Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Afghanistan

1. Pakistan’s Evolving Militant Landscape: State Responses and Policy options

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Muhammad Amir Rana, and Safdar Sial
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
At a time when a major shift is happening in the militant landscape of the country and a political transition is taking place, it is imperative to reevaluate the evolving positions and strategies of not only the militant groups but also the newly formed governments. Against this backdrop, this report seeks to delve into the emerging dynamics of Pakistan's militant landscape and security besides analysing state capacities and responses, along with potential policy shifts post-transition. While much of the research and analyses in Pakistan since Taliban takeover of Kabul has predominantly focused on aspects such as the Taliban regime's governance, Pak-Afghan bilateral affairs, and regional geopolitics, there remains a glaring absence of credible and comprehensive investigations into the broader repercussions of the evolving Afghan scenario on Pakistan's security landscape. Despite periodic headlines on the Pakistani government's negotiations with the proscribed TTP, there has been a dearth of empirical research exploring the overall fallout of Afghanistan's changing dynamics on Pakistan's security. In light of this context, PIPS undertook a firsthand, empirical investigation into the expanding terrorism landscape in the country, scrutinizing the formation of new alliances and networks among terrorist groups, mapping the geographical spread of insecurity and violence, and assessing their ramifications for both domestic and regional security paradigms, among other things. The insights gleaned from this investigation were subsequently utilized to formulate context-specific policy recommendations on how to manage or prevent the negative fallout from evolving Afghanistan situation on Pakistan and the region.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Minorities, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

2. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 12

Author:
Osama Ahmad, Imran Mukhtar, and Hazrat Bilal
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The Pak Institute for Peace Studies held its 12th quarterly consultation on “Afghan peace and reconciliation: Pakistan’s interests and policy options” in Islamabad on March 15, 2024. The consultation focused on two main themes: “Pakistan’s Afghan policy puzzle: challenges and opportunities for the new government” and “The counterterrorism and counter-extremism challenges for the new federal and provincial governments.” Participants included lawmakers from national and provincial assemblies, diplomats, retired miltary officials, academics, journalists, policy analysts, and experts on Afghan affairs. The distinguished speakers talked about the policy challenges confronting the new government. They were particularly skeptical about the new government’s ability to formulate the country’s Afghan policy, and were worried about surging terrorism in the country, India's increasing influence in Afghanistan, province-center worsening relations, and Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with the neighboring countries. In the first session, the discussion revolved around how the newly formed coalition government will address critical issues such as countering terrorism and improving relations with Afghanistan and other neighboring countries. The need for a solution to Balochistan problem was highlighted. Apart from that, various factors leading to worsening relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were discussed, for instance the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factor, deportation of Afghan refugees, border insecurity, and cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan. The participants also linked the success of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to peace in the region. Pakistan's failure to extend goodwill into Afghanistan was termed a significant problem. It was argued that Pakistan's forceful expulsion of Afghan refugees significantly eroded Pakistan's good image in Afghanistan. The participants urged the government to take political ownership of foreign and internal policies and strengthen the role of parliament in order to set things right both at home and abroad. However, they lamented the inability of the political government to assert itself, thereby allowing space to non-democratic forces to decide unilaterally on critical matters. In the second session, the consultation focused on the counterterrorism policies in the center and provinces. The prevailing antagonistic relations between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s (PTI) government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the coalition government in Islamabad were thought to prevent the formation of an effective counterterrorism policy. Speakers also highlighted how India is exploiting the situation by funneling funds to the TPP through Afghanistan, which has led to a significant surge in the terrorist activities in Pakistan. Improving trade relations with Afghanistan also came under the discussion, and it was advised to reduce hurdles in bilateral trade which will benefit not only Afghanistan but Pakistan as well. It was also highlighted that although there is peace in a political sense in Afghanistan, poverty and economic decay have increased during the Taliban government. In the last minutes of the discussion, it was underscored that the Afghan Taliban deliberately designate Pakistan as their enemy and capitalize on this rhetoric to divert the attention of Afghans away from the system they are implementing, which might lead to further destitution.
Topic:
Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Refugees, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

3. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 11

Author:
Osama Ahmad, Imran Mukhtar, and Hina Saleem
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
This report is outcome of the 11th PIPS-led structured consultation out of a series of twelve such events that have been designed to discuss and critically evaluate evolving aspects of Afghan conflict and political reconciliation and suggest policy options and strategies to the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. To that end, PIPS has established a network of credible resource persons including former diplomats, academicians, government officials, and representatives of political and religious parties, security and law enforcement agencies, civil society, and media, as well as those living at the border including Afghan refugees. The underlying goal is to support Afghan peace and reconciliation and tackle its trickle-down effect for Pakistan including in terms of militancy and insecurity, among other things.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Refugees, Conflict, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

4. What Future Awaits Pakistani-Afghan Relations?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The ruling Taliban in Afghanistan rejected, on May 12, 2024, a scheduled visit from a Pakistani military delegation to the Afghan city of Kandahar, the headquarters of Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The visit aimed to discuss border management and the Pakistani branch of the Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, TTP). The cancellation of the visit followed Islamabad's drone and missile attacks on Paktika province in southeastern Afghanistan. Earlier, on March 18, 2024, Pakistani forces carried out airstrikes on the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktika in response to a deadly attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban's security forces in North Waziristan. This indicates the ongoing tension marring relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Taliban, and Borders
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

5. Calculable Losses? Arms Transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21

Author:
Matt Schroeder
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Following the Taliban’s assumption of control in Afghanistan in August 2021, uncertainty has persisted about the scale, scope, and specific elements of the arsenal it captured from the previous regime. A new report from the Small Arms Survey, based on hitherto unpublished official data, provides the most refined picture to date of the arsenals captured by the Taliban. Calculable Losses? Arms transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Contributing to Preventing Arms Proliferation from, within, and to Afghanistan project—analyses the publicly available data on arms exports to Afghanistan, identifies gaps in this data, and provides previously unreleased data obtained from the US government.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Taliban, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

6. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

7. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

8. Crisis and adaptation of the Islamic State in Khorasan

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The paper discusses the conditions of the Islamic State in Khorasan and how its strategy and structures evolved after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021. The author also assesses the potential for the Islamic State in Khorasan to recover strength and expand its activities again in the future, in the context of Taliban counter-terrorism.
Topic:
Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Khorasan Group
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

9. The World’s Humanitarian, Economic, and Political Engagement with Afghanistan

Author:
Paul Fishstein and Aman Farahi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The August 2021 fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban ended a two decade chapter of economic and social development. On top of an already weak economy reeling from COVID-19 and a multi-year drought, the overnight cutoff of most Western aid, freezing of foreign reserve funds, and effective severing of Afghanistan’s links with the global financial system plunged Afghanistan into multiple and overlapping humanitarian, economic, financial, and political crises of almost incomprehensible proportions. As of December 2021, 98 percent of the population lacked sufficient food and 90 percent were projected to be living in poverty. By summer 2022, the economy had shrunk by 20-30 percent. Afghanistan faces a daunting array of immediate security, humanitarian, and long-term development challenges. The Taliban’s restrictive social policies and refusal to move towards an inclusive government and the charged political environment dictates much of what can or cannot be done by the international community. The West’s central challenge is at once both moral and political: trying to walk a fine line between delivering humanitarian and economic assistance to relieve some of the effects of sanctions and isolation and help the Afghan people, while avoiding even the appearance of endorsing or legitimizing the Taliban. Workarounds so far have included re-purposing the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, previously the main vehicle for funding Afghan government operations, to channel funding through United Nations (UN) agencies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide feeding, health, education, and other services. This paper highlights the significant challenges for the international community, among them: Relationship management Working with or alongside the Taliban Who performs the functions of the state? Channeling support away from the DFA and directly through the UN and NGOs can be effective for certain types of services (e.g., health, education), but this has its limits. International community cohesion, coherence, and capacity Finally, the authors highlight a number of recommendations, divided roughly into policy and operational considerations, for how, if not to resolve the impasse, to at least mitigate or get around it. These 14 recommendations assume that regardless of the Taliban’s distasteful policies and moral and technical shortcomings, the collapse of their rule would not be in anyone’s interest. There is no one to replace them, and the chaos and fragmentation that would follow would be far worse.
Topic:
Taliban, Afghanistan, Economy, Engagement, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Global Focus

10. Alternative Aid Modalities: Community development

Author:
Scott Guggenheim and Charles Petrie
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
Economic sanctions and restrictions on development aid in fragile and conflict-affected states have become an increasingly prominent part of the international toolkit for dealing with regimes that violate international norms and rules or are beset by conflict. However, there is a well-known problem: sanctions and cessations of development aid often end up hurting the poor more than the rich, particularly the political elites who the sanctions are most meant to target. Donors try to limit the impact of sanctions on the poor through humanitarian assistance, usually run by United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, in all but the smallest countries, this is extremely expensive as well as a major organizational and logistical challenge. Most recently, situations such as those in Myanmar and Afghanistan have thrown the spotlight on the complexity of the discussion. In a world of no first-best solutions, a close look at empirical experience will show (provided certain pre-conditions can be met) that donors can partially bridge the challenge of simultaneously upholding human rights values and protecting the poorest from the economic fallout caused by sanctions. These solutions require close attention to unpacking complex environments and using a difficult-to-wield set of tools spread over diplomacy, economic power, and development aid. While not all risks can be eliminated, a variety of flexible tools already exists so that donors can help the poor in sanctioned and conflict-affected countries without undermining diplomatic goals of shunning the government elites or inadvertently financing insurgencies. With a growing number of donor-funded community programs in fragile or conflict-affected states, there are also donor concerns about legitimating national authorities, risks of financial diversion, and capture by armed combatants or local elites (full list of major concerns listed below). This paper highlights and addresses these concerns in detail and offers a series of recommendations, which in addition to good donor program design and management could mitigate some of the risks (but not fully eliminate them). This paper aims to present a case on how to use one tool—community-based approaches for delivering and monitoring aid—in fragile or sanctioned contexts, as community-based local governance type development models have been used successfully in a variety of fragile, conflict, and sanctioned countries. Additionally, this paper will extract real-world illustrations of how these approaches can address donor concerns on providing post-humanitarian aid to poor people without unintentionally undermining sanctions on illegitimate regimes. Because the case literature on delivering aid under sanctions is small, the brief includes illustrations taken from aid delivery in conflict-affected countries, where governments may not be under sanction, but deep concerns remain about aid capture or aid further fueling conflict. Finally, in addition to selections from the literature, the report draws from the personal and professional experiences of the two authors, who have overseen or managed large-scale community-type humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development programs in Afghanistan, Burundi, East Timor, Gaza, Indonesia (including Aceh and West Papua), Myanmar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Syria, and have been part of discussions over development options for countries under sanction in Ethiopia and Sudan. In this paper, authors propose ten recommendations for donors coming out of this research on how they can incorporate community-driven approaches for aid in sanctioned and fragile states situations.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, Sanctions, and Community
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Global Focus