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71. Financial Conglomerates: The Future of Finance?

Author:
Robert Litan and Richard Herring
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
In 1999, after nearly twenty years of debate, the U.S. Congress finally passed legislation permitting bank affiliations with all sorts of other financial enterprises, and vice versa. In this step, the United States joined many other countries — especially in Europe and, more recently, Japan — in allowing the operation of financial conglomerates. But are financial conglomerates the wave of the future in finance? And if so, how are they to be regulated? These were the two central questions addressed in the fifth annual conference of the Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, an annual volume published by the Brookings Institution Press. The conference, held in October 2002 in Washington, D.C., convened financial services experts from around the world. The papers presented at the conference suggest, generally, that while the future may see more financial conglomerate activity than it has in the past, there still will be a role for specialist, or "monoline" financial companies. As for regulation, there is no settled model: some nations will pursue consolidated supervision, with authority over entire conglomerates vested in a single authority (often the central bank), while others will still regulate the pieces of diversified financial enterprises along structural lines.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Industrial Policy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Washington

72. The Spatial Distribution of Entrepeneurial Support Networks: Evidence from Semiconductor Initial Public Offerings from 1996-2000

Author:
Martin Kenney and Donald Patton
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Theory and recent research demonstrates that entrepreneurship is a spatially and socially embedded activity. In certain regions, dense support networks of institutions dedicated to assisting entrepreneurial start-ups have been established and a wide variety of authors have given credit to these networks for supporting regional entrepreneurship (Kenney and von Burg 1999; Saxenian 1994; Bahrami and Evans 2000). As Marshall (1890) recognized many, but not all, industries exhibit a strong clustering effect (see also, e.g., Storper and Walker 1988; Porter 1990; 1998). Research on these networks has been hampered by a lack of empirical data that contains spatial variables and identifies the relationship between various actors (i.e., venture capitalists, law firms and investment bankers) and the start-up firm. Thus research has been qualitative and anecdotal or when quantitative limited to certain industries usually biotechnology.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Non-Governmental Organization
Political Geography:
United States

73. Enron's Missed Opportunity: Enron's Refusal to Build a Collaborative Market Turned Bandwidth Trading Into a Disaster

Author:
Andrew Schwartz
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Why did Enron fail? The easy answer is that Enron was a fraud, a Ponzi scheme designed to enrich scoundrels. But beneath the off-balance sheet transactions and partnerships that have drawn such intense scrutiny, Enron's efforts to reduce complex products into tradable commodities represented one of the most promising ideas of the past twenty-five years. Enron's failure was due in part to a business strategy that regarded competitors as ruthless and uncompromising. That mentality led the company to reject the very real possibility that rivals could, working together, create the new markets that in turn would open up profit opportunities for all. Enron's brilliant vision of the New Economy didn't go far enough; it required a New Economy business model that emphasized cooperation among competitors.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States

74. Secrets or Shields to Share?: New Dilemmas for Dual Use Technology Development and the Quest for Military and Commercial Advantage in the Digital Age

Author:
Jay Stowsky
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
For a brief period in the early 1990's the U.S. Department of Defense pursued an R policy that was explicitly “dual-use,” funding projects aimed at simultaneously developing both military and civilian applications of the same underlying technologies. The policy emerged from more than a decade of bipartisan agitation in Congress and segments of the military-industrial establishment, spurred by a shared belief that more advanced technologies now “spun on” from civilian to military applications than “spun off” in the other direction (US Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary for Acquisition, 1987; Gansler, 1989; Alic et al., 1992; Stowsky 1992, 1999). With the end of the Cold War and mushrooming budget deficits constraining defense spending, Pentagon planners saw dual-use development as a strategy for improving efficiency and lowering costs as well as enhancing quality by enabling the construction of sophisticated weapons systems off a more integrated civil-military technology base (US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995; US Department of Defense, 1995).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States

75. Non-Cooperative Dynamics of Multi-Agent Teams

Author:
Robert L. Axtell
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Results on the formation of multi-agent teams are reviewed and extended. Conditions are specified under which it is individually rational for agents to spontaneously form coalitions in order to engage in collective action. In a cooperative setting the formation of such groups is to be expected. Here we show that in non-cooperative environments—presumably a more realistic context for a variety of both human and software agents—self-organized coalitions are capable of extracting welfare improvements. The Nash equilibria of these coalitional formation games are demonstrated to always exist and be unique. Certain free rider problems in such group formation dynamics lead to the possibility of dynamically unstable Nash equilibria, depending on the nature of intra-group compensation and coalition size. Yet coherent groups can still form, if only temporarily, as demonstrated by computational experiments. Such groups of agents can be either long-lived or transient. The macroscopic structure of these emergent 'bands' of agents is stationary in sufficiently large populations, despite constant adaptation at the agent level. It is argued that assumptions concerning attainment of agent-level (Nash) equilibrium, so ubiquitous in conventional economics and game theory, are difficult to justify behaviorally and highly restrictive theoretically, and are thus unlikely to serve either as fertile design objectives or robust operating principles for realistic multi-agent systems.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Latin America

76. Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Civil Violence: Guatemala 1977-1986

Author:
Timothy R. Gulden
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
This paper examines detailed records from the civil conflict in Guatemala between 1977 and 1986. It reveals a number of novel patterns which support the use of complex systems methods for understanding civil violence. It finds a surprising, non-linear relationship between ethnic mix and killing; thereby inviting analysis based on group dynamics. It shows the temporal texture of the conflict to be far from smooth, with a power spectrum that closely resembles that of other, better understood, complex systems. The distribution of incident sizes within the data seems to fall into two distinct sets, one of which, corresponding to "regular" conflict, is Zipf distributed, the other of which includes acts of genocide and is distributed differently. This difference may indicate that that agents of the state were proceeding under different types of orders. These results provide an empirical benchmark for the modeling of civil violence and may have implications for conflict prevention, peace keeping, and the post-conflict analysis of command structures.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, Central America, and Guatemala

77. The Epidemiology of Microeconomic Expectations

Author:
Christopher D. Carroll
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Since the foundational work of Keynes (1936), macroeconomists have emphasized the importance of agents' expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes. Yet in recent decades macroeconomists have devoted almost no effort to modeling actual empirical expectations data, instead assuming all agents' expectations are 'rational.' This paper takes up the challenge of modeling empirical household expectations data, and shows that a simple, standard model from epidemiology does a remarkably good job of explaining the deviations of household inflation and unemployment expectations from the 'rational expectations' benchmark. Furthermore, a microfoundations or 'agent-based' version of the model may be able to explain, in a way that still permits aggregation, stark rejections of the pure rational expectations framework like Souleles's (2002) finding that members of different demographic groups have sharply different predictions for macroeconomic aggregates like the inflation rate.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Latin America

78. Complementarity and Social Networks

Author:
Yann Bramoulle
Publication Date:
10-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
I investigate complementarity games played on graphs, which model negative externalities embedded in structures of interaction. On the complete graph, the traditional economic analysis applies: the number of agents playing one strategy is proportional to its payoff. I show that, in general and contrary to coordination games, the structure crucially influences the equilibria. On an important class of graphs, called bipartite graphs, the equilibria do not depend on strategies' payoffs. On certain highly asymmetric graphs, an increase in the payoff of a strategy even decreases the number of agents playing this strategy. In most cases, equilibria do not maximize welfare.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Latin America

79. Options for Stabilization Policy: A New Analysis of Choices Confronting the Fed

Author:
William T. Dickens, George A. Akerlof, and George L. Perry
Publication Date:
02-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
One of the most important choices any president-elect must make is how to organize and staff the National Security Council (NSC). Chief executives from John Fitzgerald Kennedy to William Jefferson Clinton have found their foreign policy held hostage to the management choices they made between election and inauguration.
Topic:
Economics
Political Geography:
United States

80. The International Financial Architecture

Author:
Jeffrey A. Frankel
Publication Date:
06-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
The recent financial crises in many emerging market economies have raised anew questions about the appropriate exchange-rate regime and the use of capital controls as policy instruments. The use of both mechanisms should be tailored to each country's unique circumstances. Fixed exchange-rate mechanisms, such as dollarization (adopting the dollar as legal tender in place of the national currency), are suited to small open economies or those desperate to import monetary stability. Larger economies, such as the European Union (EU) and the United States, should allow their currencies to float. Intermediate regimes that fall between fixed- and floating-rate regimes—such as bands, baskets, and crawls (See Figure 1 for definitions)—are still appropriate for some countries. Certain well-targeted restrictions on the composition of capital flows might be appropriate for some emerging-market countries as temporary measures when inflows are particularly high.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Europe