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41. Can the Right War Be Won?

Author:
Steven Simon
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Two new books offer insightful analyses of how to succeed in Afghanistan. But the sheer difficulty of the task points to the need for an alternative strategy -- one that defends U.S. interests without trying to rebuild a shattered country.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

42. Al-Qa'ida's Pakistan Strategy

Author:
Don Rassler
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida's strategy in Pakistan remains intentionally opaque, but has demonstrably shifted in recent years to promote increased confrontation with the Pakistani state. Al-Qa`ida's fighters originally used Pakistan as a key logistics base and facilitation point for the Afghan and Arab mujahidin during the 1980s, but since 2001 Pakistan has served primarily as an operational safe haven where al-Qa`ida and its affiliates can plan local, regional and international terrorist attacks. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and smaller parts of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) comprise al-Qa`ida's physical center of gravity. Increasingly, however, al-Qa`ida has utilized its media prowess and ideological authority to discredit the Pakistani state and promote cooperation among a variety of Pakistani militants to challenge the state's authority and undermine its support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

43. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad"

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In 2001 approximately 100 Central Intelligence Agency officers, 350 U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and 15,000 Afghans overthrew the Taliban regime in less than three months while suffering only a dozen U.S. fatalities. They were supported by as many as 100 U.S. combat sorties per day. Some individuals involved in the operation argued that it revitalized the American way of war. This initial success, however, transitioned into an insurgency, as the Taliban and other insurgent groups began a sustained effort to overthrow the Afghan government. The fighting, which began in 2002, had developed into a full-blown insurgency by 2006. During this period, the number of insurgent-initiated attacks rose by 400 percent, and the number of deaths from these attacks by more than 800 percent. The increase in violence was particularly acute between 2005 and 2006, when the number of suicide attacks quintupled from 27 to 139; remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677; and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,558 to 4,542. Insurgent-initiated attacks rose another 27 percent between 2006 and 2007. The result was a lack of security for Afghans and foreigners.
Topic:
Political Violence, Government, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban

44. Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?

Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement. Using the full range of media, it is successfully tapping into strains of Afghan nationalism and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul government and its international backers. The result is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban. The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda, particularly by ending arbitrary detentions and curtailing civilian casualties from aerial bombing.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Government, and Communications
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

45. Airpower: The Flip Side of COIN

Author:
Daniel F. Baltrusaitis
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Despite the success of the U.S. military in conventional warfare, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the challenges of pursuing a counter-insurgent strategy against “asymmetric threats” such as improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers. The “asymmetric” strategy often adopted by insurgents allows a relatively weak for ce to incapacitate a stronger one by exploiting the stronger force's vulnera-bilities rather than meeting it head-on in conventional com-bat. Our current wars have focused national attention on the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to cope with this “asymmetric” environment, yet the influence of airpower has been conspicuously missing from the debate. Even the core military doctrine for counterinsurgency, or COIN, fails to acknowledge the benefits that airpower can play against these asymmetric threats. The Army and Marine Corps recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), an impressive and influential 282-page document that skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues. This doctrine is viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq, and will likely become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine that will guide all the armed services. Regrettably, this impressive document fails to inform the COIN strategist, and policymakers, on the influence of highly integrated joint COIN strategy. Rather, it treats the influence of airpower as an adjunct capability confined to a short, five-page annex of “supplemental information.” By failing to integrate the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on only the ground dimension, FM 3-24 falls short of offering U.S. decisionmakers a pragmatic, joint solution for the challenge of COIN. The current doctrine fails to integrate all aspects of military power that may be implemented for the most effective counterinsurgency campaign. By failing to integrate airpower (or seapower) into this cornerstone doctrine document, U.S. and coalition forces risk planning operations in a dis-jointed fashion where planners do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of service capabilities. This paper examines the influence of airpower on COIN strategy and articulates the benefits of an integrated joint COIN doctrine to combat effectively the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Topic:
Civil Society, Globalization, Government, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

46. PolicyWatch #1341: Pakistani Elections and the Middle East

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After a six-week delay following the assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, Pakistanis will go to the polls on February 18 to elect a new National Assembly. Pakistan and Afghanistan are "where many of our most important interests intersect," as Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5. Accordingly, the election results could affect the position of a key U.S. ally in the war on terror -- the increasingly unpopular President Pervez Musharraf.
Topic:
Government, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and Asia

47. Why the Gulf matters: crafting an Australian security policy for the Gulf

Author:
Rodger Shanahan
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The government's decision to withdraw Australian combat elements from southern Iraq by the middle of 2008 has the potential to consign the Arabian Gulf region 1 to the periphery of Australian policy interests. There is a consequent temptation to focus our security policy on Australia's immediate region, or within West Asia only on Afghanistan where our combat forces will likely be operating for some time to come. To do so, however, flies in the face of our substantial, diverse and growing economic interests in the Gulf (including an upcoming Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) free trade agreement), our interests in counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, and our record of regularly deploying Australian Defence Force (ADF) elements into the region over the last 20 years. These factors, along with the government's recognition that '...the challenges (that) Australia faces will require us to be more internationally active, not less' 2 mean that, in an uncertain world where our strategic horizon extends beyond Southeast Asia, it is prudent to maintain and consider enhancing the diplomatic and security connections we have built up in the Gulf, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, over nearly two decades.
Topic:
Security and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, Arabia, Australia, and United Arab Emirates

48. Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing Sources of Systemic Risk

Author:
Monty G. Marshall
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A public debate over the threat posed by weak, fragile, failing, and failed states and what can or should be done about them has become increasing visible and vocal since the attacks of September 11, 2001. As President George W. Bush declared in his 2002 National Security Strategy report: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than ... by failing ones.” This debate has grown particularly acute as the United States' prolonged military response to the war on global terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq has revealed the difficulties of controlling militancy and extremism by direct military intervention and enforced democratic change. The challenges associated with weak or failing states have garnered increase d attention by the policy community, but major differences about how to assess the level of risk in any given case remain.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Development, Diplomacy, Government, and International Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and America

49. Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and Search for Justice in Afghanistan

Author:
J Alexander Thier and Leigh Toomey
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A legitimate, functioning and coherent justice system is urgently needed to establish peace and stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan. After three decades of war, continued insecurity, endemic corruption, and lack of resources hobble the formal justice system. Informal, community-based dispute resolution mechanisms—which are more readily accessible and understood than formal courts by most Afghans, particularly outside urban areas—are widely used to resolve both civil and criminal matters. These mechanisms are critical to maintaining stability within communities, and at present handle over 80 percent of disputes in Afghanistan. At the same time, informal or traditional practices may fall short of due process and human rights standards.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

50. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy

Author:
John A. Glaze
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan have skyrocketed since the Taliban were toppled in 2001 such that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world's illicit opium. The expanding opium trade is threatening to destabilize the Afghan government and turn the conflict-ridden country back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists. This paper examines the nature of the opium problem in Afghanistan and analyzes the allied strategy to counter this growing crisis. In analyzing the current counternarcotics strategy, it points out pitfalls including the counterproductive aspects of opium eradication. Finally, changes to the strategy are proposed, which include increasing troop levels and eliminating national restrictions, substantially increasing financial aid, deemphasizing opium eradication, focusing on long-term alternative livelihoods, aggressively pursuing drug kingpins and corrupt government officials, and exploring the possibility of Afghanistan's entry to the licit opium market.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, and War on Drugs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia