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1. Transatlantic Relations in a Unipolar World

Author:
William Wohlforth
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The state of transatlantic relations is normal - arguably in crisis, arguably not; poised for fundamental change, or for basic continuity. The usual question for conferences on transatlantic relations is whether this situation will continue. My purpose in this paper is to set forth a perspective on the future of the transatlantic relationship based on the central realist proposition that the distribution of capabilities among states is an important background influence on their behaviour. Major changes in international relations often arise from changes in the distribution of power. Important features of the Cold War resulted from the great concentration of power in the United States and the Soviet Union - a condition that came to be called "bipolarity." The Cold War ended in significant measure owing to changes in the distribution of power - namely, the decline and fall of the Soviet Union. As a result of Soviet and Russian decline, a new unipolar distribution has emerged with new consequences for international politics in general and the transatlantic relationship in particular.
Topic:
International Relations and NATO
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

2. The United States and Europe: Smooth Sailing or Storm Clouds Ahead?

Author:
William Hitchcock
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Two years ago, when many of us gathered together in the dramatic Alpine setting of Leukerbad to consider the recent past and the likely future of US-European relations, our group was full of dire prognostications. Russia was headed toward collapse, the EU looked weak after the Yugoslav war, NATO expansion appeared to be dividing Europe; the introduction of the euro looked liked a risky gamble that might worsen trans-Atlantic relations; and most disturbing for me as an American, my government was preoccupied with the Lewinsky scandal and the future of the Clinton presidency seemed at risk. Indeed, one of our colleagues, discussing the crisis over after-dinner drinks, declared that Clinton would resign from the presidency within matter of weeks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

3. Through the Glass Ceiling: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?

Author:
Anne Deighton
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 'St Malo process' which has being taking shape since December 1998, will bring a qualitative change in the EU's role as an international institution. Many of the big initiatives that the Union undertakes are not fully understood early on - unexpected, and sometimes unintended consequences can result from the changes that the EU agrees to. It takes time for the institutional implications of major changes to emerge: the Single Act was, in the mid 80s, often seen as the 'elephant that gave birth to a mouse'; and the Maastricht Treaty as at once called too federalist, and too timid. Likewise, the exact configuration of the changes that St Malo may bring will also take time to become clear. 'Militarising' the EU, however, ends one of the last policy taboos of a 'civilian-power' European Union and breaks through the 'glass ceiling' of the EU's self-denying ordinance against the adoption of the instruments of military force which has existed since its inception. This paper assesses how far these changes got by the summer of 2000 and asks whether the last eighteen months are one stage in the messy birth of a post-Cold War pan-European defence and security regime with institutions based around NATO and the EU. Europe's institutional configuration tends to matter more to Europeans than to our transatlantic partners; but institutions are the reality of contemporary European international politics. 'Multilateral institutionalism' too, is inescapable, and how institutions relate to each other has become an increasingly significant question. To accept this does not meant that states do not matter, for states also use institutions, as well as being shaped by institutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Switzerland

4. NATO's Past, NATO's Future

Author:
John Lewis Gaddis
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stands at a crossroads. Critical choices lie ahead that will determine its future. I begin my paper this way because it is customary to begin pronouncements on NATO with this kind of statement. Indeed papers and speeches on NATO have been beginning this way through the half-century of the alliance's existence - and yet NATO never quite reaches whatever crisis the speaker or writer has in mind. NATO seems to have a life of its own, which is remarkably detached from the shocks and surprises that dominate most of history, certainly Cold War history. And NATO's members, both actual and aspiring, seem bent on keeping it that way. So what is a crossroad anyway in historical terms? Most of my colleagues, I think, would say that it's a turning point: a moment at which it becomes clear that the status quo can no longer sustain itself, at which decisions have to be made about new courses of action, at which the results of those decisions shape what happens for years to come. The Cold War was full of such moments: the Korean War, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, the Hungarian and Suez crises, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six Day War, the Tet offensive, Nixon's trip to China, the invasion of Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War itself. What strikes me as a historian, though, is how little impact these turning points had on NATO's history - even General deGaulle, who tried to turn himself personally into a turning point. The structure and purposes of the alliance today are not greatly different from what they were when NATO was founded. Which is to say that NATO's history, compared to that of most other Cold War institutions, is uneventful, bland, and even (let us be frank) a little dull. That very uneventfulness, though, is turning out to be one of the more significant aspects of Cold War history. It surprised the historians, who have been able to cite no other example of a multi-national alliance that has had the robustness, the durability, the continuity, some might say the apparent immortality, of this one. It has also surprised the international relations theorists, for it is a fundamental principle of their discipline that alliances form when nations balance against threats. It follows, then, that as threats dissipate, alliances should also - and yet this one shows no signs of doing so. An instrument of statecraft, which is what an alliance normally is, has in this instance come to be regarded as a fundamental interest of statecraft. That requires explanation, which is what I should like to attempt here.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, Germany, and Berlin

5. U.S.-EU Relations after the Introduction of the Euro and the Reinvention of European Security and Defence

Author:
Pal Dunay
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The current phase and the prospects of U.S. - EU relations can be analysed from different vantage points. The most logical is to deal with the position of the main actors, the United States or the European Union. This paper makes an attempt to analyse the prospects of U.S. - EU relations in light of two major developments: the beginning of the third phase of the economic and monetary union, symbolised by the introduction of the Euro and the verbal (re-)establishment of European defence. The paper makes an attempt to pay attention to the arguments of the United States, though the emphasis is on the European perception of the possible complications of the new phase of evolution that European integration may generate in the relations between the two entities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

6. Beyond Enlargement: NATO's Role in Russia's Relations with the West

Author:
S. Neil MacFarlane
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In 1996, ex-NATO Defence College fellow Dmitrii Trenin wrote that "in spite of the numerous public declarations of intention by Russia and the United States, Russia and NATO, and Russia and the European Union, so far no reliable foundation for partnership has been laid." Although the remark is four years old, there is little to argue with here. The proposition remains equally valid today. Four years ago, one might have asked: so what? Given the state of affairs in Russia, it didn't matter much anyway. However, things are changing. For the first time in ten years, secessionist wars, submarine disasters and fires in television towers notwithstanding, NATO and the West face a pivotal moment in the effort to normalize the relationship with Russia. The executive has secured reasonable control over the legislature. It is moving towards the reestablishment of central authority vis-à-vis the regions. The government is restoring a disciplined and reasonably orderly approach to foreign and security policy. There is increasingly strong evidence of sustained Russian economic recovery. This is a moment, consequently, of both opportunity and risk in the West's relations with Russia. It is an appropriate time to review where we have been, where we are, where we want to be, and what the role of NATO is in getting us there.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

7. Kosovo's Evolving Contest: Security, Policy and Sovereignty

Author:
Charles H. Norchi
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
It will be recalled that Yugoslavia was created in 1918 in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new state was peopled by religiously distinct ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Muslims. After World War II and German occupation, Josip Broz Tito, the Croat leader of the Yugoslav resistance, reunited the country as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Member Republics of the SFRY were Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo. Kosovo had been incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1945, but unlike the five federal units of Yugoslavia, it did not have the constitutional right to secede from the federation. With its majority Albanian population, it held the same status of Vojvadina with its majority Hungarian population. Tito's rule was harsh. His aim was to establish a public order straddling capitalism and communism in a multi-ethnic society. His foreign policy direction was non-aligned. Tito died in 1980 and SFRY leadership was assumed by a Presidential Council intended to represent the republics and autonomous territories with council chairmanship rotating among members.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo

8. The Role of the EU in Peace-Building in the Mediterranean

Author:
Fred Tanner
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The disappearance of the overwhelming threat of Cold War confrontation has left the Europeans more sensitive to challenges, risks and threats from their southern periphery. The wars in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, the bloody civil war in Algeria, the recurrence of deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the spread of religious extremism and the increasing migratory pressures from the South have obliged Europe and NATO to pay greater attention to their near abroad in the South. Given the region's root causes of conflict such as poverty, economic cleavages and uncontrolled population growth, the North's balancing strategy of the Cold War days was replaced by policies of engagements, politico-economic partnerships and dialogue initiatives. The EU, recalling its Euro-Arab special relations of the 1970s, lobbied to get its share in the post-Gulf War peace process, that brought together for the first time Arab states with Israel and Western "sponsors" in the multilateral setting of Madrid. Short-cut by the Arab-Israeli bilateral tracks under US patronage after Oslo, the EU changed gears in 1995 and founded in Barcelona a Euro-Med partnership with all Mediterranean states, including those of North Africa (with the exception of Libya), the Near East and the Palestinian Authority. This Partnership includes a political, economic and social dimension. The founders of the Partnership hoped that it would turn into the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA on the one hand and provide a support structure for the Middle East process on the other. The "Political and Security Chapter" of the Euro-Med Partnership was not only reminiscent of the Helsinki Process of the Cold War period, it also created a political platform of North-South co-operation in the Mediterranean that kept the Americans out and the Israelis in. The exclusion of the US from Barcelona (even as observer) was certainly one of the reasons why NATO enhanced its own security co-operation with some Southern Mediterranean states. Today, the Barcelona process finds itself in more or less direct competition with NATO with regards to soft security projection towards the South. This paper examines future scenarios of Euro-Med relations as well as of Atlantic relations over Mediterranean issues - under the assumption that Europe would become an international security actor. It will suggest that - in the long term - a successful Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) would strengthen the EU security and crisis management capabilities in the Mediterranean region. The CESDP would entitle the EU to enter the domain of security-cooperation in the fields of peacekeeping, defence training and education and the use of military assets for humanitarian operations. But two obstacles will have to be overcome: First, the relations to NATO dialogue programmes in the region will have to be sorted out and second, the Southern partner states need to be assured that the EU headline force projection capabilities will not make Europe more interventionist in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

9. Russian Perception of European Security

Author:
Yuri Nazarkin
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Historically, Russia was always threatened from three sides: from the West it was threatened and invaded at different periods of its history by Poland, Sweden, France and Germany; from the South, its traditional rival and enemy was the Ottoman empire; from the East, China and Japan. Throughout its history Russia had to be on the alert along all its borders. Though at present there are no direct military threats from any of the three directions, the current Russian security planning takes into account all the three directions. However, the problem of European security is the highest priority in Russian foreign and security policy. There are a number of reasons for this.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

10. Recoiling from Russia

Author:
André Liebich
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The above manifesto, entitled "A Horror is Haunting Europe," was published on the front page of one of Europe's premier newspapers in the thick of this year's presidential campaign in Russia. It was signed by some two hundred intellectuals and public figures, the French being the most strongly represented but including signatories from fifteen other European countries and a number of Americans. Among the recognisable names are those of media and cultural personalities such as Costas Gavras, Jean-Luc Godard, John Le Carré, Bernardo Bertolucci, Jane Birkin, Vanessa Redgrave and Barbara Hendricks. Many of the others are widely known academics, such as Umberto Eco and Noam Chomsky, as well as a minor galaxy of familiar Parisian personalities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, and Europe

11. Russia's Eurasian Security Policy

Author:
Roland Dannreuther
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Ever since Catherine the Great pronounced that 'Russia is a European country', Russia has been an inescapable part of the European balance of power. Russia's European credentials are indisputable. The larger majority of the Russian population, and most of the major economic centres, are located in the European part of Russia. Russians are Christian, if of the eastern orthodox faith, and Russian poets, novelists, artists and composers have made an extraordinary contribution to European culture. Russians perceive themselves as part of European civilisation, not least when confronted with other ancient civilisations, such as Iran, India and China. Moreover, other European actors have recognised Russia as an intrinsic part of the European order, even if at times this recognition has been mixed with strong doses of suspicion and fear. But, Russia is not only in Europe. Geographically, the larger part of Russia's territory, however inhospitable and poorly populated, lies in Asia. Culturally, Russia has periodically been hermetically sealed from mainstream developments in Europe. During the medieval period, Russia lay under Tartar rule; during the Soviet period, the borders were, in Stalin's words, under 'lock and key' and Western influences were rigorously excluded. The consequent backwardness of Russia, which has been a consequence of these intermittent linkages with the more developed West, has diluted Russia's European credentials. Russia's Asian destiny was also a deliberate act of state policy with Russia's borders being continually expanded into Asian territory. Russia had a similar experience to the United States with a continental expansion to the Pacific, which was driven, as in America, by entrepreneurial colonists who subsequently decimated the local populations. Towards the South, Russia followed European imperial practice and engaged in a mission civilisatrice to bring European-style rule over purportedly backward peoples. The Russian imperial experience differed from the British and French examples in one critical element: no division was made between the metropolitan centre and empire and thus no clearly demarcated border existed between the Russian state and its imperial appendages. The Tsarist military historian, Mikhail Vernukov, argued that this absence of a separation involved a different imperial practice when compared with 'Englishmen in India who do their utmost to avoid mingling with the natives . . . Our strength lies in the fact that . . . we have assimilated subject races, mingling affably with them'. For these and other reasons, Russia's European credentials have been questioned, not only by other Europeans but by Russians themselves. For west Europeans, the vast geographical expanse, the relative backwardness and large population, the heady mix of despotism and mysticism, has made Russia an alien entity, the 'other' from which the enlightened rational West can be contrasted. The well-known French proverb - 'Grattez le Russe, et vous trouverez le Tartare' - illustrates this European scepticism well. Russians themselves have often been drawn to emphasising the exceptionalism of Russia, not as in America because Russia represents the 'new' rather than the 'old' world, but because Russia's unique position between Europe and Asia makes it belong to neither and the fusion of East and West preserves the benefits of Western civilisation but without its decadent rationalism and materialism. The notion of Moscow as the Third Rome has been a continual source of attraction to the more mystical members of Russian society. This complex set of historical experiences, mutual perceptions and attitudes have contributed to the frequent shifts in Russia's policy towards the rest of Europe. At times, Russia has fully embraced the West so as to 'catch up' and modernise; at other times, Moscow has retreated into its citadels so as to preserve its uniqueness and the universality of its message. In terms of security policy, Russian leaders have been consistent in promoting as fluid and weak a set of alliance structures in Europe as possible. Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, was arguably the first to conceive of the notion of collective security and this legacy has been followed in more recent times with Gorbachev's promotion of a 'common European home' and the Soviet and post-Soviet predilection for defining the CSCE/OSCE as the overarching framework for the European security order. These collective security proposals, which have consistently baffled and irritated other Europeans powers, have had a strong realpolitik dimension, alongside the requisite dose of mysticism. Such schemes are designed to exclude a concentration of power in Europe, which might be directed against Russia, and to prevent the type of direct aggression which Russia suffered through the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions. Such flexible arrangements are also the most favourable mechanism for promoting Russian influence in Europe and to securing Russia's consistent desire, even obsession, to be treated as an equal with the other European great powers. It is clear that the West's rejection of the proposed collective security arrangement for the post-Cold War European order, and the corresponding expansion of NATO, has been viewed in Moscow as a humiliating geopolitical defeat. The sense of betrayal, of promises made by the West and then reneged upon, has been profoundly felt. With the perception of a Europe excluding and marginalising Russia, there has been a turn towards the East in the search for alternative avenues for projecting Russia's power and influence. Again, there are historical parallels with the nineteenth century when the concerted European effort to block Russian expansion into the Balkans, with its ultimate pan-Orthodox goal of capturing Constantinople, led to Russian energies being re-directed towards expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a similar vein, in March 1997, the Russian Presidential Spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, stated at the Russian-USA Helsinki summit: 'If NATO expansion is going to continue . . . Russia will be confronted with a need to reconsider its foreign-policy priorities. Our relations with China, India . . . and Iran are developing well'. The objective of this paper is to assess the nature, complexities and the relative success and failure of Russia's purported 'turn' to the East. Three areas will be briefly surveyed: recent Russian policy towards the Middle East, to Central Asia and to China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

12. The Persian Gulf

Author:
Shahram Chubin
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the past fifty years five US President's from Truman to Clinton have directly or indirectly, affirmed US interests in the Middle East. The 'doctrines' in the case of Carter (1979) and Reagan (1981) specifically addressed the security of the Persian Gulf. The same period has seen the withdrawal of imperial powers. Three decades ago Britain managed the security of the Persian Gulf. Two decades ago France had the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean. The contraction of these commitments was encouraged by the US, which was unwilling to be associated with colonialism and its evils. Yet since Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf which occasioned the Nixon doctrine, the US has been grappling with how best to assure security. Reliance on regional states ("twin pillars") was upset by the Iranian revolution. In the 1980's the long Iran-Iraq war underscored the need for a Western role, but neither its shape nor its duration were clear. Local forces were reluctant to envisage any thing beyond an "over the horizon presence."
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and France

13. US Perceptions of NATO Deployments Beyond Europe and of European Capabilities

Author:
Stuart Johnson
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The United States and its NATO allies have engaged in two high intensity conflicts in this decade, Desert Storm in the Gulf and Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. Both campaigns were characterized by a strong, and successful, effort to maintain broad coalition participation and cohesion. But the story is more complex than the press releases from NATO Headquarters, Washington, and other NATO capitals would have us believe. Both operations revealed differences in US and European allies' capabilities and styles of prosecuting warfare. These forced the commanders to adopt an ad-hoc, inefficient division of labor in what, to the public, was presented as a seamless coalition operation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Middle East