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41. Alternative Aid Modalities: Community development

Author:
Scott Guggenheim and Charles Petrie
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
Economic sanctions and restrictions on development aid in fragile and conflict-affected states have become an increasingly prominent part of the international toolkit for dealing with regimes that violate international norms and rules or are beset by conflict. However, there is a well-known problem: sanctions and cessations of development aid often end up hurting the poor more than the rich, particularly the political elites who the sanctions are most meant to target. Donors try to limit the impact of sanctions on the poor through humanitarian assistance, usually run by United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, in all but the smallest countries, this is extremely expensive as well as a major organizational and logistical challenge. Most recently, situations such as those in Myanmar and Afghanistan have thrown the spotlight on the complexity of the discussion. In a world of no first-best solutions, a close look at empirical experience will show (provided certain pre-conditions can be met) that donors can partially bridge the challenge of simultaneously upholding human rights values and protecting the poorest from the economic fallout caused by sanctions. These solutions require close attention to unpacking complex environments and using a difficult-to-wield set of tools spread over diplomacy, economic power, and development aid. While not all risks can be eliminated, a variety of flexible tools already exists so that donors can help the poor in sanctioned and conflict-affected countries without undermining diplomatic goals of shunning the government elites or inadvertently financing insurgencies. With a growing number of donor-funded community programs in fragile or conflict-affected states, there are also donor concerns about legitimating national authorities, risks of financial diversion, and capture by armed combatants or local elites (full list of major concerns listed below). This paper highlights and addresses these concerns in detail and offers a series of recommendations, which in addition to good donor program design and management could mitigate some of the risks (but not fully eliminate them). This paper aims to present a case on how to use one tool—community-based approaches for delivering and monitoring aid—in fragile or sanctioned contexts, as community-based local governance type development models have been used successfully in a variety of fragile, conflict, and sanctioned countries. Additionally, this paper will extract real-world illustrations of how these approaches can address donor concerns on providing post-humanitarian aid to poor people without unintentionally undermining sanctions on illegitimate regimes. Because the case literature on delivering aid under sanctions is small, the brief includes illustrations taken from aid delivery in conflict-affected countries, where governments may not be under sanction, but deep concerns remain about aid capture or aid further fueling conflict. Finally, in addition to selections from the literature, the report draws from the personal and professional experiences of the two authors, who have overseen or managed large-scale community-type humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development programs in Afghanistan, Burundi, East Timor, Gaza, Indonesia (including Aceh and West Papua), Myanmar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Syria, and have been part of discussions over development options for countries under sanction in Ethiopia and Sudan. In this paper, authors propose ten recommendations for donors coming out of this research on how they can incorporate community-driven approaches for aid in sanctioned and fragile states situations.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, Sanctions, and Community
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Global Focus

42. New Canal Threatens the Peace Between the Taliban and Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since their return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have managed to reach an understanding with most of the Central Asian governments to preserve a relative calm along the areas of the Afghan-Central Asian frontier. Disputes over water use have suddenly become an issue that could derail ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Specifically, the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could lead to the loss of water for tens of thousands of people in downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, three people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters along the Afghan-Iranian border over rights to water from the Helmand River.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Water, Taliban, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

43. Unalone and Unafraid: A Plan for Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into US Military Forces

Author:
Dan Patt and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
During the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) led global research and development (R&D) and in the process created what are now commonplace technologies, including the internet, precision weapons, and the global positioning system. However, since then the DoD has struggled to incorporate new advancements as initiatives to transform the force or implement a new offset strategy have failed to substantially change the US military’s design or capability development processes. In large part, the DoD’s adoption difficulties result from the center of technological innovation shifting from governments to the private sector, increasingly making the military a technology customer rather than a creator. This is the case with artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed systems, which are already upending long-standing approaches to modern warfare. The challenge of integrating these new technologies, many of which are commercially derived, therefore provides a good case study for how the DoD could reform its processes and organizations for innovation. To that end, this study evaluates how the US military could realize more timely development, deployment, and integration of relevant uncrewed systems, and illustrates its proposed methods using examples from the US Navy. The Navy and DoD will need the operational advantages that AI-enabled uncrewed vehicles could offer. Against a resident major power like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US military cannot continue to rely on its historical dominance to deter and defeat aggression. Instead, the DoD will need to attack the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of system destruction warfare by fielding a force that is less predictable, more adaptable, and increasingly resilient. Uncrewed systems could enable such an approach by unlocking the operational innovation of US servicemembers, who could—like their counterparts in Ukraine today—use uncrewed systems to grow the variety of tactics and effects chains that they can employ, which could undermine PLA planning and concepts and afford US forces the capacity to sustain a protracted conflict. The ability of uncrewed systems to provide resilience and adaptability depends on scale. A small fleet of vehicles cannot be simultaneously applied against multiple mission threads or effects chains and will lack the capacity to support extended operations. Uncrewed systems can enable scale by foregoing robust self-defense and focusing on a narrow set of functions to lower their cost and complexity. These limitations will require that uncrewed systems be combined with other uncrewed systems and crewed platforms in systems of systems (SoS), which could exacerbate the US military’s long-standing struggles to integrate forces between and within each service branch. Realizing the benefits of uncrewed systems will therefore demand that the DoD establish routinized processes for integrating new mission threads and SoS. Otherwise, the US military services will only be able to field individual uncrewed systems that replace crewed platforms in existing use cases. US military services are already attempting to improve their ability to integrate SoS through initiatives in experimentation, rapid acquisition, digital interoperability, and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). However, as this report describes for the US Navy, these efforts tend to focus on long-term service objectives rather than near-term operational problems and use a top-down process of systems engineering to guide requirements for future capabilities. This traditional approach assumes that the US military has the time to develop new systems and retains a substantial technological edge over its rivals, but neither condition is likely to endure in the context of the US-PRC competition. To bring uncrewed systems into the force more quickly and gain the resulting operational advantages, the DoD will need to flip its traditional acquisition approach and adapt US military tactics or mission threads so they can integrate uncrewed systems that are available today. This bottom-up method of “mission integration” contrasts with the DoD’s predominant approach of systems engineering and reflects best practices emerging in commercial manufacturing or distribution, where the fastest and most effective way to assimilate robotics is to adjust the organization’s workflow as opposed to developing robots that replace humans in existing workflows.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Emerging Technology, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. The global terrorist threat forecast in 2023

Author:
Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The article presents three significant developments in the global terrorism landscape: Far-right terrorism, the growth of al Qaeda, with Taliban patronage from Afghanistan, and the persistence of the Islamic State as the most dominant threat in the world despite the successive decapitation of its leadership The article notes the importance in this context of political Islam and the spread of "jihadist" doctrines both from the Gulf and from conflict zones supplanting traditional and local Islam. The article also notes the potential impact of the radical environmental movement and the growing problem of the use of violence by other radical groups.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Far Right, and Political Islam
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and Global Focus

46. El modelo de intervención militar ruso-soviético

Author:
Alberto Priego
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Desde comienzos del siglo XX, Rusia y la URSS ha promovido un modelo de intervención militar que responde más a su visión imperialista que a sus necesidades de seguridad. Este hecho ha provocado que salvo cuando la intervención consistiera en una operación relámpago de cambio de gobierno, las aventuras militares hayan acabado en fracaso. Además, la incapacidad de Moscú para modernizar de facto sus doctrinas militares, unido a su atraso tecnológico, ha convertido al ejército ruso en una estructura ineficaz donde el factor humano no es valorado. Este trabajo pretende elaborar un modelo de intervención ruso-soviética que se repite en todas las aventuras militares rusas desde los años cincuenta hasta hoy mismo.
Topic:
Security, Imperialism, History, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Chechnya, Hungary, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Czechoslovakia

47. Soldiers out, civilians left behind: EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
This is the introduction to a three-part Report that reviews the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. Even if Europe’s security debate has moved on to this bigger and more pressing challenge, the EU must heed the lessons from Kabul as it reviews its crisis management architecture and implements the Strategic Compass. The exact conditions of the Afghanistan evacuation might not be seen again for many years. Still, the EU must consider a range of other scenarios: European soldiers or citizens in danger needing evacuation from failing states or war zones, military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or even short-term stability support to governments and initial entry missions. This requires a commitment to, and building of, EU rapid deployment capacities that are effectively ready to be used, associated with appropriate crisis management structures for EU decision-making. These are the questions that have interested this project, whose examination is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and European Union
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, and South Asia

48. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 1 – What went wrong? The decision-making moments

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
What went wrong in Kabul and what were the critical junctures in the West’s decision-making? This Paper explores these two questions in detail. Two moments stand out in the chaotic evacuation from Kabul: the establishment of the military withdrawal schedule in mid-April and when all the countries involved scrambled to get their civilians out too. What is clear is that EU institutions were not prepared and were equally blindsided by the speed of events and decisions. This Paper shows that the dereliction of prudence, planning and duty also extends to the EU. This is the first paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

49. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

50. Against All Odds: Supporting Civil Society and Human Rights in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Annie Pforzheimer, and Jan Muhammad Jahid
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Eighteen months after taking power, the Taliban is intensifying its repression of Afghan civil society and cracking down on the rights and freedoms of all Afghans, especially those of women and girls. The Taliban’s harsh approach to governing the country is repressing millions of people and fueling civil unrest, promoting extremism, and laying the foundation for the reemergence of a terrorist hotbed that will almost undoubtedly become a threat to global peace and security in the years to come. Humanitarian needs in Afghanistan remain immense, and the country will require large amounts of international aid for the foreseeable future to avoid famine and other health challenges. Twenty-three million Afghans (or nearly 60 percent of the population) currently require food assistance, and unusually cold winter temperatures this year have caused further hardship and death. The Taliban’s December 2022 order barring Afghan women from working for nongovernmental organizations led some international humanitarian organizations to suspend operations, complicating aid distribution, especially to women-headed families. The abolition of democratic institutions—the Parliament, judiciary, free press—and key government ministries and departments charged with protecting human rights demonstrates that the Taliban is adhering to the same extremist policies that marked their first stint in power from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban rules by fear and intimidation; torture, kidnapping, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings are part of daily life in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rollback of women’s rights has been swift and comprehensive. Among the most devastating anti-female policies, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on Afghanistan’s social and economic development and relations with the world, are the edicts forbidding girls from attending secondary school or university. Women and girls in today’s Afghanistan also are prohibited from accessing parks or gyms, leaving home without a male companion, and working outside the home—except in the health sector—and have been publicly flogged for not adhering to the strict behavioral edicts. Women demonstrators have been arbitrarily jailed and subject to torture and death.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia