tailored deterrence” strategy could be applied to the Korean Peninsula. To address this issue, Dr. Kim highlights the need to institutionalize the concept of extended deterrence and suggests expanding opportunities for information sharing with the U.S., utilizing various consultative bodies to provide an effective extended nuclear deterrent, and stabilizing the crisis while responding to the North Korean nuclear threats.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

20. The Road to Denuclearization of the DPRK: The DPRK’s Strategy and the ROK-U.S. Response Plan

Author:
Won Gon Park
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Won Gon Park, a professor at Ewha Woman’s University, appreciates that the Yoon government’s “Audacious Initiative” reaffirms the goals and methods of denuclearization. However, Dr. Park points out that Pyongyang refuses to accept President Yoon’s proposal to receive economic incentives in return for denuclearization, as DPRK has recently passed a radical law enshrining the right to automatically use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself. In addition, given that DPRK continues its offensive posture refusing to have any negotiations with Washington or Seoul, he highlights that South Korea and the United States should first agree on a precise definition, goals, and approaches to denuclearization.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

21. Reviewing 30 Years of “China’s Role” in North Korea’s Nuclear Issue

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Dong Ryul Lee, Professor at the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University and the Chair of the China Research Center at EAI, writes that China’s policies toward North Korea and its nuclear program has been consistent for the past 30 years, has taken caution not to pressure North Korea to the extent that would escalate instability and has played a role in easing tensions. Professor Lee highlights that Beijing actively intervened to secure its position and influence in the Korean Peninsula when significant changes to the region’s strategic landscape were made. He suggests that South Korea should seek the support of China in its North Korea policy based on the accurate understanding of China’s policy stance and the maximum degree to which South Korea can influence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Denuclearization, and Unification
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

22. Tokyo’s View on the Korean Peninsula and Regional Security

Author:
Ryo Sahashi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In this Commentary, Ryo Sahashi, Associate Professor at the University of Tokyo, discusses North Korea’s continued military armament and nuclear proliferation and stresses the importance of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation in countering this threat. Specifically, Dr. Sahashi notes that the international community needs to maintain its goal of the complete denuclearization of North Korea and that Japan and South Korea, whose security are indissolubly intertwined, must first focus on building a strong partnership. He argues that the recent victory of the Liberal Democratic party and solid political base present Tokyo with an opportunity for a proactive North Korean policy, one that might include increased diplomacy with Seoul.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Denuclearization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

23. Next steps for the US-China strategic nuclear relationship

Author:
David Santoro, David C. Logan, Vahid Brown, Heather Williams, and Duyeon Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Conducted with the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this study seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of strategic nuclear issues of significance to the bilateral relationship to pinpoint the challenges to, and opportunities for, improving the current state of affairs between Washington and Beijing. The study, in other words, aims to propose an assessment of key issues and, insofar as possible, solutions or mitigation measures to address US-China strategic nuclear problems, including those that are seemingly intractable. It is motivated by the idea that even (or perhaps especially) when stark pessimism dominates, it is essential to be clear about what is in “the realm of the possible” to improve the situation, and to act on it.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

24. North Korea Continues to Develop Its Nuclear Forces

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
North Korea is conducting further missile tests to check new types of weapons and increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. The adoption of a new nuclear doctrine that allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes also serves this purpose. North Korea is taking advantage of the period of tension between the U.S., Russia, and China, which prevent the UN Security Council from adopting further sanctions. In this situation, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen defence and deterrence capabilities against North Korea and set achievable goals to reduce the risk of escalation of tensions before possible negotiations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

25. Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States and Chinese governments, for the foreseeable future, will have the resources to keep each other’s societies vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction. If these governments are not self-destructive, they will want to keep their competition from escalating into armed conflict that could lead to nuclear war. The constructs of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability can help significantly if both governments embrace them and interpret them similarly or even if the leaders of the two countries accurately understand how they differ in their perspectives on them. Unfortunately, to date, on these issues the United States and China are like a quarrelling married couple who tried therapy for one or two appointments, found it dissatisfying, and then alternated in making excuses for not trying again, perhaps with a different therapist or format. Each says they have tried and the other doesn’t listen or understand. Both suspect that the other isn’t saying what they really feel or want; what they really feel is hostility and distrust and what they really want is to get richer and more powerful without being hassled or attacked. It would be easier if they could just go their separate ways, but the property and wealth they depend on will be lost (or at least severely diminished) if they split up or do each other harm. This paper suggests that U.S. and allied interests require persistence in inviting China to dialogue on strategic stability; to demonstrate goodwill, the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability as a fact and necessary policy. The need for both moves is reflected in the fact that neither government has defined what it might mean by stability or mutual vulnerability. To help test intentions and prompt harder thinking, the paper plays the role of therapist and offers definitions of both concepts—strategic stability and mutual vulnerability—so that the two sides can critique them more freely and without recrimination. These definitions are broader and deeper than usual, reflecting the growing problem of managing escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war, the scenario that drives U.S. and Chinese concerns and military posturing. Further, broader definitions are necessary to comprehend the dangers stemming from the entanglement of conventional, cyber, and nuclear weapons and command and control systems. The paper then sketches four benefits of declaring mutual vulnerability, contrary to opponents of the idea, before discussing steps that the United States and China could subsequently take to reflect and build each other’s confidence in such a policy. Finally, if perceived U.S. requirements in the future will be greater than the arsenal needed to deter or defeat Russia or China alone, how will Russia and China be persuaded not to try to build up to balance the additional U.S. force? In other words, if the United States is in two separate but interacting arms races (and deterrence relationships), how could each opponent (China and Russia) be persuaded to negotiate limits on their arsenal lower than the total the United States would insist on possessing to deter two nuclear opponents? Answers to these questions will affect strategic stability and mutual vulnerability of all parties but will take a long time to develop. To begin the process, the paper suggests asking Chinese leaders whether their silence on Putin’s nuclear first-use threats means that China has changed its own policy on nuclear use or that it never took a no-first-use policy seriously in the first place. Is China concerned that the capabilities that the United States and its allies may develop to strengthen defenses against Russia could be used against China too, and if so, might arms control be a wiser approach? Ultimately, the paper suggests that if China and the United States can sustain a process of serious dialogue, they will keep their relationship from worsening even if they cannot formally restrain their competition. And if dialogue leads one to ask the other for deeds to demonstrate goodwill, the paper has suggested some such deeds that could be undertaken with no security hazard and only slight political risk. No one should have the illusion that happiness is in this couple’s future. All this work would be to allow a nonviolent cohabitation that is better than the alternative of destitute divorce or murder-suicide.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

27. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

28. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

29. Tying Human Rights to U.S.-DPRK-ROK Negotiations

Author:
Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
For over three decades, the United States and the international community has been attempting to engage North Korea diplomatically, aiming for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. The Kim family regime has been committing crimes against humanity, but human rights concerns have been discounted by U.S. and other negotiators, fearing they would be an obstacle to a negotiated solution to the grave military and security challenges Pyongyang poses. North Korea has breached each and every one of the international obligations it has assumed, from imembership in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework to the Six Party Talks to the 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While its negotiating counterparts have neglected human rights concerns in multilateral and bilateral talks, North Korea has continued to develop and test its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It is time for a new paradigm, that brings human rights into the conversation, in a bilateral or multilateral setting.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

30. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

31. Japanese Non-State Actors’ Under-Recognised Contributions to the International Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement

Author:
Lili Chin, Geetha Govindasamy, and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Since the 1950s, Japanese non-state actors in the international anti-nuclear weapons movement have disseminated the dangers of nuclear weapons, tied to Japanese experiences of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Coming from the only country that has experienced nuclear attacks, they provide much needed evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. These actors include survivors of the atomic bombings, commonly known as hibakusha, who have initiated and persistently maintained the humanitarian focus on nuclear discourse for decades. This paper examines their contributions to eyewitness testimonies on the impacts of nuclear weapons and their efforts leading to major milestones in international efforts for nuclear abolition. It also focuses on the roles played by the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (Nihon Hidankyo) and the Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), which made tremendous contributions facilitating the success of the World Court Project in the 1990s and the Humanitarian Initiative in the 2010s that led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Non-state Japanese contributions were, unfortunately, under-recognised, and the successes of international nuclear abolition were often attributed to other international actors. Hence, this paper recognises the contributions of non-state Japanese actors in sustaining the international anti-nuclear weapons movement and achieving the nuclear ban treaty.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

32. A Perfect Recipe for the Next Escalation on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Lorenzo Mariani and Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
North Korea has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24 March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17. While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

33. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities

Author:
Antoine Levesques
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

34. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India

Author:
Manpreet Sethi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

35. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

36. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

37. Enhancing U.S.-China Strategic Stability in an Era of Strategic Competition

Author:
Patricia M. Kim
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, preventing a destabilizing arms race and lowering the risk of military, especially nuclear, confrontation is critical. The essays in this volume—based on a series of workshops convened by USIP’s Asia Center in late 2020—highlight both the striking differences and the commonalities between U.S. and Chinese assessments of the root causes of instability and the drivers of conflict in the nuclear, conventional missile and missile defense, space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence realms.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Peace, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. How to avoid the repetition of history: the case of North Korea

Author:
Song Young Gil
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
To most European audiences, the issue of the North Korean nuclear programme and its intercontinental ballistic missile development is a neglected topic that is not frequently covered by the international news unless there has been a severe provocation. Most often, North Korea is seen as a country with a young, ruthless leader, and a people who show cult-like support to its regime.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, History, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

39. Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach

Author:
James M. Acton, Thomas Macdonald, and Pranay Vaddi
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The governments of China, Russia, and the United States all express support for arms control. They disagree profoundly, however, about its purposes and preconditions. To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

40. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

41. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

42. Consistent Inconsistency: What One Thirty-year-old Cable Reveals About U.S.-DPRK Relations

Author:
Ben Forney
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
30 years have passed since North Korea’s then “nascent” nuclear program was identified as a “gravely serious threat.” Since 1991, its once budding nuclear program has amassed into a large-scale program, posing a grave challenge for the nuclear proliferation regime and regional security in Northeast Asia. In the following Global NK Commentary, Ben Forney, PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies, explains that international coordination efforts to deter North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons have been inconsistent and ineffective. Manifest in cable exchanges between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo and President George H.W. Bush’ solo enactment of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, unaccompanied by any consultation of his international counterparts, the US stance towards North Korea since 1991 has been contradictory and erratic. With the Biden administration facing a long list of domestic and international concerns not pertaining to the North Korean nuclear regime and the Moon administration’s difficulties into its final year, Forney asserts that prospects for meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seem bleak.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

43. The EU’s North Korea Policy: From Engagement, to Critical Engagement, and to Criticism with Limited Engagement

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While the EU had initially focused on engagement with North Korea in the 1990s, the North Korea nuclear crisis served as a turning point, pushing the EU to change its strategy to ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King`s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, explains the trajectory of EU’s policy towards North Korea. The EU’s first Asia strategy had called for the EU to become involved in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, establishing diplomatic relations with the country. However, at the onset of the second nuclear crisis and further acceleration of North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons program, the EU responded by ramping up pressure. To this date, the EU has been increasingly critical of the hermit kingdom, using a strategy that admonishes and pressures Pyongyang.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

44. Kim Jong Un’s Two-Faced Strategy: South Korea First and U.S. Later Tactics Restoration of the Inter-Korean Hotline, the Road to an Inter-Korean Summit

Author:
Sung-wook Nam
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea reportedly test-fired its new long-range cruise missiles and rail-mobile ballistic missiles four times in September, which successfully hit their respective targets. As the North continues to enhance its nuclear missile capabilities, military threats and arms races among neighboring powers are intensifying. The North claims that prospects for bilateral relations depend on the attitude of South Korean authorities as it demands the South to drop its hostile policy towards the North and that the South promptly cease crisis awareness and delusion of getting harmed that it should deter the north's provocation. The author notes that the inter-Korean hotlines restored after 55 days of suspension can create a momentum to improve inter-Korean relations. However, he notes that the road ahead will be bumpy due to the differing attitudes of the two Koreas.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

45. China’s Nuclear Arms Race: How Beijing Is Challenging US Dominance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Leonie Reicheneder
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China is building up its military capabilities. Not only is the country investing heavily in conventional arms, but it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. To secure its nuclear deterrent, China is diversifying its delivery systems. The United States sees this as a challenge to its military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington and Beijing are both fueling a qualitative arms race by investing in new capabilities. This spiral poses risks to stability that affect Germany and Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

46. Book Talk. Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb by Togzhan Kassenova

Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the Harriman Institute for a discussion with author Togzhan Kassenova about her new book, Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022). Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how the obscure country of Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the marginalized Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons—or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present. For Soviet officials, Kazakhstan's steppe was not an ecological marvel or beloved homeland, but an empty patch of dirt ideal for nuclear testing. Two-headed lambs were just the beginning of the resulting public health disaster for Kazakhstan—compounded, when the Soviet Union collapsed, by the daunting burden of becoming an overnight nuclear power. Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Kazakhstan and Asia

47. China’s Foreign Policy and Strategic Stability towards South Asia: An Analysis

Author:
Muhammad Muzaffar and Imran Khan
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This study analyzes the China‟s foreign policy towards South Asia with the phenomena of strategic stability. South Asia has emerged as progressively vibrant interest to China‟s foreign policy. Chinese administration has showed consent to continue its harmonized policies towards regional states like India and Pakistan. Following the realistic approach, it is quite possible that China may not prove helpful in resolving the chronic regional territorial disputes however; it will be cooperative in bringing peace and stability in this region along with economic boom. The outcome of discussion reflects that the imperatives of regional security added new dimensions such as China‟s peaceful rise under Xi Jinping and China‟s role of strategic balance between India and Pakistan. Due to diverse Chinese interests in this region, it is expected that Beijing will pay more attention towards South Asian affairs in future and will play a role of more responsible stakeholder.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and Asia

48. From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis

Author:
Antoine Bondaz
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European Union (EU) and its member states currently face on the world stage. Despite the staging of diplomatic meetings, the threat caused by this crisis to European interests, in terms of proliferation, instability and to prosperity, persists. It is now essential that the EU and its member states move from a strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, non-proliferation, the implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, build on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North Korea

49. Renew, Elevate, Modernize: A Blueprint for a 21st-Century U.S.-ROK Alliance Strategy

Author:
Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The U.S.–South Korea alliance is a primary deterrent to the threat North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal poses. But the alliance’s nearly singular functional focus on managing the North Korea threat, despite South Korea’s broadly integral role in advancing a rules-based order in the region, has introduced volatility in the bilateral relationship. Washington’s halting and inconsistent approach to Pyongyang and its failure to reach a timely agreement on its military cost-sharing framework with Seoul have nudged the alliance toward a new inflection point. Beyond the North Korea challenge, South Korea has the potential to play a consequential role in advancing the United States’ broader vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As Seoul adopts globally oriented policies, buoyed by its position at the leading edge of certain technology areas and its successful COVID-19 pandemic response, the United States should parlay these efforts into a more concrete role for South Korea as a partner on the world stage. Collaborating on global public health issues, combating climate change, and jointly developing norms around critical emerging technologies would position the alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st century. By widening the aperture of the alliance and positioning Seoul to play an integral role in the United States’ vision for the future of the Indo-Pacific, the two allies will be better equipped to address enduring geopolitical risks in Northeast Asia, including those associated with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

50. Restoring Strategic Competence: How to Manage Northeast Asian Alliance Dilemmas amid a Nuclear North Korea

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the foreseeable future, America’s Northeast Asian allies Japan and South Korea must live in the shadow of a nuclear North Korea, whose capabilities they cannot match. During the Obama and Trump administrations, North Korea dramatically expanded and improved its ability to hold Japanese, South Korean, and even U.S. territory at risk with its nuclear and missile arsenal.1 Despite high-profile summitry and promises to the contrary, there is no sign that this imbalance will be rectified, and its continuation exacerbates regional risks and ally insecurity.2 The mounting North Korea threat is compounded by poor timing—U.S. policy has proven exceptionally erratic, unreliable, and risk-prone in recent years. The very existence of Japan and South Korea depends on strategies built around a partnership with the United States that has become shaky, and on faith in the competence of U.S. statecraft—which both countries are starting to perceive as a risk rather than a source of security. Ally perceptions of U.S. strategic incompetence generate real costs and risks for the United States and Northeast Asian security. If the United States continues to squander its deepest relationships in Asia, the allies could become rivals with each other, increase risks of nuclear instability, play a spoiler role in U.S. regional strategy, withhold basing and access rights to U.S. forces operating in the region, and potentially take independent aggressive actions against North Korea that unintentionally escalate to war.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

51. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Early Days, 1984–2002

Author:
Torrey Froscher
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear program has been a major intelligence and policy challenge for more than 30 years. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry described the problem as “perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history.”1 Donald Gregg, who was CIA station chief in Seoul as well as US ambassador to South Korea, called North Korea the “longest running intelligence failure in the history of American espionage.”2 To be fair, Gregg was referring specifically to a lack of success in recruiting human sources—not necessarily errors in specific or overall assessments. Nonetheless, his comment underscores the difficulty of figuring out what North Korea is up to. In 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which was convened to investigate the failed 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi WMD capabilities, indicated that we know “disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries,”3 presumably including North Korea. Today we know a lot more about North Korea’s nuclear program— but mostly it is what they want us to know. Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests. We know that North Korea has nuclear weapons, a significant fissile material production capacity, and an ambitious nuclear and missile development effort. These programs are completely unconstrained. The United States has tried many approaches to deal with the problem over the years, and intelligence has played a key role in support. Are there lessons to be learned from this experience? Obviously, it’s a very big question and I will sketch out just a few thoughts, mostly from an intelligence perspective: What we knew and when and how we thought about the problem. North Korea was one of many issues I worked on as an analyst and manager in CIA until my retirement in 2006. The views that follow are my own, of course, and the specific information is drawn from the extensive public literature on the issue, as well as declassified intelligence documents.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

52. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:
Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

53. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Christopher Lawrence
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. Political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, History, Infrastructure, Crisis Management, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

55. At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash

Author:
Toby Dalton and Tong Zhao
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
While both countries may think the situation is under control, dismissive attitudes and misperceptions could end up fueling a dangerous competition. On June 15, 2020, a lethal military conflict over disputed territory in the Himalayas shook the edifice of China-India relations. The clash in the Galwan Valley along their shared border is the gravest military confrontation the two nuclear powers have faced in fifty years. This event and ongoing tensions focus attention on the long-standing but tempered competition between China and India. One of the most interesting puzzles of that relationship is why nuclear weapons, which both possess, have not played a more important role. With the potential for a major reset in China-India ties after the Ladakh crisis, are Beijing and New Delhi finally approaching a long-anticipated crossroads in their nuclear relations? The findings reveal that while Indian security analysts give serious attention to China’s nuclear policy and capabilities, Chinese analysts maintain a dismissive attitude about the relevance of nuclear weapons in China-India relations. The attitude stems from a widely held view that India’s indigenous military technologies are significantly behind China’s and that China will continue widening the gulf between the two countries’ conventional and nuclear capabilities. However, Chinese analysts do not appear to fully appreciate the long-term destabilizing implications of this growing gap. India may feel pressure to build out its nuclear arsenal, and this could further threaten the fragile stability between India and Pakistan. Chinese experts tend to underestimate the role Beijing may have in shaping New Delhi’s threat perception and nuclear strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

56. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

Author:
Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

57. On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China

Author:
David Santoro and Robert Gromoll
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper was written by Dr. David Santoro, Vice President and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum, and Dr. Robert Gromoll, former Director of the Office of Regional Affairs at the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Dr. Gromoll is now retired. Both Drs. Santoro and Gromoll participated in numerous dialogue rounds, and Dr. Santoro was a co-organizer. The paper is based primarily on the contents of the dialogue’s written reports, several of which were authored or co-authored by Dr. Santoro. By and large, the paper draws directly from these reports and reviews how the topics addressed in the dialogue were approached and discussed by the US and Chinese sides over time. (A list of these reports is included at the end of the paper; some have been published, others have not.) The paper is also based on the authors’ broader experience in participating in the Track-1.5 dialogue; the conversations they have had with US and Chinese participants on these issues over the years, both during the dialogue and on the margins; and their own personal research. This paper represents the views of the authors and not those of Pacific Forum or the US State Department.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China and Asia

58. Overcoming US-North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach

Author:
Linus Hagström and Magnus Hagström
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Periods of mutual enmity in US-North Korean relations are typically interrupted by more conciliatory gestures. How can the many twists and turns in this relationship be explained and hopefully overcome so that more long-lasting détente is accomplished? Drawing eclectically on realism and constructivism, we conclude that a nuclear deal should address not only North Korea’s interests in security and regime survival, but also its status concerns. Applying the same theories to the other part of the dyad – the US – we conclude that it may now have material interests in ameliorating the relationship, but that such a development requires US foreign policy discourse to cease depicting North Korea as “irrational” and “evil”.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Realism, and Constructivism
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

59. The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This “war against the West” actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

60. China’s Role in North Korea Nuclear and Peace Negotiations

Author:
USIP China-North Korea Senior Study Group
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This is the second in the Senior Study Group (SSG) series of USIP reports examining China’s influence on conflicts around the world. A group of fifteen experts met from September to December 2018 to assess China’s interests and influence in bringing about a durable settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This report provides recommendations for the United States to assume a more effective role in shaping the future of North Korea in light of China’s role and interests. Unless otherwise sourced, all observations and conclusions are those of SSG members.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

61. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:
Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

62. Japan: A Nuclear State?

Author:
Henrique Altemani de Oliveira
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
Japan is often seen as pacifist and as a defender of nuclear disarmament. This article, though, sustains that Japan is basing its security on extended nuclear deterrence, and on the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In the first part of the article, the role of extended deterrence in the relationship with the U.S. is analyzed, and in the second, the history of the Japanese nuclear option since the end of the Second World War is reassessed.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

63. Crossed Wires: Recalibrating Engagement with North Korea for an Era of Competition with China

Author:
Kristine Lee, Daniel Kliman, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States’ current diplomacy with North Korea has enduring implications for its strategic competition with China. Yet within the American foreign policy establishment, rising to the China challenge and managing the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea are often treated as two distinct rather than connected strands of the United States’ agenda in Northeast Asia. The rationale for maintaining some degree of bureaucratic and substantive segmentation between the two issue sets is well-founded. Addressing the North Korean threat warrants energy, resources, attention, and expertise independent of the “great power competition” framework delineated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. But excessive stovepiping may, at best, cause Washington to leave opportunities on the table that could advance its regional priorities, and at worst to risk the creation of mutually incompatible approaches to North Korea and China. U.S. negotiations with North Korea have already created strategic openings for China. The “security guarantees” that Pyongyang has demanded include, for example, the cessation of U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea and the removal from the Korean Peninsula of all American “strategic assets” such as nuclear-capable air and naval assets as well as anti-missile systems that could also be leveraged in a military contingency with China. As U.S. negotiators have locked horns with North Korean interlocutors since President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un’s initial diplomatic foray in June 2018, China has touted its role as a champion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while using its relative proximity to Pyongyang to systematically undercut America’s approach. During the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign in 2017, Beijing cast Pyongyang a vital lifeline, facilitating illegal ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean coal and petroleum in 2018, while leading a concerted push with Russia at the U.N. Security Council to try to fragment the North Korean sanctions regime. And China is poised to open the floodgates of investments into North Korea, particularly through strategic infrastructure projects in the event that Pyongyang’s demands for the relief of international sanctions yield results. Despite all of this, U.S. officials at the highest levels have publicly downplayed intimations of China’s counterproductive activities, thereby validating Beijing’s narrative that it has played a constructive role in supporting the United States’ approach to North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

64. Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic

Author:
Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China’s military ambitions in the Arctic, and its growing strategic partnership with Russia, have rung alarm bells in many governments. In May 2019, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military capabilities had a section on China’s military interests in the Arctic and the possibility of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic basin (Department of Defense, May 2019). In August 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised concerns about what he diplomatically referred to as “China’s increased presence in the Arctic” (Reuters, August 7). From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank. The flight path of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at China transit the Arctic. Key components of the U.S. missile defense system are also located in the Arctic. Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability (Huanqiu Ribao, October 28, 2013). China currently operates six nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and fifty diesel attack submarines, with more under construction. If Chinese nuclear-armed submarines were able to access the Arctic basin undetected, this would be a game-changer for the United States, the NATO states and their partners, and the wider Asia-Pacific (Huanqiu Ribao, April 11, 2012). China would be able to target missiles at the United States and Europe with ease; such ability would strengthen China’s military dominance in Asia and bolster China’s emerging position as a global military power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

65. Deter and Normalize Relations with North Korea

Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. is strong and safe—North Korea is weak, deterred by U.S. power, and desperate for economic relief.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

66. The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Toward a Relationship of Equals

Author:
Jessica J. Lee
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
President Trump contends that “very rich and wealthy countries” like the Republic of Korea should pay more for American troops stationed in their countries. While a more balanced burden-sharing arrangement is necessary, the U.S.’s demand for a five-fold increase in South Korea’s contribution, from $924 million to $5 billion, threatens to tear apart the bilateral relationship and undermines U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula. The issue demanding attention is not who pays how much, but whether the existing terms of the U.S.–ROK security relationship remain pertinent or must be revised. The long-term goal of U.S. grand strategy should be to facilitate the creation of a peaceful global order consisting of fully sovereign, law-abiding states capable of providing for their own security. Any state that hosts foreign forces and relies on those forces for its defense is not fully sovereign: It is dependent upon others to ensure its security. This describes the Republic of Korea today.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Liberal Order, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, and South Korea

67. Sino-Indian Nuclear Dynamics: Taking the Global Lead

Author:
Prakash Menon
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. ​ The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. ​ In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Asia

68. North Korea’s Shift to Diplomacy in 2018: A Result of U.S. Pressure or North Korean Security Calculus?

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
After conducting a record number of missile and nuclear tests in 2016 and 2017, North Korea dramatically changed its policy approach and embarked on a diplomatic initiative in 2018. It announced a self-imposed halt on missile and nuclear tests and held summit meetings with the United States, China, and South Korea from spring of that year. Why did North Korea shift its policy approach? This paper evaluates four alternative explanations. The first is that the change was driven by North Korea’s security calculus. In other words, North Korea planned to achieve its security goals first before turning to diplomacy and successfully followed through with this plan. The second is that U.S. military threats forced North Korea to change its course. The third is that U.S.-led sanctions caused North Korea to shift its policy by increasing economic pain on the country. The fourth is that diplomatic initiatives by South Korea and others prompted North Korea to change its position. This paper examines the actions and statements of the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, and Russia leading up to and during this period to assess these four explanations. It concludes that military threats and economic pain did not dissuade North Korea from obtaining what it considered an adequate level of nuclear deterrence against the United States and that North Korea turned to diplomacy only after achieving its security goals. External pressure may have encouraged North Korea to speed up its efforts to develop the capacity to strike the United States with a nuclear-armed missile, the opposite of its intended effect. Diplomatic and economic pressure may have compelled Kim Jong Un to declare that North Korea had achieved its “state nuclear force” before conducting all the nuclear and ballistic missile tests needed to be fully confident that it could hit targets in the continental United States. These findings suggest that if a pressure campaign against North Korea is to achieve its intended impact, the United States has to more carefully consider how pressure would interact with North Korean policy priorities. Pressure should be applied only to pursue specific achievable goals and should be frequently assessed for its impact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

69. China on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Stability

Author:
Nancy Gallagher
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
China and the United States view each other as potential adversaries with mixed motives and divergent value systems, yet both can benefit from cooperation to reduce the risk of war, avert arms races, and prevent proliferation or terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. The two countries have more common interests, fewer ideological differences, and greater economic interdependence than the United States and the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. In principle, arms control broadly defined, i.e., cooperation to reduce the likelihood of war, the level of destruction should war occur, the cost of military preparations, and the role of threats and use of force in international relations, could be at least as important in this century as it was in the last. In practice, though, China’s rise as a strategic power has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the kinds of cooperative agreements that helped keep the costs and risks of superpower competition from spiraling out of control. Why not? This paper argues that because China’s strategy rests on different assumptions about security and nuclear deterrence than U.S. strategy does, its ideas about arms control are different, too. China has historically put more value on broad declarations of intent, behavioral rules, and self-control, while the United States has prioritized specific quantitative limits on capabilities, detailed verification and compliance mechanisms, and operational transparency. When progress has occurred, it has not been because China finally matched the United States in some military capability, or because Chinese officials and experts “learned” to think about arms control like their American counterparts do. Rather, it has happened when Chinese leaders believed that the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons were moving toward its ideas about security cooperation--hopes that have repeatedly been disappointed. Understanding Chinese attitudes toward security cooperation has gained added importance under the Trump administration for two reasons. Trump’s national security strategy depicts China and Russia as equally capable antagonists facing the United States in a “new era of great power competition,” so the feasibility and desirability of mutually beneficial cooperation with China have become more urgent questions. The costs and risks of coercive competition will keep growing until both sides accept that they outweigh whatever benefits might accrue from trying to maximize power and freedom of action in a tightly interconnected world.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Asia

70. Improving the Role of Intelligence in Counterproliferation Policymaking: Report of the "Speaking Truth to Nonproliferation Project," 2018

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This report is the culmination of a two-year project sponsored by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which engaged more than 50 senior, retired and serving policymakers, intelligence officers, and top academic national security analysts. Its findings are based on hours of group discussions and private conversations that helped develop new primary histories of eight nuclear proliferation cases: India, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Libya, and an Argentine and a separate South African nuclear rocket case. Each history was prepared by an academic historian and was based on open sources. Former officials who had direct roles in these cases then critiqued these accounts. Additional private interviews were conducted with participants to fill in historical gaps. The purpose of the case studies was to identify when and how intelligence shaped or prompted nonproliferation policy actions and, if it did not, why. This set of historical conclusions prompted a more general discussion of how policy and intelligence officials might improve their collaboration to prevent and curb further nuclear proliferation and how academics might contribute by enhancing their treatment of such issues. The project addressed three broad, related questions: How can the role of intelligencein the making of nonproliferation policy be improved? How can the nonproliferation agenda get the priority it deserves? How can the nonproliferation community be sustained and strengthened?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, History, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, India, Israel, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Libya, South Africa, Argentina, South America, and North Africa

71. Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has led to the imposition of a nearly comprehensive international sanctions regime targeting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. With negotiations underway, the question of whether to provide North Korea with partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on its nuclear program has been a major point of dispute between Washington and Pyongyang. This paper looks at sanctions as a form of coercive bargaining and examines the logic and challenges behind a strategy of incrementally exchanging relief from pressure for compliance with the sanctioner’s demands. It argues that taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to sanctions relief risks missing an opportunity to reduce the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program and squandering hard-won negotiating leverage, and outlines a framework for how a step-by-step approach might proceed.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

72. North Korea’s Nuclear Program through the Lens of Strategıc Culture

Author:
Emine Akçadağ Alagöz
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper presents an application of the concept of strategic culture as a possible way to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program. The goal is to illustrate that the strategic culture approach is a useful method to understand North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear capability, demonstrating the link between culture and behavior through Alastair Johnston’s methodology. The question of the formation of a North Korean strategic culture will be scrutinized through scoring the speeches and written messages of three North Korean leaders in terms of the presence of key cultural assumptions. Then, it will accordingly suggest that North Korea’s strategic culture, affecting the practices of its security policy, leads this country toward an active defense strategy, which implies a credible nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Kim Jong-un, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

73. Can North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis Be Resolved?

Author:
G. Ivashentsov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
TENSION around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear and missile weapon systems has become a new serious factor in global strategic sta- bility. Previously, during the cold war era, the only tool of control over strategic weapons was the relationship between Moscow and Washington. At present, the international situation has radically changed. New nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – regard- less of whether or not the original five members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledge them as such, are not under the control of either Washington or Moscow or Beijing: they act at their own discretion, as they see fit. The current polycentrism of nuclear proliferation is based on region- al rivalry. India has created its nuclear arsenal as a counterweight to China; Pakistan, as a counterweight to India; and Israel, as a shield against Arab states. None of these states, however, are seeking global supremacy and so their nuclear status is taken by the world community more or less in stride.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

74. Tehran Meeting on JCPOA

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
On 23-24 June 2019 a delegation from Pugwash travelled to Iran to participate in a specially-arranged two-day meeting organized together with the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran. The central focus of the discussions was the current status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more than one year after the United States withdrew from implementing it, and the ensuing program of ever-tightening sanctions imposed by the US on Iran that has dramatically increased tension in the Middle East. The meeting also put this into context by looking at the regional situation of arms control, as well as Iran’s relations with China, Russia, the EU, and its neighbours including Afghanistan.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Comparative Nuclear Policy: A Case Study of U.S. Impact on India and Brazil Programs (1946-2018)

Author:
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo and Artur Cruz Bertolucci
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The knowledge regarding nuclear technology represented a new reality for the generation of energy and international security. The nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 represented the beginning of the so-called nuclear era and of the “balance of terror” as presented by many analysts such as Raymond Aron, deepened by the arms race in the US-Soviet bipolarity after 1947. Besides the superpowers, different countries had begun to develop their nuclear programs. The cases of Brazil and India stand out, since they develop their research agendas n the 1950s and 1960s, in the Cold War context, as a path to enhance their autonomy and bargaining power. The spread of the nuclear knowledge represented a challenge for the superpowers, and the talks for mechanisms of nuclear proliferation control such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started. This is the context in which Brazil and India develop their nuclear programs under the impact of its bilateral relations with the US. Although, these programs were convergent at first, in the search for nuclear autonomy, adjustments are going to be observed on both policies after the end of the Cold War. The article aims to understand the importance and history of Brazil and India nuclear programs and US weight on these agendas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
India, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

76. Freeze and Advance: How North Korea Maneuvered to Get the Bomb and Prospects for Its Nuclear Future

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
U.S. administrations have opted to negotiate with North Korea in an attempt to curb its nuclear ambitions. Rather than producing their intended effect, past negotiations have inadvertently served as a vehicle for North Korea to methodically achieve its nuclear objectives. This paper presents evidence of North Korea’s decades-old drive to maneuver through negotiations while also advancing its nuclear development, including its resistance to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and its subsequent demands under the Agreed Framework which allowed Pyongyang to advance the clandestine portions of its nuclear program. The paper also explains, more specifically, how North Korea has used the negotiating process with the U.S. to achieve its objectives. Nuclear negotiations have followed a repeating cycle, with North Korea: (1) getting to the negotiating table; (2) agreeing to a freeze under a system of verification; (3) obstructing the verification process intended to monitor the freeze and then (4) blaming the U.S. for the ultimate collapse of the agreement while continuing to advance its weapons program. Finally, the paper uses the ‘repeating cycle’ framework above to assess events that have occurred during the Trump administration in order to predict probable future outcomes.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

77. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

78. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

79. Hidden Memory and Memorials The Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb and the Remembrance of Korean Victims

Author:
Olga Barbasiewicz
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
During World War II, Americans dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Due to this atrocity, around 140,000 human beings lost their lives. Almost 20% of them were Koreans. It resulted in the sudden capitulation of Japan and caused the so called higaisha ishiki (awareness of being a victim) among Japanese society. Unfortunately, the question of Korean atomic blast victims has been forgotten and the Monument raised in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb was placed in the peripheries of the Park. The aim of this paper is to analyze Hiroshima Memorial Park monuments, as locations that serve as political tools, with special emphasis on the issue of the Monument in Memory of Korean Victims of the A-bomb, which characterizes Japanese politics of remembrance towards Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Memory, World War II, and Remembrance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

80. Evolving DPRK Nuclear Doctrine

Author:
Dong-hyeon Kim
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper investigates how an emerging nuclear weapon state—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—establishes and develops its nuclear doctrine upon completion of its nuclear arsenal. Since DPRK’s first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s and its first nuclear test in 2006, the nuclear nonproliferation community has focused on how to dismantle DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Only recently have scholars focused on managing to live with a nuclear North Korea, shifting attention from nonproliferation to defense and deterrence. However, little scholarship has been produced vis-à-vis DPRK’s nuclear doctrine due to the lack of information and concern over recognizing DPRK as a nuclear weapon state. Understanding DPRK’s nuclear doctrine offers insights to developing an appropriate deterrence and defense strategy, as well as ways to revise strategies to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Discerning DPRK’s nuclear doctrine not only contributes to the understanding of current security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, but more importantly offers an opportunity to expand scholarship on nuclear strategy. This paper attempts to systematically answer a question that has often been raised by the national security establishment: what is DPRK’s nuclear doctrine? The key findings offer both theoretical and policy implications. First, the findings suggest that DPRK’s nuclear posture has evolved over time towards a more aggressive posture, despite popular misperception that the role of nuclear weapons in DPRK is purely for deterrence. The evolution of its doctrine towards preemptive strike indicates that premature redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons into the Korean theater, an increasingly popular argument in Seoul, would only exacerbate DPRK’s aggressive posture with marginal benefit on extended deterrence. Second, DPRK has adopted a posture that is common among weaker nuclear weapon states, as France and Pakistan did to counter stronger adversaries. Existing theories on brinkmanship and resolve offer a logic as to why DPRK’s nuclear posture is similar to other weaker nuclear weapon states. Third, DPRK’s nuclear doctrine poses a fundamental question to existing theories of nuclear deterrence: how little is enough to credibly threaten nuclear retaliation in the absence of necessary capabilities? More work can be done to explain DPRK’s seemingly inflated behavior—to credibly threaten nuclear retaliation when such capabilities are incomplete.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

81. International Collaboration Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The international community’s confrontation with North Korea reached crisis proportions in 2017, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches and its sixth nuclear test. In the wake of a series of high-level summits, tensions began to thaw in 2018. At the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to seek support from the international community to denuclearize. But the international community, led by the U.S. in concert with the United Nations Security Council, has already worked tirelessly over the past 26 years to coordinate efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have worked through the cycle of confrontation, crisis, discussions and agreements with North Korea. Nonetheless, all these agreements have ultimately fallen apart, allowing North Korea to advance its nuclear program. This paper focuses on two key questions: How has the international community contributed toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and what is its role in facilitating the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program? Ultimately, the success of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be measured by whether North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program. Fortunately, the international “tools” are on the table, but successfully denuclearizing North Korea will, in the end, be a matter of effectively enforcing existing international measures.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

82. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

83. The Other Side of the North Korean Threat: Looking Beyond Its Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, South Korea, Japan—and every other state affected by the stability and security of Northeast Asia—has a strong incentive to find a way to end North Korea's nuclear threat and its development and deployment of ICBMs. At the same time, no one can afford to forget that North Korea poses a much wider range of threats from its conventional forces and shorter-range missiles—particularly as it develops ballistic and cruise missiles with precision strike capabilities. U.S. diplomacy and strategy cannot afford to focus solely on nuclear weapons, particularly when North Korea has the option of developing biological weapons with the same lethality as nuclear weapons. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the conventional threat that North Korea poses to South Korea—a threat that could inflict massive casualties on South Korean civilians as well as create a level of conventional war that could devastate the South Korean economy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Political stability, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

84. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

85. Redefining Success for the Trump-Kim Summit

Author:
Richard N. Holwill
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
A meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (KJU), the Supreme Leader of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), can be a success even if it fails to achieve President Trump’s announced goal: an end to the DPRK nuclear weapons program. This meeting starts by giving KJU one of his long-sought goals. It will, in effect, be more than a meeting. It will be a “summit” and will confer on KJU the status of the leader of a legitimate government. President Trump would be wise to redefine success. He should not fall into the trap of saying that success will be defined by a “denuclearization agreement.” While that should be a long-term goal, it will not happen at this meeting. Still, the summit will be successful if it produces a process that can lead to a substantial reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. This is not to say that an agreement on denuclearization is off the table. Rather, it is to rec­ognize that these talks could present a framework for negotiation that would be very valuable, even if they will fall short of a nuclear disarmament accord. To understand the difficulty of reaching a nuclear arms agreement, we need only look at the way the two leaders speak about denuclearization. Each appears to define it differently. President Trump applies the term to nuclear weapons in the DPRK. KJU speaks of it as applying to the entire Korean Peninsula. He will argue that, if he must allow a mean­ingful verification regime, so must U.S. forces in South Korea.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

86. Australia and the Korean Crisis: Confronting the limits of influence

Author:
Andrew O'Neil, Brendan Taylor, and William T. Tow
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
In this Centre of Gravity paper, Professors O’Neil, Taylor and Tow argued that the apparent optimism surrounding the upcoming ‘season of summitry’ on the Korean Peninsula should be tempered by the fact that there are potential risks attached to engaging the North Korean leadership without preconditions. They argue these include legitimising its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, alliance decoupling, and a serious deterioration in Asia’s strategic climate if the Trump-Kim summit fails to deliver concrete results. Building on a series of important policy roundtables in Australia, along with decades of experience, these three senior figures argue that Australian policy makers should look to develop a more integrated national approach to the Korean Peninsula. Policymakers should anticipate and prepare for a full range of possible outcomes. A clear definition and articulation of Australia’s considerable national interests in Northeast Asia—independent from those of the US—should be derived. Initially, the Turnbull Government should begin a whole-of-government review, managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This process would identify and implement policy initiatives where Australia can pursue a distinctly national approach to safeguarding its long-term interests on the Korean Peninsula, including future bilateral relations with North Korea.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Australia, and Pyongyang

87. The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Hackett
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
As US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet in Singapore on 12 June, it is useful to keep in mind what is at stake. The long-standing tinderbox of the Korean Peninsula, if ignited through another provocation or miscalculation, could spark a full-scale war that could well go nuclear. The prize of diplomacy – sustainable peace on the peninsula – is all the more valuable when one considers the range of military capabilities potentially in play. This information is of use in assessing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should the current efforts fail. Weapons based on the Korean Peninsula have become faster, more precise and more powerful. North Korea has tested a thermonuclear weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile and more accurate shorter-range missiles, all designed to offset the relative qualitative weakness of its broader conventional forces. It has also pursued advanced cyber capabilities. South Korea, meanwhile, has focused on developing military systems allowing for more rapid and precise strikes. US forces on the peninsula have introduced yet more advanced capabilities. For these reasons the IISS provides this independent, measured and detailed analysis of military dynamics on the peninsula. The report focuses on the defence policies and military capabilities of the two Koreas, and the US military forces stationed in South Korea which can be brought to bear in a crisis. While it does not ignore unconventional systems, it principally focuses on conventional capabilities. Due to its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, compared with those of South Korea and its US ally. Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s armed forces remain equipped with a wide range of conventional military systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its armed forces, at around 1.2 million, are the fourth-largest in the world. Its conventional military power remains significant, not least because of these numbers (for instance, 4,000 main battle tanks and 8,500 self-propelled- and towed-artillery systems) and the weight of fire they could rapidly bring to bear if employed. Seoul, for instance, is within range of many of North Korea’s artillery systems. North Korea has also developed increasingly advanced cyber capabilities as another aspect of its asymmetric power. The North will continue to improve these, if only to slow the decline in military parity between it and the South. US and South Korean defence authorities assume that the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and command-and-control networks. However, recent events like the Wannacry ransomware attacks have shown that North Korea is now using its cyber power for another purpose: raising revenue to support the regime. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defence policy and military posture is dominated by the security challenge from the North. This has led Seoul to pursue military capabilities, and strategies, designed to defeat North Korean provocations. These range from developments in air-defence, intended to tackle North Korea’s air force and missile capabilities, to strategies designed to pre-empt a potential North Korean provocation. To enable these strategies, South Korea has developed and procured increasingly advanced military systems, ranging from its own Hyeonmu ballistic- and cruise-missiles, to advanced air-to-ground air-launched weapons and, in the next few years, squadrons of F-35A combat aircraft. Working closely with the South Korean armed forces, the US maintains a military presence some 28,500-strong in South Korea, augmented by advanced military systems on the peninsula like the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic-missile-defence system, and the military power deployed by the US in the broader Indo-Pacific. This publication builds on the contributions of expert analysts of military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the extensive information holdings available in the IISS Military Balance+ database. It was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

88. Reducing the Risk of Iran Developing an ICBM

Author:
Michael Elleman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the Iran nuclear accord currently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, argues Michael Elleman in a new report. The lack of curbs on Iran’s missile programme was cited by President Donald Trump in May 2018 as one of the principal reasons for withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the nuclear accord consequently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles. The most promising would be to lock in, through negotiations, the 2,000 kilometre-range limit that Iran has previously stated is its maximum requirement. While this would not reduce the threat perceived by Iran’s regional neighbours, it would forestall development of systems that could target Western Europe or North America. Tehran is not likely to commit to verification measures for such negotiated range limits, however, without receiving something in return. One bargain that could be considered would be to allow Iran to continue its satellite-launch programme, under certain conditions, while capping the maximum range of its ballistic missiles. Such a trade-off may also be relevant to the North Korean case.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

89. Will North Korea Denuclearize after the Singapore Summit? Lessons from the past

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Policy-makers, scholars, and analysts disagree about whether North Korea will take any meaningful denuclearization steps after its leader Kim Jong Un met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore in June 2018. Many believe that the breakdowns of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks process in the 2000s show that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program cannot be constrained through cooperation. According to this view, Pyongyang violated its previous commitments once it received economic and political benefits, and it will do so again. The underlying assumption is that Washington was fully implementing its own commitments until Pyongyang broke the deal. But is this true? This paper discusses three key findings drawn from an analysis of U.S. implementation of past denuclearization agreements with North Korea. The first is that the United Stated did not always follow through with its cooperative commitments because of domestic political constraints, even when North Korea was fulfilling its commitments. This makes it difficult to determine whether North Korea ultimately did not honor its obligations because it never intended to or because it was responding to U.S. actions. The second is that some parts of past deals were more susceptible than others to being undercut by domestic opposition because they received insufficient political attention. The third is that such domestic interference could be minimized by obtaining the widest possible coalition of domestic support from the negotiation stage. The roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization is unclear, as the Singapore summit did not determine concrete steps toward that goal. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang in early July also did not yield specifics such as the scope and timeline of denuclearization. But based on the findings from past agreements, this paper argues that the only way for the United States to find out if engagement will work this time is to test North Korea’s intentions by carrying out Washington’s own cooperative commitments more consistently than in the past.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

90. Trump, Kim and the North Korean Nuclear Missile Melodrama

Author:
Euan Graham
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Trump–Kim summit is a distinct new phase in the dramatic cycle that defines the North Korea nuclear issue and the peninsula’s highly theatrical brand of geopolitics. Now that North Korea has finally reached the threshold of a nuclear missile capability to directly threaten the US mainland, its scripted brand of hyperbole and brinksmanship is encountering a different sort of melodrama: the political theatre of Donald Trump. The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be understood without an appreciation of the fundamental tension within inter-Korean relations. There is no precedent for a minor, revisionist power developing an asymmetrical nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States. The result is unlikely to be stable.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

91. Tides of Change: China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic Stability

Author:
Tong Zhao
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Maritime, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

92. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

93. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Peace
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

94. The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Program: from Survival Strategy to Ideological Legitimization

Author:
Marco Milani
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In recent years the North Korean nuclear program has increasingly become a major concern for East Asian security. Pyongyang has repeatedly demonstrated its advancements in both missile and nuclear technology, with the final goal of acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve this goal, the regime has committed a vast amount of state resources and has jeopardized relations with neighboring countries and major powers. This dangerous situation has created instability in the region and has hindered the possibilities of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. The traditional interpretation of the North Korean nuclear program focuses on the survival of the regime and emphasizes the military aspect of security. While these factors play a significant role, over the last twenty-five years new roles have emerged for the nuclear program. Survival remains the priority, but in addition to the military level of nuclear deterrence this paper introduces two different aspects directly connected to the security of the regime: economic security and domestic ideological legitimization. The development of nuclear weapons has been repeatedly used by Pyongyang as leverage in negotiations and to strengthen its political legitimacy. Understanding the complexity and the different factors behind this strategy is crucial to design and implement a viable and effective strategy aimed at limiting or eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

95. Geo4Nonpro 2.0

Author:
Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The most impressive discovery was North Korea’s Kangson uranium-enrichment facility. CNS believes it to be the first time this facility has been identified or analyzed in the open-source literature. It represents the possibility that North Korea has been producing—and can continue to produce—as much, if not more, fissile material for nuclear weapons than it could have using the only previously known enrichment site at Yongbyon. The first section of this report discusses the evolution of the platform: from the conception of Geo4Nonpro 1.0 and the initial training of G4N team members, to the lessons learned during the first phase of the project and how these lessons fed into the platform’s continued development. The second section describes the launch of Geo4Nonpro 2.0, its new features, and highlights news stories that featured Geo4Nonpro and the central role that it played in many of these discoveries. This is followed by an analysis of each campaign. Lastly, the team proposes the next steps and future applications for this innovative platform.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

96. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in China and North Korea through Remote Sensing Imagery

Author:
Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although uranium mining and milling constitute the first step in any nuclear-weapons program, nuclear nonproliferation analysts have devoted surprisingly little attention to monitoring these processes. Understanding and monitoring uranium mines and mills can provide deeper insight into fissile-material production. This report focuses on the insights gleaned from remotely sensed images of known Chinese uranium mines and mills to understand the current status of uranium mining and milling in North Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

97. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in India and Pakistan through Remote Sensing Imagery

Author:
Melissa Hanham, Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, and Ben McIntosh
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #41 details existing and potential uranium mines and mills in India and Pakistan as part of an ongoing project to track uranium production in Asian states that possess nuclear weapons. As non-signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, India and Pakistan face challenges procuring fissile material from foreign sources. Both countries have ongoing nuclear-weapon programs, clear and increasing demands to supply their nuclear-energy programs, and domestic production deficits. The continuing and increasing demand for uranium in India and Pakistan indicates that domestic uranium production is likely to grow significantly in the near future. This paper explores remote-sensing techniques that can allow open-source analysts to monitor and track front-end uranium production activity in these countries. India and Pakistan both have plans to expand their nuclear-energy industries, increasing both countries’ demands for uranium. However, without membership in the NPT, both countries face a multitude of challenges to importing uranium. They are not entitled to receive nuclear-related technologies from nuclear-weapon states, nor are they allowed to trade nuclear materials with any NPT states parties. This leaves only non-signatory countries as possible trading partners: Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. Pakistan has a history of trade with North Korea through the now-defunct A.Q. Khan network. Both India and Pakistan are expanding existing uranium mines and mills and funding exploratory research into new sites for uranium-resource exploitation. Both countries still rely heavily on domestic production of uranium resources, which allows analysts to gain significant insight into their nuclear capabilities by monitoring domestic uranium-production sites. The operational output of a mine or processing plant can be gauged by weighing numerous factors, including the amounts of vehicle traffic, construction on the site, tailings and waste piles, and changes in the surrounding environment.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

98. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

99. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

100. North Korea’s Public Relations Strategy, 2018

Author:
Eun A Jo
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Tension on the Korean Peninsula had reached a boiling point by the time Kim Jong-un delivered his New Year’s address—a tradition set by his grandfather that he had revived in 2013. Beyond the talk of a “nuclear button,” which triggered another round of fiery exchanges with Donald Trump, Kim devoted a considerable segment of his speech to calling for improved inter-Korean relations. Though signaling an ambiguous friendly overture to the South has become an annual exercise for Kim, this year’s speech was uncharacteristically specific in that he offered to send a delegation to South Korea’s highly anticipated Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. But sports diplomacy is hardly new to Kim; an avid sports fan himself, Kim is acutely aware of its propaganda value and utility as a channel for diplomacy. For Kim, the Pyeongchang Olympics presented a timely opportunity to remake the regime’s flailing image at home and abroad. In this chapter, the Pyeongchang Olympics are used as a case study to understand Kim’s public relations strategy. Before exploring the strategic intentions behind Kim’s diplomatic campaign, both the old and new features of his image-making efforts are examined, focusing in particular on his use of sports diplomacy. How Kim’s charm offensive in Pyeongchang is communicated internally and received externally is then analyzed, yielding important insights about the prospects of reconciliation between the two Koreas post-Olympics.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Public Relations, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea