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1. Will China's impending overhaul of its financial regulatory system make a difference?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China's reshuffle of its financial supervisory architecture announced in March, like previous changes, appears incremental rather than radical. It will not, however, resolve the main challenge hobbling China’s financial system, which is not linked to specific choices of supervisory architecture but rather to the unfinished transition from a state-directed to a market-based financial system and the way the Chinese Communist Party's pervasive role creates obstacles to good corporate governance of individual financial firms and to the independence of supervisory authorities. Too often, political authorities and sometimes the supervisors themselves intervene directly in financial firms’ decisions to allocate capital and credit, occasionally resulting in failures of risk control and risk management. The authors argue that Chinese reformers should aim at a clearer and more rigorous division of responsibilities, in which financial firms manage financial opportunities and risks, and supervisors are exclusively focused on their respective public policy mandates.
Topic:
Economics, Regulation, Finance, and Corporate Governance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Do US firms have an incentive to comply with the FLSA and the NLRA?

Author:
Anna Stansbury
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
To what extent do US firms have an incentive to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)? Stansbury examines this question through a simple comparison of the expected costs of noncompliance (in terms of legal sanctions) to the profits firms can earn through noncompliance. In the case of the FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions, typical willful violators are required to pay back wages owed and in some cases additional penalties, if detected by the Department of Labor (DOL). Based on available data on the penalties levied, a typical firm would need to expect a chance of at least 78-88 percent that its violation would be detected in order to have an incentive to comply with the FLSA. In practice, the probability of detection many firms can expect to face is likely much lower than this. In the case of the NLRA, a firm that fires a worker illegally is required to reinstate the worker with back pay if the violation is detected. Based on empirical estimates of the effect of unionization on firm profits, a typical firm may have an incentive to fire a worker illegally for union activities if this illegal firing would reduce the likelihood of unionization at the firm by as little as 0.15-2 percent. These analyses illustrate that neither the FLSA nor the NLRA penalty and enforcement regimes create sufficient incentive to comply for many firms. In this context, the substantial evidence of minimum wage and overtime violations, and of illegal employer behavior toward unions, is not surprising.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Regulation, and Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. Uncertain prospects for sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Among the best-known sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-owned or controlled investment vehicles—are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises all the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This Policy Brief compares the GCC SWFs with each other and with other funds in terms of their transparency and accountability on the fifth SWF scoreboard, available here. Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC’s SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Government, Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

4. Sovereign wealth funds are growing more slowly, and governance issues remain

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In the last two decades, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—funds accumulated by a government that are invested in whole or in part abroad to benefit the country in the future—have faced increased public scrutiny over their investment patterns, financial results, and governance. This Policy Brief updates and expands a prototype scoreboard rating the transparency and accountability of SWFs, which Truman established in 2007. This fifth edition of the scoreboard shows that the average scores continued to improve for the 64 SWFs examined, but governance issues remain. New funds have emerged—many of them government holding companies or strategic investment funds—but the growth of assets under management by SWFs has slowed, in some cases partly because of withdrawals to help finance expenses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about their future role.
Topic:
Government, Markets, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Governance, Regulation, and Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed?

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Open Sub-navigation BackOpen Sub-navigation Publications Back Policy Briefs Working Papers Books PIIE Briefings Open Sub-navigation Commentary Back Op-Eds Testimonies Speeches and Papers Topics & Regions PIIE Charts What Is Globalization? Educational Resources Open Sub-navigation Back Senior Research Staff Research Analysts Trade Talks Open Sub-navigation Back RealTime Economic Issues Watch Trade & Investment Policy Watch China Economic Watch North Korea: Witness to Transformation 中文 Open Sub-navigation Back All Events Financial Statements Global Connections Global Economic Prospects Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lectures Trade Winds Open Sub-navigation Back News Releases Multimedia Media Center Open Sub-navigation Back Board of Directors Staff Employment Contact Annual Report Transparency Policy POLICY BRIEF VIEW SHARING OPTIONS Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed? Gary Clyde Hufbauer (PIIE) Policy Brief21-5 March 2021 Photo Credit: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse One economic argument for government subsidies is that they are necessary to compensate firms and industries for benefits they provide to society at large but cannot capture in the prices they charge for goods or services. For example, subsidies to renewable energy are defended because renewable energy limits carbon emissions. When a major economy subsidizes extensively, however, its trading partners are drawn into the game, with losses all around. As the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, a better outcome would entail mutual restraint. But the goal of mutual restraint is no less difficult in international trade than it is in international arms control. Both the European Union and the US federal system try, in different ways, to regulate industrial subsidies. Hufbauer examines efforts to contain unjustifiable subsidies and proposes modest improvements, bearing in mind that as countries struggle to overcome the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little appetite for restoring a free market economy—one in which firms compete with minimum government assistance or regulation. Selective upgrading of the rulebook may nevertheless be possible.
Topic:
Agriculture, Government, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Manufacturing, Industry, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

6. Public procurement in law and practice

Author:
Erica Bosio, Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, and Andrei Shleifer
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This paper examines a new dataset of laws and practices governing public procurement, as well as procurement outcomes, in 187 countries. The authors measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring agents. They find that laws and practices are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practices are correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. To shed light on this puzzle, they present a model of procurement in which both regulation and public sector capacity determine the efficiency of procurement. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity and detrimental in countries with high public sector capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion. The paper finds evidence broadly consistent with this prediction: Regulation of procurement improves outcomes but only in countries with low public sector capacity.
Topic:
Government, Law, Regulation, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Global Focus