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601. The Domestic Impact of the ICERD on TRC-Related Prosecutions in South Africa: A Story of Lost Opportunities for Post-Apartheid Justice

Author:
Ntokozo Sibanyoni
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD/the Convention) is a response to apartheid in pre-democratic South Africa. Article 6 obliges states to provide reparations to victims of discrimination. However, 31 years into its democracy, South Africa is haunted by a poor record of prosecuting apartheid. While popular discussions focus on the failure of the government to prosecute, this article focuses on the extent of the Convention’s domestic impact on the prosecutions. This contribution uses a working definition of domestic impact, which emphasises the efforts of all stakeholders in the state’s reporting process. The contribution relies on data collected through desktop research and semi-structured interviews with people working on race-related issues, to assess the extent to which article 6 of the Convention has been realized. Arguing that the Convention has made a delayed and limited impact on prosecutions, the article discusses factors that have hindered impact and provides recommendations towards the realisation of article 6 of the Convention.
Topic:
Apartheid, Transitional Justice, Justice, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

602. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for Strengthening Land Tenure Security: A Case of Mvomero District, Tanzania

Author:
Samwel Alananga and Christoncia Joyness
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
In Tanzania, conflicts over land resources between pastoralists and farmers have been pervasive, especially in Mvomero District despite numerous efforts by the government to resolve them. This study is based on secondary data concerning the persistence of conflict, complemented by thematic analysis of six key informant interviews from three villages in Mvomero District: Kambala, Bungoma and Mkindo. The goal is to understand the evolving nature of land conflicts, the effectiveness of conflict-resolution mechanisms and the impacts on both farmers and pastoralists. The findings reveal that efforts to address land conflicts are hindered by several factors: inadequate resources, low levels of knowledge and awareness about land matters, the absence of village land councils, a lack of Village Land Use Plans (VLUPs), especially in pastoralist-dominated villages and insufficient and uncoordinated information. Drawing on theories of principled negotiation and conflict resolution, this paper argues that there is no single resolution strategy suitable for all conflicts, as each setting is unique even within the same village. Nonetheless, coercive methods remain common, with paramilitary and government officials often employed instead of negotiated solutions. Since this approach offers only short-term relief, land conflicts tend to recur repeatedly. In light of these findings, the paper recommends that stakeholders should follow up initial coercive interventions with negotiated approaches to ensure long-term stability. To this end, the effective implementation of the Village Land Act (1999) and the Land Disputes Courts Act (2019) requires the development of operational guidelines and tools that support negotiated solutions in line with the principles of principled negotiation theory.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Land Conflict, Land Tenure Security, and Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

603. Analysing the Root Causes of Armed Conflicts in Northern Ethiopia

Author:
Alemu Mullaw
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Armed conflicts that need constructive measurement are rampant in various corners of the world. Currently, there are wars occurring in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Armed conflict can be understood as a battle between two parties, at least one of which is a state government, over a government or territory, using armed forces.1 The notion of conflict is evolving along with understandings of states, borders, relationships, actors, issues, and globalisation. Mary Kaldor described this expanded understanding as ‘New Wars,’ which applies to the 2020 Ethiopian armed conflict.2 Ethiopia maintained its independence during the colonial period and emerged with its present borders and ethnic make-up at the end of the 19th century due to the territorial expansion undertaken by Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913). However, the history of the country is riddled with intra- and inter-state conflicts and it has experienced acute political and economic contradictions.3 The country has been a federal republic since 1994, with the official name of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, subdivided into nine ethnically based regional states (Killil), each with a large degree of autonomy, and two autonomous cities with regional state status, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.4
Topic:
Security, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
Political Geography:
Africa and Ethiopia

604. The Role of the African Union Peace and Security Council in Promoting the Responsible use of Artificial Intelligence for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Africa

Author:
Victor Obinna Chukwuma
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Petra Molnar wrote that the development of technology ‘reinforces power asymmetries between countries’ and influences ‘our thinking around which countries can push for innovation, while other spaces like conflict zones and refugee camps become sites of experimentation.’1 Africa has been dealing with a perennial refugee crisis. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Around 30 million internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum-seekers live in Africa, representing almost one-third of the world’s refugee population.’2 As artificial intelligence (AI) is gradually reshaping the way things are done all over the world, governments are turning to novel technologies to streamline processes and reduce administrative burdens and costs in public service delivery, including critical decisions affecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. While the deployment of AI for border control seems to be more pronounced in developed countries, it is gradually gaining traction in Africa. African governments are exploring the best ways to harness AI, not just for economic growth but also for improving their security architecture and border control. Indeed, AI can be of immense assistance to Africa in managing the refugee crisis. However, there is a need for deeper engagement on how these technologies may compromise the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Africa, as it is being done in developed countries today. Whereas a harmful use of AI in refugee settings in Africa can exacerbate the existing crisis, a responsible use of AI can have alleviatory impacts. This research examines the role of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in this regard.
Topic:
Refugees, Artificial Intelligence, UN Security Council, Asylum, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa

605. Critical Reflections on SADC’s approach to Regional Security: The case of SAMIM

Author:
Chikondi Chidzanja
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
This article is situated in the broader context of the challenges that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and counterinsurgency (COIN) missions are facing in executing their mandates. Although these challenges have been discussed mainly within the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping contexts, they have extended to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) context. These challenges are noticeable in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed a mission, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), with a counterterrorism mandate. This piece reflects on the lessons from the intervention for both SADC and its member states. The lessons focus on the host state’s consent and cooperation, self-funding, coordination with partners and lastly, host state ownership and responsibility for citizen protection. Both at the macro and micro level, the SAMIM intervention provides critical insights into the emerging ad hoc model for RECs as they assume responsibility for security sector governance architecture following gridlocks in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the crisis of multilateralism. Following the UN General Assembly in 2024, which will be remembered for its overarching theme ‘Pact for the Future,’ the piece focuses on how SADC should navigate the aforementioned lessons to enhance sustainable peace and security in the region. Not many studies have focused on how host state consent, self-funding, coordination with partners, and host state ownership and responsibility can affect REC missions like SAMIM. The key question is the commitment of member states to the use of multilateral regional institutions and how these institutions promote the use of their frameworks to tackle common regional security issues while maintaining local agency. Broadly, some questions are: How can SADC and its member states work towards closer cooperation with consistency and in an adaptive manner without compromising the overall mandate of SADC as a regional body? At the same time, how can SADC member states stop viewing SADC as an afterthought in the peace and security sector?
Topic:
Peacekeeping, Counter-terrorism, Protection, Regional Security, and South Africa Development Community (SADC)
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

606. Conflict Resolution by the African Union: Encounters of Peacekeeping Efforts in Somalia

Author:
Jacqueline Nakaiza and Charlotte Karungi Mafumbo
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Two of the goals set by the African Union (AU) were to promote peace, security and stability for socioeconomic development and to draft an agenda to tackle African problems. The aspiration of African Solutions for African Problems, under the norms of the responsibility to protect (R2P), prompted the AU to take up this responsibility in Somalia. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, Somalia has perpetually failed to secure its territory and protect its populace from self-destruction. It has also failed to respond to disasters, such as famine caused by drought. Somalia is suffering instability caused by Islamist groups who can easily operate in the country due to the absence of state institutions. When the United Nations (UN) Security Council is unwilling to act in a situation crying out for intervention, such as in Somalia, it authorises regional or sub-regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to intervene.1 The Security Council passed Resolution 1744 (2007) under this clause, mandating the AU to deploy troops to Somalia in 2007.2 The initial mandate to stabilise the country and pave the way for a UN Peace Operation was six months long.3 Regarding interventions, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act clearly states: ‘the AU has the right to intervene in a Member State according to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’4 As such, the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens is not a purely domestic concern and sovereignty cannot shield repressive states from intervention by the AU. This article in the AU Constitutive Act was invoked after the reluctance of the international community to intervene in Somalia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

607. Artisanal Mining in Zimbabwe: A Complex Narrative of Balancing Economic Gains and Social Strife

Author:
Rumbidzaishe Matambo
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) ‘refers to mining by individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no mechanisation, often in the informal (illegal) sector of the market’.1 A distinction can, however, be made between artisanal mining and small-scale mining. Artisanal and small-scale miners rely on basic tools and limited technology to mine gemstones and key minerals and metals such as gold, cobalt, tin, tungsten, and tantalum.2 These materials are vital to the global economy, supporting essential products such as computers, mobile phones, aircraft, medical devices, and rechargeable batteries.3 A significant share of these metals is sourced through ASM. Driven by the steady demand for these goods, artisanal miners persist in their work, often facing dangerous and exploitative conditions, including child labour and other human rights violations.4 Due to limited resources, ASM activities are usually confined to surface and shallow underground mining, representing the simpler side of small-scale mining.5 Historically, ASM is a traditional practice with roots stretching back centuries across various cultures. Since ancient times, artisanal mining has been a core economic activity, supplying materials for adornments, tools, and construction, and was the dominant form of mining until the Industrial Revolution.6
Topic:
Crime, Mining, and Livelihoods
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

608. ‘Something for Something’: The Face of Peace and Security in Africa under Trump 2.0

Author:
Joel Odota
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The second Trump Administration is reverberating across global systems – politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The world is observing an increasingly transactional and disruptive foreign policy approach, from dramatic aid cuts to multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), to militaristic threats in West Asia and elsewhere and a regressive stance on gender rights. One of the defining characteristics of this Administration is the emergent doctrine of ‘something for something,’ whereby the United States (US) engagement in global affairs, particularly in peace and security, is conditional upon tangible benefits – primarily economic or strategic resources. A pertinent example of this approach is the Trump Administration’s reported demand for 50% of Ukraine’s critical minerals – including graphite, uranium, titanium, and lithium – in exchange for continued security assistance.[1] Lithium, essential in battery production for electric vehicles, is of particular strategic interest. A similar arrangement appears to be unfolding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the African government is seeking a security deal with Washington in exchange for access to the country’s abundant natural resources. In fact, Trump appointed his in-law Massad Boulos as the Senior Advisor for Africa, and Massad’s first overseas trip was to the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. The visit was to do two things: to ‘get more momentum on the peace agreement and the peace process in eastern DRC, and also, how to bring US investment to the region in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.’[2] A review of Senior Advisor Boulos’s professional background reveals a strategic alignment with President Trump’s objectives in the DRC. Boulos brings decades of experience in sectors closely tied to the Administration’s emerging interest in resource-for-security exchanges. Notably, he previously held senior executive roles, including Director of Peugeot Nigeria Ltd., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Nissan Nigeria Ltd., and Managing Director/CEO of SCOA Nigeria Group. The SCOA Group is a prominent conglomerate engaged in the assembly, distribution, sales, and servicing of a wide range of global brands in sectors such as automotive, construction and mining equipment, agriculture, power generation, oil and gas, and industrial machinery. Additionally, the company has substantial interests in contracting and real estate development. Boulos’s extensive background in extractive industries and infrastructure development, especially within the African context, positions him as a key figure in shaping and advancing Trump’s transactional approach to US-Africa relations, particularly in countries like the DRC where strategic natural resource access is a central concern.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Natural Resources, Leadership, Peace, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

609. The African Union’s Pace of Integration: The Sahelian Crisis as a Challenge to Supranational Expectations

Author:
Matteo Peccini
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
This article contributes to the ongoing and dynamic debate surrounding the process of continental integration promoted by the African Union (AU). The article investigates how the African integration process has evolved, particularly from the perspective of peace and security, with a specific focus on the case study of the central Sahel. How can the continental approach to the Sahelian crisis be assessed in light of the AU’s longstanding integrative ambitions in the fields of peace and security? Can the instability in the Sahel be considered a missed opportunity for strengthening the continental response to such a significant crisis? This article reflects on these central questions and proposes the Sahel as a potential lens through which to interpret broader continental dynamics.
Topic:
Security, Peacekeeping, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

610. The Pitfalls of Regionalising National Dialogues

Author:
Chido Mutangadura-Yeswa
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
National dialogues can provide continental and regional actors with entry points to manage political and electoral violence through multi-track diplomacy. Multi-track diplomacy refers to the expansion of international engagement to a multiplicity of levels outside of the traditional diplomatic high-level channels. Multi-track diplomacy is linked to the whole-of-society approach to conflict management. This approach promotes adopting inclusive strategies to transform complex and multi-dimensional conflicts.[1] This shifts the focus away from traditional, high-level engagement among heads of states, diplomats and high-ranking officials. Multi-track diplomacy instead engages multiple conflict stakeholders in coordinated multi-level dialogues. Multi-track diplomacy in Africa translates into regionalising national dialogues because mediators deployed by the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) engage with conflict actors largely within state-organised or, at the least, state-sanctioned frameworks. The East African Community’s (EAC) intervention during the Burundi political crisis from 2015 to 2019 demonstrates the opportunities and challenges presented by regionalising national dialogues in peace processes. Burundi’s political crisis was triggered by the presidential candidate nomination of Pierre Nkurunziza by the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The CNDD-FDD’s decision caused a political crisis leading to large-scale protests, government crackdowns, an attempted coup d’état, and militia attacks on military garrisons. By 2018, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over 430 000 refugees had fled the country due to the crisis.[2] The EAC’s Inter-Burundi Dialogue eventually emerged as the main preventive diplomacy intervention with Tanzania’s late former president, Benjamin Mkapa, as the facilitator and Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, as the chief mediator.[3] The Inter-Burundi Dialogue was conducted as a series of multi-track problem-solving workshops between December 2015 and October 2018. The problem-solving workshops were categorised into ecumenical, women, youth, political parties, and business leaders. The initiative ended with the attendees signing non-violence pacts. Additionally, Benjamin Mkapa held consultative meetings with a wide range of actors, from grassroots to high-level government officials and international actors, before each round of the main dialogue. This article looks at how the Inter-Burundi Dialogue provides insights into how crackdowns on civic spaces, lack of formal regional citizen engagement channels, and government’s lack of cooperation complicate attempts to regionalise national dialogues. The article draws upon my PhD research,[4] which examined the role of regional organisations in promoting citizen participation in election violence prevention processes in Africa, and included 35 in-depth interviews with officials from intergovernmental organisations, civil society representatives in Burundi and expert sources.
Topic:
Mediation, Regionalization, Peace Process, and National Dialogue
Political Geography:
Africa and Burundi

611. The Palaver Tree and the Notions of National Tribunal and Republican Confessional: Reclaiming the African Conflict Resolution Ethos in National Dialogues

Author:
Jean Yves Ndzana Ndzana
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
In the past two decades, national dialogues have become a recurring feature in post-conflict transitions and governance reform across Africa. These processes are often convened to respond to crises of legitimacy, protracted violence, or political fragmentation. While national dialogues are widely acknowledged as participatory mechanisms intended to rebuild social contracts and create pathways for peaceful political transitions, their outcomes have often been mixed. Some have helped usher in new constitutional orders or restore relative stability, while others have collapsed due to elite manipulation, the exclusion of key stakeholders, or a lack of follow-through on agreed-upon resolutions. Despite growing attention from international organisations and regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), many national dialogues remain vulnerable to a key limitation: a failure to ground the process in locally legitimate and culturally resonant frameworks of dialogue and consensus-building.[1] One of the critical yet overlooked dimensions in the design of national dialogues in Africa is the limited incorporation of anthropologically grounded approaches to conflict resolution. Indeed, in many instances, these dialogues replicate procedural blueprints modelled on Western liberal notions of deliberation, often emphasising electoral legitimacy, adversarial bargaining, or constitutional legality. However, these externally driven frameworks usually ignore the rich and deeply rooted traditions of communal dialogue, reconciliation, and restorative justice in African societies. As scholars and peace practitioners have increasingly observed, successful peace processes in Africa require not only institutional inclusiveness but also cultural intelligibility.[2] A national dialogue that resonates with local modes of reasoning and social organisation is more likely to secure legitimacy, mobilise trust, and foster sustainable reconciliation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Tribunal, National Dialogue, and Palaver Trees
Political Geography:
Africa

612. National Dialogues in Africa’s Fragile States: Power Struggles, Diversity Management, and the Precarious Fight Against State Collapse

Author:
Distinct Obuzor Imaka and Tonye Marclint Ebiede
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
National dialogues have become an increasingly important conflict management tool in countries facing political instability, conflict, or transitions of power. In many African contexts, it is often seen as a last resort by national stakeholders, an attempt to prevent complete collapse or to guide a nation through a significant political shift. Unlike traditional negotiations that usually involve only political elites or those in power, national dialogues are designed to be more inclusive. They bring together a wide range of voices from across society, including opposition groups, civil society, religious leaders, and community representatives. In recent years, this approach has gained prominence in Africa as a response to ongoing crises. While the outcomes of national dialogues have been mixed, they are generally seen as opportunities to reset national priorities, address long-standing grievances, and open pathways toward reform and reconciliation. This article examines the role of national dialogues in Africa’s fragile states, where contested power, deep divisions, and the risk of state collapse shape the political landscape. In such situations, national dialogue has emerged as a way to manage diversity, resolve conflict, and create space for inclusive reform. The article explores how these dialogues navigate power struggles and whether they offer a meaningful path toward long-term stability.
Topic:
Security, Peace, Mediation, Fragility, and National Dialogue
Political Geography:
Africa

613. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include: Northern Australia and Defence, Developing Northern Australia, Northern Australia new policy opportunities, Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Development, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

614. Northern Australia: securing a developing economy to secure a developed nation

Author:
John Coyne and Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Northern Australia is central to the nation’s future. Economically, it serves as the gateway to Indo-Pacific trade, is home to world-class resources and represents a frontier of opportunity. Strategically, it’s the keystone of Australia’s national defence posture. Yet, despite its immense importance, the region continues to face persistent structural challenges, including limited private-sector investment; low local economic capture from major projects; workforce and service deficits; and deteriorating public safety indicators. The Northern Australia Action Plan 2024–2029 describes a refreshed agenda for the north, encompassing economic development and delivering on a broad range of government priorities to support the region’s success. Its policy priorities cover many of the north’s needs. The action plan remains framed largely within nationwide policy approaches, however. This report reframes northern Australia not as a peripheral problem but as a developing economy within a developed nation. It calls for a renewed, coordinated investment agenda, treating spending in the north as a nation-building imperative. Inaction will incur higher costs in the future, but it will also expose Australia to intolerable risks. This investment—needed now—needs to be premised on the strategic advantage offered by the North’s space—literally and figuratively—for ideas, initiatives and infrastructure that strengthen the nation’s security and sovereignty through fields such as energy development, trusted and resilient minerals supply chains and military endeavours including with allies, all of which blends government responsibilities, traditional ownership and commercial development. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the Northern Territory (NT) and extending to northern Queensland and northern Western Australia (WA), this report presents a comprehensive, evidence-based argument for nation-building through targeted investment. It highlights not only the economic, security and strategic benefits but also the moral imperative to close the gap in service access, infrastructure quality, and life outcomes. Much of the analysis focuses on the NT, as the economic data for northern Queensland and northern WA is often distorted by the prosperity of those states’ southern regions. That makes it more difficult to isolate the structural challenges unique to the north in those states. However, the NT shares key demographic, geographic and economic characteristics with northern Queensland and WA—including low population density, high infrastructure costs, limited private-sector depth, and service delivery challenges in remote communities—making it a strong proxy for the broader region. The north shouldn’t be treated as a region apart but as the leading edge of Australia’s future prosperity and security. Ten years on from the Australian Government’s 2015 Our north, our future: White Paper on developing northern Australia, and four years since the 2021 Australian Infrastructure Plan, where progress has been mixed, this report outlines actionable recommendations across the federal, state, territory and private-sector domains. Australia is operating within an unstable international environment, involving an uncertain global outlook that doesn’t just include wars in Europe and the Middle East but growing tensions and security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to view investment in the North as not just a local prosperity matter but vital for Australia’s long term security, deterrence of adversaries and preparation and resilience should deterrence ever fail and when inevitable natural disasters occur. In this way, this report provides a practical road map to secure a resilient, sovereign and prosperous future for the north and the nation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Borders, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

615. Australia-Indonesia defence and security partnership: Overcoming asymmetric aspirations to tackle common threats

Author:
Euan Graham and Gatra Priyandita
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australian officials accustomed to dealing with Indonesia are cognisant of the limitations to strategic cooperation, but Canberra needs to be more realistic and creative in how it approaches the critical relationship with Jakarta. Australia places greater strategic value on the relationship with Indonesia than vice versa. That dynamic is unlikely to change fundamentally. Optimism and ambition will still be needed to achieve a more balanced partnership, but it’s also crucial that Australian policymakers ground their expectations in this reality. Politicians, in particular, should guard against optimism bias. There are still plenty of opportunities for both countries to engage more deeply across a range of shared security challenges. This report analyses the defence and wider security partnership and identifies several areas where Indonesia and Australia should productively concentrate their efforts in the coming years, particularly to counter the rise of hybrid threats. The 2024 Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is best understood as a continuation of, rather than an acceleration in, the strategic relationship. But it provides Australia with useful avenues to expand its defence relationship with Jakarta, at a time when Indonesia finds itself courted by other countries that don’t share Australia’s security interests. Ultimately, the DCA reflects Canberra’s long-term investment in a defence partnership that can address evolving regional security challenges. From disaster response and maritime patrols to multilateral peacekeeping, the agreement lays the groundwork for a future in which the two countries’ armed forces can operate together effectively. Continued engagement should centre on expanding military training programs, enhancing operational coordination, and exploring new areas of cooperation, especially to counter hybrid threats. The DCA’s future success will depend on the ability of both sides to manage their differing aspirations, motivations and strategic outlooks in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment. Proper management of those differences, rather than avoidance of them, would better position the two countries for practical cooperation on clear common interests but which, too often, is limited to positive prose instead of action. Revitalising the Australia–Indonesia security relationship requires a shift in focus, away from treating defence cooperation as simply an expression of goodwill or strategic alignment and towards framing it as a joint response mechanism to shared vulnerabilities. Australia and Indonesia face a convergence of challenges, such as maritime insecurity, cyberattacks, disinformation, illegal fishing and transnational crime, that affect both nations and undermine the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific. Responses to those shared concerns can still guide the two countries’ defence partnership in the absence of strategic alignment. By investing in functional collaboration—through interoperable training, coordinated hybrid threat responses and trilateral maritime frameworks involving states such as the Philippines—both countries can build a more flexible and purpose-driven security partnership. This approach acknowledges the limitations to cooperation without being paralysed by them, allowing the relationship to evolve around problem-solving rather than the chimera of strategic convergence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, ASEAN, and Strategic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

616. Match-fit for the global contest?: Innovation, leadership, culture and the future of Australia’s National Intelligence Community

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The business model of the Australian national intelligence community (NIC), including the ways in which the NIC collects intelligence, analyses that intelligence and then provides it to busy senior customers, is being challenged. At the heart of that challenge lies the NIC’s relationship with innovation and its ability to take advantage of the opportunities that innovation can bring. Innovation matters to Australia because our ability to leverage it will be critical to overcoming Australia’s ‘national capacity’ problem in the coming decades. This problem isn’t new. Australia has always had an inverse relationship between its extensive geography and interests, and its relatively small population. But that’s being exacerbated by the emergent international (and existential) contest in which we’re now engaged and the rapid advances of critical and emerging technologies. The answers to this national capacity problem necessarily involve technology, partnerships— and innovation. Reinvention is hard for all sectors, but it’s particularly hard for intelligence communities, which operate with such high degrees of secrecy. But, to keep pace with larger partners and to keep ahead of adversaries, innovation is absolutely essential. It’s needed so the NIC can develop more sustainable and creative ways to serve its customers, and the NIC also needs to fundamentally, and continuously, rethink the value it provides to them. Despite growing investment, all intelligence communities can struggle to reinvent themselves—and invest in the right capabilities and technologies— as they deal with multiple global conflicts and the unrelenting pace of change. In order to inform the findings and recommendations contained in this report, ASPI conducted a range of semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 28 former and current Australian national-security officials, industry representatives, and those with comparable experience of the UK’s national-security system. The interviews focused on the topics of leadership; technology; risk and experimentation; culture; partnerships; and public engagement and transparency. This report makes five key recommendations, including in relation to actively promoting the concept and practice of ‘intelligent failure’ in the service of innovation; incorporating an appreciation of the impact of secure workspace design and operation on the effectiveness of the work carried out within those spaces; expediting the 2024 Independent Intelligence Review’s own recommendations in relation to national-security technology; an urgent, classified audit of Australia’s sovereign intelligence capability resilience; and preparation of the NIC for the impending (and different) future of intelligence production.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia

617. A critical juncture: Sustaining and strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As Australia navigates an increasingly complex security landscape, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stands at a crossroads. With cyber threats, foreign interference, grey-zone competition, and the prospect of Indo-Pacific conflict reshaping our national security, the need for robust, adaptive oversight of intelligence agencies has never been more pressing. This report from ASPI’s Statecraft and Intelligence Policy Centre underscores the need to reform and reinforce the PJCIS to ensure it remains an effective pillar of democratic accountability for Australian intelligence. Key to that reform will be refocusing the future work of the committee back towards intelligence oversight. Strengthening the PJCIS’s structure, clarifying its remit, and enhancing its resources are essential to maintaining public trust and ensuring effective oversight of the national intelligence community. The reforms outlined in this report offer a roadmap for renewal – one that the next chair of the PJCIS can seize with urgency and resolve.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

618. Shifting the needle: Making Australia’s research security ecosystem work smarter

Author:
Brendan Walker-Munro
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since 2018, the Australian Government has made serious strides in countering espionage and foreign interference, including introducing policy and legislative reforms aimed at protecting the research and university sector. That was necessary. Foreign states have actively targeted Australia’s research ecosystem—seeking to influence research agendas, extract sensitive information and exploit institutional vulnerabilities. However, the threat landscape hasn’t remained static. It has evolved—and rapidly. Seven years on, adversaries are no longer simply stealing data or cultivating informal relationships. Today, we’re seeing deliberate efforts to insert malicious insiders, target researchers through transnational repression, exploit data and cyber vulnerabilities, and manipulate legal frameworks through lawfare. Those methods are more sophisticated, more targeted and more integrated than ever before. Responding to them requires more than a continuation of current practice—it demands a fundamental shift in mindset. Security must now be built on persistent adaptation and shared responsibility, not one-off compliance measures. Yet the tools available to respond are lagging. Australia still lacks a clear, consistent national definition of ‘research security’—a gap that has bred confusion, resistance and fatigue across the university and research sectors. For many, security remains synonymous with red tape, rather than resilience. Meanwhile, government controls are fragmented across portfolios and jurisdictions, with no centralised leadership akin to the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce. Heavy reliance on ministerial discretion and legislative blunt force undermine the goal of shared, sector-wide ownership. At the same time, we must acknowledge that universities aren’t government agencies. They’re complex, competitive, globally connected institutions working under immense financial pressure and regulatory complexity. Building sustainable research security means recognising those realities—not as excuses, but as critical inputs into any effective framework. Encouragingly, there is some movement. The Group of Eight has stepped forward with a national security and defence committee, co-chaired by Major General (Ret’d) Paul Symon and Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Rick Burr, to strengthen trust and coordination with government. But those are early steps. To protect Australia’s sovereign research capability into the future, we need more tailored, practical and scalable approaches to research security. They must be clear in purpose, flexible enough to adapt to changing threats, and sensitive to the day-to-day realities of research collaboration. Above all, they must be nationally coherent and built on partnership—not paternalism. The integrity of our research ecosystem isn’t just a matter of academic ethics. It’s a matter of national security, future capability, and Australia’s ability to compete in a world increasingly shaped by strategic technologies and knowledge dominance. This requires a set of consistent, coherent and high-level principles that informs strong applied policy guidance. This report outlines Australia’s comprehensive and globally leading approach to research security. However, it also makes clear that the threats that are confronting Australia are adapting, and so Australia’s approach will similarly need to adapt. The report argues that Australia’s research security posture must evolve, moving beyond the narrow lens of countering foreign interference and espionage to a broader, more integrated and risk-based framework.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

619. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11

Author:
John Coyne and Susan Thomson
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence, 2. Critical minerals, 3. Supply chain resilience, 4.Environmental disaster preparedness, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 11 also features a foreword by Senator the Hon Nita Green, Assistant Minister for Northern Australia. Senator Green calls readers attention to the Federal Government’s commitment to the North, while pointing to the rich opportunities available to northern Australia with the right continued investment. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term and the articles work together to create an overarching narrative that centres northern excellence. Thus, facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Northern Australia

620. Mapping India-Pakistan military power

Author:
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Security competition between India and Pakistan, rooted in the territorial dispute over Kashmir, has persisted since the partition of British India in 1947. Since the 1990s, Pakistan’s support for insurgent and terrorist groups in Indian-administered Kashmir has posed a persistent challenge to Indian security. While both countries have maintained nuclear arsenals since the late 1980s, the threat of escalation has historically constrained India’s responses. However, India’s posture has shifted in recent years, with a growing willingness to conduct overt cross-border strikes and covert operations targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. This evolution has been marked by key incidents, including the 2016 Uri attack and India’s surgical strikes, the 2019 Pulwama bombing and Balakot air strike, and the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which triggered a series of retaliatory strikes by both sides. India’s targeting of major Pakistani air bases in 2025 marked a significant escalation, raising concerns about strategic stability. China’s role further complicates the regional picture. As Pakistan’s close ally and India’s primary military rival, China’s growing involvement—through arms transfers and strategic coordination—has led Indian planners to seriously consider the possibility of a two-front war. This ASPI brief provides a overview of the current military balance between India and Pakistan, with a focus on quantitative comparisons of defence spending, conventional military capabilities, and strategic assets. India has consistently maintained a superior conventional military force, particularly in terms of major equipment categories, shaping the strategic calculus on both sides.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, and Asia-Pacific

621. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2025-2026

Author:
Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces a perilous strategic environment with multiple threats overlapping and, in some cases, converging. We’re confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, multiple conflicts around the world, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyberwarfare. Our largest trading partner, China, is increasingly aggressive militarily and has growing control of critical technologies integral to our societies. In Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, rearmament is underway, including increased prospects of nuclear proliferation. Australia is a part of that rearmament, though others are moving much faster. Great powers flout the international rules-based system, either seeking to expand their spheres of influence, as Russia and China are doing, or pursuing a transactional and user-pays form of vassalage in the case of the US under the Trump administration. To be clear: the actions of the US are not comparable to those of Russia and China, but the administration’s tendency to treat all countries the same, without separating friend from foe, is causing unhelpful disruption and adding to global uncertainty. Many countries’ politics are become more partisan and prone to populist movements, fuelled by social-media outrage and demagoguery. Hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure, internet-connected systems and the political foundations and institutions of states are becoming more common. Trust in public institutions is eroding, and cynicism is rising and often turning into belief in conspiracies. We’re reminded in the ministerial forewords to almost all public national-security documents that there’s no greater responsibility for the government than defending Australia. Part of that most fundamental responsibility is the obligation of government to resource the national-security community appropriately to prepare the nation for the challenges it faces. That’s why, this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has broadened its budget brief, The cost of Defence, beyond its traditional focus on the budget of the Department of Defence. The security challenges that Australia faces cannot, and should not, be borne by Defence and our armed forces alone. For too long, Australian governments have partitioned Australia’s security and failed to deliver a comprehensive approach to national security. ASPI has been vocal in calling for comprehensive national-security planning, and now we reflect that by examining the government’s national-security spending as a whole. Moreover, The cost of Defence: ASPI defence budget brief 2025–26 thoroughly examines the government’s progress with, and spending on, the 2024 National Defence Strategy. The core of the strategy is the concept of national defence, defined as ‘a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’. This year’s Cost of Defence therefore asks some more fundamental and strategic questions and evaluates whether the government is paying enough attention to the traditional strategy calculation of ends, ways and means. Has it identified and articulated the objectives that meet Australia’s strategic intents, as set out in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy? Has it chosen the best plans for meeting those objectives? And has it allocated enough resources for those plans? We also examine whether the government is giving enough attention to the nation’s preparedness and resilience. This is a major theme for ASPI in 2025. The 2025 ASPI Defence Conference: Preparedness and Resilience will focus on those challenges for Australia, including how they bear on our industry, civil society and relationships with international partners. This year’s Cost of Defence provides ASPI’s views as a lead-in to that conversation. Another issue is whether the government is too focused on future equipment acquisitions, rather than the preparedness and readiness of the current force. Given that most of the major acquisitions won’t arrive until well into the 2030s and 2040s, we must ask the unnerving question of whether the ADF is too hollow for military operations this decade. Can the ADF we have now deter adversaries from attempting military domination in our area of primary interest? The issue has been on the country’s mind since a Chinese flotilla this year sailed close to Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea and rehearsed strikes on Australia’s cities, national infrastructure and joint military facilities. Finally, this year’s Cost of Defence asks the hard questions about whether the government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation investment in defence and about the criticality of Australia’s defence industry base, national economic base and resilience is being matched by resources. This includes money in the latest Budget for 2025–26 and the forward estimates and, perhaps more importantly, human capital in the form of a larger skilled workforce. There are also the strategies, concepts and interagency, intergovernmental and international engagements that government must be delivering. We argue, as we did last year, that resourcing isn’t matching the rhetoric. We suggest that, in part, that’s because the implementation of strategy has been frustrated by bureaucratic, time-consuming and inefficient processes. In a first for the Cost of Defence series, we recommend ways for the government and the Defence Department to shift the dial towards agility, adaptability, effectiveness and efficiency. That includes increased and more effective messaging on why defence investment is needed. Whatever percentage of GDP the government spends on defence, it is a large number, and not enough has been done to foster public support for the defence spending required to deter the types of conflicts we see in Europe and elsewhere. Governments shouldn’t wait for public pressure to make security decisions, but a measure of social licence is needed for defence investment, and that in turn takes candour about the gravity of the threats we face. ASPI’s charter requires us to inform and nurture public debate on defence and security and to provide alternative advice for the government. The cost of Defence does so objectively, sharing the government’s and Defence’s aim of strengthening Australia’s long-term security, prosperity and sovereignty. It’s never been more important for experts inside and outside the Australian Public Service to speak truth to power frankly and fearlessly in order to give decision-makers the strongest possible suite of options. We don’t expect all readers to agree with our positions. Indeed, we welcome debate and disagreement in the hope that Australia will be stronger, more prepared and more resilient for the challenges we confront now and will face in the future.
Topic:
Economics, Armed Forces, Artificial Intelligence, Defense Industry, Research and Development, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

622. Building national preparedness: A road map for Australia and what we should learn from Finland

Author:
Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces increasing threats from natural disasters, pandemics and geopolitical tensions—including the increasing likelihood of conflict and war—necessitating robust preparedness mechanisms. But Australia lacks a comprehensive national preparedness framework that’s fit for purpose against the broad range of threats that the nation is likely to face soon and in the foreseeable future. Beyond a narrow range of potential crises, Australia remains poorly prepared, and little government attention is currently paid to understanding or resourcing national preparedness for threats, beyond annually reviewed natural-disaster arrangements. The Australian Government isn’t doing enough to prepare Australian citizens for the more volatile and uncertain strategic environment that we face. There’s no regular public discourse about the national risks to Australia, there’s no planning or capability development for mitigating such risks, and there’s no regular program for educating, training or exercising Australia’s communities to deal with them. National preparedness isn’t just a task for a national government; it’s a truly whole-of-society activity and a shared responsibility of all within the nation, including all three levels of government, businesses, civil society and the citizenry at large. This report recommends a road map of immediate, near-term and longer term initiatives that the Australian Government should embrace as it builds the capabilities and capacities needed to fully prepare the nation. The roadmap is split into two parts, the first focuses on building an effective national preparedness system, while the second part focuses on the capabilities and capacities needed for national preparedness. The road maps contain recommendations for Australian policymakers, industry, civil society, critical infrastructure owners and operators, the Defence organisation and the defence industry. By implementing these initiatives across all sectors, Australia can build and maintain a robust national preparedness and resilience framework capable of meeting all threats, up to and including war, thereby safeguarding its security, prosperity and way of life. The Republic of Finland is an excellent exemplar of what a nation can do to build and maintain national resilience and national preparedness against all hazards, including the risk of conflict and war. Finland’s Comprehensive National Security model and ‘total defence’ strategy, which integrate civilian and military preparedness, offer valuable insights for strengthening Australia’s national preparedness framework. Australia and Finland have the opportunity to work together to build and maintain more robust national preparedness systems that help each country to address future crises. That can be done by fostering collaboration in knowledge exchange, policy development, intelligence sharing and bilateral cooperation on issues such as crisis management and civil defence; military preparedness and defence cooperation; disaster management and crisis response; cybersecurity; social resilience and public preparedness; and international collaboration and multilateral engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, European Union, Resilience, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Europe, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

623. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:
Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

624. South Korea and Australia in space: Towards a strategic partnership

Author:
Sangsoon Lee
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Space cooperation between Australian and South Korea remains stuck in its infancy and, to some extent, is treated as an end in itself. This report argues that the time is ripe for both Australia and South Korea to embark on joint projects and initiatives that would deliver tangible and practical outcomes for both countries. For South Korea and Australia, space cooperation and space development serve as key pillars of the bilateral relationship. The two nations elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2021, incorporating space development into core areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, innovation and technology. As a part of that elevation, the leaders of both countries agreed to strengthen joint research and cooperation between space research institutes and industries. Following that, in 2022, South Korea and Australia established a Space Policy Dialogue. A greater bilateral focus on expanding the scope and opportunities for space cooperation could deliver foreign-policy, national-security, defence and economic outcomes for South Korea and Australia. This report argues that there are opportunities in the bilateral relationship to boost both space cooperation (the collaborative efforts between nations to leverage space advancements for mutual benefit and to foster diplomatic ties and intergovernmental collaboration) and space development (the advancement of space-related technologies, infrastructure and industries) and is pivotal in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management. This report first analyses the space development strategies of South Korea and Australia and examines the environmental factors that can increase the potential for cooperation. It then proposes areas where the two countries can combine their technologies and resources to maximise mutual benefits and offers eight policy recommendations to the governments of both countries. Scott Pace, former Executive Secretary of the US National Space Council, has emphasised that ‘International space cooperation is not an end in itself, but a means of advancing national interests.’ The South Korea – Australia partnership aligns with that principle, and it’s time to realise the opportunity.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Cooperation, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Space

625. Indonesia in 2035: Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Michael Copage, Robert Glasser, and Isabelle Bond
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific region is particularly exposed to climate impacts, and Indonesia, like many countries, will be severely affected by climate impacts in the decade to come. The effects of climate-amplified disasters, combined with the political, social and economic consequences of climate impacts originating from within and across the region, will strain Indonesia’s economic and national-security interests. This report presents the findings of a narrative-driven scenario to stress-test Indonesia’s climate risks emerging by 2035. Its objective is to identify opportunities for Indonesia and its economic and strategic partners to prepare for and mitigate the risks. While Australian policymakers have devoted significant attention to the existential risks that Pacific island countries face, Southeast Asian countries are also highly exposed and often face similar risks. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s climate risks have received very limited attention despite its high exposure to climate hazards, its very large population (over 10 times larger than all Pacific island countries combined) which is densely concentrated in vulnerable coastal areas and small islands, and its history of political unrest associated with disruptions to food and energy security. It’s also one of the closest neighbouring countries to Australia. Figure 1 on page 5 provides a visual summary of the interacting hazards, risks and consequences highlighted in this report. The population size of Southeast Asian countries and their often-close proximity to one another means that climate impacts in one country will often have consequences beyond their borders and for their neighbours across the region. Gaining a better understanding of how Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will be affected by climate developments is vital, given both the domestic and regional consequences. Even below the ‘safe’ threshold of a 1.5°C rise in global average temperature—the aspirational target set in 2015 by the signatories to the Paris Agreement—countries around the world are already experiencing serious, record-setting, climate-driven disruptions on a large scale. The era of climate-induced disruption is clearly already upon us—and it will intensify rapidly. Building resilience while preparing for future disruption requires an enhanced appreciation of climate risk that goes beyond adapting to more frequent and severe natural hazards, such as floods and fires. Development-assistance and defence communities have embraced the importance of treating climate change as a threat to human, economic and traditional military security. The challenge is to build the capacity and tools to assess the broad suite of security-related risks of climate change—and to translate that information into measures to mitigate the risks. Understanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with climate trends is a daunting task, greatly complicated by the need to incorporate the many ways climate change affects social, political and economic systems. The scenario developed in this report isn’t a prediction of the future, but rather a description of a possible future. It identifies many climate impacts, but suggests three primary pathways through which Indonesia may face compounding and destabilising climate disruptions: Significant food insecurity from losses to domestic production due to shifting precipitation timing and extremes across the wet and dry seasons, heightened sensitivity to shocks in global food prices, and reduced government ability to absorb economic shocks, such as food-price hikes. Large-scale coastal population displacement driven by Indonesia’s high coastal population density and the significant exposure of that population to sea-level rise and climate-induced coastal flooding. Slowed economic growth from lost agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, rising disaster costs at home and abroad affecting economic infrastructure and supply chains, and rising challenges in responding to domestic crises driven by food insecurity and population displacements. A major finding of this research is that, in little more than a decade, Indonesia is likely to experience major climate disruptions that also amplify climate and security risks in the region, resulting in a range of additional and cascading risks for Australia. A second overarching finding in the report is that Indonesia may be underestimating the likely scale of the climate risks and should devote greater attention to analysing them. It’s in Australia’s interests to do the same and, as a good neighbour, to coordinate an Australian whole-of-government effort to support Indonesia to mitigate the risks, including cross-border risks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Climate Change
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

626. National food security preparedness Green Paper

Author:
Andrew Henderson and John Coyne
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia’s agriculture sector and food system produce enough food to feed more than 70 million people worldwide. The system is one of the world’s least subsidised food systems. It has prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values, but it now faces chronic challenges due to rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. The world is changing so rapidly that the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is driving enhanced preparedness activity in Australia’s defence force, but that isn’t being replicated across the agriculture sector and food system in a coordinated manner. Food hasn’t featured as a priority in the public versions of the Defence Strategic Review or the National Defence Strategy. This has created a gap in Australia’s preparedness activities: if Australia’s national security and defence organisations are preparing for potential conflict, then Australia’s agriculture sector and food system stakeholders should also be preparing for this period of strategic uncertainty. Food security is a pillar of whole-of-nation preparedness for an uncertain future. While current targeted preparedness efforts and resilience mechanisms are valuable, they aren’t sufficient. Stakeholders are calling for stronger, proactive national coordination from the government to empower and support private-sector action. Meeting that demand is essential to strengthening overall resilience. So, too, is understanding that Australia’s food security relies on a holistic and interconnected ecosystem rather than a fragmented supply chain. Australia is a heavily trade-exposed nation that exports 70% of production, so any disruption to maritime and other transport corridors or to the infrastructure needed to move food risks undermining both national food security and Australia’s standing as a reliable global supplier. This work has been written and constructed as a Green Paper, not an academic publication. Informed by six months of consultations with government, the private sector and civil society, the paper combines applied policy analysis and real-world insights to promote deliberate conversation about protecting Australia’s food security with the same priority as protecting Australia’s national security. The Green Paper is divided into four parts. It also includes three case studies in the Appendix, which use a threat and risk assessment to analyse three critical inputs to the food security ecosystem—phosphate, glyphosate and digital connectivity—to help stakeholders evaluate the vulnerabilities in Australia’s food security ecosystem. The intention of this Green Paper is to deepen understanding of food security as a key public policy issue, stimulate public discussion, inform policymaking and provide both government and key stakeholders with policy options for consideration. This Green Paper’s 14 recommended policy options have been designed to equip governments and the private sector with structured national-security-inspired assessment tools and a framework to continuously identify, prioritise and mitigate vulnerabilities. That includes options to centralise the coordination and decentralise delivery of preparedness activities, establish accountability and embed food security as a national security priority and a key element of Australia’s engagement across the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Agriculture, National Security, Food Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Australia and Indo-Pacific

627. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:
Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

628. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Governmental practices in protecting IP-intensive industries

Author:
Gatra Priyandita and Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since 2022, an increasing number of governments have introduced new policies, legislation, regulations and standards to deal with the threat to their economies from cyber-enabled IP theft. Most prominently, in October 2023, the heads of the major security and intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US (also known as the ‘Five Eyes’) appeared together in public for the first time, in front of a Silicon Valley audience, and called out China as an ‘unprecedented threat’ to innovation across the world.1 That was followed up in October 2024 with a public campaign called ‘Secure Innovation’. There is, however, variation in how governments frame their responses. Countries such as the UK and Australia take a national-security approach with policy instruments that seek to monitor the flow of knowledge and innovation to and from specific countries (primarily China). Other countries, such as Malaysia and Finland, take a due-diligence risk approach with a focus on awareness building and providing incentives to organisations to do their due-diligence checks before engaging with foreign entities. Countries such as Japan and Singapore, by contrast, take an economic-security approach in which they focus on engaging and empowering at-risk industries proactively. This report is the third in a compendium of three. The first report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, published in 2022, looked at the scale, scope and impact of state-sponsored cyber-espionage campaigns aimed at extracting trade secrets and sensitive business information. The second report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to respond to cyber-enabled IP theft, looks at the extent to which agreed norms effectively constrain states from conducting economic cyber-espionage and also examines the varying levels of vulnerability experienced by selected major emerging economies. This third report complements those diagnoses by offering policymakers an action perspective based on good practices observed across the world. Various practices and examples have been selected, drawing from a multi-year capacity-building effort that included engagements in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Latin America and consultations with authorities in developed economies such as the US, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Netherlands. Many of the practices covered in this report were presented at the Track 1 Dialogue on Good Governmental Practices that ASPI hosted during Singapore International Cyber Week 2023.
Topic:
Crime, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cybersecurity, Business, and Espionage
Political Geography:
Global Focus

629. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to defend against cyber-enabled IP theft

Author:
Gatra Priyandita and Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Strategic competition is deepening existing tensions and mistrust between states and prompts nations to develop capabilities that they consider central to sovereign national power. Technological capabilities sit at the centre of this. It’s therefore not surprising that governments around the world are seeking technological advantage over their competitors and potential adversaries. In this context, safeguarding intellectual property (IP) has become necessary not just because it’s an essential asset for any modern economy—developed or emerging—but because it’s also increasingly underwriting national and regional security. Today, middle-income countries1 ‘World Bank country and lending groups’, World Bank, 2024, online. that are seeking to progress in the global value chain are home to vibrant knowledge-intensive sectors. Some of the world’s largest science and technology clusters are located in São Paulo and Bengaluru, for example.2 Other exemplars include the biochemical industry in India, information and communication technology (ICT) firms in Malaysia and petroleum processors in Brazil. In fact, countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Vietnam have emerged as increasingly major producers of knowledge and innovation.3 Perhaps reflecting that changing reality, it’s middle-income countries that are confronted by increasing attempts to deprive them of their economic crown jewels. In our report State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, ASPI estimated that the number of state-sponsored cyber incidents affecting private entities in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the Middle East increased from 40% in 2014 to nearly 60% in 2020.4 To be clear: economic espionage isn’t new. But it’s the growing scale and intensification of economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes—and as an integrated tool of statecraft—that is a cause for concern.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cybersecurity, Espionage, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:
Global Focus

630. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:
Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

631. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Author:
Rodrigo Duton
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
Topic:
National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and United States of America

632. The Current State of Energy Security in Europe

Author:
Dan Ziebarth, Johannes Späth, and Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This Policy Analysis examines the state of energy security in Europe. The concept of energy security has been commonly used to refer to the ability to securing uninterrupted access to energy and energy supplies at an affordable price (IEA, World Energy Outlook 2022). Energy security is essential for maintaining economic stability, political security, and social well-being. Although, the classic approach energy security is reducing dependencies through the diversification of energy sources and supplies, energy security also requires robust and resilient infrastructure, political and bureaucratic will, market conditions and cooperation. Building for energy security also entails the right assessment of the existing realities. Europe‘s energy security faces multiple threats and risks. This policy analysis identifies four major threat domains to energy security: (1) geopolitical coercion and cyberattacks; (2) infrastructural and systemic weaknesses; (3) resource scarcity and critical mineral dependency; and (4) political/regulatory fragmentation. The paper argues that over-reliance on diversification (e.g., of imports such as replacing Russian gas with Qatari LNG and diversifying the energy mix through an increase in renewable energy) won‘t be enough. The EU also needs to invest in innovative technologies and infrastructure. The blackout in Spain highlighted the vulnerability of grids to high levels of renewable energy without the necessary adaptations. European energy security requites inclusive and integrated resilience strategies with a whole-of-society approach, technological innovation and cooperation, investment in infrastructure, bureaucratic coordination, and political unity.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Renewable Energy, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe

633. Flawed by Design: What al-Sisi’s Egypt Reveals About the Myth of Authoritarian Efficiency

Author:
Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This policy analysis challenges the rising narrative that authoritarian regimes, despite their repressive nature, offer superior governance efficiency and contribute to regional stability. Using Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as a case study, it argues that the perception of authoritarian efficiency is not only analytically flawed but dangerously misleading for international policymakers. European and Western engagement with Egypt continues to rely on flawed assumptions about authoritarian capacity and stability. Financial support, arms sales, and diplomatic legitimacy are extended largely unconditionally, under the illusion that al-Sisi’s regime can deliver long-term order. This approach ignores the structural fragility baked into Egypt’s political economy, and risks enabling a trajectory toward fiscal implosion and social unrest. The paper argues for a strategic recalibration. European policymakers should shift from regime-centered engagement to resilience-centered investment, focusing on areas like education, climate adaptation, and local economic empowerment that outlast regime cycles. Europe’s current approach risks buying short-term quiet at the cost of long-term instability. A policy recalibration grounded in realism, not regime accommodation, is both necessary and overdue.
Topic:
Political Economy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, European Union, Regime Security, Regional Stability, and Regime Legitimation
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Egypt

634. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:
Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

635. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

636. A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, and Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change. Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future. The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions. Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria. Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface. The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.
Topic:
Regime Change, Geopolitics, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and Eastern Mediterranean

637. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

638. Navigating neutrality: How to find the best match between NATO and its four remaining neutral Western European Partners (WEP4)?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“Is small still beautiful?” (Gebhard, 2013). Is NATO still interested in the remaining four neutral countries in Europe (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland)? Can these WEP4 benefit from the Alliance’s ‘return to Europe’ in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? On the opposite, might the Alliance’s ‘war’ approach, with high focus on defence and deterrence, risk marginalizing them and evidencing “the limits of partnership for deterrence” (Aronsson & Swaney, 2022, 5)? Using the opportunity of the current geopolitical crisis as well as rapidly shifting alliance constellations, this paper aims to assess the current partnership between NATO and the WEP4 and to provide with a framework for its redefinition in light of the new security context in Europe. While keeping Trump.2 ‘after-shock’, the current turmoil of the new Transatlantic relation as well as NATO’s existential crisis on the way to its summit in The Hague in June 2025, as a background, this paper tries to isolate the question of the WEP4 from the ‘elephant in the room’ and to address it as a per se challenge.
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Neutrality
Political Geography:
Europe

639. Smoke and Mirrors: Israel Stronger or Weaker in 2025? Implications for Israel and its Neighbours

Author:
Osnat Lubrani
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Writing this 2025 trend report on a topic I am knowledgeable about has been a Sisyphean task. Every day I woke up to realize the ‘trend’ I confidently foresaw yesterday is questioned by a new development. I submit that by the time I complete this report, it will become outdated the next day. Since its colossal security/defense failure on 7 October 2023, Israel has been able to restore its reputation as a formidable military power with substantial military support from the USA and others, notably its neighbors (Bradley A, 2024). Gaza is destroyed and Hamas is still in charge, but Israel can point to its elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, the decimation of their military capabilities, and effective striking of Iran and the Houthis as impressive wins. Yet Israel at the start of 2025 is weaker as a state and as a society. The reasons are manifold. Some trace back to before the 7th of October, while others followed from it. All of the issues—from extreme political and social divisions to a plummeting international standing (Wintour, P. 2024) to grave economic losses (Ziady, H. 2024)—have worsened since. Israel’s choices and actions in 2025, both domestically and internationally, will not only affect its long-term security and stability, but also those of its neighbors and the broader Middle East. The polarized geopolitical landscape already is facing disruptions at the start of the year; the extent of their severity will depend on how the USA foreign policy will unfold under the new administration. What is clear is that in 2025, the United States has become even more significant in determining Israel’s path and the broader region’s trajectory. President Trump’s initial statements of intent to end all wars, with focus on the Middle East and Ukraine, and to secure a lucrative deal for Israel with Saudi Arabia hint at possible scenarios. However, as he adds outlandish items to his ‘to do’ list—even some which diametrically contradict his earlier wishes—one can logically assume that not all of his plans will come to fruition. Given Trump’s mercurial nature, many “known unknowns,” as Donald Rumsfeld once put it, remain.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civilians, Atrocities, Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

640. From Belgrade to Tbilisi: How the EU Views Civil Protests

Author:
Ljiljana Kolarski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
From Belgrade to Tbilisi: How the EU Views Civil Protests The European Union (EU) has long positioned itself as a promoter of democratic values, human rights, and media freedom. However, its stance on opposition protests in different countries is often influenced by a complex interplay of geopolitical considerations and pragmatic interests. This paper examines the EU’s contrasting reactions to anti-government protests in Serbia and Georgia in 2024, emphasizing how these responses are shaped by the political alignments of the respective governments. On the one hand, the EU has brought a strong support to opposition in Georgia, whose government maintains close ties with its northern neighbor, Russia. On the other hand, Brussels has failed to actively support opposition groups in Serbia, which has visibly distanced itself from Moscow since the war began without moving towards greater democratization.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Protests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, and Georgia

641. Bro-Politics in Action: Trump and the “Personalization” of Foreign Policy

Author:
Ádám Csobánci
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Congratulations poured in from European heads of state and government as soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was turning U.S. battleground states red and winning the presidential election last November. Many presidents and prime ministers posted selfies and pictures with Trump, emphasizing their strong personal relationship and shared history. While congratulations to the new President might seem like standard diplomatic courtesy, the enthusiasm for the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels appears less than sincere, given their rather complicated relationships with the first Trump administration. In contrast, leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who described Trump’s victory as "the biggest comeback in Western political history" and forecasted a golden era in US-Hungarian relations, expressed a strong eagerness to collaborate on shared goals. Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised the "unshakable alliance" between Italy and the U.S., demonstrating clear support for Trump’s win. Recognizing the heightened importance of personal relationships in dealing with Trump and his administration, European leaders are hoping to establish strong personal ties with the President. This trend report predicts how in 2025 further “personalization” of foreign policy is to be expected from the next U.S. administration. I present, through the examples of Orbán and Meloni, that European leaders already possessing close ties with the next U.S. president or his inner circle might have a significant head start to influence Trump’s Europe policy, with far-reaching consequences. Europeans who were not in power during Trump’s first term are pressed for time because the start of his new presidency is expected to bring rapid and aggressive policy changes. With the Republican Party controlling all branches of government, Trump’s administration will likely prioritize advancing its agenda swiftly, particularly before the midterm elections in 2026, when Congressional support could wane. For European leaders who are new to office or lacked strong ties with Trump previously, this creates urgency. They have strong incentives to build closer relations with his administration, whether due to shared ideologies or fears of trade tariffs; however, they face a glaring challenge. They will have to compete for Trump’s very limited time, attention and interest, as European affairs are unlikely to be a top priority for the new administration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Personalization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

642. Bridging divides: Saudi Arabia’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic approach after the Gaza outbreak in 2023 reveals its emerging role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. By balancing regional interests and maintaining its strategic independence, Riyadh is steering away from traditional reliance on Western allies, particularly the U.S., to pursue a more autonomous and multipolar foreign policy. Since his rise to power in the mid-2010s, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has prioritized regional stability as a cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic transformation. This strategy reflects Riyadh’s intent to diversify its oil-dependent economy, attract foreign investment, and enhance its geopolitical influence (Borck, 2025). Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has relied on its alliance with Western powers, particularly the United States, which has provided security assurances in exchange for privileged access to the Kingdom’s abundant oil resources (Adil, 2024). However, under MBS, Saudi Arabia began to engage more openly with regional rivals and non-Western powers, signaling a move towards greater autonomy in its foreign policy. In 2023, Saudi Arabia achieved a historic rapprochement with Iran through China’s mediation, showcasing its pragmatic willingness to engage non-Western actors to stabilize the region. Simultaneously, normalization talks with Israel brokered by the U.S. signaled Riyadh’s strategic intent to recalibrate regional power dynamics. However, the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel disrupted this trajectory, reigniting Israeli and Arab world tensions. Undeterred, Saudi Arabia continued its dialogue with Israel for normalization while distancing itself from overt U.S. security arrangements, underscoring its strategic independence. More recently, Riyadh abandoned its pursuit of a bilateral defense treaty with the U.S., due to the Israeli normalization stalemate (Nakhoul & Magid, 2024). This is because the bilateral defense treaty with the U.S. would require formal recognition of Israel (Nakhoul & Magid, 2024). As Saudi Arabia carves out its role as a credible mediator, its pragmatic and balanced diplomacy could redefine regional power structures in 2025.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Politics, and Muhammad bin Salman (MBS)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

643. The Rise and Growing Coordination of The Global South

Author:
Veronika Nechaeva
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The phrase “Global South” is increasingly employed in the information space, which introduces certain modifications to the traditional understanding of the “East-West” division model of the world. While concerns about the global order and the role of the Global South have been debated for decades, China’s assertive ambitions and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have sparked renewed discussions about the Global South’s geopolitical significance. Some experts even note that it is the representatives of the Global South, as the owners of the “golden share”, who may ultimately decide the fate of the further arrangement of international relations. The term “Global South” was coined to the general public in 1969 by the American political activist Carl Oglesby. It refers to regions of the world often characterized by lower levels of economic development, historical colonial influence, and geographic location predominantly in the Southern Hemisphere. Countries in the Global South are frequently associated with socio-economic challenges such as income inequality, limited industrialization, and weaker political influence in global governance structures. Traditionally, the ‘old’ narratives surrounding the Global South focused on these characteristics, framing these nations primarily as recipients of aid or as dependent economies within a Western-dominated world order. However, the term now carries an ideological component, reflecting new narratives that emphasize the agency, resilience, and aspirations of these nations in shaping the global geopolitical landscape.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Global South, International Order, Coordination, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Global South

644. The End of an Era: The Decline of Neoliberalism and the Emerging Interregnum

Author:
Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The era of neoliberal and unconditional globalization, once heralded as the ultimate phase of human history, is in slow but likely irreversible decline. The frameworks and assumptions that underpinned global integration for decades are eroding, leaving behind a fragmented landscape and an uncertain future. Periods of upheaval like this compel us to reconsider the structures that shape our lives. Central to these is the notion of political order. Historian Gary Gerstle, in the U.S. context, defines it as a set of dominant political ideas broadly shared across partisan lines. These ideas persist over significant periods of time and can only be challenged to a certain degree. Contrarian views may simultaneously still exist but remain on the fringes, unable to disrupt the mainstream consensus upheld by the political order. Historically, political orders collapse when crises expose their inability to adapt and adequately respond. These moments of systemic failure pave the way for new paradigms. The stagflation crisis of the 1970s—marked by high inflation and unemployment—marked the end of the New Deal order and its Keynesian economics. In its place emerged a once-radical fringe idea: neoliberalism, soon to become the new dominant order. The "neo" in neoliberalism can be confusing, as this set of ideas is closely aligned with classical liberalism (e.g., Adam Smith’s focus on free markets and limited government). It was labelled "neoliberalism" to distinguish its market-oriented approach from the interventionist liberalism of the mid-20th century, such as New Deal policies, which also identified as liberal.
Topic:
Globalization, History, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Global Focus

645. The European Union and Critical Raw Materials: Juggling Geopolitical and Economic Realities

Author:
Dan Ziebarth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, critical raw materials (CRMs) have emerged as a crucial focus for governments and industries worldwide. These materials, which include rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and others, have gained strategic importance due to their essential role in modern technologies, particularly those related to clean energy, digitalization, and advanced manufacturing (CRM Alliance 2024). In particular, the essential role of CRMs in clean energy technologies and the global push for a green energy transition have led to a surge in demand for CRMs (World Economic Forum 24-05-2024). This surge has created substantial opportunities for green industrialization. According to the International Energy Agency, the market for these raw materials has more than doubled over the past five years, with expectations of "unprecedented growth" in the coming years (International Energy Agency 2023); current climate commitments could lead to a quadrupling of global demand for materials such as rare earths, cobalt, and nickel by 2040 (Findeisen & Wernert 30-06-2023). CRMs are of paramount importance for the European Union’s economy, industrial base, and strategic autonomy. These materials have a wide range of applications, contributing to the production of various goods across all supply-chain stages in Europe. The use of CRMs is also essential for the EU’s green transition goals, as these materials are necessary for technologies crucial to the EU’s green and digital transformations. This is particularly true for many technologies that support net-zero carbon emissions goals like wind turbines and electric vehicles. For example, the production of a typical electric car has been estimated to require six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car; an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant (International Energy Agency 2022). This surge in demand has led to increased concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities in western countries as many CRMs are concentrated in a small number of countries or are produced as by-products of other mining operations (U.S. Department of Energy 2023). The European Union, recognizing the economic and strategic significance of CRMs, responded by publishing a list of critical raw materials in 2011, updating it every three years to reflect changing economic importance and supply risks (Gislev & Grohol 2018), while the European Commission produced a foresight study of CRMs in 2020 for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU (Bobba et al. 2020). In 2023, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) was adopted, which aims to increase and diversify the EU’s critical raw materials supply, strengthen circularity and recycling efforts, and support research and innovation in resource efficiency and the development of substitutes (European Council 2024).
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Geopolitics, and Critical Raw Materials (CRM)
Political Geography:
Europe

646. Navigating a World on Edge: Why Teaching War and Peace is Essential amid Rising Global Tensions in 2025

Author:
Annika Scharnagl
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
2025 brings with it a cascade of unresolved political crises and escalating global tensions. Notable events include the protracted war in Ukraine, which is nearing its third year, and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, which has drawn in various neighboring states. Meanwhile, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria signals significant shifts in the Middle East, though the implications of this change remain uncertain. According to ACLED’s (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) December 2024 analysis, global conflict levels rose by 25% compared to the same period in 2023, nearly doubling since 2020. Researchers suggest that the unprecedented levels of violence recorded in late 2024 will likely continue into 2025 (Raleigh & Kishi, 2024). In their analysis for 2025, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) found that since they started their Preventative Priorities Survey in 2008, never have so many contingencies at the same time be rated with a high likelihood/impact than at the end of 2024 (Stares, 2025). The expert respondents to the CFR survey also expressed a level of anxiety that has never been higher than at the end of 2024, looking at 2025 (ibid). If we look at the Emergency Watchlist of the International Rescue Committee, they mention the top 10 humanitarian crises in the world, which also overlap with those mentioned in the ACLED report such as Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, Syria, and the Sahel region. Those grapple with (the aftermath of) war, terrorism, climate change, gang violence and related problems such as internal displacement, health crisis, food insecurity, sexual violence and ethnic cleansing, among others (International Rescue Committee, 2024). And while Donald Trump vowed during his campaign for reelection to fix some of those conflicts quickly, such as vowing to end the war between Russia and Ukraine “within one day” and to bring “peace” to the Middle East (Bateman, 2024), the complexities of these conflicts suggest that any resolution will likely leave a bittersweet aftertaste. An example of the complexity in both countries is the issue of rebuilding everything that was destroyed during the war and the financial burden this entails. Furthermore, no agreement will fully satisfy the partners to the agreement, creating a pretext for future escalations between the warring parties. In addition to those big plans on the agenda, in a news conference on 7th of January, Donald Trump shared his expansionist ideas of annexing Greenland, reclaiming the Panama Canal, and absorbing Canada—plans which might trigger even more conflicts in 2025 than were anticipated just one month prior (Smith & Lee, 2025). These global crises are no longer confined to international summits or policy debates; they permeate everyday conversations, also among younger generations exposed to unfiltered narratives on social media. Inevitably, schools have become critical spaces for discussing war and the hope for peace. The October 7th terror attack on Israel by Hamas, for example, has led to spikes in both Islamophobia and antisemitism in Western countries (Broekaert et al., 2024), further amplifying the need for balanced and informed dialogue in educational settings. Since 2025 will likely keep us on our toes concerning the development of conflicts all over the world, those conflicts and discussions will remain present within classrooms and during breaks while playing in the schoolyard. Therefore, the impact of global developments on classrooms cannot be negated and consequently increases the need for educators to address the realities of an interconnected and conflict-ridden world.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

647. Hybrid Threats and the Role of the Far Right

Author:
Daniela Pisoiu
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
On 16 December 2024, the Council of the European Union decided for the first time to sanction a number of individuals and entities as a response to Russian “hybrid activities of various kinds, including the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.” (Council of the EU 2024) The malicious activities invoked in the decision mainly relate to disinformation and misinformation campaigns in relation to the war in Ukraine but also include espionage and hate crimes such as the deliberate painting of Stars of David on the streets of Paris in October 2023. Russia’s hybrid war against the EU is not limited to misinformation, disinformation and low-level violence, but has also included sabotage and cyberattacks, as documented in detail in the press. The recent incident whereby power and internet cables were cut in the Baltic Sea by an anchor of a Russia-linked tanker (Bockmann 2024; Rasmussen and Kauranen 2025) is only one example. NATO officials estimate that such attacks have reached levels never seen before, along with numerous foiled plots (Clark 2024). In July 2024, two parcel bombs were detonated—one in a DHL plane in Leipzig and another in a warehouse near Birmingham—while several arson attacks were registered in the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia (Kayali et al. 2024). Some officials would go as far as to call these attacks acts of terrorism (ibid.), in what appears to be an all-out war on several fronts. In the background of this strategic situation in Europe, the recent advances of far-right parties in several key EU members become particularly relevant, especially considering their neutral or even positive attitudes towards Russia. While Hungary repeatedly opposed EU sanctions against Russia in the context of its aggression war in Ukraine, far-right parties in Austria and Germany consistently argue for a ‘neutral’ approach towards the war or even against their countries’ support for Ukraine (Hasselbach C. 2024; Lindorfer and Gebhart 2024). Russian overt and covert funding of far-right parties and actors in Europe has been clearly evidenced and analyzed as a tool to undermine liberal democracy in Europe and as “a reward for ideological alignment with Moscow and an incentive to advance Russian interests in the West.” (Datta 2022) Interference in national elections is a particularly effective and worrisome form of Russian hybrid warfare that has already occurred in Europe at least twice last year. According to a press release of the European Parliament in October 2024, Russia conducted a number of destabilizing actions in Moldova in order to influence the national vote through voter fraud schemes, cyberattacks and information warfare. For example, authorities foiled a voter fraud scheme involving “$15 million being transferred to 130,000 Moldovans as part of a voter bribery operation”. (European Parliament, 2024) Interestingly, and in spite of the overwhelming evidence presented, a resolution issuing a warning against Russian interference was met with 53 votes against and 104 abstentions (ibid.). The Romanian presidential election at the end of 2024 was also marked by strong Russian interference, again in support of an anti-EU and pro-Russian actor, this time also with clear far-right tendencies. Presidential candidate Calin Georgescu, having risen from 1% support to first ranked after the first round of presidential elections, publicly praised the Romanian fascist organization Iron Guard—as well as others responsible for assassinations and the systematic killing of Jews during World War II—and openly collaborates with alleged current Iron Guard members (Pro TV 2024). Sociolinguistic analysis furthermore concluded that his discourses heavily rely on the Iron Guard, but also communist rhetoric (Benea 2024). Public statements in relation to the war in Ukraine resemble the tenor of far-right parties in Germany and Austria in terms of advancing a neutral stance towards the war and promoting ‘peace’ (Ardelean 2024). On the background of previous activities in the esoteric scene, other statements advanced various conspiracy, New Age–colored theories, including those concerning a faked moon-landing, the energetic power of the pyramids, and an alternative chemical composition of water (Barbuta 2024). The Romanian presidential elections were canceled by the Constitutional Court after a number of declassified documents showed massive foreign interference through several hybrid tactics, namely cyber-attacks, sabotage, and disinformation, as well as various breaches of electoral legislation (Costita et al. 2024). The tactics used closely resembled the ones employed prior to the elections in Moldova and to the war in Ukraine. For example, according to documents released by the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service, Russia considers Romania as an enemy state that poses a threat through its NATO membership, and which constitutes ‘competition’ for Russia in Moldova. The scope of Russian hostile actions included propaganda and disinformation to affect political and economic preferences, support for anti-EU candidates and anti-establishment movements, affecting trust in national and European institutions, and creating discontent among the population to pressure the government towards changing its stance on the war in Ukraine (ibid.). Romanian presidential elections are scheduled to take place again in May 2025. The parliamentary elections in December 2024 failed to produce a rise of far-right/nationalist parties, which overall scored a little over 20% altogether (Digi24 2024), which seems to indicate the powerful effect of hybrid warfare when carefully orchestrated and funded. In the meantime, the public has been made somewhat aware of the online manipulations on social media, but further hostile actions can be expected in Romania and other EU countries. While initial measures have already been taken to address the Russian hybrid threat, further initiatives are needed to strengthen cooperation with social media platforms and to better adapt political communication strategies of mainstream parties to the particularities of social media platforms in order to limit the reach and effect of extremist messaging.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Far Right, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Europe and Romania

648. The Politics of Misinformation: Social Media, Polarization, and the Geopolitical Landscape in 2025

Author:
Ceren Çetinkaya
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
According to the Global Web Index, as of October 2024, 64% of the global population actively uses social media; they spend an average of 2 hours and 19 minutes daily on such platforms. (Chaffey, 2024). This digital transformation has reshaped various domains in our lives, most notably the political sphere. Social media platforms, particularly X (formerly known as Twitter), TikTok, and Facebook have become central hubs for political discourse. Their democratizing potential enables grassroots movements and empowers individuals to communicate with large audiences, bypassing traditional gatekeepers. However, this empowerment has come with significant trade-offs, including the proliferation of disinformation and misinformation, and the reinforcement of ideological echo chambers which contribute to the polarization of society. The World Economic Forum’s 2025 Global Risks Report identifies misinformation as the most critical challenge to political cohesion and societal trust, particularly due to its ability to fracture democratic institutions, in the next two years. As we enter 2025, X has shown its potential to become a platform for political discourse, especially for populist far-right movements, and has been accused of propagating misinformation. Recently, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that Meta would remove third-party fact-checkers in the US and replace them with a crowd-sourced moderating service like the “community notes” feature on the rival social media platform X, because “the fact-checkers are politically biased”. Given the previous effects of social media in conflicts such as Rohingya humanitarian crisis in 2018, the effect of changes in social media regulations and the big tech-politics axis remains uncertain in a year where the ongoing conflicts seem unlikely to end soon. This report examines the geopolitical implications of misinformation in 2025 and calls for greater global attention to the role of social media in conflict areas.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Social Media, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

649. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

650. Chinese Foreign Policy in 2025: Absorbing Blows & Profiting from Others’ Mistakes

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2025, decision-makers in Austria and the EU should prioritize three highly topical questions that are at the forefront for China researchers: Will China respond severely to US tariffs? Will China contribute to peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine War? Will China fill the vacuum as the US retreats from global governance leadership? Among other trends in China research, there will be further work on how China’s technological and industrial progress—including on electric vehicles, AI, and quantum computing—will impact relations with the US and EU (ReConnect China 2025). Moreover, there will be more research on how integrated the Chinese economy is with the EU and others, and how resilient Europe is in this context (China Horizons 2025). Lastly, among rising regional focal areas, scholars will publish more on China’s rise as a research, economic, and geopolitical actor in the polar regions (Funaiole et al 2024; Paul 2024).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Tariffs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Austria

651. The End of Françafrique: A Second Decolonisation Wave in Africa

Author:
Angela Meyer
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
On 28 November 2024, Chad formally declared in a press communiqué to terminate the defence accord with France which had been in place since 1976. This announcement came only a couple of hours after the visit of French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot, to N’Djaména. On the same day, the Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced that France would close its military bases in Senegal, as their presence is incompatible with the country’s sovereignty. Both African countries were long regarded as being stable allies of France on the African continent and pillars of the elite-centred network of economic, political, and military influences that Paris has been maintaining with most of its former colonies. The end of military cooperation with Chad and Senegal is thus another bitter blow for French foreign policy. This is all the more so as it follows a prevailing trend in francophone West and Central Africa: the open rejection of the so-called Françafrique. Propelled by the emergence of a multipolar world order and harnessed by anticolonial narratives, we are witnessing a new era of African sovereigntism that is closing the chapter of postcolonial special relationship between France and Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Decolonization
Political Geography:
Africa, France, and Sahel

652. A Possible Ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025: Is the OSCE on Board?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“Where is the OSCE during Russia’s war on Ukraine?” asked Pál Dunay (Dunay, 2022). To be honest, not in the spotlight. However, changing political realities in 2025 might provide the Vienna organization with renewed legitimacy, fifty years after the signature of the Helsinki Accords that served as its groundwork. After more than 1,000 days of attrition war, several factors may bring the conflict in Eastern Europe to a turning point. Despite both parties’ recent military escalation, there seems to be no end in sight on the battlefield. Neither side has the resources to achieve a decisive victory, a situation that academics describe as “mutually hurting stalemates” (Slantchev & Goemans, 2025). Militarily, Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, but Putin’s goal of defeating the Ukrainian armed forces in open combat and occupying more Ukrainian territory is a “strategic impossibility” (Dickson & Holowinsky, 2024). It is doubtful that 2025, which marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazism, will coincide with a triumphal parade on Moscow’s Red Square. The resilience and morale shown by the Ukrainian armed forces deserve admiration and tribute, but Kyiv knows that it will not recover Crimea and the Donbas by force. After more than two years of grinding conflict, the weariness of its population is becoming evident. Because neither side can achieve its ultimate goals, new approaches to ending the Ukraine war are beginning to surface. Compared to only a few months ago, more actors are ready to look at alternative scenarios.
Topic:
Politics, Ceasefire, OSCE, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

653. NATO in 2025 and Beyond: Success and Peril Go Hand in Hand

Author:
Emiliano Alessandri
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an impressive string of achievements, including the recent enlargements to Finland and Sweden, NATO is poised to remain the dominant force in the post-Russian invasion European security landscape. Indeed, NATO’s self-styled description as “the most successful alliance in history” has never seemed more apt. (Stoltenberg, 2024). Yet questions and doubts about NATO’s future are to resurface in 2025, possibly forcefully so: how will the Alliance cope with the return of NATO skeptic Donald Trump to the White House? And will Europe be able to meaningfully step in to compensate for a less Atlantic-oriented America? As the rise of populist nationalism is a key factor behind both America’s returning temptation to go it alone (McConnell, Foreign Affairs, 2025) and the inclination of a growing number of European politicians to define strategic policy in narrow national terms, a crucial test for the coming years is to what extent a shared vision of Euro-Atlantic security is still possible – and what it would look like. The roles and agendas of both NATO and the European Union in the evolving political context remain open questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nationalism, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

654. The European Union and the Sahel: the day after

Author:
Angela Meyer, Loïc Simonet, and Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Geopolitics are changing fast in the Sahel. Over the past three years, the region, one of the most impoverished and imperilled of the world, has undergone a dramatic cycle of regime change and alliance shift, which has significantly challenged the strategy and engagement of the European Union (EU) and its member states in the region. Against the background of this severe crisis in EU-Africa relations and growing anti-Western sentiments, new international players are appearing or increasing their influence, such as the Russian Federation, China and Turkey. It is now urgent for the EU to acknowledge the new situation in the Sahel region and rethink its approach. If Europe wants to remain engaged in the region, it should forge a new path guided by day-after policies, with a view to rebuilding trust in the EU as a reliable partner. This Policy Analysis draws on the Panel Discussion held at the oiip on 28 November 2024 on the same topic, in cooperation with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence (bmlv). This piece dives into the drivers of the Sahel region’s geopolitical dynamics and critically investigates the shortcomings of the EU’s approach to the region. It concludes with actionable recommendations for recalibrating the EU’s Sahel policy to address past mistakes, prevent further damage, and adapt to the region’s evolving realities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Sahel

655. Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments

Author:
Anders Christoffer Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
China’s overtures have been met with suspicion in the Arctic states, where some analysts and commentators read nefarious intent into Chinese actions and statements. China’s construction of critical infrastructure and investments in the strategically located and resource-rich Arctic have raised concerns about national security. This is particularly the case in the seven out of eight Arctic states (excluding Russia), all of whom are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, questions abound about the dual-use applicability of Chinese research activities in the region.1 The Arctic is a highly strategic location, and activities here are often framed in geopolitical terms. In an era of intensifying great power competition between the United States and China, this suspicion has generated several core narratives2 about China’s Arctic interests and its engagement with and in the region. Xi Jinping launched China’s Belt and Road Initiative3 (BRI) in 2013. The initiative envisages interconnectivity across the Eurasian continent, primarily from China to Europe. Since then, the project has expanded to other areas of the globe, including the Arctic region. The Arctic region was officially made a part of the Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Cooperation Vision statement (“一帶一路”建設海上合作設想).4 Later, China established the Polar Silk Road (冰上丝绸之路) in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper5 connecting Asia and Europe through the Arctic Ocean. In the 2018 White Paper, the State Council of the PRC refers to its country as a “Near-Arctic State,” a statement that has remained highly controversial. While the White Paper emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to peaceful cooperation in the region, as well as a desire to contribute to Arctic research, protection, and development in accordance with international law, it also articulates Beijing’s aim of increasing its participation and influence in Arctic governance. It further iterates Beijing’s responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the region as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013; since then it has contributed to scientific knowledge through research stations and expeditions, invested in Arctic business and competence, engaged in infrastructure projects, traded with Arctic states, and participated in multilateral international agreements such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.6 Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious. Commentators in the seven Arctic states often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope, and risk. Analysts have the tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. For example, some analysts estimate that Chinese investments in the Arctic top $90 billion7 and call this level of investment “unconstrained.”8 According to one mainstream narrative, China will use this “inflow of investments”9 to increase its influence among Arctic nations by means of debt-trap diplomacy.10 Our research finds that these numbers are highly exaggerated and often mobilized to support a narrative in which China is successfully “buying up” the Arctic region, but that these inflated numbers include unsuccessful investment projects and proposed projects that have not been implemented. To facilitate informed debate and decision-making, this policy paper attempts to outline, although not to summarize, the actual level and state of Chinese ownership in the Circumpolar Arctic. To help illustrate our findings, we present a map displaying geographical locations of investment interests (See Figure 1), containing two further information layers. The first information layer displays the type of known Chinese interests in the Arctic, and the second information layer indicates whether this interest materialized, is paused/in question, or has been cancelled. For further description of our mapping methodology, see Appendix A. We use the term “investment” generously in this brief, including traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) according to established definitions, but also other modes of Chinese economic engagements. We have relied on open-source material in various languages to support our analysis, including Russian, Chinese, English, Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish. For a detailed description of our methodology, see Appendix A. This inclusiveness means that the amount of investments appears larger than with a more restrictive definition of FDI.
Topic:
National Security, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Critical Infrastructure
Political Geography:
China and Arctic

656. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future

Author:
Yam Atir
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
Topic:
Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

657. Harvard Project Releases Second Discussion Brief on Climate-Change and Trade Policy

Author:
Valerie J. Karplus
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Valerie Karplus explores relationships between trade and climate-change policy, with a geographical focus on China, the United States, and Europe. She asks how, “[a]gainst a backdrop of escalating trade tensions and signs of softening climate ambition…we can make progress — or at least minimize backsliding” on climate action. She responds by citing the need for “safe spaces”: “…in trade: could certain key inputs to the green economy be potentially exempted from tariffs, without thwarting the ambitions of protectionist programs?” “…for the emergence and diffusion of decarbonized energy technologies” “…that support infrastructure and systems necessary for decarbonization.” Karplus concludes by “…offering a few ways these safe spaces might be established.”
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Environment, Renewable Energy, Trade Policy, Energy, and Green Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific

658. Permafrost Thaw in Alaska: An Overlooked Climate-Health Crisis

Author:
Aruni Ranaweera and Tessa Varvares
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Rapid thawing of permafrost has accelerated a public health crisis in Alaska by disrupting access to clean water, sanitation resources, and basic health infrastructure. For example: Permafrost thaw-induced damage to hospitals, roads, and runways has disrupted the delivery of critical medical services and supplies. Destabilization of housing and water infrastructure has created hazardous living conditions for children and families. Thaw-induced disruptions to fishing, hunting, and subsistence practices have threatened food security and imposed barriers to practicing traditional cultures. As this concept note explains, these outcomes are not inevitable or irreversible. Rather, strategic investments by the U.S. federal government, Alaska state agencies, Tribal government, and other community-based entities can help to bolster financial and technical assistance programs and infrastructure that will better enable those affected by permafrost thaw to adapt and build resilience to public health disruptions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Water, Infrastructure, Sanitation, Public Health, and Permafrost
Political Geography:
North America and Alaska

659. Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The Current Landscape

Author:
Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns, and Ai Takahashi
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3 While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development. In the remainder of this brief, we summarize the hydrogen policy landscape in the United States and European Union (EU), concluding with an examination of the causes of demand-side stagnation in the clean hydrogen market.
Topic:
Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Regulation, Public Policy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Global Focus, United States of America, and European Union

660. Harvard Project Releases Discussion Brief on Climate-change and Trade Policy

Author:
Michael A Mehling
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Michael Mehling explores relationships among industrial policy, trade, and efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Among his conclusions are that climate action is now tied to the rise of industrial policy; border carbon measures are seeing increased interest but are also controversial as tools of climate action; and, while trade and climate cooperation have evolved separately, they are increasingly intersecting.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Trade Policy, and Greenhouse Gas
Political Geography:
Global Focus

661. The many contending futures of UN peacekeeping

Author:
Corine van Emmerik and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This DIIS Working Paper examines how UN peacekeeping operations are being reimagined in an era of global uncertainty. Through analysis of key UN documents and interviews with officials and diplomats, the research reveals multiple competing visions for peacekeeping's future — from a return to core principles to modular approaches and even a dramatic downscaling of peacekeeping as we have known it since the turn of the millennium. As peacekeeping operations face diminished legitimacy, host state resistance, and a deadlocked Security Council, the study argues that peacekeeping's chronic challenges are inherently unsolvable and must be continuously navigated. The paper comes at a critical moment following the closure of the Mali mission, considerable challenges in the DRC, and ahead of the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial, with implications for the future of global conflict management in an increasingly multipolar world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Global Focus

662. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

663. Decolonisation in the second space age

Author:
Trine Rosengren Pejstrup and Ian Klinke
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The corporate space race is rendering space increasingly 'congested, contested, and competitive'.1 Governments too are upgrading their space capabilities. In Denmark, the new Danish Space Strategy promises a doubling of investment to ensure a Danish space industry that is 'ready for battle'. However, concerns over the environmental and sociopolitical consequences of test launches, extensive satellite programmes and ambitions to establish bases on celestial bodies have sparked growing criticism of a 'colonisation of outer space'. This policy brief reveals a growing political rift over the question of space colonisation.
Topic:
Space, Decolonization, Investment, and Commercialization
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Space

664. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

665. Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental grid

Author:
Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The disconnection of the Baltic States from the Russian electricity system and their synchronisation with the Continental European Network is a key technological and geopolitical milestone. But safeguarding energy infrastructure remains vital. Operating within a shared electricity grid across multiple countries improves reliability. This arrangement allows transmission system operators (TSOs) to share resources, maintain a steady flow of electricity and handle mismatches between supply and demand more efficiently, helping to lower overall costs and ultimately benefiting consumers. However, geopolitical tensions have turned the Russian electricity system into a strategic paradox: the Baltic States, NATO and EU members are connected to Russia’s electricity dispatch system – a perceived security threat – for grid stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic States

666. Europe's migration block crumbles in Niger

Author:
Hans Lucht
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Frontex has warned that Russia could leverage migration and growing influence in Libya and the Sahel to put pressure on Europe. Based on fieldwork in Niger, this policy brief analyses the shifting political realities on the ground. Driving from the airport in Niamey to the city centre after the coup remains a familiar journey except for the new Russian flags at the roundabouts, alongside those of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Since the ousting of the democratically elected president, Mohammed Bazoum, in July 2023 Niger’s military rulers fronted by General Tchiani have thrown out the former colonial power France, turned their backs on Europe and the US, and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with the political and military backing of Russia. This new and challenging scenario in the Sahel has had a profound impact on several important European priorities in the region. These range from fighting militant jihadism, to great power rivalry with Russia, competition over rich African energy and natural resources, development assistance, and also reducing irregular migration to southern Europe.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Borders, and FRONTEX
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Libya, Sahel, and Niger

667. Europe's teenage jihadists

Author:
Dino Krause
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Islamic State (IS)-related terror plots in Western Europe increasingly involve individuals under the age of 18. Central to this trend is IS’s ability to disseminate propaganda online, effectively targeting younger audiences.
Topic:
Radicalization, Internet, Islamic State, Youth, Propaganda, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe

668. EU foreign policy in the next political cycle

Author:
Fabrizio Tassinari
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The ‘geopolitical’ Commission of the past five years is to be replaced by a ‘geoeconomic’ discourse in the next political cycle. To enact the hard strategic choices ahead for the next Commission the EU needs to refocus on the normative underpinnings, the instruments of tried-and-tested effectiveness, and on managing expectations. A ‘geophilosophy’ of Europe can be harnessed as a constitutive lens to understand and practice foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

669. 8 old and new challenges for UN peacekeeping

Author:
Peter Albrecht and Corine van Emmerik
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Recent reviews and calls from the ‘Pact for the Future’ to reshape the UN peacekeeping framework, underscore an urgent need for innovation and dialogue to ensure peacekeeping’s continued relevance. While peacekeeping’s core principles of impartiality, consent, and limited use of force remain essential for fostering trust and legitimacy, rethinking is also needed to address unresolved challenges like asymmetric warfare, regionalized conflicts, and external geopolitical influences. Denmark’s seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2025–2026 presents a crucial opportunity to shape the future of peacekeeping, particularly as adapting conflict responses aligns closely with Denmark’s key thematic priorities for its tenure. We recommend eight ways to address both enduring and emerging challenges.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Innovation, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Global Focus

670. Future-proofing peacekeeping

Author:
Peter Albrecht and Corine van Emmerik
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
As Denmark takes its seat on the Security Council amidst geopolitical tensions and global fragmentation, peacekeeping is confronting an identity crisis. This moment offers Denmark a crucial opportunity to steer discussions on fundamental questions, aligning with its priority to adapt conflict responses and prevention strategies to contemporary challenges. Peacekeeping, historically one of the UN’s most significant and visible conflict management tools, stands at a crossroads. The large, multidimensional flagship mission in Mali was terminated in 2023, and the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has wound down, leaving lingering questions about their positive contributions to peace. No new missions, whether large or small, are currently being deployed. Furthermore, Secretary-General António Guterres appears disengaged from discussions on the future of peacekeeping, reflecting broader uncertainty about its relevance in today’s conflict landscape, and consensus among Security Council members is becoming increasingly elusive. With the background context of ongoing geopolitical tensions in Europe and the Middle East, there is a perception that peacekeeping missions deployed, supported, and/or mandated by the UN are becoming obsolete in addressing the evolving nature of modern conflicts.
Topic:
Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, UN Security Council, and Future
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

671. The rise and fall of the Wagner Group

Author:
Karen Philippa Larsen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Wagner Group’s rise, conflict and fall show a process firstly of endorsing private military companies in Russia, only to later seek to regain control by including the groups in the official security structures. The plane crash that killed the leader of the Wagner Group, oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and six other high-ranking Wagner Group members in August 2023 marked the literal and figurative fall of the Wagner Group’s considerable influence on Russian foreign policy. The Wagner Group is what Russia calls a private military company (PMC), which tends to have a much closer relationship to the state than we would normally expect from a private company in the West.
Topic:
Security, Wagner Group, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

672. Okinawa and Thule US military bases

Author:
Minori Takahashi and Ulrik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Dialogue is key to building trust and legitimacy around US military bases. A comparison of the bases in Okinawa and Thule reveals that the outcome of such dialogues is shaped by who is included in the conversation. Involving regional governments can enhance inclusivity but lead to political instability, while relying on central authorities may offer stability but at the cost of excluding local communities.
Topic:
Legitimacy, Dialogue, Trust, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Greenland

673. Battle for the bush: Banditry and violent agrarian change in northwest Nigeria

Author:
Peer Schouten and James Barnett
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Contemporary banditry in northwest Nigeria is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses a wide spectrum of violence waged by heavily militarised yet loosely organised rural gangs. These groups engage in everything from cattle rustling to kidnapping for ransom and extortion of peasant communities, with bandits becoming important de facto authorities in swathes of rural northwest Nigeria. Underpinning the contemporary bandit conflict, we argue, is an ongoing ‘battle for the bush’ — a struggle over land, governance and rural livelihoods. Historically, the bush functioned as a shared space for farmers and pastoralists. However, land use data shows that the expansion of cropland farming has gradually overtaken grazing lands, reducing pastoral mobility and generating increasing conflicts. The state’s failure to mediate these tensions or provide equitable land policies, coupled with the breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, has allowed grievances to fester. In response, bandits have violently reclaimed and reshaped the governance of the bush, not only as a refuge but as a domain of coercive rule, imposing levies on farming and controlling access to land and cattle. We examine the historical drivers of this transformation and analyse how opportunistic criminals and social bandits have evolved into de facto rural rulers. Along the way, the trend of cropland expansion is being reversed. Yet instead of reestablishing a pastoral idyll, banditry is reproducing the very conditions that gave rise to it, further undermining rural livelihoods in the northwest. This has compounded rural poverty and food insecurity while depriving pastoralist youths’ access to government services and education that could provide for a better future. Our analysis implies that the crisis cannot be solved through military interventions alone but requires a rethinking of rural governance.
Topic:
Agriculture, Land Conflict, Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict, and Banditry
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

674. Trump and the future of transatlantic relations

Author:
Mikkel Runge Olesen and Jakob Linnet Schmidt
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A widespread view in Europe is that the US is becoming more a necessary partner than an ally or a friend. Lack of confidence that the US will defend Europe is as powerful a driver for increased European defence spending as pressure from the US. Due to the breach of trust, transatlantic relations are unlikely to be normalised after Trump.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

675. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:
Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Arctic

676. Norway’s vaccine diplomacy during Covid-19

Author:
Emma Sandvik Ling
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
How did Nordic countries manage the tensions and ethical dilemmas of national health security and international solidarity during the Covid-19 vaccine response? This DIIS working paper examines Norway’s Covid-19 vaccine procurement and distribution strategy within the framework of the SCANVAX project on Nordic vaccine diplomacy. The study analyses how Norway worked to procure Covid-19 vaccines to cover the needs of the Norwegian people as well as how Norway engaged in the global pandemic response and efforts to ensure global vaccine distribution. The working paper also examines how tensions between national health security and international solidarity was navigated in public discourse during the pandemic. The case demonstrates how a small non-EU state managed pandemic responses through complex diplomatic arrangements while balancing domestic needs with global solidarity commitments. The working paper is part of the project Strategic solidarity: Scandinavian countries' Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy (SCANVAX) that explores the significant tension between national, regional and international vaccine solidarity during Covid-19 and asks how the dominant policy goal of securing vaccines in the interest of national health security was intertwined with global health security and broader foreign policy objectives, whether related to international solidarity, diplomatic influence, or geopolitical interests. SCANVAX is financed by NordForsk under the Nordic Council of Ministers and implemented by a consortium of researchers from the University of Oslo, Lund University and DIIS.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, COVID-19, and Vaccine Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Europe and Norway

677. Denmark’s vaccine diplomacy during Covid-19

Author:
Adam Moe Fejerskov and David Lyndorff Paris
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
How did Nordic countries manage the tensions and ethical dilemmas of national health security and international solidarity during the Covid-19 vaccine response? This DIIS working paper examines Denmark's Covid-19 vaccine procurement and distribution strategy within the framework of the SCANVAX project on Nordic vaccine diplomacy. The Danish case shows the complexities of how a small European state managed pandemic responses through multilateral frameworks while pursuing national interests, highlighting persistent tensions between vaccine nationalism and global health solidarity during health crises. Denmark's experience illustrates the multifaceted realities of vaccine diplomacy, where even countries with strong international development commitments prioritise domestic health security when faced with uncertain vaccine supplies, while simultaneously using surplus vaccines as tools for broader foreign policy objectives. The working paper is part of the project Strategic solidarity: Scandinavian countries' Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy (SCANVAX) that explores the significant tension between national, regional and international vaccine solidarity during Covid-19 and asks how the dominant policy goal of securing vaccines in the interest of national health security was intertwined with global health security and broader foreign policy objectives, whether related to international solidarity, diplomatic influence, or geopolitical interests. SCANVAX is financed by NordForsk under the Nordic Council of Ministers and implemented by a consortium of researchers from the University of Oslo, Lund University and DIIS.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Vaccine, COVID-19, Development Policy, and Vaccine Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

678. Beware of historical analogies

Author:
Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
When political leaders legitimise security policy decisions with a historical analogy (typically to World War II), the analyst and public opinion should be on the alert. This DIIS Working Paper refers to contributions from the academic literature on decision-makers' historical analogies. Crisis decisions by Anthony Eden, Margaret Thatcher, Joseph Stalin and John F. Kennedy illustrate the discussion, and implications for the discourse on the current Ukraine-conflict are drawn.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Conflict, Crisis Management, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

679. Three opportunities for expanding Danish 'Techplomacy'

Author:
Kristin Anabel Eggeling
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
As governments around the world struggle with the international dimensions of digital transformation, Denmark has been at the forefront with its pioneering ‘techplomacy’ strategy. Now, it has the opportunity to enhance this approach through discursive, geographic and sectoral expansion. The term ‘techplomacy’ merges technology and diplomacy. Since 2017 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed three ‘tech ambassadors’; opened and developed three ‘tech embassies’ in Palo Alto, Beijing and Copenhagen; and published two dedicated ‘tech diplomacy’ strategies in 2021 and 2024. Thanks to these efforts, Denmark has become widely regarded as a diplomatic pioneer in this field, not least by the large number of states that have begun to follow the Danish model.1 In light of considerable geopolitical changes since the publication of the most recent strategy in May 2024,2 the Ministry could expand these efforts in three ways. First, discursively – by fostering more inclusive global narratives and highlighting the democratic benefits of digital regulation; second, geographically – by extending its virtual reach and physical presence to other global hubs of technology development; and third sectorally – by investing in new forms of cross-sectoral diplomacy that focus on collaboration with key sites of research and development and major technology companies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

680. Beyond Access: Towards productive inclusion in the era of fintech

Author:
Marie Kolling, Kevin Donovan, and Adam Moe Fejerskov
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
New DIIS publication compels financial inclusion discussions to move beyond access to ensure inclusion improves economic well-being for low-income populations. It underscores the linked nature of household and sovereign debt, arguing that both must be addressed to advance global prosperity
Topic:
Science and Technology, Finance, Inclusion, and Well-Being
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

681. Who counts as ‘local’ in conservation and biodiversity strategies?

Author:
Adam Moe Fejerskov and Alma Tjalve
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
What does it mean to work 'locally' in conservation, and how can practitioners navigate the complex power dynamics this entails? A new DIIS Working Paper explores the evolving landscape of inclusive conservation approaches, examining how concepts like community-based conservation, Indigenous-led stewardship, and critical localism interpret and operationalise 'the local'. As development partners intensify their conservation engagement globally, understanding these diverse frameworks and their implications for practice has become essential. The paper maps out how different conservation approaches conceptualise locality and community participation, from collaborative partnerships to full community control over resource management. Through analysing various models — including Community-Based Natural Resource Management, Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, and Indigenous-led conservation — the authors explore how each interprets empowerment, knowledge integration, and decision-making authority differently. The study concludes with practical principles for inclusive conservation programming, emphasising that working effectively with 'the local' requires careful attention to power dynamics, rights recognition, and the integration of multiple knowledge systems across scales.
Topic:
Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Conservation, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

682. Gendered tax burdens in contexts of high informality

Author:
Abel Gwaindepi
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This study examines the intersection of taxation, gender, and informality. While both men and women work informally in low-income countries, women are concentrated in more precarious, low-paying segments than men — making them prone to heavier tax burdens, compounded by unpaid care work and limited social protection.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Tax Systems, Informal Economy, Gender, and Development Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

683. Ghana’s electrification via rural mini-grids has been disappointing

Author:
Abdul-Bassit Abubakari
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite Ghana’s explicit plans to deploy mini-grids for the electrification of off-grid and remote communities, progress has been slow and disappointing. This paper explores how political dynamics and policy shifts have shaped the governance of mini-grids over time. It examines the evolution of mini-grids in Ghana in three phases: preliminary design stage (2007–2013); active implementation period, marked by policy modifications (2013–2019); and subsequent consolidation under a predominantly public-led model post-2019. Guided by an adapted political settlements framework and process tracing methodology, the paper argues that misalignment between the government of Ghana and donors over governance and ownership models, mediated by the country’s competitive clientelist politics, explains Ghana’s limited progress in the development of mini-grids. The paper provides nuanced insights into the complex ways transnational factors and domestic politics interact in shaping the development of mini-grids with wide implications for debates on energy governance and reform in sub-Saharan Africa.
Topic:
Environment, Natural Resources, Electricity, and Development Policy
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

684. The crisis of multilateralism and African peace operations

Author:
Corine van Emmerik and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Resolution 2719, adopted in December 2023, holds the potential to be a watershed in how the UN and the broader international community support African-led peace operations. However, its implementation is faltering amid political inertia, technical hurdles, and US hostility toward global institutions.1 2719 authorised the UN to use ‘assessed contributions’ – mandatory payments by member states – to cover 75% of the costs of African Union (AU) missions, with the AU expected to provide the remaining 25%. Early messaging around 2719 suggested that it might provide stable funding for peace operations on the continent that has hosted the majority of peacekeeping missions since the Cold War. It would recognise that Africans conduct the vast majority of fighting in security operations, yet enjoy neither political leadership of deployments nor financial support that reflects their sacrifice in providing an international public good. However, the resolution has not yet been tested in practice, and geopolitical disruption has caused political momentum to stall. A stable funding basis for African-led peacekeeping now appears increasingly out of reach, as the US retreats from the very institutions of the liberal world order it once claimed to champion, though often inconsistently in practice. The future of the resolution now hinges on a Security Council vote in May 2025, which will determine whether it applies to the AU’s mission in Somalia – the only active AU-led peace operation and therefore the only obvious test case.2
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Multilateralism, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa

685. Denmark needs to rethink its multilateral engagement

Author:
Rens van Munster and Corine van Emmerik
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Uncertainty about NATO’s future and American commitment to European security is challenging the foundations of Danish foreign and security policy. Denmark must face this new reality and strengthen its commitment to multilateralism as central to its long-term security and influence. Denmark’s 2023 foreign policy strategy acknowledges that ‘the rule-based world order and multilateralism are under pressure’ – a stark reality for a small state whose security and prosperity fundamentally depend on international rules. Intensified geopolitical competition, rival visions of global governance, and the erosion of consensus on international security norms have plunged multilateralism into a full-blown crisis, placing Denmark – like many countries – in an increasingly difficult position.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

686. Tariff Tensions: Redefining Washington-New Delhi Relations

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The strategic partnership between the United States and India faces a critical juncture as recent developments strain their ties. On August 15, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for national self-reliance in trade and foreign exchange, a response to high tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump's administration on Indian imports.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Imports, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

687. Strategic Recalibration: Turkey's Decision to End the Oil Agreement with Iraq

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On July 21, 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his government's decision not to renew the agreements and protocols signed between Türkiye and Iraq since 1973 regarding the crude oil pipeline extending from Iraq to Türkiye. The agreement, which facilitated oil transport from Kirkuk in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to the Yumurtalık oil port in southeastern Türkiye, has played a strategic role in delivering millions of barrels of Iraqi oil through the Turkish port of Ceyhan to global markets. Originally renewed in 2010 for fifteen years, the agreement is scheduled to expire on July 27, 2026.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Oil, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

688. European Shift: The Path Toward Palestinian State Recognition

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Western and European announcements regarding intentions to recognize a Palestinian state in September 2025 have accelerated, coinciding with the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting. These developments emerge amid intensifying criticism of Israeli positions in both Western media and social platforms, creating mounting domestic pressure on European governments to adopt clearer stances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Palestinians, UN General Assembly, and Recognition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

689. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

690. The Indian Factor: Analyzing Pakistan-Turkey Rapprochement and its Implications for India

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In a move that reflects the deepening ties between Pakistan and Turkey, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Turkey on May 25–26, 2025 — his second visit to the country this year — as part of a broader regional diplomatic tour that also included Iran, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. The tour aimed to express Pakistan's gratitude and strengthen regional partnerships in the wake of its recent military confrontation with India. Turkey's support for Islamabad during this conflict has strained India–Turkey relations, prompting New Delhi to launch campaigns calling for the boycott of Turkish products and services.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Rapprochement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, Turkey, and India

691. Geography and Energy: The US-Central Asia Partnership in Critical Minerals

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting President Donald Trump's recognition of the national security risks posed by China's dominance over global supply chains in this sector. Following the approach of previous administrations, the current leadership has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers to diversify American access to these vital resources. The focus has now turned to the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in minerals essential for energy and defense technologies. Through two primary frameworks, the U.S. has begun exploring Central Asia's untapped critical mineral wealth: the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), alongside a series of bilateral memorandums of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambition does not necessarily align with the logistical challenges of emerging supply chains in Central Asia. In response to these complexities, analysts Haley Nelson and Natalia Stroz published a report with the Atlantic Council titled "Central Asia's geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership."
Topic:
Partnerships, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

692. Strategic Shift: Understanding Russia's Delisting of the Taliban

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Russia's relationship with the Taliban has undergone a significant transformation in recent times. Moscow now perceives the Taliban as a potential strategic partner, seeking to establish more open diplomatic relations—a remarkable departure from the hostile stance maintained since 2003 when Russia formally designated the movement as a terrorist organization. This gradual evolution has unfolded over recent years, culminating in a growing understanding and emerging cooperation between two former adversaries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Geopolitics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, and Taliban

693. Ocalan’s Call: Can Peace Be Achieved Between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
After four decades of violence claiming at least 40,000 lives, Abdullah Ocalan, founder and leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), issued a message from his prison on an island off Istanbul on February 27, 2025. In his statement, Ocalan urged the PKK to lay down its arms, end its resistance against the Turkish state, and dissolve itself. Responding positively to Ocalan's call, the PKK's executive committee announced in early March 2025 that it accepted his proposal and awaited Ankara's response. The initiative aligns with a proposal launched on October 22, 2024, in the Turkish parliament by Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Bahceli's initiative aimed to facilitate dialogue with Ocalan to disband the PKK, disarm its fighters, and declare an end to terrorism in Turkey—a move endorsed by Erdoğan.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Peace, PKK, and Abdullah Ocalan
Political Geography:
Turkey and Kurdistan

694. Fragile Ceasefire: Will international efforts succeed in halting the escalation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In response to the escalating humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the coalition of rebel groups led by the M23 movement[1] announced a ceasefire on February 4, 2025. The decision came after intense military clashes in the city of Goma, which had been intensifying since January 25. According to the United Nations, the conflict has had devastating consequences, resulting in at least 900 deaths, approximately 2,880 injuries, and the displacement of over 400,000 people since the beginning of the year.
Topic:
Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, and M23
Political Geography:
Africa, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo

695. Uncertainty in Caracas: What Awaits Venezuela's Maduro in his Third Term?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On January 10, 2025, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was sworn in for a third six-year term. The opposition condemned this event as a "coup," accusing Maduro of election fraud in connection with the presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. In response, the government organized a rally in support of Maduro in the capital. Meanwhile, the opposition staged a protest led by Maria Corina Machado, who made her first public appearance since August 2024.
Topic:
Economics, Elections, Protests, Organized Crime, Social Unrest, and Nicolas Maduro
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, and Venezuela

696. Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:
Julie Baer and Nora Nemeth
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:
The Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 559 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends and recruitment patterns with respect to international students for 2025/26 and (2) trends related to U.S. study abroad in 2024/25, as well as an outlook for 2025/26.
Topic:
Education, Students, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

697. Outlook 2030 Brief: Expanding International Study to the U.S.

Author:
Mirka Martel and Jonah Kokodyniak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:
In 2024, over 1.1 million international students pursued their higher education in the United States. By 2030, increasing our efforts will ensure support for U.S. higher education, industries, and innovation. This is the second edition of IIE’s annual Outlook 2030 brief. The data-driven report focuses on key trends in academic mobility to the United States, comparing global findings and looking ahead at the next five years. The United States is the single largest host of international students in the world, attracting top talent from around the globe. International students pursue academic degrees in the U.S. due to the excellence of its higher education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). U.S. colleges and universities, in turn, benefit from the innovation and global perspectives that students and scholars bring to their institutions. Attracting global talent is crucial for driving the U.S. economy’s growth and maintaining the country’s leadership in research and development. The U.S. will continue to drive the development of new industries, and building a domestic and global pipeline of talent will advance this pivotal role.
Topic:
Education, Innovation, Higher Education, Industry, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

698. Opening Space for Transitional Justice in Yemen

Author:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This report explores pathways for transitional justice in Yemen, emphasizing victims’ experiences, political dynamics, and existing justice mechanisms. It examines national and local efforts, including mediation and reconciliation initiatives, and highlights the role of Yemeni civil society. Based on over 50 interviews, the report offers guidance on how to advance transitional justice in Yemen, including strengthening institutional cooperation, ensuring victim-centered approaches, supporting civil society and documentation efforts, and integrating justice and reconciliation into peace negotiations.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reform, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Reconciliation, Reparations, and Peace Process
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

699. Of Two Minds: Sanctions as a Form of Accountability and the Dilemmas for Transitional Justice

Author:
Elena Naughton
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This report provides an analysis of international economic sanctions from a transitional justice perspective. Sanctions are a policy tool primarily associated with issues of foreign policy, peace, and security, often deployed as a form of coercive diplomacy to induce a change in behavior or policy. In recent years, however, especially as sanctions have been increasingly targeted at those responsible for human rights violations, the potential for greater engagement with transitional justice has expanded. The report considers the role that sanctions may play in advancing or hindering justice goals such as accountability, redress, and prevention in response to massive and serious human rights violations. It suggests that sanctions may provide an alternative or complementary means of justice in contexts of impunity, including in societies where significant political transitions have not yet begun. Sanctions may also offer opportunities for victim participation, while also presenting risks for victims and human rights activists. The report gathers lessons learned to provide guidance and broach a discussion about whether and how international economic sanctions function in support of (1) transitional justice goals, by punishing perpetrators, recognizing victims and repairing the harms they have suffered, advancing the truth, and preventing a recurrence of violations; and (2) transitional justice processes, by documenting human rights violations and identifying those responsible, supporting trials and truth commissions, and funding reparations. The report also examines the challenges that sanctions pose to justice, related to both legitimacy and impact. These include selectivity in the choice of targets, negative humanitarian impact, sanction evasion and the empowerment of authoritarian and corrupt actors, limited tangible impact on targets, undermining justice processes and actors, lack of outreach, legal and practical challenges, and lack of coordination and coherence. It concludes by identifying areas where increased engagement between justice practitioners and sanctions authorities could take advantage of the synergies in their work.
Topic:
Sanctions, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Memory, Accountability, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

700. Foreign policy congruence in Africa: Evidence on free movement and free trade

Author:
Florian G. Kern, Martin C. Steinwand, and Samira Diebire
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
How does foreign policy of African governments reflect the preferences of their constituents? Scholars have studied public opinion in Africa and how constituents assess government performance. Yet social scientists neglect how and why foreign policy by African governments reflects public opinion, despite much anecdotal evidence of citizens expressing opinion on African foreign policy. In this paper, we investigate the congruence of governmental foreign policy positions and public opinion on issues of free movement and free trade across 34 African countries. We explore two drivers of foreign policy congruence: first democratic vs. autocratic government, and second external rents accruing from natural resources, aid, and remittances. Our descriptive evidence suggests that, on free trade, African publics tend to be more trade-sceptic than the liberalised policy positions of their governments, meaning low foreign policy congruence. On free movement, low foreign policy congruence stems from African constituents preferring more liberalisation than what governments provide. Surprisingly, multivariate analysis indicates that democracies show lower foreign policy congruence than autocracies on issues of free trade. We argue that this may be because democracies systemically oversupply market liberalisation. We cannot find an effect of external rents on foreign policy congruence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Free Trade, Freedom of Movement, and Globalism
Political Geography:
Africa