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1. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Recent technological and political developments in OSCE participating States suggest a strong interest in pursuing, testing and using weaponised AI and weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features controlled by algorithms. In May 2021 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had begun producing combat robots “capable of fighting on their own”,1 while the French Army is planning to introduce robotic systems by 2040.2 The United Kingdom (UK) government has stated its objective of achieving “a leading role in critical and emerging technologies”3 and has established a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit to better understand them.4 In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has urged the government “not [to] be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs”.5 The global discussion about autonomous weapons systems is often framed in a futuristic way and focuses on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – colloquially called “killer robots” – or the “AI arms race”. But weaponised AI is already a reality of European security. Thus far participating States have been reluctant to utilise the OSCE platform to address the risks caused by the increasing autonomy of weapons systems. Building on this issue, this essay intends to address the following questions: (1) how does the lack of regulation of weaponised AI affect security and stability in Europe? and (2) what role can the OSCE play in mitigating the risks related to weaponised AI?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:
Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

6. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:
Haytham Manna
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

7. The Concept of “Forward Defence”: How Has the Syrian Crisis Shaped the Evolution of Iran’s Military Strategy?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to “forward defence” or “offensive defence” as the foundation of Iran’s military strategy. While the concept implies the inclusion of offensive aspects into Iran’s military strategy, which used to have an overwhelmingly defensive nature, it is also increasingly used to justify Iran’s military presence beyond its borders. This paper begins with a historical overview of the evolution of Iran’s military strategy, especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, showing how the concept of “deterrence” has become the cornerstone of its strategic military planning. It also discusses the crucial concept of “strategic depth”. Understanding these basic concepts is essential to be able to analyse the forward defence strategy, its main elements, and the domestic, regional, and international factors contributing to its formation. The paper also explores how the Syrian crisis has affected Iran’s military strategy in both conceptual and instrumental terms, leading to the formation and consolidation of the forward defence. Conceptually, Iran has justified its direct military presence far from its borders as necessary for confronting threats at their source before they reach Iranian territory. From an instrumental point of view, Iran’s involvement in the Syrian crisis has led to the development of Iran’s regional network of non-state allies and proxies, while adding a new layer to Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. The main argument is that forward defence is not a new military doctrine but an evolved and updated form of “deterrence”. The paper also identifies Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes, its support for non-state actors across the region, and its focus on developing cyberwar capabilities as the main elements of its forward defence strategy, rooted in its perception that it is located in an increasingly insecure regional environment. Finally, the paper suggests that, for the United States to reach an agreement with Iran on these missile and regional issues, Washington and its regional allies must make reciprocal concessions to alleviate Iran’s sense of threat to its security and survival. In this case, Iran might be ready to make concessions on its allied and proxy militias in Yemen and Syria, although the more complex security and political situations in Iraq and Lebanon leave Tehran with comparably less leverage. While Iran is not expected to agree on considerably limiting its missile programme, an agreement on the range of its ballistic missiles could be achievable.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments

Author:
Naomi Egel
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
CBMs for AWS would make a significant contribution to reducing the military risks posed by AWS and - equally important - are a realistic goal. Although agreement within the OSCE cannot be assured, its strong history of developing CBMs and its ability to make progress towards reducing military risk even in a climate of geopolitical tensions makes the OSCE uniquely well positioned to develop AWS CBMs. The growing proliferation of AWS and their increasing importance in military operations means that risk reduction is an urgent priority. Given the numerous challenges to arms control and cooperative security measures in other international organisations, OSCE CBMs offer one of the best opportunities for making progress in reducing the military risks of AWS. Moreover, they would provide a foundation for further governance of AWS by other international organisations. The CBMs proposed here would provide greater transparency regarding states’ capabilities and intentions regarding AWS, and in doing so, would reduce the risks of miscommunication, miscalculation and inadvertent conflict escalation that these systems pose.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

10. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

11. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine

Author:
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

12. Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022

Author:
Serhat Erkmen, Nicholas Heras, and Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Syria is a geographic entity divided into three main zones of control, each ruled by local actors with the strong and seemingly indefinite support of powerful foreign actors. These three zones are one zone in western, central, and eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian government, a second zone in northwest and northern Syria along the Syrian-Turkish border controlled by the Syrian opposition and supported by Turkey and a third zone in northeast Syria controlled by the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) and its military the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which is supported by the United States and several of its allies that are part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The common perception by observers of the Syrian conflict is that it is frozen; that Syria will be indefinitely divided into these different territorial zones of control. This assumption obscures the fact though that a significant amount of fluidity on the ground within Syria's three main zones of control is possible. Each of these zones has its own unique characteristics and local customs that must be understood to draw broader assessments on how the wider Syrian conflict might be resolved one day.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

13. Military Operations and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Tobias Vestner
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will most likely transform military operations. This paper explores how AI systems may affect and be affected by principal instruments for preparing and conducting military operations. Therefore, the paper analyses and discusses AI in the context of strategy, doctrine, plans, rules of engagement, and orders to situate opportunities, challenges, and open questions as well as offer overarching observations. The paper takes a broad angle of analysis that enables a general examination of the issue based on new policies and technological developments as well as the consideration of political, military, legal, and ethical perspectives. Thereby, the paper provides insights and avenues to advance further reflection, research, and policy-making on the appropriate integration, management, and use of AI for military operations.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America