Political Geography: Africa / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 25 Years / Topic: Corruption

1. Remittances and corruption perceptions in Africa

Author:: Alex Yeandle and David Doyle
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: The relationship between remittances and corruption is contested. For some authors, external income endows individuals with financial buffers, which undermine these individuals’ incentive to hold governments to account and allow rent-seeking politicians to invest fewer resources in public goods. For others, remittance payments undermine clientelist networks and increase individual-level political engagement and accountability. For others still, remittances diffuse social norms, since senders are likely to live in large cities or wealthier countries where corruption is less tolerated. However, despite being rooted in individual-level assumptions, many of the conflicting results in the extant literature have an empirical focus at the aggregate level. In this paper we offer a corrective, explaining variation in individual-level perceptions of corruption among remittance recipients through a new mechanism. With survey data from 34 African countries, we show that recipients are endowed with greater cash income, which is used to bribe officials in the hope of securing preferential access to basic services. This act of paying bribes, coupled with the fact that access does not appear to improve, fuels perceptions that the government is corrupt.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:: Africa

2. What Synergy of Action in the Fight Against Corruption in Cameroon?

Author:: Theophile Nguimfack Voufo
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The phenomenon of corruption is growing so much in Cameroon, to the point where we must be careful that it does not become a characteristic of Cameroonian identity. Cameroon has twice held the rank of the highest corruption index in the world.[1] However, the will of the public authorities to put an end to it is matched only by the determination of the actors of corruption to escape the meshes of the control mechanisms. Given the government strategy and the proliferation of organizations fighting against corruption, one could expect a significant reduction of this scourge in Cameroon. But like a hydra, corruption remains a major problem in Cameroonian society. A substantial literature has been able to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of administrative, political, and jurisdictional bodies in the fight against corruption.[2] Among other weaknesses are prominently the subordination of the power of sanction to the will of the president of the Republic, the politicization of special operations to fight against corruption, and the lethargy of certain control bodies. The creation of the NACC, an organization specializing in the fight against corruption, has created hope in Cameroon. But, the decree fixing its attributions does not give it its own power of sanction. Consequently, NACC limits itself to noting the facts of corruption and reports them to the public authorities or seizes the judge by denunciation. This technique of referral by denunciation was mainly oriented toward the judicial judge. In practice, however, NACC had to experiment with referral to the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court, which opens up the prospect of collaboration between these two bodies in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. The question arises as to how NACC and the jurisdiction of accounts can combine their actions in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. After analysis, it appears that the ways of functional collaboration between the two organizations exist (I); however, they require some operational coordination (II).
Topic:: Corruption, Courts, Bureaucracy, and Efficiency
Political Geography:: Africa and Cameroon

3. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018

Author:: Joshua Craze
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: Though elections are now postulated for next year, South Sudan remains in crisis. Conflict continues to scar the country, and climatic shocks exacerbate already acute resource scarcity, leaving approximately 76 per cent of South Sudan’s population surviving on humanitarian assistance. The regime of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir survives by diverting revenues in three key areas—oil production, humanitarianism, and loans from international financial institutions—to the benefit of an elite class in Juba, but at the cost of the immiseration of the people of South Sudan. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018—a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—analyses this predatory political economy in South Sudan, and charts a shift from the use of wages to reward loyal appointees to a more obscure system based on the dispensations of favours.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Political Economy, Elections, Conflict, and Revenue
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

4. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:: Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:: Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Uganda and Africa

5. Halting the Kleptocratic Capture of Local Government in Nigeria

Author:: Matthew T. Page and Abdul H. Wando
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Too often viewed as a monolithic state, Nigeria has complex subnational governance systems that can have outsized impacts on its trajectory. The state is covered with a vibrant but frayed political quilt, consisting of three layers: the federal government in Abuja, thirty-six state governments, and 774 local governments. Frequently overlooked, Nigeria’s local governments are disproportionately important; if they functioned well, they would be best positioned to meet people’s basic needs and to build their resilience to cope with everyday challenges. Matthew T. Page Matthew T. Page is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In reality, however, “no local government [in Nigeria] works for the people.”1 Instead, “every household is its own local government,” sourcing its basic needs—water, electricity, education, and healthcare—however it can.2 Exhausted by local government kleptocracy—a system in which those who govern steal from the governed—Nigerians understand that they must fend for themselves. While local government corruption is a global problem not unique to Nigeria, it is nevertheless crucial to address. It fuels democratic backsliding, communal conflict, and poverty. By hurting governance outcomes at the subnational level, local government corruption is quietly hobbling Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation.
Topic:: Corruption, Government, Domestic Politics, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

6. Barriers to Effective Whistleblowing in Botswana: Lessons from the Construction Industry

Author:: Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:: Adopting Botswana’s construction industry as a case study, this Policy Brief examines key barriers to effective whistleblowing in Botswana. Data were drawn from 117 construction firms and interviews with regulators of this sector. Despite the enactment of the Whistleblowing Act 2016, the study finds the following key barriers to effective whistleblowing: (i) fear of retaliation or punishment, (ii) fear of job loss, (iii) absence of organisational whistleblowing policies, (iv) lack of incentive to report, (v) lack of education on whistleblowing, and (vi) insufficient action and follow-up on disclosures by authorities. From a policy perspective, there is a need to strengthen the existing legal protection offered to whistleblowers, their families and associates to ensure they are not subject to harm, retaliation or victimisation. There is also a need to increase levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in general, and the Whistleblowing Act 2016 in particular.
Topic:: Corruption, Regulation, Whistle Blowing, and Construction
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

7. Institutional corruption as the bane of critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria

Author:: Obinna Ukaeje
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: Against a background of contemporary security challenges such as terrorism, violent extremism, insurgency, armed banditry, and separatist movements across the country, the study attempts to examine critical infrastructure protection. With the aid of largely secondary data, the study finds that there is an inextricable link between CIP and institutional corruption in Nigeria. Institutional corruption has been a major factor inhibiting effective critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria. This is because funds meant for the strengthening of operational effectiveness of the agencies are often diverted to other expenditure that does not have an effect on the operational strength of the agencies, thereby undermining their capacity to deliver on their mandates and increasing the vulnerability of the infrastructures to vandalism. The study recommends the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to CIP in Nigeria, because of its ability to block leakages and ensure transparency in the business of government as well as encouraging all stakeholders, the state, private, CSOs, the media, traditional institutions and all others involved, to share responsibilities in the protection of infrastructures as part of their concerns.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Infrastructure, Institutions, and Protection
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

8. Why Most Communities in Zimbabwe Are Embracing the Right2SayNo

Author:: Farai Maguwu
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: A new scramble for Africa’s natural resources is leaving communities more impoverished, oppressed, and traumatized. Enriching the ruling elites and mul- tinational corporations, the withdrawal of natural resources from the Earth con- tributes to land and water grabs, violence, intimidation, desecration of cultural heritage sites, pollution of water sources, and poverty in communities hosting natural resources. Whereas exploitation of natural resources is expected to boost local economies and improve livelihoods, the lived realities of host communities in Zimbabwe demonstrate that living standards decline when natural resource extraction occurs. There is often trading of accusations between government and extractive industries on the problem of whose responsibility it is to develop resource-rich communities. Corruption and a rent-seeking culture have weakened governance, leading to social stratification, class formations, and entrenched autocratic rule. Access to resource rents is also turning the focus of government away from other more sustainable sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. This paradox of plenty, also known as the resource curse, confirms the long-held view that countries with abundant natural resource reserves are prone to poverty, confliict, and poor governance. In these countries, natural resources are sometimes used to finance violence, repression, and rigged elections.
Topic:: Corruption, Natural Resources, Elites, Value Extraction, and Rent-seeking
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

9. The Impact of Corruption on Nigerian Enterprises' Performance: An Empirical Study

Author:: Mohamed Zakaria Fodol
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Bilgi
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: This study aims to assess the effects of corruption on Nigerian enterprises performance using data from the World Bank's Enterprises Survey, (Panel Data) for the years 2007, 2009, 2014. The Pooled Regression Model was applied. The corruption measured by six indicators divided into two groups, graft incidence and perceived need to make bribe payments. Graft incidence measures enterprises experienced request for a bribe payment across five types of applications, namely (1) an electrical connection, (2) water connection, (3) phone connection, (4) construction-related permit, and (5) total annual informal payment to public officials. While the perceived need to make bribe payments based on the answer to the question: (6) It is said that establishments are sometimes required to give gifts to public officials to ‘get things done’. The study found that the enterprises experienced a statistically insignificant bribe payment for the water connection and construction-related permit are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the level of firms expected to give gifts to public officers "to get things done", especially related to the sale and purchase of fixed assets significant and positively affect the enterprises' performance. As for the total payments to the public officers is significant and has negative effects, which indicates the medium or long terms impacts. This may be explained by the fact that developing economies are characterized by formal institutional flaws such as ineffective public administration and weak rule of law. It can also be explained by the theory of transaction cost, which states that the high transaction cost leads to a decrease in profits and thus poor performance. Unlike other studies, this study indicates that corruption represents an obstacle to Nigerian enterprises’ performance. The argument is that public authorities should move away from increasing the costs of corruption by improving the performance of public officials and implementing standards of transparency. Entrepreneurs also must search for alternatives to avoid paying bribes, such as leasing financing and so on.
Topic:: Corruption, Economy, Business, and Performance Evaluation
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

10. Enhancing the credibility of the public office holders asset declaration regime

Author:: E. Gyimah-Boadi
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:: A credible and effective asset declaration regime is an essential component of the ensemble of rules and structures necessary for democratic governance. It helps to: • Prevent abuse of power by holders of public office • Protect public assets and the public interest • Deter public corruption • Promote the integrity of public officials • Foster public accountability and trust as well as governmental legitimacy. A credible asset declaration regime is also good for public officials. It helps to: • Protect the private assets of public officials from wrongful and extra-legal confiscation • Protect public officials from undue suspicion, baseless allegations of wrongdoing, and all manner of calumny.
Topic:: Corruption, Government, and Reform
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

11. An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:: Busisipho Siyobi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Secretariat should take the lead in developing intervention mechanisms that ensure a strong civil society representation in the multi-stakeholder groups, to enable real public participation and obtain local legitimacy of the Initiative: This can be done through actively identifying and partnering with relevant grassroot civil society organisations that work directly with mining-affected communities. Implementing countries should work more collaboratively with the EITI to investigate any reported revenue discrepancies highlighted in the country-specific EITI reporting: This can be enforced by implementing countries in alignment with their guiding principles of regulatory bodies and the national EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) in the effort to fight against corruption and ensure local ownership of the EITI process.
Topic:: Civil Society, Corruption, Natural Resources, Governance, Regulation, Mining, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:: Africa

12. West African Elites’ Spending on UK Schools and Universities: A Closer Look

Author:: Matthew Page
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Political, business, and cultural elites from around the world have a strong affinity for the United Kingdom (UK) education system. Nowhere is this truer than in West Africa, where some families in Nigeria and Ghana have a long tradition of sending their children to private boarding schools and universities in the UK. These institutions are especially popular destinations for the offspring of prominent politically exposed persons (PEPs) from the region. Immigration officials, admissions staff, and UK law enforcement are not likely to scrutinize the conditions under which the children of PEPs enroll in British schools, even though the PEPs themselves may have modest legitimate earnings and opaque asset profiles that in other circumstances would raise serious financial concerns. This relative lack of review has allowed some West African PEPs to channel unexplained wealth into the UK education sector. It is not easy to estimate the overall value of this flow, yet it likely exceeds £30 million annually.1 Most of these funds emanate from Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Ghana; compared with these two countries, only a handful of students from elsewhere in West Africa seek an education in British schools. Tackling this small but significant illicit financial flow should be a priority for UK policymakers. In doing so, they would be helping to realize the UK’s global anticorruption objectives, advance its International Education Strategy, and close a troublesome anti–money laundering (AML) loophole. Failing to do so would exacerbate existing corruption challenges both at home and abroad and increase the UK education sector’s reputational liabilities.
Topic:: Corruption, Education, Law Enforcement, Higher Education, and Elites
Political Geography:: Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and West Africa

13. Truth, Accountability, and Asset Recovery: How Transitional Justice Can Fight Corruption

Author:: Ruben Carranza
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: On March 2 and 3, 2020, two weeks before the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a COVID-19 global pandemic, transitional justice and anti-corruption policymakers, experts, and activists from the Gambia, Kenya, South Africa and Armenia met with their counterparts in Tunisia for a two-day conference entitled, “Truth, Accountability and Asset Recovery: How Transitional Justice Can Fight Corruption,” organized by ICTJ with the support of Tunisia’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (INLUCC) and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This diverse group of leaders came together to share solutions to a common problem: How can countries emerging from dictatorship, war, or political transitions hold corrupt ex-rulers accountable, recover their ill-gotten assets, and ensure that those harmed the most by human rights violations and large-scale corruption can achieve justice, obtain reparations, and overcome marginalization? For many countries pursuing transitional justice, including those represented by participants in the conference, the health and economic impact of the pandemic has made it more urgent to find and design solutions that advance accountability for both human rights violations and corruption. In Kenya, for example, citizens questioned the government’s use of $12 million in COVID-19-related aid from the World Bank, “amid reports that the lockdown intended to curb the spread of the virus had worsened poverty, even forcing a mother to cook stones to make her eight children believe she was preparing food for them.” In Tunisia, INLUCC “identified 11 instances of suspected corruption and conflicts of interest” related to a government deal to acquire millions of facemasks. At the conference, participants brought up the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in enabling corruption during dictatorship or in facilitating state capture through privatization. Ninety-seven human rights and anti-corruption groups have jointly reminded the IMF, which has offered loans to pandemic-hit countries even as it continues to set austerity as a condition, that “transparency and accountability are key to making sure the money the IMF is disbursing actually goes to protecting lives and livelihoods.” This report gives an overview of the conference and its five panel discussions. It presents the thematic questions posed in each panel and summarizes the panelists’ statements and the comments and questions from moderators, other panelists, and participants in the audience. By design, the premise of the conference was clear: The practice by mainly global South countries of including accountability for corruption in their transitional justice processes has settled the debate over whether accountability for corruption should be part of transitional justice. In 2008, the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission began investigating land-grabbing, large-scale corruption, and violations of economic and social rights. Soon after the Arab Spring in 2011-2012, Tunisia took the most significant steps when it established the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) with a mandate that covered violent political repression as well as corruption under former President Ben Ali. In its recently released final report, the commission examines the extent of the corruption and how the development policies and austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF enabled it. In 2016, the post-dictatorship government in the Gambia created a truth commission to examine human rights violations as well as a separate commission of inquiry to investigate ex-dictator Yahya Jammeh’s corruption and identify his ill-gotten wealth. The latter commission is now considering using part of those assets to fund reparations. Although corruption was excluded from the mandate of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, activists in 2017 created the People’s Tribunal on Economic Crime that linked the continuity of post-apartheid corruption to the failure to address it in earlier transitional justice processes. In 2018, the South African government then created the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture to investigate specific economic crimes during and after apartheid. After the 2018 revolution in Armenia that ended a decade of authoritarian rule in the post-Soviet state, the new government embarked on prosecutions for corruption and human rights violations and is now considering a truth commission that would examine specific cases of corruption and human rights violations since 1991. These processes informed the conference, and the panelists who were directly involved in them discussed the challenges, successes, and lessons learned. This report’s original intent was to highlight the most important lessons from these experiences and promote South-South exchanges on transitional justice and accountability for corruption. However, the unprecedented global pandemic during which the conference took place has given it another equally relevant purpose. As ICTJ pointed out in a recent special report on COVID-19, “The pandemic is bringing to the surface underlying inequalities, including the unequal access to health care.” With this in mind, the author hopes this report will also offer policymakers practical approaches to transitional justice that can help address those underlying inequalities, such as measures aimed at improving access to health care for the most vulnerable, and initiatives to use recovered ill-gotten assets to fund reparations for victims.
Topic:: Corruption, Reform, Criminal Justice, Institutions, Reparations, COVID-19, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Kenya, Europe, Armenia, North Africa, Tunisia, Gambia, and Africa

14. Dubai Property: An Oasis for Nigeria’s Corrupt Political Elites

Author:: Matthew Page
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For politically exposed persons (PEPs) with ill-gotten wealth, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an alluring destination for investing their gains. Although certainly not the only place to stash money, Dubai—dubbed the commercial capital of the Middle East—exercises minimal oversight and has few legal or logistical obstacles to transferring large amounts of cash or purchasing property. PEPs, defined as individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function, are at higher risk of involvement in unlawful activity due to their positions of influence and access to assets.1 In some cases, government officials and associates who succumb to the temptation become front-page news, but in many other cases, their activities go undetected or uncorroborated, despite the efforts of local authorities and intergovernmental bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force. As a result, billions of dollars are siphoned away to the detriment of both prosperous and struggling economies and societies. The case of Nigeria—home to Africa’s largest economy and the world’s seventh most populous country—offers valuable insights into this phenomenon.2 For Nigerian PEPs in particular, Dubai is an accessible oasis far away from the political drama in their capital, Abuja, or the hustle and bustle of their biggest city, Lagos. But a dearth of specific information about Nigerian PEPs’ property in Dubai has long precluded a deeper analysis of the share of illicit financial outflows from Nigeria; that is, until 2016, when the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (now known as C4ADS) acquired the data of a private database of Dubai real estate information (dubbed the “Sandcastles” data). At least 800 properties were found to have links to Nigerian PEPs or their family members, associates, and suspected proxies. With such information and continued monitoring, Nigerian and Emirati authorities and national and international actors could ramp up their scrutiny on high-end property transactions involving Nigerian elites to ensure that these purchases are not being made with pilfered public funds. The two countries could also deepen bilateral law enforcement cooperation by sharing information and assisting investigations more responsively and routinely. For their part, Western governments, the United Nations, and other international organizations could press the UAE to make its property and corporate records more transparent.
Topic:: Corruption, Economy, Financial Crimes, Elites, and Property
Political Geography:: Africa, Nigeria, Dubai, and Gulf Nations

15. Moment of truth: Mali teeters between President Keïta and the protest movement

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: President Keïta is currently facing a mass movement demanding he step down. Decrying rampant corruption, election rigging, a collapsing economy and rising unemployment, a lack of security, and ethnic conflict, the movement sees his ouster as the first step toward a fourth republic and democracy.
Topic:: Corruption, Democracy, Protests, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: Africa and Mali

16. Whistleblowing in Botswana's Construction Industry : A Public and Private Sector Perspective

Author:: Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:: The construction industry (CI) is considered one of the most corrupt both internationally and regionally. Therefore, this study examined the views and attitudes of professionals in Botswana’s CI towards the role whistleblowing (or protected disclosure) can play in curbing corruption in the sector. A convergent mixed methods approach was adopted. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders from the construction industry. Furthermore, a self-administered survey was utilised to collect quantitative data from 117 construction firms. Data revealed that there was little awareness of whistleblowing legislation. Fear of retaliation or punishment and job loss, and a lack of education on whistleblowing were identified as some of the most substantial barriers to effective whistleblowing in the industry. From a public policy perspective, it is recommended that an emphasis be placed on improving levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in the construction sector. In addition, there should be consideration to amend the Whistleblowing Act 2016 to include construction industry regulators, the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board, and private media amongst the list of institutions authorised to receive reports of impropriety in order to extend the scope of legal protection to whistleblowers in the sector. Recommendations for further research are provided.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Economics, Public Sector, Manufacturing, Economic Development, Private Sector, Industry, and Whistle Blowing
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

17. Corruption Crossroads? Rising Perceptions of Graft Weaken Citizen Trust, Threaten Botswana’s Democratic Standing

Author:: Thomas Isbell and Batlang Seabo
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Corruption is widely considered one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in African countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Corruption hinders macro-economic growth by weakening governance structures and diluting the positive effects of investments. At the micro level, corruption can trap the poorest, who are least likely to have alternatives to state provision of services, in a downward spiral (Peiffer & Rose, 2014). Botswana has long been considered one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and top performers in democratic practice and good governance. But while Transparency International’s (2019) Corruption Perceptions Index continues to rank Botswana as best on the continent, other observers have questioned this reputation (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017; Good, 2017). Allegations have focused on, among other things, high-level corruption in military procurement contracts under former President Ian Khama, close ties between members of the ruling party and the agricultural sector, and charges that well-connected suspects are often cleared by the courts (Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2016; Konopo, 2017; Good, 2017; Norad, 2011; Sebudubudu 2014; Gasennelwe, 2018). Recent corruption scandals have reached the highest levels of government, including the alleged looting of the National Petroleum Fund (Kgalemang, 2019; Motshegwa, Mutonono, & Mikazhu, 2019), and are still before courts of law (Shuma, 2020). In this paper we use Afrobarometer survey data to explore citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Botswana. We find that far more people see corruption increasing than decreasing and that perceptions of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament have risen sharply over the past decade. Fewer Batswana approve of how the government is handling the anti-corruption fight, and while many believe ordinary people can help fight corruption, a majority say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to the authorities. A correlation analysis suggests that perceptions of corruption, especially in the Presidency, are strongly associated with less popular trust in public institutions and less satisfaction with democracy.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Democracy, and Citizenship
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

18. Whistleblowing in Botswana’s Construction Industry: A Public and Private Sector Perspective

Author:: Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:: The construction industry (CI) is considered one of the most corrupt both internationally and regionally. Therefore, this study examined the views and attitudes of professionals in Botswana’s CI towards the role whistleblowing (or protected disclosure) can play in curbing corruption in the sector. A convergent mixed methods approach was adopted. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders from the construction industry. Furthermore, a self-administered survey was utilised to collect quantitative data from 117 construction firms. Data revealed that there was little awareness of whistleblowing legislation. Fear of retaliation or punishment and job loss, and a lack of education on whistleblowing were identified as some of the most substantial barriers to effective whistleblowing in the industry. From a public policy perspective, it is recommended that an emphasis be placed on improving levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in the construction sector. In addition, there should be consideration to amend the Whistleblowing Act 2016 to include construction industry regulators, the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board, and private media amongst the list of institutions authorised to receive reports of impropriety in order to extend the scope of legal protection to whistleblowers in the sector. Recommendations for further research are provided.
Topic:: Corruption, Public Sector, Private Sector, Whistle Blowing, and Construction
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

19. Donor Assistance in the Transparency and Accountability Movement

Author:: Davin O'Regan
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Focusing on transparency and anti-corruption issues, this report discusses the findings from a series of participatory workshops and more than seventy interviews with social movement actors and organizations in Kenya, Nigeria, and Ukraine. It looks at the different ways social movement actors in these countries were influenced by foreign financial support and training, including in terms of the goals they set, the tactics and activities they pursue, and whether receiving foreign support compromises their legitimacy with their domestic constituents.
Topic:: Corruption, Social Movement, Accountability, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, Europe, Ukraine, and Nigeria

20. Conflict Prevention in Kenya: Combating Corruption through Nonviolent Action

Author:: Tabatha Thompson and Hussein Khalid
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The relationship between corruption and violent conflict is complex and significant. Corruption affects access to basic services, contributes to resource scarcity, and fuels organized crime. It was included on a European Commission checklist for the root causes of conflict, and it was cited as a potential driver of extremism in the 2019 report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Focusing on several social movements in Kenya, this report reviews the efforts of collective civic action to combat corruption and advance transparency, accountability, and good governance.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Corruption, Governance, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Peace
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

21. Post-Authoritarian Nigeria: Democratizing Under Pervasive Corruption

Author:: Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: In the last three decades, the global intellectual spaces have been proliferated with scholarly studies which have explored the processes of democratization in the hitherto authoritarian, but now “democratizing” societies of the Global South (see Diamond 1995; Alexander 2002). Interestingly, while these studies, would appear to have to added to scholarly understanding of democracy, outside the lenses of the early “democratizers”, by identifying conditions under which democracy, once launched, in new democracies, could be safeguarded from break-down or reversal. However, they seem to have been skewed, in focus and orientations towards the experiences of the early “Third Waver” of Latin America, with scanty attention to African countries (see Diamond 1996; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Even, few Africanist works, such as Villalon and Von Doepp (2006) and Cho and Logan (2009), that focus on Africa, by interrogating the processes of democratization while no doubt, have offered robust arguments to explaining the poor performance of Africa’s new “democracies”; sidelined the issue of corruption. Yet, the incidence of corruption, going by the publicity it has been given by regional and global institutions remains a gargantuan monster that has thwarted the continent’s march to sustainable development (Schiller 2000). It is against the backdrop of this observed gap in the literature that this article, with a focus on post-authoritarian Nigeria, examines the character of democratization process, in Africa, under condition of pervasive corruption. Following this introductory preamble, which sets the background and significance of the study, is the second section that conceptualizes and contextualizes the key concepts that are germane to this study. Section three explores and surveys extant literature on the nexus between democracy and corruption. In the section that follows, the Nigerian experience with democracy and corruption, in the post-Authoritarian era, is interrogated and discussed. Section five develops an explanatory framework for explaining the core problematique in the discourse. The sixth section sums up the arguments, reflects and concludes with a number of submissions.
Topic:: Corruption, Democratization, Governance, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

22. Gender and Corruption in Botswana: Perceptions, Participation and Considerations for Anti-Corruption Policy

Author:: Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:: Several studies have argued that corruption has a greater impact on women than men and that increasing women’s representation in key decision-making positions has a positive effect in reducing corruption. However, limited scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to understanding the link between gender and corruption in Botswana. This paper explores the gendered differences of perceived and actual participation in bureaucratic corruption in Botswana. By examining Afrobarometer data and undertaking a documentary analysis, the study finds that while levels of perceived corruption by men and women in public institutions were high, participation in bureaucratic corruption (bribery) was considerably lower. Contrary to the notion that corruption has a greater impact on women than men, this study finds that higher levels of participation across all public service categories were reported by unemployed men, in particular, having to give a gift or a favour to avoid problems with the police. Notwithstanding the scant availability of data, the documentary analysis revealed that non-monetary forms of corruption such as sextortion (sexual extortion) have been experienced by female students and undocumented female migrants in Botswana. Nevertheless, this form of corruption has received little policy attention, despite its potential to undermine gender equality efforts. Additionally, the study finds little correlation between higher levels of women’s representation in key decision-making positions (i.e., parliament and cabinet) and lower levels of corruption in Botswana. There is a need for both the gender and anti-corruption policy framework to be synthesised in order to specifically reflect on and respond to the perceived gendered dimensions of corruption. The establishment of an independent police authority or commission might not only increase levels of public trust and confidence in the police service, but also strengthen levels of transparency and accountability.
Topic:: Corruption, Public Policy, Participation, Gender, and Perception
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

23. Gender and Corruption in Botswana: Perceptions, Participation and Considerations for Anti-Corruption Policy

Author:: Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:: Several studies have argued that corruption has a greater impact on women than men and that increasing women’s representation in key decision-making positions has a positive effect in reducing corruption. However, limited scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to understanding the link between gender and corruption in Botswana. This paper explores the gendered differences of perceived and actual participation in bureaucratic corruption in Botswana. By examining Afrobarometer data and undertaking a documentary analysis, the study finds that while levels of perceived corruption by men and women in public institutions were high, participation in bureaucratic corruption (bribery) was considerably lower. Contrary to the notion that corruption has a greater impact on women than men, this study finds that higher levels of participation across all public service categories were reported by unemployed men, in particular, having to give a gift or a favour to avoid problems with the police. Notwithstanding the scant availability of data, the documentary analysis revealed that non-monetary forms of corruption such as sextortion (sexual extortion) have been experienced by female students and undocumented female migrants in Botswana. Nevertheless, this form of corruption has received little policy attention, despite its potential to undermine gender equality efforts. Additionally, the study finds little correlation between higher levels of women’s representation in key decision-making positions (i.e., parliament and cabinet) and lower levels of corruption in Botswana. There is a need for both the gender and anti-corruption policy framework to be synthesised in order to specifically reflect on and respond to the perceived gendered dimensions of corruption. The establishment of an independent police authority or commission might not only increase levels of public trust and confidence in the police service, but also strengthen levels of transparency and accountability.
Topic:: Corruption, Gender Issues, Migration, Politics, Women, and Men
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

24. Malawi: The Road to the 2019 Tripartite Elections. Reflections on Corruption, Land and Multiparty Politics

Author:: Stephanie Regalia
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 21st 2019, Malawi will hold its tripartite elections, where voters will vote for the President, Members of Parliament and local Councillors. 2019 will also mark the 25 years of multiparty politics in Malawi since the one-party regime presided by Hastings Kamuzu Banda came to an end in 1994. The transition to multiparty democracy has been encouraging with the number of large political parties steadily growing and power peacefully changing hands between the four presidents, the country has known since 1994. In this context, the race to the 2019 elections is particularly competitive. The most recent polls place voter intention for the outgoing president Peter Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at a near tie with the lead opposition candidate Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The MCP used to be the only authorized political party under Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s rule. Its return to the forefront of voter intentions signals important changes in the landscape of political actors in Malawi. This paper explores some of the reasons behind this changing political landscape. It looks at the DPP’s recent loss of support due to discontent with rampant corruption and a controversial land reform passed in 2016. It also examines the landscape of challengers, including the current Vice President Saulos Chilima, following his departure from DPP ranks to form a new political movement, the United Transformation Movement (UTM). Given the diversity of large political parties in contention, which also includes Atupele Muluzi’s United Democratic Front (UDF) and Joyce Banda’s People’s Party (PP), the possibility of securing victory in the 2019 presidential election may rest on the ability of political parties to form strategic electoral alliances. This may require moving past political parties formed solely around the personality and identity of their leaders to a more issue-based political debate.
Topic:: Corruption, Politics, Elections, Land, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: Africa and Malawi

25. Can Building Bridges Break the Cycles of Corruption and Political Violence in Kenya?

Author:: Agatha Ndonga and Ruben Carranza
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: In its report, the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission concluded that “corruption is endemic in Kenya” and that “there is a direct link between corruption and gross violation of human rights.” This paper considers the extent of impunity for corruption in Kenya, how corruption fuels and facilitates political violence and land injustices, and how Kenya can learn from other countries’ experiences to go beyond building bridges among the elite and meaningfully protect the rights of its citizens.
Topic:: Political Violence, Corruption, Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, and Truth
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

26. Rent Seeking and Industrial Growth in Africa: The Case of Dangote’s Cement Industry

Author:: Adeoye O. Akinola
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Over the years, Africa has been noted for its socio-economic turmoil, and one of the decisive factors responsible for its dwindling economic fortune has been the lack of industrialization or de-industrialization experienced in the region. Africa is not lacking in both human and natural resources required for the attainment of socio- economic greatness; however, the lack of will-power and necessary policies to spur industrial growth have been evident. Although, Africa had recorded economic growth indicators decades ago, but the lack of its industrial prowess to sustain such has had a debilitating effect on its economy. This has made it imperative to acknowledge the policy-gaps in the industrialization question and explore the factors responsible for the lull in its industrial growth. Western scholarship holds that corruption and rent seeking hurts Africa’s quest for industrialization, but I contend with ascribing the same understanding to the two concepts and argue that rent seeking is required to drive the industrial agenda of African states. Through the case study of Dangote’s investment in the Cement industry in Africa, and unstructured interview of key players in the industrialization project, the article examines the place of rent-seeking in Africa’s industrial growth. Rents is essential in developing economies to spur the development of infant industries; thus, the implementation of ‘conditional’ rents- friendly policy remains the answer towards achieving industrial growth and development in Africa.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Economic Growth, Industrialization, and Industry
Political Geography:: Africa

27. From Manifesto Promise to Policy Implementation: Analysis of Government’s Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication Program

Author:: Gilfred Asiamah, Awal Swallah, Kojo Asante, and Samuel Baaye
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:: The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) with funding support from the Department for International Development (DFID) under its Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) program has initiated a project to track the implementation of the government's flagship Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication Program (IPEP).
Topic:: Corruption, Government, Poverty, Infrastructure, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

28. Practice and Perils of Vote Buying in Nigeria’s Recent Elections

Author:: Freedom C. Onuoha and Jide Ojo
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: “Going, going, gone!” is a refrain commonly used to herald the determination of the highest bidder of an item being sold on auction. This process of presenting items for bid, taking bids, and then selling them to the highest bidder aptly encapsulates a questionable practice that has permeated Nigeria’s recent electoral experience: vote buying. Vote buying is not fundamentally new to Nigeria’s electoral politics or only restricted to Nigeria or Africa.1 According to Matenga, however, “nearly 80% of voters from 36 African countries believe voters are bribed – either sometimes, often or always. Furthermore, 16% of voters in African countries reported being offered money or goods in exchange for their vote during the last election”. Since the return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999, vote buying has steadily grown in scale and brazenness. Several videos and images have emerged, showing unabashed sharing of cash, food and valuable items among the electorate by politicians and parties during recent elections in Edo, Anambra, Ondo and Ekiti states. This has led to the apt description of Nigeria’s electoral politics as “cash-and-carry democracy”. If not urgently addressed, this trend portends grave danger for Nigeria’s democracy. This article therefore highlights the nature, causes and implications of vote buying for democratic governance in Nigeria.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Bribery
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

29. Bounded Autonomy: What Limits Zimbabweans’ Trust in their Courts and Electoral Commission?

Author:: Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: After the Constitutional Court upheld the election results of 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe’s leading opposition party ended its online public response with the following message to newly confirmed President Emmerson Mnangagwa: “You can rig the elections. You can capture ZEC [Zimbabwe Electoral Commission]. You can capture [the] judiciary. But you will never capture the people. Their will shall prevail. The people shall govern!” (Movement for Democratic Change, 2018). While some might dismiss it as partisan rhetoric, the MDC statement points to critical issues for Zimbabwe’s democracy – the autonomy, and perceived autonomy, of the country’s courts and electoral commission. This policy paper analyzes public trust in these two institutions. Though intended to act as independent custodians of the Constitution and the electoral process, both the judiciary and the electoral commission are frequently accused of being beholden to political leaders. This year’s election is not the first to be accompanied by allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, and politically tainted court decisions. Allegations of bias are frequently leveled against judges from the High Court and Supreme Court, even between election cycles. Yet previous analysis of Afrobarometer data has shown that Zimbabwe’s courts are among the most trusted on the continent (Logan, 2017). And trust in the ZEC has doubled since 2010. How do these seemingly contradictory views fit together? Our analysis of public opinion data suggests that citizens trust these two institutions within bounds. For court cases involving only ordinary citizens and technical electoral issues such as the rollout of the biometric voter registration (BVR), the judiciary and the ZEC enjoy substantial public confidence. But faced with politically sensitive issues, they no longer find broad popular support. Afrobarometer survey data show clear differences in trust levels among citizens over time and along party lines. Public confidence in the judiciary is heavily dependent on whether it is perceived to hold the president and the powerful elite that surrounds him to account. Similarly, trust in the electoral commission depends less on its ability to handle managerial tasks in preparation for Election Day and more on its ability to ensure an accurate count of ballots and the resolution of post-election conflicts.
Topic:: Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Courts, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

30. Mainstreaming Corruption Poverty and Development in Nigeria

Author:: Jolaade Omede and Arinze Ngwube
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: The culture of corruption has continued to plague the Nigeria society in all sectors at an alarming rate creating culture of acceptability of such a way of life. That corruption is endemic and has assumed a national way of life is a disturbing reality in Nigeria. It is this light that Achebe (1983, 38) avers that anyone who can say that corruption in Nigeria has not yet reached an alarming proportion is either a fool, crook or else does not live in Nigeria. He further posits that the situation has become so worse to the extent that keeping a Nigeria from being corrupt is like preventing a goat from eating yam. Corroborating this view, Anazodo, Okoye and Ezenwile (2012, 124) submit that corruption in Nigeria has affected all the political, economic and social facets of Nigeria and these are responsible for decayed infrastructure,downturn of the economy, fragile political institutions and steady decline in all institutions of national development.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Poverty, and Governance
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

31. Following the Money in Ghana: From the Grassroots to the Hallways of the IMF

Author:: Abdulkarim Mohammed
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:: Between 2011 and 2014, Ghana went from boasting the world’s fastest growing economy to requiring a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While a global downturn in commodity prices precipitated the fall, a lack of accountability in how public finances have been managed has been at the heart of the problem. Fiscal indiscipline, fueled by a lack of oversight and rampant corruption, left the government unable to mount an effective response during lean economic times. Oxfam and its civil society partners in Ghana were worried that everyday Ghanaians would be left shouldering the burden of the economic crisis. Moreover, Ghanaians worried that their concerns and aspirations would not be represented in the high-level negotiations on the bailout between the Government of Ghana and the IMF. To address these concerns Oxfam and its partners coordinated a multi-level advocacy campaign. The campaign drew together a diverse coalition of civil society—from community activists to globally influential think tanks—able to represent and articulate local level concerns and project a united voice at the national and global levels. This novel approach proved highly successful in driving important changes in policy and practice that have enhanced accountability, fiscal responsibility, and citizens’ participation. The campaign not only contributed to improving the laws governing how public finances are managed in Ghana, but also helped to increase pro-poor spending and protect crucial social services.
Topic:: Civil Society, Corruption, Accountability, Social Services, Participation, IMF, Oversight, and Public Spending
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

32. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria’s Soft Power

Author:: Oluwaseun Tella
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Academic scholarship on Nigeria’s regional credentials and influence has focused on its hard power (economic and military capability). Despite the increasing relevance given to soft power in the 21st century, this aspect of the country’s status has been neglected. This article contributes to the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy by engaging the currencies of its power of attraction and the limitations that constrain the optimization of this source of power. It employs constructivism as its theoretical lens and concludes that addressing challenges such as ubiquitous corruption and Boko Haram terrorism would enhance Nigeria’s credibility and ultimately its soft power projection in the international arena.
Topic:: Corruption, State Formation, Regionalism, and Power
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

33. Nigeria’s Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled

Author:: Ebere R. Adigbuo
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: There is no doubt that Nigerians conceive their country as the giant state in Africa, principally for the country’s human and material endowments. In the realm of foreign policy, it is Nigeria’s status more than that of any other black African country, that most determines Africa’s collective future. Nigeria is determined not just to play its leadership role in Africa, but to also build upon it.1 It is against this background that Nigeria’s problem of capability comes in. A country that utilizes less than 10% of total steel used in Africa, less than 12% of all the power generated in Africa, a country that is associated with institutional failings and where social upheavals threatens the polity because of inept and corrupt leadership, it is doubtful if Africa will entrust its destiny to the crippled state. Using the “leadership role conception”2 as the theoretical framework, this paper examines the successes and challenges in this monumental task of leading Africa in the 21st century.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Corruption, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

34. Democratic Governance and the Frightening Impact of Corruption in Contemporary Nigerian Society

Author:: Christian Chima Chukwu
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Studies of Changing Societies Journal (SCS)
Institution:: Studies of Changing Societies Journal (SCS)
Abstract:: This work examines democratic governance and the frightening impact of corruption in contemporary Nigerian society in a bid to restore confidence in good governance and also improve the socio- economic development of the citizenry after fifty seven years of independence. Related literatures to the variables were reviewed including the adoption of the descriptive and content analytical method in the analysis of the secondary data in order to achieve the objectives of this study. Also, the social learning theory was employed as theoretical framework to find essence. Findings reveal that the phenomenon of corruption has evidently graduated beyond impunity, both in volume, scale, breadth, depth and has become a national cancer. In addition, the study notes that corruption has swallowed up Nigerian politicians into yet other webs of delusion, and deception such that the pursuit of corrupt practices by them, seem greeted with ovation. Aside this, the paper also highlights that since the mad rush for corrupt practices, especially amongst politicians seems impossible to abate, the alarming rate of vicious opulence which has engulfed the Nigerian nation clearly demonstrates naivety, desperation and un-Godly helplessness. Based on all these, the paper suggests that there is the urgent need to halt the hypocritical position in corruption cases involving high influential members of the government as well as the immunity covertly granted their cronies. The paper recommends that amongst other measures, government should not only be transparent in enforcing all relevant laws against corruption, but prosecute all those found culpable. Finally, Judicial Service Commission as autonomous body should halt the incessant dismissal of corrupt cases by judges on technical grounds, as well as continuing to beam its searchlight on all corrupt judicial officers.
Topic:: Corruption, Economics, Governance, Democracy, Financial Crimes, Transparency, and Judiciary
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

35. Efficacy for Fighting Corruption: Evidence from 36 African Countries

Author:: Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Corruption is a major obstacle to economic growth, human development, and poverty reduction (Mauro, 1995, 2004; Asiedu, 2006). The practice of demanding or expecting monetary or other benefits in exchange for preferential treatment has plagued the global South, and high-profile revelations of corruption in politics and business have shed light on the magnitude of the problem (Baker, 2016; McCool, 2015). The poor are most vulnerable to both the immediate effects of having to pay bribes or do favours and the longer-term impacts of hampered growth and weakened investment power (Hosken, 2017; Baker, 2016). Recent research by Peiffer and Rose (2014) and Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) notes that poor citizens faced with official corruption have fewer means to seek out services from alternative providers and are thus forced to “play the game.” In recent years, headlines have pointed toward a stronger stance against corruption in Africa. In South Africa, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and other countries, scandals and government responses have placed corruption at center stage. In Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari’s winning ticket in 2015 included zero tolerance for corruption, and he has taken several steps to try to fight what he calls the “hydra-headed monster” (Maclean, 2016; Gaffey, 2016). In Tanzania, President John Magafuli won the 2015 election after a campaign denouncing corruption and misconduct among civil servants (Muvunyi, 2016). No doubt strong and committed leadership is necessary if meaningful progress is to be made in fighting corruption. But as with any attempt to change the status quo, it is equally important that the policy be accepted, “lived,” and enforced by ordinary citizens. To what extent do ordinary Africans feel they can combat corruption? What informs whether citizens believe they can play a role? Findings from Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014/2015) surveys suggest that education and material security contribute to building efficacy among ordinary citizens for the fight against corruption. But leadership also matters: Perceptions that elected leaders or officials are corrupt make citizens less likely to think they can make a difference.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Transparency, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Africa

36. Beyond the Card Reader: Elections Rigging as an Emerging National Security Threat in Nigeria

Author:: Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Hakeem Onapajo
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage)
Abstract:: This paper provides an evaluation of the existing technological strategies in the Nigerian electoral process with a view to ascertain their reputed efficacy for solving the problem of electoral malpractices in the country. Are the devices really fit for purpose? Will they address the accreditation problems and prevent multiple voting and other forms of elections rigging and malpractices? Is Nigeria technically ready and able to manage effectively electronic devices that have the potential of being used to unleash massive electoral fraud that could completely undermine peaceful coexistence within its fragile and sensitive electoral context? It then provides policy recommendations on advancing the measures to improve the credibility of elections in Nigeria.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Developing World, Elections, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

37. South Africa. The Need for Change

Author:: Giovanni Carbone
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Has the new South Africa – once an inspiring “rainbow nation” – failed the expectations it had generated? Is the country now in a crisis? Two decades after the end of the apartheid regime, Africa’s southernmost state faces multiple political, economic and social challenges. A lackluster growth performance is compounded by mounting corruption and political turbulence, as well as by the frustration of many ordinary citizens who expected much more rapid social and economic improvement. Labour strikes, student protests and anti-immigrant riots have all been on the rise. As a clear sign of increasing dissatisfaction, uncertainty and decline, the ruling African National Congress recently ran into its worst electoral result ever – if still only at local levels. Meanwhile, Jacob Zuma’s embattled presidency, marred by allegations of corruption and political cronyism, sent South Africa’s international image plummeting alongside the Rand, the national currency. This volume sheds light on the current difficulties and discusses future prospects. The “new” South Africa is a country in dire need for change.
Topic:: Corruption, Elections, Economic Growth, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: South Africa and Africa

38. Breakfast Talk by Thuli Madonsela (former Public Protector of South Africa)

Author:: Rosalie Dieleman and David Lando
Publication Date:: 11-2016
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: Ms. Madonsela is the former Public Protector of South Africa, Chairperson of the African Ombudsman Research Center in South Africa, and one of the drafters of the South African post-Apartheid constitution. She has been in the spotlight during the last year for a report she filed before leaving the Office of the Protector regarding the connection between South African President Zuma and Indian-South African lucrative businessmen Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta. The report “details a disturbing web of influence exerted over parts of the South African state by a powerful family of Mr. Zuma’s chums”,[1] the Gupta family. The report indicates that the Gupta family was involved in political appointment, including that of the South African finance minister.
Topic:: Apartheid, Corruption, Law, and Legal Theory
Political Geography:: Africa, South Africa, and Southern Africa

39. Election Quality, Public Trust are Central Issues for Africa’s Upcoming Contests

Author:: Peter Penar, Rose Aiko, Thomas Bentley, and Kangwook Han
Publication Date:: 09-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Nothing kindles democracy’s energies, anxieties, hopes, and frustrations like an election. The quality of an election can spell the difference between a cooking fire and an explosion. If a successful election can calm and focus a nation (e.g. Namibia 2015), a disputed election can tear it apart (e.g. Burundi 2015, Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Kenya 2008). With at least 25 African countries conducting national elections in 2016-2017,1 great attention is focused on electoral management bodies – typically national electoral commissions – as crucial players in electoral processes and in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud and, even if it doesn’t swing an election, produce political alienation, public mistrust, protest, and violence. In 2016, we have already seen examples of unrest in Kenya, where opposition calls for electoral commission reforms using the hashtag #IEBCMustFall have sparked demonstrations and a violent reaction from security forces; in the Republic of the Congo, where election malpractices led to violent protests; and in Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after President Ali Bongo claimed a widely disputed re-election victory. In Ghana, pre-election anxieties are high amid questions about the electoral commission’s revision of the voter roll for December’s election. Against the backdrop of history’s examples – in Africa and elsewhere – of tampering with voter rolls, suppression of competition and voter turnout, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, multiple voting, and manipulation of results, free and fair elections, agreed to in the African Union’s Charter on Good Governance and Elections, depend on competent election management supported by citizen sensitization efforts to build public confidence. Using 2014/2015 Afrobarometer data from 36 African countries, this analysis examines public perceptions of electoral management institutions and the quality of elections. Overall, public trust in national electoral commissions is moderate at best. Although a majority of citizens say their most recent elections were mostly free and fair, citizens express serious concerns about the fairness of vote counts, corruption during elections, and the safety of voters during campaigns and at the polls. Citizens’ views of electoral commission performance and election quality generally mirror the opinions of country experts found in international assessments. More broadly, many citizens say elections are not working well as mechanisms to ensure that people’s views are represented and that voters can hold non-performing leaders accountable. Few countries have achieved improvement in the perceived performance of elections over the past decade.
Topic:: Corruption, Public Opinion, Elections, and Election watch
Political Geography:: Africa

40. Botswana's Democratic Consolidation: What Will it Take?

Author:: Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:: 01-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Botswana is Africa’s oldest continuous democracy, having enjoyed decades of peaceful multipartyism since independence in 1966. However, this success is tempered by growing concerns that the country’s remarkable stability has come at the cost of further political development. Significant weaknesses in Botswana’s democracy include low civic participation, relatively weak opposition and civil society sectors, and a lack of incumbent turnover in 11 consecutive free and fair elections. Despite these challenges, Botswana has maintained its reputation as an African success story due to the scale, pace, and endurance of its socioeconomic and political development, particularly given setbacks elsewhere in the region. Democracy is one of Botswana’s four founding principles and is a pillar of its National Vision 2016, which has driven development plans since 1997 (Presidential Task Group, 1997).1 The Vision 2016 Council’s evaluation of the country’s progress on this front is largely positive, citing high rankings on international benchmarks relative to other African countries (Botswana Vision 2016 Council, 2015). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, ranks Botswana as the least corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa, while Freedom House has classified the country as “free” since 1973. In recent years, however, the country’s CPI score has declined (Transparency International, 2015), and in 2009, Freedom House downgraded Botswana’s political rights rating as a result of “decreased transparency and accountability in the executive branch under President Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s administration” (Freedom House, 2015a).
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Governance, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

41. Does Personal Experience of Bribery Explain Protest Participation in Africa?

Author:: Moletsane Monyake
Publication Date:: 07-2016
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Protests, boycotts, and online petitions targeting alleged corruption are fast becoming commonplace in many of the world’s most corrupt nations. In addition to the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and the Color Revolutions in Ukraine, a series of anti-corruption protests have emerged in Nigeria, Moldova, and India and forced Guatemala's president, Otto Pérez Molina, to resign following allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and bribery (Luhnow, 2015). In 2009, thousands of Indonesians took to the streets to oppose attempts by corrupt elements in government and business to frustrate the work of Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency (Beyerle, 2014). In 2015, more than a million Brazilians demonstrated against systemic corruption. While earlier protests centered on a wide range of socioeconomic grievances, media reports indicate that the recent protests in Brazil were specifically inspired by allegations of corruption, especially in the presidency (see, for example, Magalhaes & Jelmayer, 2015). Indeed, it would seem, as Transparency International co-founder Frank Vogl, observed, “… that ordinary citizens, even in some of the most corrupt nations … and some of the most dangerous for anti-corruption activists, can organize and secure justice” (Vogl, 2012, p. 193). Nevertheless, recent academic analyses of different forms of anti-corruption collective action seem to take for granted the motives of the individuals who participate in these endeavours, focusing more on the strategies and tactics of the civil-society organizations that mobilize against corruption (see Beyerle, 2014; Landell-Mills, 2013). Furthermore, the fact that Landell-Mills, Beyerle, and others restrict their analysis to instances of “successful” anti-corruption civic engagement constrains variation on the dependent variable. For that reason, their research offers a limited account of why anti-corruption collective action does not occur in societies that often share similar attributes with those in which such initiatives seem to thrive. Attempts at more systematic comparisons also focus almost exclusively on institutional factors underlying the successes or failures of anti-corruption civic engagement, offering no explanation about variations in individual-level participation. While Verdenicci and Hough (2015) underscore the role of state institutions in the “success” of civilian-led anti-corruption initiatives in India, and their apparent failure in China, they do not explain why participation rates differ in the former. In essence, the overemphasis on the institutional context seems to play down the role of individual-level factors in explaining anti-corruption civic engagement, particularly the effect of perceptions and experiences of corruption.
Topic:: Corruption, Social Movement, Protests, Participation, and Bribery
Political Geography:: Africa

42. Corruption and Political Stability in Post-Conflict Countries: Its There Really a Trade-Off?

Author:: Franziska Perlick
Publication Date:: 03-2016
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:: The assumption of a trade-off between the levels of corruption and political stability in a post-conflict situations is not new to the peacebuilding debate, but expert opinions deviate significantly on how the former may affect the latter. The study at hand asks whether corruption is a significant obstacle for peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, or might even have a stabilizing effect. The concept of Hybrid Political Orders is used to model post-conflict societies. The basic assumptions of the literature analysis of central concepts of peacebuilding and corruption are tested against the case study of Sierra Leone for the period 2002-2012. Assuming different concepts of factors of political stability, such as legitimacy, it becomes clear that the effect of corruption on political stability can vary significantly, depending on the socio-economic and socio-cultural context, and is not necessarily destabilizing.
Topic:: Corruption, Political stability, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and Sierra Leone

43. The Viability of Political Opposition in Africa: Popular Views

Author:: Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:: 08-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: How competitive are African political regimes? Why do opposition parties often struggle to gain a foothold? In many countries, an incumbent ruling party dominates the political arena, essentially reducing elections to a one-horse race and limiting day-to-day governance to a closed shop. In these countries it is unclear whether opposition political parties are sufficiently viable – either alone or in electoral alliance – to amass enough votes to win and exercise political office. This paper addresses the question of opposition viability from the perspective of ordinary African citizens. Do citizens desire real choices at the ballot box? Do they differentiate ruling and opposition parties, and if so, how? And how do they perceive the role of the political opposition in the long periods between elections? Do they wish opposition parties to play the classic democratic role of holding rulers accountable? And what explains the perceived viability of political opposition?
Topic:: Corruption, Democracy, Opposition, and Partisanship
Political Geography:: Africa

44. Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa

Author:: Emile Ouédraogo
Publication Date:: 07-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Vivid examples of weak military professionalism in Africa are regularly evident in news accounts of instability on the continent. Militaries collapsing in the face of attacks by irregular forces, coups, mutinies, looting, human rights abuses against civilian populations, corruption, and engagement in illicit trafficking activities are widespread. This pattern persists decades after the end of colonialism, despite billions of dollars of security sector assistance and longstanding rhetoric on the need to strengthen civil-military relations on the continent. The costs for not having established strong professional militaries are high: persistent instability, chronic poverty, deterred investment, and stunted democratization.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Human Rights, and Post Colonialism
Political Geography:: Africa

45. Responding to Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea

Author:: Patrice Sartre
Publication Date:: 07-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Peace Institute
Abstract:: The Gulf of Guinea has become notorious for its violent conflicts and political instability. This insecurity has its origins in bad governance, corruption, and failures of social and economic development. Violent power struggles and competition for the control of economic assets periodically cause crises to flare up, and these tend to be persistent and widespread. The international community has worked to move countries in the region onto a stable trajectory. West Africa has also made efforts to develop a coordinated approach to the region's challenges through a common security architecture. Such subregional initiatives may ultimately prove most conducive to long-term stability.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, and Governance
Political Geography:: Africa

46. Who says elections in Ghana are ‘free and fair’?

Author:: Sharon Parku
Publication Date:: 11-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Since 2000, elections in Ghana have been lauded by observers both internally and externally as being “free and fair.” The losing political party, however, has consistently contested the election results. After the 2004 presidential election, three key opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) members challenged the results announced by the Electoral Commission (EC), suing the EC to publish detailed data from the election. Similarly, at the end of the closely contested 2008 presidential election and the subsequent run-off, leading NDC members accused the EC of trying to manipulate results, and their frustrated supporters invaded the EC head office in Accra. When the NDC was eventually declared the winner, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) accused the NDC of rigging the election. Again in the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election, the opposition NPP accused the winner – John Dramani Mahama and the NDC – of rigging the election, boycotted the inauguration of the president, and asked the Supreme Court to overturn the official results declared by the EC.
Topic:: Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Election watch, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

47. Africa's Willing Taxpayers Thwarted by Opaque Tax systems, Corruption

Author:: Rose Aiko and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Afrobarometer survey data, covering 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa reveal widespread citizen commitment to the principle of taxation and to taking responsibility – by paying their taxes – for national development. But taxation systems across the continent remain opaque to large majorities. Most find it difficult to know what they owe, and the public is even more in the dark when it comes to understanding how tax revenues are actually used by governments. Moreover, perceived corruption among tax authorities remains significant, and evidence suggests these perceptions undermine public commitment to the integrity of the tax system and increase the likelihood of non-compliance.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Tax Systems, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Africa

48. Tanzania and Statoil: What Does the Leaked Agreement Mean for Citizens?

Author:: David Manley and Thomas Lassourd
Publication Date:: 08-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:: The leak in July 2014 of an important addendum to a production sharing agreement (PSA) between Norwegian national oil company Statoil and the government of Tanzania has ignited a debate on whether Tanzania “got a good deal” from granting these extraction rights for a block now expected to produce large amounts of commercial natural gas. The debate demonstrates a public appetite for explanations from the government on the country’s management of its nascent oil and gas industry. Potentially at stake are billions of dollars of potential revenues that could boost socio-economic development in Tanzania if it becomes possible to extract these gas resources. An NRGI financial analysis suggests that the deal is not out of line with international standards for a country that had no proven offshore reserves of natural gas at the time when the original contract was signed. Thus claims that the addendum is on its face grossly unfair to Tanzania appear to be premature. The outgoing managing director of Tanzania’s national oil company TPDC gave an estimate of the government’s take of 61 percent, a figure that our own model determined to be plausible under a reasonable set of assumptions. There are some caveats to this result which we explain in the body of the main briefing.
Topic:: Corruption, Natural Resources, Tax Systems, Accountability, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:: Africa, Tanzania, and Sub-Saharan Africa

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS