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41. Al-Qa'ida's Pakistan Strategy

Author:
Don Rassler
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida's strategy in Pakistan remains intentionally opaque, but has demonstrably shifted in recent years to promote increased confrontation with the Pakistani state. Al-Qa`ida's fighters originally used Pakistan as a key logistics base and facilitation point for the Afghan and Arab mujahidin during the 1980s, but since 2001 Pakistan has served primarily as an operational safe haven where al-Qa`ida and its affiliates can plan local, regional and international terrorist attacks. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and smaller parts of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) comprise al-Qa`ida's physical center of gravity. Increasingly, however, al-Qa`ida has utilized its media prowess and ideological authority to discredit the Pakistani state and promote cooperation among a variety of Pakistani militants to challenge the state's authority and undermine its support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

42. Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience

Author:
Dipali Mukhopadhyay
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Despite his commitment to develop a democratic, modern state, President Hamid Karzai placed many former warlords in positions of power, particularly in the provinces. Many observers, Afghan and foreign alike, have decried the inclusion of warlords in the new governmental structures as the chief corrosive agent undermining efforts to reconstruct the state. Indeed, warlord governors have not been ideal government officials. They have employed informal power and rules, as well as their personal networks, to preserve control over their respective provinces. Informalized politics of this kind is the antithesis of a technocratic, rule-based approach to governance and entails considerable costs, from inefficiency to corruption and human rights abuses.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Government, Sovereignty, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

43. Airpower: The Flip Side of COIN

Author:
Daniel F. Baltrusaitis
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Despite the success of the U.S. military in conventional warfare, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the challenges of pursuing a counter-insurgent strategy against “asymmetric threats” such as improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers. The “asymmetric” strategy often adopted by insurgents allows a relatively weak for ce to incapacitate a stronger one by exploiting the stronger force's vulnera-bilities rather than meeting it head-on in conventional com-bat. Our current wars have focused national attention on the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to cope with this “asymmetric” environment, yet the influence of airpower has been conspicuously missing from the debate. Even the core military doctrine for counterinsurgency, or COIN, fails to acknowledge the benefits that airpower can play against these asymmetric threats. The Army and Marine Corps recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), an impressive and influential 282-page document that skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues. This doctrine is viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq, and will likely become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine that will guide all the armed services. Regrettably, this impressive document fails to inform the COIN strategist, and policymakers, on the influence of highly integrated joint COIN strategy. Rather, it treats the influence of airpower as an adjunct capability confined to a short, five-page annex of “supplemental information.” By failing to integrate the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on only the ground dimension, FM 3-24 falls short of offering U.S. decisionmakers a pragmatic, joint solution for the challenge of COIN. The current doctrine fails to integrate all aspects of military power that may be implemented for the most effective counterinsurgency campaign. By failing to integrate airpower (or seapower) into this cornerstone doctrine document, U.S. and coalition forces risk planning operations in a dis-jointed fashion where planners do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of service capabilities. This paper examines the influence of airpower on COIN strategy and articulates the benefits of an integrated joint COIN doctrine to combat effectively the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Topic:
Civil Society, Globalization, Government, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

44. PolicyWatch #1341: Pakistani Elections and the Middle East

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After a six-week delay following the assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, Pakistanis will go to the polls on February 18 to elect a new National Assembly. Pakistan and Afghanistan are "where many of our most important interests intersect," as Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5. Accordingly, the election results could affect the position of a key U.S. ally in the war on terror -- the increasingly unpopular President Pervez Musharraf.
Topic:
Government, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and Asia

45. Why the Gulf matters: crafting an Australian security policy for the Gulf

Author:
Rodger Shanahan
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The government's decision to withdraw Australian combat elements from southern Iraq by the middle of 2008 has the potential to consign the Arabian Gulf region 1 to the periphery of Australian policy interests. There is a consequent temptation to focus our security policy on Australia's immediate region, or within West Asia only on Afghanistan where our combat forces will likely be operating for some time to come. To do so, however, flies in the face of our substantial, diverse and growing economic interests in the Gulf (including an upcoming Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) free trade agreement), our interests in counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, and our record of regularly deploying Australian Defence Force (ADF) elements into the region over the last 20 years. These factors, along with the government's recognition that '...the challenges (that) Australia faces will require us to be more internationally active, not less' 2 mean that, in an uncertain world where our strategic horizon extends beyond Southeast Asia, it is prudent to maintain and consider enhancing the diplomatic and security connections we have built up in the Gulf, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, over nearly two decades.
Topic:
Security and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, Arabia, Australia, and United Arab Emirates

46. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad"

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In 2001 approximately 100 Central Intelligence Agency officers, 350 U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and 15,000 Afghans overthrew the Taliban regime in less than three months while suffering only a dozen U.S. fatalities. They were supported by as many as 100 U.S. combat sorties per day. Some individuals involved in the operation argued that it revitalized the American way of war. This initial success, however, transitioned into an insurgency, as the Taliban and other insurgent groups began a sustained effort to overthrow the Afghan government. The fighting, which began in 2002, had developed into a full-blown insurgency by 2006. During this period, the number of insurgent-initiated attacks rose by 400 percent, and the number of deaths from these attacks by more than 800 percent. The increase in violence was particularly acute between 2005 and 2006, when the number of suicide attacks quintupled from 27 to 139; remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677; and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,558 to 4,542. Insurgent-initiated attacks rose another 27 percent between 2006 and 2007. The result was a lack of security for Afghans and foreigners.
Topic:
Political Violence, Government, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban

47. Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?

Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement. Using the full range of media, it is successfully tapping into strains of Afghan nationalism and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul government and its international backers. The result is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban. The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda, particularly by ending arbitrary detentions and curtailing civilian casualties from aerial bombing.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Government, and Communications
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

48. Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing Sources of Systemic Risk

Author:
Monty G. Marshall
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A public debate over the threat posed by weak, fragile, failing, and failed states and what can or should be done about them has become increasing visible and vocal since the attacks of September 11, 2001. As President George W. Bush declared in his 2002 National Security Strategy report: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than ... by failing ones.” This debate has grown particularly acute as the United States' prolonged military response to the war on global terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq has revealed the difficulties of controlling militancy and extremism by direct military intervention and enforced democratic change. The challenges associated with weak or failing states have garnered increase d attention by the policy community, but major differences about how to assess the level of risk in any given case remain.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Development, Diplomacy, Government, and International Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and America

49. State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions

Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs convened the colloquium, “State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions,” on 16-18 November 2007 in Brussels, Belgium. The conference was funded in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the House of Liechtenstein, and the Government of Austria.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Economics, Government, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, Asia, Belgium, and Austria

50. Creating Stability and Prosperity in Afghanistan and the Region

Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs convened the colloquium, “Creating Stability and Prosperity in Afghanistan and the Region,” on 26-29 October 2006 in Vienna, Austria. This was the eighth LISD-sponsored colloquium on Afghanistan since 2001 and was the inaugural meeting of a two-year project, “State Security, and Prosperity: Afghanistan, its Neighbors and the Region,” being undertaken by LISD and funded in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Government, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, New York, Central Asia, and Austria

51. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
03-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are small civilian-military units that assist provincial and local governments in Iraq to govern effectively and deliver essential services. In January 2007 President Bush announced that the United States would double the number of PRTs as part of his plan for a “New Way Forward.” Ten new PRTs will be embedded with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Baghdad, Anbar, and Babil. The new PRTs will differ significantly from the ten original PRTs set up in Iraq in November 2005. Led by the State Department, most of the original PRTs are located on U.S. military bases and rely on the military for security and logistical support. Both types of PRTs in Iraq differ in staffing and organization from PRTs in Afghanistan. Start-up of the PRT program in Iraq has been troubled by interagency differences over funding, staffing, and administrative support and by the overriding challenge of providing security. Embedding the new PRTs with BCTs should help overcome many of these problems. Despite the problems, PRTs provide a U.S. civilian presence in areas that would not be served otherwise. Participants in PRTs believe they are having a positive effect.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Middle East

52. Afghanistan's Endangered Compact

Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
While the growing insurgency is attracting increasing attention, long-term efforts to build the solid governmental institutions a stable Afghanistan requires are faltering. Following conclusion of the Bonn process, which created the country's elected bodies, the Afghan government and the international community committed at the London Conference (31 January-1 February 2006) to the Afghanistan Compact, which identified “three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity” over five years: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and social and economic development. The government signed on to realizing a “shared vision of the future” for a “stable and prosperous Afghanistan”, while over 60 nations and international institutions promised to provide the necessary resources and support. A year on, even those most closely associated with the process admit that the Compact has yet to have much impact. Afghans and internationals alike still need to demonstrate the political will to undertake deep-rooted institutional changes if the goals of this shared vision are to be met.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Government, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and London

53. Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and Search for Justice in Afghanistan

Author:
J Alexander Thier and Leigh Toomey
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A legitimate, functioning and coherent justice system is urgently needed to establish peace and stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan. After three decades of war, continued insecurity, endemic corruption, and lack of resources hobble the formal justice system. Informal, community-based dispute resolution mechanisms—which are more readily accessible and understood than formal courts by most Afghans, particularly outside urban areas—are widely used to resolve both civil and criminal matters. These mechanisms are critical to maintaining stability within communities, and at present handle over 80 percent of disputes in Afghanistan. At the same time, informal or traditional practices may fall short of due process and human rights standards.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

54. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy

Author:
John A. Glaze
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan have skyrocketed since the Taliban were toppled in 2001 such that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world's illicit opium. The expanding opium trade is threatening to destabilize the Afghan government and turn the conflict-ridden country back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists. This paper examines the nature of the opium problem in Afghanistan and analyzes the allied strategy to counter this growing crisis. In analyzing the current counternarcotics strategy, it points out pitfalls including the counterproductive aspects of opium eradication. Finally, changes to the strategy are proposed, which include increasing troop levels and eliminating national restrictions, substantially increasing financial aid, deemphasizing opium eradication, focusing on long-term alternative livelihoods, aggressively pursuing drug kingpins and corrupt government officials, and exploring the possibility of Afghanistan's entry to the licit opium market.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, and War on Drugs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

55. Fragile States and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money

Author:
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown
Publication Date:
08-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The Bush administration has increasingly acknowledged that weak and failing states represent the core of today's global development challenge. It has also recognized that such states are potential threats to international peace and security. But despite the rhetoric, it has yet to formulate a coherent strategy around fragile states or commit adequate resources towards engaging them. Excluding funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and HIV/AIDS, the administration's FY07 budget request proposes to spend just $1.1 billion in direct bilateral assistance to fragile states—little more than a dollar per person per year. In this new working paper, CGD research fellow Stewart Patrick and program associate Kaysie Brown urge U.S. policymakers to consider increasing aid to fragile states and to think creatively about how and when to engage these troubled countries. The authors also call for the policy community to integrate non-aid instruments into a more coherent government strategy. To put its money where its mouth is, the U.S. should treat aid to weak and failing states as a form of venture capital, with high risk but potentially high rewards.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Humanitarian Aid
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

56. The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance

Author:
Nathan Converse and Ethan Kapstein
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have adopted democratic forms of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc nations. Policy-makers in the west have expressed the hope that this democratic wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward to China. But the durability of this new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least half of the world's young democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being “unconsolidated” or “fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have reverted back to authoritarian rule. Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, and Iraq

57. Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants

Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Taliban and other foreign militants, including al-Qaeda sympathisers, have sheltered since 2001 in Pakistan's Pashtun-majority Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), seven administrative districts bordering on south eastern Afghanistan. Using the region to regroup, reorganise and rearm, they are launching increasingly severe cross-border attacks on Afghan and international military personnel, with the support and active involvement of Pakistani militants. The Musharraf government's ambivalent approach and failure to take effective action is destabilising Afghanistan; Kabul's allies, particularly the U.S. and NATO, which is now responsible for security in the bordering areas, should apply greater pressure on it to clamp down on the pro-Taliban militants. But the international community, too, bears responsibility by failing to support democratic governance in Pakistan, including within its troubled tribal belt.
Topic:
Government and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Asia, Taliban, and Tribal Areas

58. Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes

Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Fierce battles rage in southern Afghanistan, insurgent attacks in the east creep towards the provinces surrounding Kabul and a new campaign of terrorist violence targets urban centres. The country's democratic government is not immediately threatened but action is needed now. This includes putting more international forces into the battle zones but insurgencies are never beaten by military means alone, and there are no quick fixes. Diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is needed, and the government of President Karzai must show political will to respond to internal discontent with serious efforts to attack corruption, work with the elected National Assembly and extend the rule of law by ending the culture of impunity. Afghanistan needs a renewed, long-term effort to build an effective, fair government that provides real security to its people.
Topic:
International Relations, Government, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Asia, and Kabul

59. Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan

Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
President Pervez Musharraf and the military are responsible for the worsening of the conflict in Balochistan. Tensions between the government and its Baloch opposition have grown because of Islamabad's heavy-handed armed response to Baloch militancy and its refusal to negotiate demands for political and economic autonomy. The killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006 sparked riots and will likely lead to more confrontation. The conflict could escalate if the government insists on seeking a military solution to what is a political problem and the international community, especially the U.S., fails to recognise the price that is involved for security in neighbouring Afghanistan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

60. Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate

Author:
Abubakar Siddique and Barnett R. Rubin
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies today are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The nationalist insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, which Pakistani leaders assert receives support from Indian agents in Afghanistan, also aggravates relations between the two countries. The challenges of violent insurgency require both countries to address their relationship, particularly as it affects the border areas. Formation of such a policy is essential to the vital interests of the United States, NATO, and the international community, which has committed itself to the effort in Afghanistan through UN Security Council resolutions and other measures Afghanistan and Pakistan have had largely antagonistic relations under all governments but the Taliban since Pakistan was created as part of the partition of India in 1947. Some elements of friction were also inherited from conflicts between Afghanistan and India when it was under British imperial rule. Afghanistan's governments, including that of the Taliban, have never recognized the Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and have made claims on the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan. Today 's cross-border insurgencies, with their sanctuaries and support networks in Pakistan, are nurtured by the same sources as previous conflicts, as well as global Islamist movements. Arrangements to secure the frontier of the British Empire in the nineteenth century by isolating Afghanistan as a buffer state do not work for a twenty-first-century borderland integrated into networks of global conflict. The United States and other external powers that seek to support the new order in Afghanistan and stabilize both Pakistan and Afghanistan should encourage a multidimensional process of dialogue and peacebuilding focused on the problems of the border region. Pressure may also be needed to convince some actors to engage seriously in such a process, but pressure alone will not succeed. A process should work toward reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, leading to their integration into Pakistani national politics and administration; the recognition by Afghanistan of the international border; assured access by Afghanistan to Pakistani ports and transit facilities; the maintenance by both countries of open borders for trade, investment, and cultural relations; agreement by both countries and by India to keep the India-Pakistan dispute out of Afghanistan 's bilateral relations with both; and agreements on both sides to cease supporting or harboring violent opposition movements against the other. The United States, NATO, and the UN must agree to send a common message to Islamabad: that the persistence of Taliban havens in Pakistan is a threat to international peace and security that Pakistan must address immediately. They also must agree to urge Afghanistan and India to do all in their power to encourage Pakistan to make difficult decisions by addressing sources of Pakistani insecurity, including issues relating to the border region and Kashmir. They should actively promote this process and act as guarantors and funders of any agreements that result from it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, United Kingdom, India, Taliban, and Kashmir