Political Geography: Afghanistan / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Pakistan’s Evolving Militant Landscape: State Responses and Policy options

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Muhammad Amir Rana, and Safdar Sial
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: At a time when a major shift is happening in the militant landscape of the country and a political transition is taking place, it is imperative to reevaluate the evolving positions and strategies of not only the militant groups but also the newly formed governments. Against this backdrop, this report seeks to delve into the emerging dynamics of Pakistan's militant landscape and security besides analysing state capacities and responses, along with potential policy shifts post-transition. While much of the research and analyses in Pakistan since Taliban takeover of Kabul has predominantly focused on aspects such as the Taliban regime's governance, Pak-Afghan bilateral affairs, and regional geopolitics, there remains a glaring absence of credible and comprehensive investigations into the broader repercussions of the evolving Afghan scenario on Pakistan's security landscape. Despite periodic headlines on the Pakistani government's negotiations with the proscribed TTP, there has been a dearth of empirical research exploring the overall fallout of Afghanistan's changing dynamics on Pakistan's security. In light of this context, PIPS undertook a firsthand, empirical investigation into the expanding terrorism landscape in the country, scrutinizing the formation of new alliances and networks among terrorist groups, mapping the geographical spread of insecurity and violence, and assessing their ramifications for both domestic and regional security paradigms, among other things. The insights gleaned from this investigation were subsequently utilized to formulate context-specific policy recommendations on how to manage or prevent the negative fallout from evolving Afghanistan situation on Pakistan and the region.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Minorities, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

2. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 12

Author:: Osama Ahmad, Imran Mukhtar, and Hazrat Bilal
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: The Pak Institute for Peace Studies held its 12th quarterly consultation on “Afghan peace and reconciliation: Pakistan’s interests and policy options” in Islamabad on March 15, 2024. The consultation focused on two main themes: “Pakistan’s Afghan policy puzzle: challenges and opportunities for the new government” and “The counterterrorism and counter-extremism challenges for the new federal and provincial governments.” Participants included lawmakers from national and provincial assemblies, diplomats, retired miltary officials, academics, journalists, policy analysts, and experts on Afghan affairs. The distinguished speakers talked about the policy challenges confronting the new government. They were particularly skeptical about the new government’s ability to formulate the country’s Afghan policy, and were worried about surging terrorism in the country, India's increasing influence in Afghanistan, province-center worsening relations, and Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with the neighboring countries. In the first session, the discussion revolved around how the newly formed coalition government will address critical issues such as countering terrorism and improving relations with Afghanistan and other neighboring countries. The need for a solution to Balochistan problem was highlighted. Apart from that, various factors leading to worsening relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were discussed, for instance the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factor, deportation of Afghan refugees, border insecurity, and cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan. The participants also linked the success of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to peace in the region. Pakistan's failure to extend goodwill into Afghanistan was termed a significant problem. It was argued that Pakistan's forceful expulsion of Afghan refugees significantly eroded Pakistan's good image in Afghanistan. The participants urged the government to take political ownership of foreign and internal policies and strengthen the role of parliament in order to set things right both at home and abroad. However, they lamented the inability of the political government to assert itself, thereby allowing space to non-democratic forces to decide unilaterally on critical matters. In the second session, the consultation focused on the counterterrorism policies in the center and provinces. The prevailing antagonistic relations between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s (PTI) government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the coalition government in Islamabad were thought to prevent the formation of an effective counterterrorism policy. Speakers also highlighted how India is exploiting the situation by funneling funds to the TPP through Afghanistan, which has led to a significant surge in the terrorist activities in Pakistan. Improving trade relations with Afghanistan also came under the discussion, and it was advised to reduce hurdles in bilateral trade which will benefit not only Afghanistan but Pakistan as well. It was also highlighted that although there is peace in a political sense in Afghanistan, poverty and economic decay have increased during the Taliban government. In the last minutes of the discussion, it was underscored that the Afghan Taliban deliberately designate Pakistan as their enemy and capitalize on this rhetoric to divert the attention of Afghans away from the system they are implementing, which might lead to further destitution.
Topic:: Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Refugees, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

3. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 11

Author:: Osama Ahmad, Imran Mukhtar, and Hina Saleem
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This report is outcome of the 11th PIPS-led structured consultation out of a series of twelve such events that have been designed to discuss and critically evaluate evolving aspects of Afghan conflict and political reconciliation and suggest policy options and strategies to the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. To that end, PIPS has established a network of credible resource persons including former diplomats, academicians, government officials, and representatives of political and religious parties, security and law enforcement agencies, civil society, and media, as well as those living at the border including Afghan refugees. The underlying goal is to support Afghan peace and reconciliation and tackle its trickle-down effect for Pakistan including in terms of militancy and insecurity, among other things.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Refugees, Conflict, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

4. What Future Awaits Pakistani-Afghan Relations?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The ruling Taliban in Afghanistan rejected, on May 12, 2024, a scheduled visit from a Pakistani military delegation to the Afghan city of Kandahar, the headquarters of Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The visit aimed to discuss border management and the Pakistani branch of the Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, TTP). The cancellation of the visit followed Islamabad's drone and missile attacks on Paktika province in southeastern Afghanistan. Earlier, on March 18, 2024, Pakistani forces carried out airstrikes on the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktika in response to a deadly attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban's security forces in North Waziristan. This indicates the ongoing tension marring relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Taliban, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

5. Calculable Losses? Arms Transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21

Author:: Matt Schroeder
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: Following the Taliban’s assumption of control in Afghanistan in August 2021, uncertainty has persisted about the scale, scope, and specific elements of the arsenal it captured from the previous regime. A new report from the Small Arms Survey, based on hitherto unpublished official data, provides the most refined picture to date of the arsenals captured by the Taliban. Calculable Losses? Arms transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Contributing to Preventing Arms Proliferation from, within, and to Afghanistan project—analyses the publicly available data on arms exports to Afghanistan, identifies gaps in this data, and provides previously unreleased data obtained from the US government.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Taliban, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

6. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:: John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

7. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

8. After the Kabul Hotel Attack: The Taliban and China Confront Security Challenges in Afghanistan

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 12, members of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked a local hotel in Kabul, where several Chinese nationals were staying. The attack injured five Chinese nationals along with 18 other victims, while the three attackers were killed by security forces (China Daily, December 14, 2022). It was reported that Chinese businesspeople run the hotel, which is frequently visited by Chinese diplomats and business people (Global Times, December 13, 2022). In response, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated: “China is deeply shocked at the attack, which is highly egregious, and firmly opposes terrorism in any form” (China Daily, December 14, 2022). The ISKP strike in Kabul will further reinforce Beijing’s commitment to giving special attention to the security and stability of Afghanistan. An unstable and volatile Afghanistan threatens Chinese interests and could be a hurdle to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Chinese sources have expressed concern that uncertainty and unrest could lead to Afghanistan becoming a hotbed for terrorists “targeting China’s Xinjiang and its interests overseas, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, where enhanced communication and coordination between China and Pakistan is required to tackle potential threats” (Global Times, August 19, 2021). In response to these challenges, China has sought to provide the Taliban with enough support to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Taliban, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and Kabul

9. WHY DO MASS EXPULSIONS STILL HAPPEN?

Author:: Meghan Garrity
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: January 30, 2023 marks 100 years since the signing of the Lausanne Convention—a treaty codifying the compulsory “population exchange” between Greece and Turkey. An estimated 1.5 million people were forcibly expelled from their homes: over one million Greek Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Empire and 500,000 Muslims from Greece. This population exchange was not the first such agreement, but it was the first compulsory exchange. Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Muslim Greek nationals did not have the option to remain. Further, Greek and Muslim refugees who had fled the Ottoman Empire and Greece, respectively, were not allowed to return to their homes. Only small populations in Istanbul and Western Thrace were exempted from the treaty.
Topic:: Human Rights, History, Refugees, International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome Statute, Rohingya, Geneva Convention, and Lausanne Convention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Turkey, Greece, Germany, Nigeria, Myanmar, and Niger

10. ACLED Year in Review Global Disorder in 2022

Author:: Timothy Lay
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine escalated the war to a level that dwarfed all other conflicts in 2022, both in the sheer scale of violence and its deadliness. It also obscured a significant overall deterioration of the security situation in most other regions worldwide. Driven by heightened levels of conflict in both new and longstanding hotspots, political violence increased substantially over the course of the year. While 2022 saw some positive developments – including a significant reduction in total violent events in places like Afghanistan and Yemen after years of war – these gains only represent qualified improvements. Despite the aggregate decline in events in Afghanistan and Yemen, for example, they remain home to two of the most complex and severe conflict environments in the world. Globally, political violence targeting civilians became not only more common but also more deadly in 2022, underscoring the fact that it is civilian communities that are increasingly shouldering the burden of rising conflict levels around the world.
Topic:: Security, Political Violence, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Global Focus

11. From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization? Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan

Author:: Vito Morisco
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Intra-Taliban fragmentation, based on tribal, factional, ideological and structural fault lines, represents a major challenge to the transition from a polycentric and anti-centralist structure to a unified movement; the fragile balance between the political center in Kabul and the powerbrokers in the periphery, namely Kandahar, represents a key challenge. Women’s rights and girls’ education remain sensitive topics for the Taliban to the extent that the more pragmatic figures push for lifting the ban, the less Hibatullah will grant concessions in order to assert his authority vis-à-vis his critics. Taliban’s ban on secondary education for girls is unique in the world, thus clearly implying internal power dynamics rather than religious motivations. An intellectual struggle over the IEA’s constitutional design has started among main factional groups and Chief Justice Haqim Haqqani’s book “The Islamic Emirate and Its System” (2022) constitutes the first political manifesto about what an Islamic Emirate is and how to run one. The movement has adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the outside world based on the principles of neutrality, non-interference, sovereignty and respect for the international order, but factionalism might cause an inconsistent foreign policy. In the short-term, brutal counterterrorism measures might prove effective in decapitating Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)’s leadership but, in the long term, indiscriminate violence could alienate Salafi communities and the young urban generation on university campuses. The Taliban and al-Qaeda (AQ) are bound by bay’ah (religious oath of loyalty) but tensions and mistrust have emerged since the Doha Agreement.
Topic:: Governance, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

12. Two Years Of Repression: Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan

Author:: Asena Karacalti and Elliott Bynum
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 17 August 2021, two days after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban held a press conference promising amnesty for former government officials, respect for women’s rights, and freedom of the press.1 Nearly two years later, it is clear that the Taliban has upheld none of these promises, instead conducting a violent campaign of repression. Since the takeover, the Taliban has targeted former government and security officials, carried out collective punishments in areas where anti-Taliban groups have emerged, and imposed ultraconservative societal restrictions – especially on women and journalists – aimed at maintaining control. ACLED records over 1,000 incidents of violence targeting civilians by the Taliban between the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, accounting for 62% of all attacks on civilians in the country. This places the Taliban regime in Afghanistan2 among the world’s top government or de facto state perpetrators of violence targeting civilians domestically since August 2021, behind only the military junta in Myanmar. As Taliban rule reaches the two-year mark, this report examines patterns of violence targeting civilians under the regime, with particular attention to the top four most targeted groups: former government and security officials, prisoners, women, and journalists. Taken together, the Taliban’s retaliatory attacks, use of collective punishment, and broad crackdown on women and the press reveal the scale and severity of repression ongoing in Afghanistan. In particular, this report analyzes the continued targeting of former government and security officials, as well as violence against civilians in the country’s northeast, where armed anti-Taliban groups have been active. Both former officials and resistance forces are subject to violence when detained by the Taliban, accounting for a large number of incidents of prisoner abuse recorded by ACLED. Moreover, this report highlights persistent violence against women who oppose a return to the “gender apartheid” of past Taliban rule.3 Women have responded to increased restrictions on their daily lives by holding protests against Taliban policies, with demonstrations featuring women4 nearly doubling in 2022 compared to 2021. Finally, the report concludes with an accounting of attacks on journalists, who remain among the most targeted groups in the Taliban’s Afghanistan – creating further challenges for documenting violence in the country under the new regime.
Topic:: Human Rights, Taliban, Women, Violence, Journalism, Civilians, and Collective Punishment
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

13. The World’s Humanitarian, Economic, and Political Engagement with Afghanistan

Author:: Paul Fishstein and Aman Farahi
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:: The August 2021 fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban ended a two decade chapter of economic and social development. On top of an already weak economy reeling from COVID-19 and a multi-year drought, the overnight cutoff of most Western aid, freezing of foreign reserve funds, and effective severing of Afghanistan’s links with the global financial system plunged Afghanistan into multiple and overlapping humanitarian, economic, financial, and political crises of almost incomprehensible proportions. As of December 2021, 98 percent of the population lacked sufficient food and 90 percent were projected to be living in poverty. By summer 2022, the economy had shrunk by 20-30 percent. Afghanistan faces a daunting array of immediate security, humanitarian, and long-term development challenges. The Taliban’s restrictive social policies and refusal to move towards an inclusive government and the charged political environment dictates much of what can or cannot be done by the international community. The West’s central challenge is at once both moral and political: trying to walk a fine line between delivering humanitarian and economic assistance to relieve some of the effects of sanctions and isolation and help the Afghan people, while avoiding even the appearance of endorsing or legitimizing the Taliban. Workarounds so far have included re-purposing the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, previously the main vehicle for funding Afghan government operations, to channel funding through United Nations (UN) agencies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide feeding, health, education, and other services. This paper highlights the significant challenges for the international community, among them: Relationship management Working with or alongside the Taliban Who performs the functions of the state? Channeling support away from the DFA and directly through the UN and NGOs can be effective for certain types of services (e.g., health, education), but this has its limits. International community cohesion, coherence, and capacity Finally, the authors highlight a number of recommendations, divided roughly into policy and operational considerations, for how, if not to resolve the impasse, to at least mitigate or get around it. These 14 recommendations assume that regardless of the Taliban’s distasteful policies and moral and technical shortcomings, the collapse of their rule would not be in anyone’s interest. There is no one to replace them, and the chaos and fragmentation that would follow would be far worse.
Topic:: Taliban, Afghanistan, Economy, Engagement, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and Global Focus

14. Alternative Aid Modalities: Community development

Author:: Scott Guggenheim and Charles Petrie
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:: Economic sanctions and restrictions on development aid in fragile and conflict-affected states have become an increasingly prominent part of the international toolkit for dealing with regimes that violate international norms and rules or are beset by conflict. However, there is a well-known problem: sanctions and cessations of development aid often end up hurting the poor more than the rich, particularly the political elites who the sanctions are most meant to target. Donors try to limit the impact of sanctions on the poor through humanitarian assistance, usually run by United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, in all but the smallest countries, this is extremely expensive as well as a major organizational and logistical challenge. Most recently, situations such as those in Myanmar and Afghanistan have thrown the spotlight on the complexity of the discussion. In a world of no first-best solutions, a close look at empirical experience will show (provided certain pre-conditions can be met) that donors can partially bridge the challenge of simultaneously upholding human rights values and protecting the poorest from the economic fallout caused by sanctions. These solutions require close attention to unpacking complex environments and using a difficult-to-wield set of tools spread over diplomacy, economic power, and development aid. While not all risks can be eliminated, a variety of flexible tools already exists so that donors can help the poor in sanctioned and conflict-affected countries without undermining diplomatic goals of shunning the government elites or inadvertently financing insurgencies. With a growing number of donor-funded community programs in fragile or conflict-affected states, there are also donor concerns about legitimating national authorities, risks of financial diversion, and capture by armed combatants or local elites (full list of major concerns listed below). This paper highlights and addresses these concerns in detail and offers a series of recommendations, which in addition to good donor program design and management could mitigate some of the risks (but not fully eliminate them). This paper aims to present a case on how to use one tool—community-based approaches for delivering and monitoring aid—in fragile or sanctioned contexts, as community-based local governance type development models have been used successfully in a variety of fragile, conflict, and sanctioned countries. Additionally, this paper will extract real-world illustrations of how these approaches can address donor concerns on providing post-humanitarian aid to poor people without unintentionally undermining sanctions on illegitimate regimes. Because the case literature on delivering aid under sanctions is small, the brief includes illustrations taken from aid delivery in conflict-affected countries, where governments may not be under sanction, but deep concerns remain about aid capture or aid further fueling conflict. Finally, in addition to selections from the literature, the report draws from the personal and professional experiences of the two authors, who have overseen or managed large-scale community-type humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development programs in Afghanistan, Burundi, East Timor, Gaza, Indonesia (including Aceh and West Papua), Myanmar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Syria, and have been part of discussions over development options for countries under sanction in Ethiopia and Sudan. In this paper, authors propose ten recommendations for donors coming out of this research on how they can incorporate community-driven approaches for aid in sanctioned and fragile states situations.
Topic:: Development, Humanitarian Aid, Sanctions, and Community
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Global Focus

15. New Canal Threatens the Peace Between the Taliban and Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since their return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have managed to reach an understanding with most of the Central Asian governments to preserve a relative calm along the areas of the Afghan-Central Asian frontier. Disputes over water use have suddenly become an issue that could derail ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Specifically, the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could lead to the loss of water for tens of thousands of people in downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, three people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters along the Afghan-Iranian border over rights to water from the Helmand River.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Water, Taliban, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

16. Unalone and Unafraid: A Plan for Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into US Military Forces

Author:: Dan Patt and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: During the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) led global research and development (R&D) and in the process created what are now commonplace technologies, including the internet, precision weapons, and the global positioning system. However, since then the DoD has struggled to incorporate new advancements as initiatives to transform the force or implement a new offset strategy have failed to substantially change the US military’s design or capability development processes. In large part, the DoD’s adoption difficulties result from the center of technological innovation shifting from governments to the private sector, increasingly making the military a technology customer rather than a creator. This is the case with artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed systems, which are already upending long-standing approaches to modern warfare. The challenge of integrating these new technologies, many of which are commercially derived, therefore provides a good case study for how the DoD could reform its processes and organizations for innovation. To that end, this study evaluates how the US military could realize more timely development, deployment, and integration of relevant uncrewed systems, and illustrates its proposed methods using examples from the US Navy. The Navy and DoD will need the operational advantages that AI-enabled uncrewed vehicles could offer. Against a resident major power like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US military cannot continue to rely on its historical dominance to deter and defeat aggression. Instead, the DoD will need to attack the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of system destruction warfare by fielding a force that is less predictable, more adaptable, and increasingly resilient. Uncrewed systems could enable such an approach by unlocking the operational innovation of US servicemembers, who could—like their counterparts in Ukraine today—use uncrewed systems to grow the variety of tactics and effects chains that they can employ, which could undermine PLA planning and concepts and afford US forces the capacity to sustain a protracted conflict. The ability of uncrewed systems to provide resilience and adaptability depends on scale. A small fleet of vehicles cannot be simultaneously applied against multiple mission threads or effects chains and will lack the capacity to support extended operations. Uncrewed systems can enable scale by foregoing robust self-defense and focusing on a narrow set of functions to lower their cost and complexity. These limitations will require that uncrewed systems be combined with other uncrewed systems and crewed platforms in systems of systems (SoS), which could exacerbate the US military’s long-standing struggles to integrate forces between and within each service branch. Realizing the benefits of uncrewed systems will therefore demand that the DoD establish routinized processes for integrating new mission threads and SoS. Otherwise, the US military services will only be able to field individual uncrewed systems that replace crewed platforms in existing use cases. US military services are already attempting to improve their ability to integrate SoS through initiatives in experimentation, rapid acquisition, digital interoperability, and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). However, as this report describes for the US Navy, these efforts tend to focus on long-term service objectives rather than near-term operational problems and use a top-down process of systems engineering to guide requirements for future capabilities. This traditional approach assumes that the US military has the time to develop new systems and retains a substantial technological edge over its rivals, but neither condition is likely to endure in the context of the US-PRC competition. To bring uncrewed systems into the force more quickly and gain the resulting operational advantages, the DoD will need to flip its traditional acquisition approach and adapt US military tactics or mission threads so they can integrate uncrewed systems that are available today. This bottom-up method of “mission integration” contrasts with the DoD’s predominant approach of systems engineering and reflects best practices emerging in commercial manufacturing or distribution, where the fastest and most effective way to assimilate robotics is to adjust the organization’s workflow as opposed to developing robots that replace humans in existing workflows.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Emerging Technology, and Military
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. The global terrorist threat forecast in 2023

Author:: Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The article presents three significant developments in the global terrorism landscape: Far-right terrorism, the growth of al Qaeda, with Taliban patronage from Afghanistan, and the persistence of the Islamic State as the most dominant threat in the world despite the successive decapitation of its leadership The article notes the importance in this context of political Islam and the spread of "jihadist" doctrines both from the Gulf and from conflict zones supplanting traditional and local Islam. The article also notes the potential impact of the radical environmental movement and the growing problem of the use of violence by other radical groups.
Topic:: Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Far Right, and Political Islam
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, and Global Focus

19. El modelo de intervención militar ruso-soviético

Author:: Alberto Priego
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Desde comienzos del siglo XX, Rusia y la URSS ha promovido un modelo de intervención militar que responde más a su visión imperialista que a sus necesidades de seguridad. Este hecho ha provocado que salvo cuando la intervención consistiera en una operación relámpago de cambio de gobierno, las aventuras militares hayan acabado en fracaso. Además, la incapacidad de Moscú para modernizar de facto sus doctrinas militares, unido a su atraso tecnológico, ha convertido al ejército ruso en una estructura ineficaz donde el factor humano no es valorado. Este trabajo pretende elaborar un modelo de intervención ruso-soviética que se repite en todas las aventuras militares rusas desde los años cincuenta hasta hoy mismo.
Topic:: Security, Imperialism, History, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Chechnya, Hungary, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Czechoslovakia

20. Soldiers out, civilians left behind: EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: This is the introduction to a three-part Report that reviews the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. Even if Europe’s security debate has moved on to this bigger and more pressing challenge, the EU must heed the lessons from Kabul as it reviews its crisis management architecture and implements the Strategic Compass. The exact conditions of the Afghanistan evacuation might not be seen again for many years. Still, the EU must consider a range of other scenarios: European soldiers or citizens in danger needing evacuation from failing states or war zones, military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or even short-term stability support to governments and initial entry missions. This requires a commitment to, and building of, EU rapid deployment capacities that are effectively ready to be used, associated with appropriate crisis management structures for EU decision-making. These are the questions that have interested this project, whose examination is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and European Union
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, and South Asia

21. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 1 – What went wrong? The decision-making moments

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: What went wrong in Kabul and what were the critical junctures in the West’s decision-making? This Paper explores these two questions in detail. Two moments stand out in the chaotic evacuation from Kabul: the establishment of the military withdrawal schedule in mid-April and when all the countries involved scrambled to get their civilians out too. What is clear is that EU institutions were not prepared and were equally blindsided by the speed of events and decisions. This Paper shows that the dereliction of prudence, planning and duty also extends to the EU. This is the first paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

22. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Europe

23. Against All Odds: Supporting Civil Society and Human Rights in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

Author:: Lisa Curtis, Annie Pforzheimer, and Jan Muhammad Jahid
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Eighteen months after taking power, the Taliban is intensifying its repression of Afghan civil society and cracking down on the rights and freedoms of all Afghans, especially those of women and girls. The Taliban’s harsh approach to governing the country is repressing millions of people and fueling civil unrest, promoting extremism, and laying the foundation for the reemergence of a terrorist hotbed that will almost undoubtedly become a threat to global peace and security in the years to come. Humanitarian needs in Afghanistan remain immense, and the country will require large amounts of international aid for the foreseeable future to avoid famine and other health challenges. Twenty-three million Afghans (or nearly 60 percent of the population) currently require food assistance, and unusually cold winter temperatures this year have caused further hardship and death. The Taliban’s December 2022 order barring Afghan women from working for nongovernmental organizations led some international humanitarian organizations to suspend operations, complicating aid distribution, especially to women-headed families. The abolition of democratic institutions—the Parliament, judiciary, free press—and key government ministries and departments charged with protecting human rights demonstrates that the Taliban is adhering to the same extremist policies that marked their first stint in power from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban rules by fear and intimidation; torture, kidnapping, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings are part of daily life in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rollback of women’s rights has been swift and comprehensive. Among the most devastating anti-female policies, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on Afghanistan’s social and economic development and relations with the world, are the edicts forbidding girls from attending secondary school or university. Women and girls in today’s Afghanistan also are prohibited from accessing parks or gyms, leaving home without a male companion, and working outside the home—except in the health sector—and have been publicly flogged for not adhering to the strict behavioral edicts. Women demonstrators have been arbitrarily jailed and subject to torture and death.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

24. Instead of Politicizing Afghanistan, Stand Up for Women and Girls

Author:: Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Ahuman rights calamity is unfolding in Afghanistan. In its latest move to repress half of the country’s population, the Taliban mandated that Afghan women can no longer work for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The United Nations (U.N.) condemned the Taliban for forcing the international organization to make an “appalling choice” between continuing its operations without employing Afghan women, which would violate the U.N. charter, or withdrawing from the country, which would deepen the humanitarian crisis.1 Following a U.N.-led international meeting in Doha in early May, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres signaled that the U.N. would likely continue operating in Afghanistan despite the harsh Taliban edict.2 This follows several other outrageous Taliban edicts, including keeping girls out of secondary school and young women from attending university; preventing women from leaving their homes without a male companion; and prohibiting women from going to parks or gyms or holding jobs, except in the health sector.3 Yet rather than stand up for Afghan women and girls in the face of such repressive policies, American leaders—Republicans and Democrats alike—are busy in a blame game about which political party is responsible for the U.S. failure in Afghanistan. Republican congressional leaders have held hearings on Afghanistan that focus on the Biden administration’s poor handling of the August 2021 withdrawal but largely ignore what is happening to women and girls in the country. One exception to Republican leaders’ inaction on the plight of Afghan women was Congressman Mike McCaul’s chairing of a roundtable on the issue that featured remarks by former Afghan Ambassador Roya Rahmani.4 For its part, the Biden administration recently published a review of the Afghan withdrawal that laid blame on the Trump administration for the Biden administration’s own failures.5 For instance, the Biden administration chose to bind itself to the Trump-era Doha deal made between the United States and the Taliban that called for U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021. The Biden administration could have delayed a troop withdrawal and negotiated a harder bargain with the Taliban. The administration would better serve American interests by focusing on implementing policies that support women and girls, like conditioning engagement with the Taliban on the reopening of schools and universities to women.
Topic:: Human Rights, Taliban, and Women
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

25. CTC Sentinel: October/November 2023 Issue

Author:: Devorah Margolin, Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, and Caroline Morgan
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On October 7, Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis in the largest terror attack since 9/11, carrying out acts of brutality that matched, and even surpassed, the worst atrocities of the Islamic State. The resulting war in Gaza, the escalation in tensions across the Middle East, and the anger in Arab and Muslim communities over the large number of Palestinian civilians killed in the conflict so far have upended the international terror threat landscape, creating acute concern about reprisals, and given the attacks already seen in France and Belgium, raised the specter of a new global wave of Islamist terror. In our feature article, Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt write that “The brutal Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israeli communities near Gaza represented a tactical paradigm shift for the group.” They observe that “the group’s explicit targeted killing and kidnapping of civilians [on October 7] baldly contradicts Hamas’ articulated revised political strategy since it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Ironically, Hamas’ sharp tactical shift only underscores that the group never abandoned its fundamental commitment to the creation of an Islamist state in all of what it considers historical Palestine and the destruction of Israel.” Global jihadi groups have been exploiting the conflict in Gaza to call for attacks. In our feature interview, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Ilkka Salmi says that “these calls to attack or to engage in some terrorist activity spread extremely quickly on social media and that’s why they could have a rapid and serious impact on the security situation. It reminds me of the days back in 2014-2016 when Daesh propaganda was at its high peak. The situation in Israel, combined with that sort of propaganda, could change the security situation in the E.U. quite drastically.” Tore Hamming writes that “three factors are likely to determine the impact of the ongoing events on the trajectory of the terrorism threat in the West: the length of the war, the scale of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and the degree of support from Western nations to Israel.” Erik Skare stresses that analysts need to holistically examine both what Hamas says and does to better understand the group. He writes: “October 7 likely signifies the victory of those in the movement who have grown frustrated with an excessive focus on politics, advocating instead for a renewed emphasis on violence to reach their long-term goals.” In our second interview, General (Retired) Stephen Townsend, who commanded AFRICOM until August 2022, warns about intensifying jihadi terrorist threats across Africa. He says that al-Qa`ida’s affiliates there are “probably the largest threat to U.S. interests in the region today. And as they gain capacity, they’ll broaden their picture to the region and globally, to include our homeland eventually, I think.” Finally, Asfandyar Mir examines the counterterrorism dilemmas facing the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He writes: “Al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State are pivoting to exploit Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the civilian harm in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since … Policymakers should take seriously the risk of a surprise terrorist provocation from Afghanistan.”
Topic:: Terrorism, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

26. CTC Sentinel: August 2023 Issue

Author:: Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Abdul Sayed, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Lucas Webber, and Alec Bertina
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: As we enter a new era of calibrated counterterrorism 22 years after 9/11, in this month’s feature article senior analysts at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center provide a unique window into the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to suppress international terrorism. NCTC director Christine Abizaid writes: “It is clear to me that Americans at home and abroad would be confronted with a more severe terrorism threat if it were not for the sustained and focused efforts of the entire U.S. CT community over the past 22 years. As we approach another 9/11 anniversary, I asked senior analysts from NCTC to share more with the public and academic community about the constant, behind-the-scenes work of CT professionals across the government. It is my hope that, through this product, others can gain a greater degree of insight into what this community regularly confronts in its mission to protect innocent civilians from persistent terrorist adversaries.” In the second feature article, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed examine the enduring threat posed by Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). They write: “An analysis of ISK’s operations, outreach, and clashes with the Taliban indicate that the organization remains capable of strategic adaptation and is only broadening and deepening its influence in the region, posturing to become a truly regional organization. And while the Taliban have demonstrated some capacity in targeting ISK commanders, any security gains are unlikely to hold in the absence of sustained counter-ISK operations.” With the Islamic State earlier this month announcing the appointment of its fifth caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, Aymenn Al-Tamimi examines what little is known about the group’s recent paramount leaders. He writes: “Despite the fact that the group’s caliphs are now very much ‘men of the shadows,’ there is little evidence pointing to the prospect of the group’s fragmentation in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere around the world, with the group’s affiliates seemingly willing to accept successor caliphs about whom little or nothing is publicly known.” Lucas Webber and Alec Bertina profile the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its paramilitary wing, the Russian Imperial Legion (RIL), tracing their involvement in the Ukraine conflict since 2014. They write: “With the Wagner Group’s resources waning, there may be an opportunity for RIM/RIL to deepen its involvement in Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. This could bolster the group’s recruitment, paramilitary capabilities, and thus increase the broader threat it poses. However, the organization may face sanctions in the future from the Russian state if the Kremlin continues to clamp down on Russian pro-war ultra-nationalist elements.”
Topic:: Security, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, 9/11, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

27. CTC Sentinel: May 2023 Issue

Author:: Paul Cruickshank, Abdul Sayed, Tore Hamming, Colin Clarke, and Mollie Saltskog
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: With Pakistan engulfed by political and economic turmoil, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—better known as the Pakistani Taliban—is again growing as a threat. In our feature article, Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming write: “With the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, the TTP has obtained new more sophisticated weapons and relocated fighters from Afghanistan to Pakistan and is now turning its focus back to its war against the Pakistani state. Over the past two years, the group has gone through a series of mergers, strengthened its media and operational activities, moved away from the indiscriminate targeting of civilians in suicide attacks, implemented a range of new internal policies centralizing its organizational structure, and settled on a localized strategy. With a solid organizational foundation and its eyes set on the Pakistani state, the TTP appears ready to follow in the footsteps of the Afghan Taliban and take control of territory in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Taliban victory in Afghanistan has emboldened and strengthened the TTP. With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan and sympathetic to the TTP, the TTP now enjoys a level of ‘strategic depth’ that is arguably unparalleled in its history.” Our interview is with Robin Simcox, the United Kingdom’s Commissioner for Countering Extremism. He talks about tackling violent and non-violent extremism across the ideological spectrum and the findings of the recent independent review of the United Kingdom’s “Prevent” counter-extremism pillar. Wassim Nasr recounts his journey through Idlib in late April and early May 2023 on a reporting assignment for France24. He met with senior leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including its leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who told him they have definitively turned away from global jihad. In Nasr’s words: “You have a core jihadi group with core leaders saying, ‘OK, we don’t want anything to do with international jihad anymore.’ This is unique. It’s never happened before.” Colin Clarke, Mollie Saltskog, Michaela Millender, and Naureen Fink examine the recent targeting of infrastructure by America’s violent far-right. They write that “the increased focus and attacks on critical infrastructure by far-right extremists has the potential to wreak extensive, multifaceted societal disruption and damage, impacting communications, the economy, mobility, and basic human necessities.”
Topic:: Infrastructure, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Far Right, Jihad, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United Kingdom, South Asia, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

28. Strange Intimacies: Indo-Afghan Relations and the End of the War on Terror

Author:: Mou Banerjee
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Riding the Afghan tiger has always been an incredibly risky venture, as history is witness, and getting off safely has almost always been impossible. There is no reason to believe that the new political dispensation in Afghanistan will not experience or exercise more violent changes in the near future. This is a tinderbox situation, and as always, Afghanistan is serving as a proxy for external neo-imperial ideologies and political maneuvers. This genealogical pattern is not unfamiliar to historians—Afghanistan served the same purpose in the nineteenth century between Britain and Russia, in the twentieth century between the USSR and the United States at the height of the Cold War, and in the twenty-first century between the so-called enlightened and liberal Western world order led by the United States and the dark forces of “jihadi” terrorism. China, India, and Pakistan are perhaps setting the board for a new iteration of this eternal “Great Game.”
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and India

29. Can the Belt and Road Initiative Succeed in Afghanistan?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At a trilateral meeting in Islamabad on May 9, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for multilateral infrastructure projects already underway, including the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project and the Trans-Afghan Railways (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 9). Earlier on January 5, the Taliban regime signed an agreement with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin, under which China will invest $150 million annually for three years and increase it thereafter to $540 million for the contract’s 25-year duration (Kabul Now, January 5). Then on April 13, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that the Chinese company Gochin had expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves (Kabul Now, April 13). Meanwhile, China is reported to be in talks with the Taliban regime over renegotiating the terms of a 2008 contract to mine copper from the Mes Aynak reserves in Logar province (The Print, June 8, 2022). The agreements, including plans to extend CPEC—a key leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—into Afghanistan, are a significant development. The deal relating to oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin is the Taliban regime’s first major foreign investment deal. However, in the past, major Chinese projects have failed to take off. Will the recent deals remain in limbo as well? China’s growing role in Afghanistan faces formidable challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

30. Afghanistan morass: An analysis of Pakistan’s security after NATO withdrawal

Author:: Iqra Jathol and Zahid Yaseen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The study discusses about the emerging security challenges to Pakistan after NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and Re-emergence of Taliban. After 19 years US signs an agreement and leaves Afghanistan in 2021. After withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, country faces alarming security concerns due to extreme hunger and poverty. To understand Pakistan's security dilemma, it is essential to analyze the Afghanistan’s current security scenario under the Talban government, foreign intervention in Afghanistan, Humanitarian crises, Pak-afghan relation, boarder issue, the movements in Pakistan and refugee crises, and then assess the security concerns of Pakistan due to Afghanistan crises after US withdrawal. Certainly, the Indian factor cannot be discounted during the study of Pakistan's security dilemma or south Asian security environment. The study is in qualitative mode and tries to find some security solutions through the lens current condition of Afghanistan.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

31. R2P Monitor, Issue 67, 1 December 2023

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 67 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso

32. R2P Monitor, Issue 66, 1 September 2023

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 66 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso

33. R2P Monitor, Issue 65, 1 June 2023

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 65 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso

34. R2P Monitor, Issue 64, 1 March 2023

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 64 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso

35. No Good Way to Occupy a Country: Conceptions of Culture in the Iraq War

Author:: Rochelle Davis
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: CCAS Professor Rochelle Davis’ latest book project examines the role that the U.S. military’s conception of culture played in the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Her work—which makes use of interviews with U.S. servicemembers and Iraqis, as well as military documents, cultural training materials, journalist reports, and soldier memoirs—analyzes the narratives that are told about Iraqis, Afghans, Arabs, and Muslims and explicates the paradoxical military objectives of cultural sensitivity and occupation. Professor Davis, who has published two prior books on Palestine, is currently finalizing the manuscript for No Good Way to Occupy a Country. She shares a bit about her project below.
Topic:: Occupation, Interview, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, Palestine, and United States of America

36. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:: Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

37. Covering the Greater Middle East Crisis: The Problematic Representation of Cultural and Political Issues in International Media

Author:: Giacomo Buoncompagni
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Review of Human Rights
Institution:: Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
Abstract:: Through the analysis of international media content, this study focuses on two phases of the recent Afghan history and its media representation—the end of the American military campaign and the beginning of the new Taliban government. Specifically, the analysis involves two questions: first, how the Western mainstream media publicly narrated the crisis following the establishment of the Taliban government; second, how the voices of Afghan women and journalists were reported within the news environment. Focusing on two dimensions, political and cultural, the article argues that the country has embarked on a process of "de-modernization," which needs to be checked.
Topic:: Human Rights, Politics, Religion, Women, Media, and Gender
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, and Taliban

38. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 9

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: There is a complete political deadlock and the leaderships in Afghanistan and Pakistan apparently also do not seem very much interested in getting out of it. At the same time, no one appears convinced to recognize the Taliban’s de facto government including Pakistan. The biggest bilateral problem, which concerns Pakistan the most, is the banned TTP and its cross-border terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s current stance is that it will not talk to the TTP, but to the Afghan government; the country lays the responsibility of checking the TTP incursions on the Afghan Taliban. However, the Taliban see the TTP as Pakistan’s internal issue, which not only adds to Pakistan’s frustration but also emboldens the militant group, which has already increased its terrorist attacks in Pakistan manifold. These are some of the findings of the PIPS-led 9th consultation on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on August 10, 2023 in Islamabad.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

39. Pakistan’s Afghan perspective and policy options

Author:: Safdar Sial
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: With the aim of strengthening Pakistan’s support for the peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pak Institute for Peace Studies initiated a comprehensive research and advocacy program in July 2021. Since then, PIPS has developed and published 8 quarterly monitors titled "Perspectives from Pakistan on Afghan peace and reconciliation," a same number of expert consultation reports, and 16 analytical papers embodied in 8 quarterly situation reviews titled "Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan." This policy-oriented final report builds upon the findings of the entire PIPS monitoring and analysis produced as well as consultations held over the project course. The main focus of this report is placed on exploring, analysing and informing Pakistan’s policy responses and options to support Afghan peace and stability. It comprises eight chapters. While chapter 2 provides a brief historical background of Pak-Afghan ties, chapter 3 narrates official and public responses from Pakistan since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. Chapter 4 analyses the challenges confronting the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and the following chapter discusses the fallout of emerging Afghan situation on Pakistan. Chapter 6 offers a detailed account of challenges and opportunities in Pakistan’s bilateral engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan. Chapter 7 evaluates evolving geopolitical dynamics and developments in relation to Afghanistan including international concerns and responses, the refugee issue, humanitarian aid and assistance, the recognition issue, as well as an analysis of geopolitical machinations and standpoints on Afghanistan and regional politics. The eighth and last chapter exclusively focuses Pakistan’s Afghan policy challenges and options as well as policy recommendations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

40. Perspectives from Pakistan on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation 8

Author:: Safdar Sial
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Given the fast-evolving situation in Afghanistan and its multifaceted impact on Pakistan, Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) has taken an initiative of monitoring, documenting, and analysing the opinions of different segments of Pakistani society and state institutions on the emerging Afghan situation. Under the Initiative, the institute has planned to prepare and publish quarterly reports, and the present one is the eighth of the series, covering the period from April to May 2023. This series of 'monitoring and analysis reports' constitutes one of the key components of a PIPS programme that aims at strengthening Pakistan's support for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. The reports are expected to improve knowledge-base and awareness of key stakeholders on Pakistan's Afghan perspective by demonstrating an overall understanding and critical review of a variety of viewpoints and positions, mainly around emerging events and developments in Afghanistan and their implications for Pakistan and the region.
Topic:: Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Social Media, Peace, Trade, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

41. Afghanistan as Seen from Pakistan - VIII

Author:: Ahmed Ali
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This series of analytical paper is among the key components of a PIPS programme that aims at strengthening Pakistan's support for the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Therefore, larger focus of these policy-oriented analytical papers – whose eighth quarterly issue comprising two papers is in your hands – is placed on specialised aspects and themes of Afghan conflict and peace as seen from Pakistani perspective. The purpose of this series of analytical papers is to expand the knowledge base and awareness of key stakeholders on Pakistan's Afghan perspective, and its role and interest in Afghan peace and reconciliation. That purpose is linked to another underlying goal of developing and suggesting updated policy options and recommendations for Pakistani government and civil society. These papers are expected to demonstrate an overall understanding of a variety of viewpoints and positions mainly around emerging events and developments in Afghanistan and their implications for Pakistan and the region.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

42. A Blind Spot of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan into Relation with India: The Second Reign Since August 2021

Author:: Mohammad Khalid Khawrin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: India, from a humanistic perspective, has significantly contributed to Afghanistan's development and aids. The inductive research method was applied in the study. The nature of the data was in qualitative form in the secondary mood. The data was analyzed through the narrative analysis technique. The results showed that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is in state-making process. Afghanistan is complicated and unstable and that how it develops politically will determine how India and Afghanistan will interact in the future. It is recommended that IEA clarify and formalize its internal and external politics, policies, commitment to Islamic human rights, and responsibility to the state.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Aid, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and India

43. Afghanistan After 18 Months: Its Humanitarian, Financial, and Governance Crisis

Author:: Wolfgang Danspeckgruber
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) announces the publication of a new series – The Triesenberg Papers – and presents the first installment, entitled: “Afghanistan after 18 Months: Its Humanitarian, Financial, and Governance Crisis.” The paper is available to download here. Key findings of this first Triesenberg Paper demonstrate that the Taliban expects the international community to continue financial and humanitarian assistance as well as to provide food for more than 28 million Afghans, while it apparently keeps enriching itself through taxation (almost $2 billion in 2022), as well as sales of arms, natural resources, and drugs. Afghanistan under Taliban rule is the world’s only country with complete gender apartheid and oppression of girls and women. The paper argues that the Taliban must not be (economically) successful because this can contribute to regional instability and inspire radical (Islamic) forces elsewhere to follow this model in trying to create similar repressive states. It reiterates that Afghanistan has once again become a pawn in the great power game—including Russia, Pakistan, India, China, and others, with tensions between India and China looming large—while Taliban policies and ambitions are being instrumentalized. The paper warns that ignoring the plight of the Afghans in our crisis-prone world increases the existing problems and resulting security risks particularly for Afghanistan’s neighborhood and Europe, by permitting Afghanistan to become a hornet’s nest for international terrorism. The paper proposes concrete steps on how to move forward constructively. The Triesenberg Papers are a new publication series edited by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and published through the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University. Subjects emanate from the Liechtenstein Colloquia on European and International Affairs (LCM) as well as other specialized meetings on critical topics in contemporary geopolitics, communal relations, security, technology, society, and cultural-religious issues. The LCM have been active since 1989. The meetings and publications seek to produce meaningful, non-polemic, analytical and substantial analysis and to develop innovative and sustainable solutions.
Topic:: Financial Crisis, Governance, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

44. Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy Responses

Author:: Farkhondeh Akbari and Jacqui True
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:: Nearly two years on from the Taliban’s takeover, diplomatic efforts have so far failed to anticipate or halt the unfolding regressive regime in Afghanistan. Feminist foreign policy approaches can guide both normative and practical efforts to protect and defend women’s fundamental rights in the country and support local actors to create alternative spaces for women’s and girls’ to reclaim their rights to education, employment, and political agency. This paper makes the case that governments employing a feminist foreign policy approach – as well as those who claim to prioritise gender equality – must use the term “gender apartheid” to signal their condemnation in the strongest terms. The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan is becoming more critical every day under the Taliban’s terror regime of gender apartheid. The international war fought by militaries has ended but the war against women and girls has escalated. Egregious violations of human rights and pervasive gender-based violence are occurring, targeting women protesters, women associated with the previous government, and ethnicminority women. The Taliban regime not only restricts the rights of women, but also commits new forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), such as abducting women who protest peacefully, raping them in custody, burning the hands of Panjshiri women, and lashing Hazara women. The latter are specific tortures for specific ethnic identities. These acts are also intended to dishonour the families and communities of the victims.1 The war against women is an extension of conflict by other means. The Taliban’s barbaric treatment of women and the international community’s apparent impotence to gender oppression emboldens the Taliban regime and its extremist ideology. The Taliban threatens regional and global peace and stability as extremist groups and regressive leaders in other countries are galvanized by the Taliban’s success. Despite not formally recognising their regime, some regional countries, namely China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Qatar, have chosen to cooperate more with the Taliban by giving them control of Afghanistan’s consulates. To date, diplomatic engagements to negotiate with the Taliban regarding its political and ideological gender policies have been futile and ineffective. The brutal oppression of women has been the defining characteristic of Taliban rule and a chief symbol of its grip on power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Apartheid, Development, Human Rights, Taliban, Women, and Gender
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

45. Pakistan Security Report 2021

Author:: Safdar Sial, Muhammad Amir Rana, and Najam U Din
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: While the political and security situation in neighboring Afghanistan is still fluid, concerns are growing inside Pakistan about the possible fallout including in terms of increased insecurity, border tensions, and militant violence. For one, the developments in Afghanistan had already started influencing Pakistan’s militant landscape in 2021 as the year witnessed not only an increase in terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but also an intensified terrorist violence by Baloch insurgent groups mainly in Balochistan. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also emerged as one of the key actors of violence and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the year. While the Afghan Taliban find it difficult to convince the world to recognize their government and activate/unfreeze financial channels, they are also finding it increasingly hard to address the domestic challenges mainly those linked to governance, security, and intra-Afghan reconciliation. Despite their repeated promises to not allow anyone to use the Afghan soil against Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have yet not seriously considered to act against the TTP; except having facilitated the talks between Pakistani government and the TTP which have also not shown any successes so far. Nonetheless, there have been critical statements about Pakistan from some Taliban officials on multiple occasions about Pakistan’s democratic political system as well as fencing of the border by Pakistani security forces. Pakistan has eventually conveyed its concerns to the Afghan interim government about Afghan officials’ repeated efforts to damage the border fencing saying it was observing maximum restraint.
Topic:: Security, National Security, and International Security
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Middle East, and Asia

46. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:: Arooj Mumtaz
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: The Taliban captured Kabul on 15th August 2021 and announced their government three weeks later. Pakistan viewed the event as cleaning up of the unwanted externalities in its neighborhood i.e., a complete pullback of Indian and Western presence and influence. However, the initial exhilaration has morphed into disappointment over the past months. Not only has the Taliban regime adopted traditional approach to Durand line, they are also believed to be turning a blind eye to the safe havens of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups on their soil. Pakistan in the current situation requires an all-encompassing parliament-led policy that focuses on provision of humanitarian assistance and on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Along with humanitarian assistance, Pakistan’s present Afghan policy must address its bilateral equation with Afghanistan and counter-terrorism mechanisms. Unfortunately, despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade or border. So, the government must avail this opportunity and focus on sketching a bilateral strategic agreement because unlike previous governments in Kabul, the current government is keen to make formal agreements with neighbouring Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan needs to exhibit a balanced approach, neither being apologetic about the amicable equation it shares with the Afghan Taliban, nor become an advocate of the Taliban. This will allow Pakistan to be pragmatic and shape its actions and reactions accordingly. Here it may be noted that a key factor that is limiting Pakistan’s policy choices is the enhanced threats to Pakistan’s internal security as well its western borders since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Cross border movements of militants have increased, leading to a spike in attacks on Pakistan security personnel. As far as TTP is concerned, between September 2021 and March 2022, it claimed to have carried out 197 attacks. Apparently, the Taliban have reneged on their promises made in Doha as well as earlier that they would prevent Afghan soil from becoming a staging point for attacks inside Pakistan. This inaction is fundamentally due to the Afghan Taliban’s long affiliation with the TTP which fought side by side with them against foreign forces. Against this backdrop, the Afghan Taliban are averse to the idea of cracking down on the TTP in a meaningful way. Currently, the Taliban are limiting their efforts to being a mediator between the Pakistani government and TTP kingpins. On the question of Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crisis, there are contrasting opinions. While some advocate that Pakistan must be at the front foot, others maintain that Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic issues are majorly a concern of the international community and Pakistan must conduct low- key. Through Pakistan’s weakened economy does not allow it to help Afghanistan single-handedly, still it can facilitate international engagement which certainly is the remedy for Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises. Socio-economic stability in Afghanistan is crucial for Pakistan’s internal security because if Afghanistan does not stabilise macroeconomically, no politics or diplomacy will save Pakistan from fallout of the crisis in Afghanistan. Pakistan must focus its efforts towards assuring that international engagement and assistance is not conditioned with the provision of women rights – at least in the immediate term - particularly because Afghanistan has a specific cultural orientation which does not fully align with the Western concepts of human rights. Pakistan has so far exhibited a stern strategy towards refugees. Though it is fundamentally an attempt to keep the international community from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan, it is also motivated by Pakistan’s economic fragility. Not only has Pakistan given a cold response to the idea of more refugees pouring into Pakistan, it has also stopped UNHCR from using the terms “new arrivals” or “new refugees”. However, this approach will have negative impacts because when refugees are abandoned by states and a vacuum is created, other forces and elements start interfering. It is argued that such policies have led to recruitments in ISKP. So, with the situation in hand, the right roadmap will be to sketch inclusive measures in order to deal with the matter of refugees; refugees living in Pakistan for the last many decades should be considered for granting right to Pakistani citizenship.
Topic:: Governance, Taliban, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

47. Perspectives From Pakistan on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:: Muhammad Amir Rana
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Since the US withdrawal and Taliban takeover in August last year, Afghanistan’s economic situation has been fast deteriorating. As a result, Afghans are suffering from poverty, starvation, and a lack of access to healthcare and other services. Pakistani government and different segments of its society seem aware of the situation. The government has not only been providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people but also facilitating international efforts in that regard. On political front, too, Pakistan continues to help Afghanistan by telling the world not to abandon Afghan people in time of their need. During the quarter under review, Pakistan facilitated a Saudi-led OIC Foreign Ministers’ extraordinary meeting in Islamabad. It has already established Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Coordination Cell. Both of these initiatives are meant to accelerate relief efforts in Afghanistan. Similarly, while Pakistan has not yet formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it has informally started the diplomatic relationship with the country. This chapter provides a summarized outcome of the PIPS quarterly monitoring of the opinions of different segments of Pakistani society and state institutions on Afghanistan’s political, social and security situations and their perceived impact on Pakistan. PIPS’ desk and field researchers regularly monitored/reviewed press and electronic media reports, social media platforms, academic and research analyses and reports, publications of religious groups and militants, government records and press releases, as well as officials’ statements and happenings on the Afghan situation and related developments. PIPS team also conducted interviews with experts, officials, political leaders, and media persons to seek their comments where responses were missing in public or media discourses
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Governance, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

48. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan’s Interests and Policy Options II

Author:: Arooj Mumtaz
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: The recognition of the Taliban government continues to be a major concern of world powers which are also closely monitoring the stance of Afghanistan’s neighbours on the matter of recognition. Since the fall of Kabul, Pakistan has demonstrated the policy of engagement, however as far as the recognition of the Taliban government is concerned, experts are of the opinion that recognition by Pakistan will be of no use until others follow the suit. Many in the U.S. and NATO countries believe that their “defeat” in Afghanistan could have been avoided had Pakistan not played the role it did. Hence, Pakistan needs to consider the great powers’ perspective on Afghanistan meanwhile ensuring that it facilitates humanitarian assistance in the war-torn neighbour. Moreover, experts assert that the Taliban are capable enough to further their agenda on the regional and world stage and Pakistan needs to avoid assuming that role. Cross-border migration remains a pronounced worry of the Pakistani government, but due to border fencing and strict security measures the phenomenon has so far been under control. However, if further humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan is not prevented, more refugees will certainly cross the border to enter Pakistan. To escape this situation, Pakistan has time and again urged the world community to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. The hosting of OIC summit is one such attempt by Pakistan. However, experts believe that OIC is less likely to be fruitful; firstly, because individually important OIC members (Saudi Arabia or U.A.E) have not given any statement regarding Afghanistan’s assistance, and secondly because the issue of recognition is impossible to be tackled as all the Arab states are hesitant to accept the Taliban regime.
Topic:: Security, Migration, Governance, Taliban, Leadership, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

49. The Afghan refugee crisis: How to resurrect the global refugee resettlement coalition

Author:: Rory Stewart
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Six months after the fall of Kabul, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated at an alarming rate. The threat of famine and economic collapse looms over the entire country. Consequently, many Afghans are fleeing both these appalling conditions and the oppressive Taliban that now control the country. However, Afghan asylum seekers will be facing difficult circumstances even after they leave their country. The global resettlement order remains severely atrophied after the refugee crisis of the mid-2010s, leaving it unable to face the challenge in a rise in Afghan refugees or for other future refugee crises. As the humanitarian tragedy in Afghanistan intensifies, a new global refugee resettlement coalition has to be formed to address the escalating refugee crisis. The primary objectives of this report, written by Rory Stewart, Senior Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute and former UK development minister, are to: outline the ways in which states have already attempted to respond to the Afghan refugee crisis; discuss realistic and measured ways to address the refugee crisis without undermining border security; improve transatlantic and global coordination in reinvigorating standards on refugee resettlement across the world. This report outlines how the refugee resettlement coalition can be restructured. Beginning with the United States, United Kingdom, and coalition of likely EU member states (such as France, Germany, Benelux, and the Nordic countries), these countries can resettle approximately 320,000 refugees annually. This would happen if each country committed to taking in 0.05% of their respective populations each year: 33,026 for the United Kingdom, 166,400 for the United States, and 120,000 for the likely coalition of willing EU member states. The report also explains how the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly since the fall of Kabul, why Afghans are leaving their home country in increasing numbers, and why the international community must reinvigorate the global resettlement coalition to address this crisis and future refugee crises.
Topic:: Refugee Crisis, Resettlement, Asylum, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

50. Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian interests may yet intersect

Author:: Borzou Daragahi
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: A new issue brief, Afghanistan: Where US-Iranian Interests May Yet Intersect, authored by Atlantic Council senior fellow Borzou Daragahi delves into the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and how the swift collapse of the US-backed government in Kabul last summer not only shocked the United States and its allies in the 20-year struggle in that country, but also Afghanistan’s influential neighbor, Iran. As refugees continue to stream into Iran, the government in Tehran has still not recognized the Taliban regime and remains worried about a further deterioration in Afghanistan’s economy and social cohesion, as well as the growing presence of Sunni Jihadi militants. As Iran-Afghan relations evolve, will US concerns about Afghanistan’s fragile state provide a basis for tacit cooperation between Washington and Tehran, similar to what existed when the Taliban was last in power?
Topic:: Government, Taliban, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

51. Humanitarian Catastrophe in Afghanistan: A Crisis by Choice

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: One of the world’s most serious humanitarian crises is taking place in Afghanistan and it is largely the result of flawed assumptions of Western policy following the Taliban’s seizure of power. The West’s suspension of development aid has led to the collapse of the economy and to hunger for millions of Afghans. Instead of forcing the Taliban to respect human rights, the actions will have the opposite effect—a humanitarian catastrophe, mass migration, and a failed state. The European Union may soon face these effects directly, so it should take steps to resume development cooperation and avert the worst-case scenario.
Topic:: Human Rights, Taliban, Economy, Development Aid, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

52. Austrian Migration Policy and the Events in Afghanistan and Belarus

Author:: Łukasz Ogrodnik
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Contrary to the government’s rhetoric about restrictive migration policy, Austria remains open to the settlement of people from outside the EU. The takeover of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 and the intensifying crisis on the border between EU countries and Belarus stimulated the Austrian government in international forums in the field of migration. The prospects for cooperation with the V4 countries in this regard were heightened after interior minister Karl Nehammer was elevated to Chancellor.
Topic:: Government, International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, and Borders
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, Austria, and Belarus

53. Lessons from NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan

Author:: Benjamin Zyla and Laura Grant
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: AFter US troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021, the Taliban launched an offensive to take back control of the country. By August, the militants had retaken con- trol of most (administrative) districts and President Ashraf Ghani and other key officials fled the country. NATO Allies rushed to close nearly all of the military and civilian infrastructure they had built since 2001, and hastily set up air bridges to evacuate their citizens and personnel from Kabul. Most of this was done by the member states while NATO as an organization mainly stood on the fringes. Critics have focused on these events to call for an evaluation of this hasty and uncoordinated withdraw- al, and of the entire Afghan intervention more gener- ally. Among others the NATO Parliamentary Assem- bly called upon member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance not only to “conduct a thorough, clear-eyed, and comprehensive assessment of the Alliance’s 20-year engagement in Afghanistan”, but also demanded to incorporate these lessons into “NATO’s New Strategic Concept”.1 This Policy Brief aims to contribute to the lessons learned analysis that will be central to discussions at the NATO Summit this coming June in Spain. We of- fer eight findings and recommendations, based on a four-year long study of the effectiveness of the Af- ghan intervention.2
Topic:: NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

54. Powered by Twitter? The Taliban's Takeover of Afghanistan

Author:: Laura Courchesne, Bahar Rasikh, Brian McQuinn, and Cody Buntain
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:: On August 15, 2021, a spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban’s self- proclaimed state, declared on Twitter: “With the help of God, and the support of the nation, we are now in control of all parts of the country. We would like to congratulate our nation on this big achievement.” After 20 years of conflict with U.S. and NATO coalition forces, no one predicted the speed with which the Taliban would consolidate power and precipitate the collapse of the Afghan government and military. Presenting research conducted by the newly established Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Conflict (CAIDAC), this report explores social media’s central role in the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and the strategies used by the group to manipulate international and domestic audiences. It examines the Taliban’s social media strategy on Twitter throughout their takeover of Afghanistan, which culminated in the storming of Kabul on August 15, 2021. Specifically, we studied the activity of 63 accounts claimed by the Taliban leadership, spokespersons, and avowed members from April 1 to September 16, 2021. These accounts had more than 2 million followers on Twitter in September 2021. As of May 8, 2022, Taliban content reaches more than 3.3 million accounts. We also examined the broader Taliban ecosystem, which included more than 126,000 Twitter accounts that either retweeted Taliban content or posted content subsequently shared by the Taliban’s core network. We found clear patterns in the group’s communication strategies, visual imagery deployed, and the timing and content of social media activity and events on the ground.
Topic:: NATO, Terrorism, Taliban, Social Media, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

55. An Unfinished Agenda: Carving Out Space for Humanitarian Action in the UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Resolutions and Related Sanctions

Author:: Agathe Sarfati
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the UN Security Council has developed two main streams of work related to counterterrorism: the sanctions regime established by Resolution 1267 and measures under Resolution 1373. However, these resolutions and related sanctions regimes have been criticized for failing to safeguard and facilitate impartial humanitarian action. In response, the council has progressively incorporated language that better considers international humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian principles. Despite these efforts, humanitarian organizations have continued to criticize counterterrorism resolutions and related sanctions regimes for inhibiting humanitarian activities. This policy paper considers how the Security Council’s counterterrorism resolutions and related sanctions regimes can continue making progress to better protect humanitarian action. It begins by describing the council’s main streams of work on counterterrorism as well as their subsidiary organs. The second section discusses the impact of these counterterrorism measures on impartial humanitarian activities. The third section then reviews the incremental steps taken by the Security Council to incorporate language relevant to IHL and humanitarian affairs into these measures. The fourth section analyzes the four most recent counterterrorism-related resolutions adopted by the Security Council. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for entities both within and outside of the UN to better safeguard humanitarian action within counterterrorism resolutions and related sanctions regimes: For humanitarian organizations, relevant civil society groups and UN entities, and independent experts: Advocate to keep humanitarian action high on the Security Council agenda; Monitor the implementation of the humanitarian exception for Afghanistan; and Issue independent opinions on advisable forms of humanitarian carve-outs. For the UN Security Council and other UN member states: Reinforce implementation and monitoring of provisions in Security Council resolutions pertaining to IHL and humanitarian action; Provide adequate resources to monitor the impact of UN counterterrorism measures and related sanctions on humanitarian action; Amend language in UN counterterrorism resolutions and related sanctions regimes to facilitate humanitarian action; and Empower elected members of the Security Council to be agents of change.
Topic:: Sanctions, Counter-terrorism, UN Security Council, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Global Focus

56. When Interventions Fail: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Latin America

Author:: Leticia Abad and Noel Maurer
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: In the middle of 2021, despite two decades of effort, the Afghan government collapsed in just nine days. The United States failed to create a state with the capacity to control its own armed forces or local officials. As early as 2009, eight years into the intervention, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry had already noted that the Afghan government could not carry out most state functions and that its leadership showed little interest in trying. U.S. civilians and soldiers tried to fill the gap.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, State Building, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Latin America, and United States of America

57. Biden’s Foreign Policy Casts a Long Shadow

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Upon taking office as US president, Joseph R. Biden vowed he would bring the United States back to the centre of the international stage after the erratic course followed by Donald Trump. One year later, it can hardly be said that he has been successful.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

58. The American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, One Year Later

Author:: Yoram Schweitzer and Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Global considerations prompted the United States’ decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, not military pressure from the Taliban. This is evident one year after the withdrawal, despite the difficult scenes of the first few days after the Taliban takeover of the capital, Kabul, and the victory celebrations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Furthermore, at this stage the danger of an international wave of terrorism in the West led by al-Qaeda does not appear to be a concrete and immediate threat. The killing by the United States via an armed UAV of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was hiding in Kabul, has also contributed to the organization's weakness and put it on the defensive. For the US administration and from a long-term perspective, the withdrawal was the right step, which did not harm the United States' superpower standing and even enabled greater attention and resources for coping with the main challenges currently posed by China and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

59. MF Dollars for Dictators? The Allocation of SDR to Moderate and Isolated Countries

Author:: Haggy Etkes
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: “The International Monetary Fund assisted radical regimes, including the Russian government and the Taliban in Afghanistan”: This claim was made given the allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) by the IMF to states in the region. Is there truth to this charge?
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Finance, and IMF
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, and Middle East

60. Strategic Patience: Sustainable Engagement with a Changed Afghanistan

Author:: Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: One year after the United States withdrew its military from Afghanistan, relations between the two countries are stuck in a holding pattern. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian donor to the people of Afghanistan, with over $774 million USD distributed since the Taliban takeover, but the United States maintains no diplomatic presence in the country — nor does it send official diplomatic envoys.1 U.S. sanctions have not altered the Taliban’s calculus on human rights or ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban has proved intransigent and unrealistic in its relations not only with Washington but with neighboring countries like Pakistan. Its senior leaders lack a coherent vision for the country and its emir remains reclusive.2 Future U.S. policymakers might be tempted to disengage diplomatically and economically from Afghanistan and instead rely primarily on “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism.3 The most likely consequence of this approach would be a more isolated and unstable Afghanistan, which in turn could foster an even more permissive environment for transnational terrorists. Consistent diplomacy tied to long-term U.S. security objectives is likely to produce incremental results at best, but is still preferable to diplomatic disengagement or military intervention. This brief provides a concise background and analysis of the most pressing issues affecting U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It draws on open source data; interviews with government officials — including from the de facto Taliban government; and interviews with private analysts that were conducted remotely or in person — in the United States, Pakistan, and Qatar. Broad policy recommendations • The United States should work closely with regional countries, including Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to ensure they are prepared to handle security challenges as they emerge. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is revived, opportunities may emerge to engage Iran on Afghanistan. These should include routine dialogue, intelligence sharing, and capacity building, such as policing and border security. Washington should engage separately with India and Pakistan to bolster humanitarian aid and limited commerce to Afghanistan. • The United States should reiterate mutual responsibilities under the 2020 agreement it signed with the Taliban in Doha, but recognize that it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and therefore is better understood as an aspirational framework. • Formal recognition of the de facto Taliban government should be withheld until it demonstrates a clear commitment to its counterterrorism responsibilities and respect for basic human rights, including for women. But Washington should place diplomats in Afghanistan either through the creation of an in-country Afghanistan affairs unit, whether based in the prior U.S. Embassy or inside a friendly third country’s diplomatic mission, or by sending temporary delegations to Kabul, as our allies have. This should be coupled with multilateral steps to remove the leadership’s travel privileges. It is important that U.S. officials interact with Taliban cabinet members in Kabul and other Taliban stakeholders based in Kandahar.4 Direct outreach by U.S. military officials and the intelligence community may have utility but it is not a replacement for a coherent civilian-led diplomatic strategy. • Sanctions intended to target the Taliban as a non-state actor now extend far beyond their original scope, since they became the de facto government of Afghanistan. If not yet determined, the U.S. government should communicate what steps the Taliban must take to be de-listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

61. Afghanistan Under Taliban: A new Regime Poses a Threat to International Stability

Author:: Valeri Modebadze
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The purpose of this study was to see whether the Taliban regime poses a threat to the international community. The research primarily examined the threats that the formation of a theocratic regime in Afghanistan poses to neighboring countries and the international community. With regards to research methods, a document analysis method was used to obtain valid information and to analyze and describe the complex situation in Afghanistan. A wide array of documents and scholarly articles were analyzed to obtain reliable and objective information. This research revealed that the Taliban has not changed at all and still rules Afghanistan with medieval methods and strategies. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the economic situation has deteriorated considerably and people face severe hardship. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Afghans want to leave their homeland and migrate to the West. The Taliban violates constantly human rights and discriminates against women, ethnic and religious minorities. The Taliban has transformed Afghanistan into a narco-state. Neighboring countries fear that Afghanistan might become a hotbed of terrorism and extremism again.
Topic:: Security, Economics, International Cooperation, Governance, Taliban, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

62. Scope and Limitations of Soft Power Diplomacy: A Quantitative Analysis of Afghans' Perceptions about India

Author:: Mohammad Reyaz and Sabir Ahamed
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Before the Taliban came back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, India and Afghanistan had cordial bilateral relations and were often described as great friends. Since 2002, India had helped build several infrastructure projects as part of its promised development assistance program of over $2 billion (later increased to $3 billion). Considering India’s investments in Afghanistan, the goodwill it enjoyed among common Afghans was understandable. However, it would be wrong to imply that these unique, multifaceted bilateral relations between the two countries were simply due to India's helping hand. This research paper is one of its kind attempt to explain the perceptions Afghans had about India based on the field survey done in Afghanistan in 2019. Using responses of over 321 Afghan participants, the paper attempts to quantitatively analyze the goodwill and positive vibes that India enticed among Afghans. However, many Afghans felt that India did not do enough during the crisis in August 2021. Based on the survey and the general perceptions of Afghans in the aftermath of the return of the Taliban, this paper argues that the soft power investments in Afghanistan helped India in its nation-branding, making it attractive and creating goodwill. However, New Delhi lacked the will to act smartly and hence did not get the desired strategic influences due to ‘soft power behavior’.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, India, and Asia

63. Pakistani PM sparks Outrage among Afghanis at the OIC Conference

Author:: Giovanni Matteo Quer
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In January issue of Beehive, Giovanni Quer analyzes the reactions to Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statement on Afghan society and the emerging digital counterpublic.
Topic:: History, Women, Humanitarian Crisis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

64. A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: European officials are frustrated at India’s apparent fence-sitting over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, for Indian policymakers, maintaining a workable relationship with Russia is central to counterbalancing Chinese hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. India also depends significantly on Russia for arms supplies, including advanced systems that help it keep pace with China. Despite this, India has for some time been slowly decoupling from Russia and strengthening its relations with the West, especially the US. Europeans should be aware of how India defines its own strategic positioning, and support India where possible as they negotiate the tricky issues relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Arms Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and India

65. Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups is a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have relied on the Taliban to prevent non-state actors from operating in northern Afghanistan and launching cross-border attacks. In recent months, however, the Islamic State has bombed mosques near the border with Central Asia, and claimed to have launched a rocket attack into Uzbekistan. The deteriorating situation in the region demonstrates the limits of Central Asian states’ security strategies, and highlights that they have few options in dealing with a new threat on their border.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Taliban, Borders, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and United States of America

66. Afghanistan After Zawahiri: America's Counterterrorism Options in the New South Asia

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Despite the attention in Washington currently paid to developments in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, terrorism remains a threat to US national security. The recent counterterrorism strike against Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul highlights that the fight against al-Qaeda, among other groups, is not over, and that Afghanistan remains a safe harbor for many of the world’s terrorist organizations or their affiliates. Going forward, the United States will need to continue to dedicate resources to detect and disrupt terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. To do so, Washington needs to rebuild a coalition of allies opposed to violent Islamist extremism—both around Afghanistan and inside the country—who can provide intelligence and logistics support as needed, to help in that task.
Topic:: National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Coalition
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

67. Apply the Logic of the Afghanistan Withdrawal to Syria

Author:: Natalia Armbruster
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The logic President Biden used for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan applies to Syria. Since a U.S. intervention should be defined by clear, achievable goals, and since long-range strikes, instead of occupying forces, can accomplish U.S. counterterrorism goals, there is no good case for keeping U.S. troops in Syria either. Around 900 U.S. forces currently occupy territory in eastern and southern Syria, risking conflict with Syrian forces and local militias, as well as Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces. ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria was eliminated in 2019. The few, small, remote areas the remnants of ISIS now hold are largely within territory held by Syrian government forces. Local forces can fight the remnants of ISIS. None of the other standard rationales for keeping U.S. forces in Syria—protecting the Kurds, countering Iran and Russia, unseating the Assad regime—justifies keeping troops in Syria either.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

68. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:: Andrew Doris
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

69. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

70. Turkey in Afghanistan: more than one reason to stay

Author:: Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite a long history of bilateral contacts, Turkey’s most intensive commitment in Afghanistan only started in 2001 with the NATO mission. A first friendship treaty was signed back in 1921; the first official foreign visit to the Republic of Turkey was made in 1928 by King Amanullah of Afghanistan. Turkey’s engagement in South Asia started with Afghanistan but has recently been Pakistan-centred. As the only majority-Muslim NATO country, Turkey was viewed more positively by the Afghan population and the Taliban than other NATO member states. Ankara has been reaching out to the Taliban since summer 2021. However, the Taliban have not met Turkish demands for a more inclusive government, or in relation to girls’ education. Turkey has become a haven for non-Taliban (opposition) Afghans, who are told not to voice their criticism of the Taliban. There are four main motivations for Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan: 1) improving relations with the US; 2) stabilizing Afghanistan to prevent migrant flows; 3) getting a foothold in the geopolitics of the region; 4) benefitting from the economic potential. Kabul international airport is important both for the Taliban and for Turkey. For the Taliban, it is their window to the world; for Turkey, it is an opportunity to profit economically and to boost its international status. In Afghanistan, Turkey’s soft power approach includes TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the Maarif schools, and the Yunus Emre Institute. These institutions have remained operational. In 2020, Afghanistan received the third largest amount of Turkish developmental aid, amounting to 36.5 million USD. Even if the world, and Turkey, are currently focused on Ukraine, Afghanistan will continue to occupy an important place in Turkey’s regional foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Turkey, and Middle East

71. Global threat landscape 2022

Author:: Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Three trends will characterise the evolving global terror threat landscape in 2022. First, the cascading implications of the return of the Taliban-al Qaeda alliance to Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. Second, the diffusion of the Islamic State threat from the Levant, notably from Iraqi-Syrian theatre. Third, the online surge of extremist and violent content especially of Islamist and Far Right entities on servers in North America and Europe mobilising and radicalizing especially youth. With lockdowns, partial lockdowns and other pandemic restrictions, the challenges facing government security forces - military, law enforcement and intelligence surged and both in resource allocation for training and mobility for operations hampered their performance and efficacy. The focus on humanitarian challenges by governments during the pandemic was ably exploited by threat groups to expand their support bases or capture territory. On the other hand, a range of ideological and material threats manifested in 2021. Some will institutionalise both in the physical and digital spaces in 2022. With radicalisation and reciprocal radicalisation of Islamists and Far Right threat groups, their networks, cells and personalities will stage attacks.
Topic:: Taliban, Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Islamism, and Digital Space
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Syria

72. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime

Author:: Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

73. August 2022 Issue

Author:: Paul Cruickshank, Madeline Field, Andrew Watkins, Don Rassler, and Muhammad Al-'Ubaydi
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: One year ago, the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, raising concerns that they would again provide al-Qa`ida with a safe haven. Soberingly, in the months before his death in a U.S. airstrike at the end of July, al-Qa`ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was releasing videos encouraging global terror, while living in a salubrious neighborhood of Kabul under the apparent protection of the Haqqani Taliban. This special issue of CTC Sentinel focuses on evolving dynamics relevant to the terrorism threat landscape one year into Taliban rule. In the feature article, Andrew Watkins takes a deep look at the Taliban’s first year in power. He writes: “Until the subtle, almost imperceptible attempts to nudge the needle on controversial issues within the movement gain more momentum, the Taliban’s emphasis on policing public life—and most critically, keeping women out of it—is likely to continue. And given this dynamic, al-Zawahiri’s killing under sanctuary in Kabul may confront the Taliban with a greater obligation to shore up their legitimacy among jihadi circles than to fall in line with international expectations on counterterrorism.” Our interview is with Edmund Fitton-Brown, the outgoing coordinator of the ISIL/Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations, who argues that a key determinant of the future international terror threat will be the degree to which the Taliban inhibit al-Qa`ida from launching attacks with fingerprints that lead directly back to Afghanistan. Don Rassler and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi evaluate who may be next in line to lead al-Qa`ida. They write: “The decision that al-Qa`ida makes could end up strengthening the group and al-Qa`ida’s status as a global brand. It could also, like someone pulling a loose thread, facilitate a greater unraveling of al-Qa`ida and its network of formally aligned regional affiliate partners.” Tore Hamming and Abdul Sayed assess the evolving threat posed by al-Qa`ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), writing, “it appears that with Taliban-run Afghanistan offering it a platform for regional expansion, AQIS is pivoting its focus to other parts of the South Asia region. Having set its eyes particularly on India and the contested Kashmir region, AQIS is currently pushing out targeted propaganda to recruit new operatives and to instigate new insurgencies in the region.” Nishank Motwani looks at the lessons learned for countering violent extremism in Afghanistan based on a survey of how former governing elites saw the violent extremism problem set in Afghanistan before the Taliban takeover.
Topic:: Taliban, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

74. January 2022 Issue

Author:: Michael Knights, Alex Almeida, Don Rassler, Brian Fishman, and Amira Jadoon
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Notwithstanding a night attack that killed 11 Iraqi soldiers on an army base in the Iraqi province of Diyala earlier this month, the Islamic State is at its lowest ebb in Iraq in many years, according to new data published by Michael Knights and Alex Almeida in this month’s feature article. They write that “a comprehensive analysis of attack metrics shows an insurgency that has deteriorated in both the quality of its operations and overall volume of attack activity, which has fallen to its lowest point since 2003. The Islamic State is increasingly isolated from the population, confined to remote rural backwaters controlled by Iraq’s less effective armed forces and militias, and lacks reach into urban centers.” They note that “the key analytical quandary that emerges from this picture is whether the downtrend marks the onset of an enduring decline for the group, or if the Islamic State is merely lying low while laying the groundwork for its survival as a generational insurgency.” In this month’s interview, Amy Zegart speaks to Brian Fishman and Don Rassler about her soon-to-be published book Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. In the interview, she calls for the creation in the United States of a dedicated open-source intelligence agency because “OSINT will never get the priority or resources the nation needs without its own agency.” Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines assess the threat trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. They assess that “given the absence of multilateral counterterrorism pressure, the Taliban’s limited capacity to govern, and a worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, ISK now finds itself perhaps in the most permissive environment yet to rebuild, rally, and expand.” Drawing on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with bandits and jihadi defectors, James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz examine the nexus between Nigeria’s bandits and jihadi organizations in northwestern Nigeria. They find that despite widespread fears bandits and jihadis would find common cause, there has been infrequent cooperation between them because they have conflicting approaches in their treatment of local inhabitants and because the more powerful bandits feel they have little to gain from working with the jihadis.
Topic:: Crime, Insurgency, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Nigeria

75. Survivor-Centred Justice for Gender-Based Violence in Complex Situations

Author:: The George Washington University The Global Women's Institute (GWI)
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: The Global Women's Institute (GWI), The George Washington University
Abstract:: The report Survivor-Centred Justice for Gender-Based Violence in Complex Situations is the result of new research conducted by IDLO, in partnership with the Global Women’s Institute at George Washington University, in six countries across the globe with the aim to identify approaches that centre survivors in all efforts to address gender-based violence (GBV) in complex situations. The report is informed by country case studies in Afghanistan, Honduras, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Sudan, and Tunisia, to provide different perspectives of complexity in accessing justice and an analysis of diverse justice mechanisms dealing with GBV in situations of conflict, organized crime, climate disasters, and health emergencies, often intersecting with contexts of legal pluralism and political transition. Research findings show that, in order to be effective, measures and programmes aimed at ensuring access to justice for GBV survivors need to be responsive to women’s specific needs and vulnerabilities, as well as relevant to contextual challenges, while firmly anchored in international gender equality and human rights legal obligations.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Gender Based Violence, Justice, and Group Survival
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, Asia, Philippines, Central America, North America, Tunisia, Honduras, South Sudan, and Papua New Guinea

76. Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: One year after the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, fighting has decreased considerably. Yet serious security problems remain, not least the foreign militants still in the country. External actors should press the new authorities to fulfil their commitments and avoid any steps that could reignite large-scale violence.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Taliban, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

77. Pakistan’s Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Islamabad must tread carefully with its long-time Taliban allies back in power in Kabul. Pitfalls lie ahead for Pakistan’s domestic security and its foreign relations. The Pakistani government should encourage Afghanistan’s new authorities down the path of compromise with international demands regarding rights and counter-terrorism.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Middle East, and Asia

78. Responding to Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis: The Potential Role of Digital Payments

Author:: Michael Pisa
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis continues to worsen, with the World Food Programme (WFP) reporting that 22.8 million people—more than half the country’s population—are projected to be acutely food insecure in 2022, including 8.7 million at risk of famine-like conditions.[1] Even before the Taliban took over the country on August 15, 2021, Afghanistan’s economy was buckling under the weight of the country’s worst drought in decades, a deteriorating security situation, and the COVID-19 pandemic.[2] Financial flows into Afghanistan collapsed immediately after the Taliban takeover, as foreign aid was cut, private sector activity fell sharply, and foreign banks and money service providers (collectively: “financial service providers” or FSPs) refused to process payments into the country for fear of inadvertently violating sanctions and anti-money laundering and the countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations. The exceptional nature of the situation hampers efforts to resume normal financial flows to Afghanistan. Never before has an organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States assumed control of an entire jurisdiction.[3] The United States and other countries responded to this novel circumstance by freezing the country’s foreign exchange reserves held abroad; keeping in place sanctions that criminalize most transactions with the Taliban; and denying official recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate head of the Afghan state, which has prevented the Afghan central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank or DAB) from maintaining correspondent accounts with foreign banks. Cumulatively, these measures have limited access to US dollars in the Afghan economy, leaving Afghans unable to pay for the food, fuel, and imported intermediate inputs their economy relies on.
Topic:: Security, Economy, Humanitarian Crisis, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

79. How Religious Diplomacy and Pan-Islamic Organizations Can Help Stabilize Afghanistan

Author:: Hussam R. Ahmed
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 was followed by a surprisingly quick takeover by the Taliban, the predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that had initially been ousted in 2001. Their triumphant return to power 20 years has raised numerous questions about what led to the US and Western failure in Afghanistan, the implications for regional and global security, and the policy options now available to Europe and the United States. As of now, the West has no plans to engage with the Taliban government, but continued inaction could result in dire consequences for Afghan citizens as well as for Western interests at large. A severe humanitarian crisis has gripped Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, pushing nearly 20 million people to the verge of famine. The United Nations Development Programme fears Afghanistan will face near “universal poverty” by the end of 2022 with 97 percent of the population living below the international poverty line. There is also a growing threat that a Taliban regime could enable terrorist organizations to operate more openly on Afghan soil, paving the way for new, aggravated threats to regional and global security. The withdrawal has also compelled European to re-evaluate their partnership with the United States on Afghanistan and to fear that the fallout from the Taliban’s resurgence will be most severe for Europe, including more immediately with social and economic costs of dealing with more refugees. There is widespread agreement in the West that engagement in Afghanistan needs to continue but not the way it was done in the past. To explore what that reimagining Western engagement can look like, this paper presents an analysis of a foreign policy approach that has largely remained absent from the discussion: religious diplomacy. This form of Track Two diplomacy is deeply rooted in religious texts, practices, and traditions, and it is oriented toward the active role of faith leaders in politics, conflict resolution, and peace-building. In Afghanistan, where the sociocultural and political realities have historically remained deeply intertwined with it, an insufficient understanding of religion has led some to argue this was a major blind spot in the Western foreign policy approach. There is a need to revisit religion’s centrality to the war and how religious diplomacy offers an underappreciated peace-building framework that can be operationalized through faith-based organizations that share existing relationships with Afghanistan, a common religious language and cultural affinities with its people, and moral capital to draw from. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Muslim World League, in particular, are two highly influential pan-Islamic nongovernmental organizations, that have leveraged their religious legitimacy and moderate interpretations of Islamic teachings to provide a counter narrative to radical ideas that promote violent extremism, to facilitate dialogue, to mediate conflicts, and to initiate peace-building in previous and ongoing conflicts in the Muslim world. Drawing on their experience, this paper argues that creative religious diplomacy through them can be an effective policy option for the Europe and the United States for a sustainable future engagement in Afghanistan. The paper therefore offers recommendations that flesh out the form this could take.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Religion, Political stability, Domestic Politics, Society, and Community-based Organizations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

80. Regime Change No More: Coming to Terms with the Greater Middle East

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Reflecting on the ‘farcical retreat from Afghanistan’ back in August 2021, Henrik Larsen discusses the need for a reckoning within US foreign policy and that of its NATO Allies. To focus on the other challenges to transatlantic security with a sense of integrity, these states must come to grips with their failed regime change agenda over the past 20 years. Afghanistan was the first of their interventions in the Greater Middle East since 2001, alongside Iraq, Libya, and Syria, that obscured the pursuit of realistic objectives and prioritised (liberal) ideals that proved to be detached from the local realities. In the wake of NATO’s new Strategic Concept for 2030 and beyond, this Strategic Update seeks to analyse the options for policy in the Middle East going forward.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regime Change
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

81. Civil Society & Political Transformations (Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, Fall 2021)

Author:: Ghazi Ghazi
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Eleven years after the 2011 Arab Spring, feelings of transformation and change still reverberate throughout the region. The Spring 2022 edition, Civil Society and Political Transformations, seeks to illuminate how civil society organizations operate in the region and their effects on political transformations.
Topic:: Civil Society, Education, Human Rights, Migration, Politics, Race, History, Reform, Women, Constitution, Arab Spring, Syrian War, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Baath Party, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, South Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, North Africa, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, and United Arab Emirates

82. Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of Kabul

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The group’s international profile has risen substantially with help from China, Turkey, and other states, but Western leaders should curtail their engagement so long as Kabul keeps gaslighting them about its al-Qaeda ties. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized its “Islamic Emirate.” Yet while no country has officially recognized the new government established after the group recaptured Kabul one year ago, the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration. In March, for example, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called for international recognition of the Islamic Emirate, while his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov argued that it should be granted a seat at the United Nations. Just how extensive is this diplomatic momentum? And how might it be affected by the July 31 targeted killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was reportedly being sheltered in Kabul by Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Terrorism, Reform, Taliban, Democracy, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

83. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

84. Central and South Asia Economic Corridor in the Evolving Central Asian Geo-Political Circumstances

Author:: Shabir Amhad Khan and Imrana Begum
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The US withdrawal from Central Asia, Russia-Ukraine conflict and diverted great-powers’ competition from the region necessitate and drive the Central Asian region to revive historical links and open up in southern direction. The circumstances also induce Russia to open up trade routes to South via Central Asia. Central Asia with prudent regional approach may move from a “shatter belt” status (a region torn by internal strife and external intervention) to strengthened regionalism in the absence of direct great powers’ competition. The changed geo-political and geo-economic situation presents new opportunities to Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia for developing the Central-South Asia economic corridor, though accompanied with challenges within Afghanistan. The paper argues that the recent changes in the situation of the region provide additional space to the Central Asian countries for political maneuver to address the issues of security and development by materializing Central-South Asia economic corridor.
Topic:: Security, Development, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and Central Asia

85. R2P Monitor, Issue 63, 1 December 2022

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 63 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

86. R2P Monitor, Issue 62, 1 September 2022

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 62 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, South Sudan, Yemen, Mozambique, Nigeria and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

87. R2P Monitor, Issue 61, 1 June 2022

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 61 looks at developments in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria, South Sudan, Mozambique and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

88. R2P Monitor, Issue 60, 1 March 2022

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 60 looks at developments in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and Venezuela.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

89. The US strike on al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri

Author:: Alistair Taylor, Mick Mulroy, Javid Ahmad, and Douglas London
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On today’s episode, host Alistair Taylor explores the ramifications of the CIA drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan on July 31. Joining the program are three MEI experts - Mick Mulroy, Javid Ahmad, and Douglas London - who bring with them a variety of perspectives, from intelligence to diplomacy.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Drones, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, North America, and United States of America

90. Taliban rule of Afghanistan at six months

Author:: Marvin G. Weinbaum and Sayed Madadi
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: Marvin Weinbaum and Sayed Madadi discuss Afghanistan’s worsening economic and humanitarian crises six months after the Taliban reclaimed control of the country.
Topic:: Security, Taliban, Humanitarian Crisis, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

91. The Killing of Al-Zawahiri and the Future of Al-Qaeda

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In the afternoon of 1 August, Joe Biden gave a speech from the White House confirming the killing of Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan. According to senior sources from the administration, Zawahiri was killed by “a precise tailored airstrike” conducted at around 06:30 am local time in the Sherpur neighbourhood of Kabul.[1] The strike was carried out via two Hellfire missiles (allegedly, two R9X missiles) fired from a drone.[2] The area in which the attack was carried out is particularly significant: the Sherpur neighbourhood is located in a deeply protected area of the capital, in which many Taliban leaders now live. Al-Zawahiri was reportedly killed in the house owned by a top aide to senior Taliban leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani.[3]
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

92. The Special Responsibility of the United States to Female Afghan Security and Police Officers Seeking Protection

Author:: Hans Hogrefe, Sahana Dharmapuri, and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Our Secure Future
Abstract:: In no other country since World War II did the United States act as a quasi-government either directly or by proxy as it did in Afghanistan during its 2001-2021 civil and military engagement there. Female Afghan police and military personnel were recruited, retained, trained, equipped and paid because the United States legislated, funded, and implemented programs in accordance with U.S. national security priorities. The U.S. initiated programs and created this special group of female Afghan combatants, for whom the United States continues to have a special responsibility.
Topic:: Security, Women, Peace, and Police
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

94. Setting the Right Conditions for Aid to Afghanistan—and Other Nations as Well

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: A year of Taliban rule over Afghanistan has shown all too clearly that there are good reasons to debate the future level of aid to Afghanistan. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS has prepared a detailed analysis of these issues, drawing on key sources like the UN, OHC, World Bank, CIA, and SIGAR.
Topic:: Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, and Equality
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

95. FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ASSASSINATION OF AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI

Author:: Rebecca Best, Debra Leiter, and Simanti Lahiri
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Last weekend, a US drone dropped two Hellfire missiles, killing Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on his balcony in the heart of Kabul. It was the first targeted killing of an Al Qaeda leader since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Here, contributors Rebecca Best, Debra Leiter, and Simanti Lahiri answer questions about what the strike might mean for Al Qaeda, US-Afghanistan relations, and more.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Drones, Assassination, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

96. Rethinking & Revisiting Diplomacy Volume XXIII, Number 1

Author:: Richard M. O'Meara, Sylvia Paola, Claude Rakisits, William Maley, Stephen F. Sener, Mathew J. Martin, Ivelaw L. Griffith, and Ilan Kelman
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: Since the turn of the century, we have seen conflicts emerge, stabilize, and deteriorate as the world has shifted towards a period of post-colonization and globalization. In the past two decades, we have seen the rise, fall, and resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. We have seen the near-century-old conflict in Palestine-Israel and Jammu-Kashmir heighten with civilian lives at stake. Myanmar marched forward with a democratically elected leader yet fell victim to a military coup d’état. The COVID-19 pandemic brought a multitude of conflicts, impacting individual countries and the global world on three levels: political, economic, and social. This global health crisis brought to the forefront a new type of diplomacy: health diplomacy. The current status of these conflicts, amongst others, pushes us to question the traditional nature of diplomacy and understand what must be done to reconfigure diplomacy for the next era. This year’s issue seeks to serve as a discourse on the failures and the future of diplomacy processes. The twenty-third volume of the Journal contains seven articles on a variety of different conflicts and current diplomacy processes, serving either as case studies or recommendations. The first four articles focus on traditional diplomacy processes and the last four focus on health diplomacy. Richard M. O’Meara analyzes the cases of wars in Afghanistan and Ukraine, arguing that not only is it crucial for practitioners and scholars to understand the beginning and end of war, but that we they must also understand as well as the conduct of battle. Examining the historical and legal definition of preventative diplomacy, Sylvia Paola evaluates the contemporary approaches and non-traditional security threats to preventative diplomacy, focusing on Mexico’s strategy for preventive diplomacy during its time as a United Nations Security Council member. Alluding to the possibility of peace in the South Asian subcontinent, Claude Rakisits outlines a three-step grand plan to carve the path to a free and demilitarized Jammu and Kashmir. Utilizing a 1½ track dialogue, focusing on the rights of self-determination, Rakisits posits that the resolution of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as a result, lead to peace between Pakistan and India. William Maley explores why “regional solutions” to refugee crises, especially in the case of Australia, may not be the answer to solving the refugee problem because of the influence of a state’s domestic politics favoring itself over the good of the people. When these traditional modes of diplomacy fail, what comes next? As Stephen F. Sener and Matthew J. Martin explore this same question, their answer is: health diplomacy. Focusing on past efforts of health diplomacy, Sener and Martin offer solutions to contribute to global health diplomacy and expand on how this will become a lifeline for state relations. As vaccination continues to be a key driver in the discourse of health diplomacy, Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith studies the gap in vaccine diplomacy dynamics in relation to the power players and the nature of their investment in a combination of humanitarianism and geopolitics. With the diplomatic arena expanding beyond nation-states, it is key to take into consideration the influence of non-state actors such as pharmaceutical companies and multi-lateral organizations. Ilan Kelman examines the potential for health diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic from a disaster diplomacy perspective, analyzing its impact on peace, cooperation, and diplomacy between countries. His analysis suggests that while pandemic-related actions may complement existing peace and cooperation efforts, COVID-19 alone is unlikely to lead to new and sustainable diplomatic initiatives for a more peaceful future. As the world continues to grapple with conflicts, traditional modes of diplomacy are being challenged, and health diplomacy is emerging as a critical element in state relations. The articles presented in this volume provide insights into the complexities of various conflicts and offer recommendations for practitioners and scholars alike. It is clear that diplomacy in the next era must be reconfigured to adapt to the changing global landscape, and health diplomacy must be embraced as a vital component of state relations.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Health, War, Refugees, Vaccine, COVID-19, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, Ukraine, Kashmir, Caribbean, and Mexico

97. Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges, and ways forward

Author:: Hameed Hakimi
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Despite the spectacular and unprecedented events following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the global spotlight steadily shifted away from the country. Because of the war in Ukraine, among other global issues, Afghans have been competing for attention from the international community and for media coverage of the multiple crises unfolding in Afghanistan. Some of the crises facing Afghans predate the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021, such as unemployment, migration and displacement, natural disasters, weak governance, and infrastructural challenges. Yet the profound loss of major gains of the past twenty years because of the Taliban’s return to power cannot be underestimated.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Economy, and Business
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and Taliban

98. China's Contribution to the Stabilization of 'Democratic' Afghanistan

Author:: Lukasz Jurenczyk
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China and Afghanistan established diplomatic relations in 1955. In the following decades of the Cold War, however, relations between the countries were limited, which was due to the main directions of the foreign policies of both countries. Afghanistan focused on balancing the influence of the USSR and the US on its territory. China, in turn, adopted a rotational stance towards superpowers, and in the region, it strengthened political, economic and military cooperation with Pakistan (Zaborowski 2012, 142). In the 1970s, China supported the pro-communist Shu’lai Javid (Eternal Flame) party operating in Afghanistan. Members of Parcham, the pro-Moscow wing of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), contemptuously described its members as Maoists (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 46). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Beijing allowed Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim fighters to pass through the Wakhan Corridor into Afghanistan to support the mujahideen insurgency there. At that time, political relations between states were maintained only at the consular level.By February 1989, the Soviets withdrew their troops from Afghanistan, and in September 1992 the last communist president - Mohammad Najibullah (09.1987-09.1992) was overthrown. However, this did not end the civil war, as individual mujahideen groups fought for influence in the country. The war destabilized not only Afghanistan, but also the border areas of neighboring countries, including the Western border of the PRC. In 1992, the President of Afghanistan - Burhanuddin Rabbani (06.1992-09.1996) tried to normalize relations with Beijing, but due to increasing military operations in 1993 China withdrew its diplomatic representation from Kabul. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 1996, the country fell into international isolation in which China participated. During the Taliban regime, Afghanistan hosted al-Qaeda, which trained around 1,000 Uyghur fighters in the camps there. In Beijing, this caused serious concern and encouraged the Chinese authorities to intensify security cooperation with Pakistan. According to leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), most of the security problems in the Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province were to be caused by neighboring Afghanistan. For example, the 1997 incidents in the province, known as the Yining riots, were considered to be Taliban-inspired (Cheema 2002, 308)
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Democracy, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. Taliban Tightening Grip on Afghanistan One Year after Taking Power

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since the seizure of Kabul on 15 August 2021, the Taliban have been consolidating power by recreating the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan of the 1990s. The Taliban government’s limiting of human rights, especially of women, and constant ties to terrorist organisations reduce the chances of international recognition. Afghanistan has not yet become a centre of global terrorism or a source of mass migration, but the suspension of economic support has deepened the humanitarian crisis. Western partners, including the EU and the U.S., should pursue humanitarian aid and consider unfreezing Afghan currency reserves.
Topic:: Human Rights, Taliban, Domestic Politics, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

100. International Support: How the Taliban are trying to uproot ISIS in Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Taliban and the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS) seem to have shifted their focus. Latest reports coming from American security and defence intelligence agencies have indicated that, despite the US withdrawal from Afghanistan six months earlier, terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are less likely to make the country a launchpad for international terrorist attacks against the West. These reports contradicted earlier statements made by senior US Pentagon officials. They had maintained that the newly formed branch of ISIS, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (or ISKP), would launch attacks on American and Western soil as early as 12 months within the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.
Topic:: Security, Taliban, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Coordination
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

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