Publishing Institution: Peterson Institute for International Economics / Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: 3 selected

1. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2. Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 provoked a transatlantic trade spat. After the law was passed, the Biden administration addressed some of the concerns raised by the European Union by writing controversial rules to implement the legislation. These regulations are expected to have complex effects that, in some instances, may offset the intended impact of other provisions in the original legislation. This paper examines how the law, its implementing regulations, policy decisions on leasing, as well as potential critical minerals agreements all have the potential to affect the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain. The EV case study showcases the political-economic complications involved in US and EU attempts to cooperate over clean energy transition policy to address the global externality of carbon dioxide emissions. EVs are but one example of the challenge facing partners with integrated supply chains and similar levels of economic development that share concerns about climate change, rising inequality, workers, other social issues, and democracy itself. The EV conflict laid bare the differing US and EU prioritization of these issues relative to economic efficiency, World Trade Organization rules, the approach to nonmarket economies, and national security vulnerabilities that arise from depending on an authoritarian regime such as China for import sourcing of critical inputs.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Supply Chains, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

3. The European Union renews its offensive against US technology firms

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The European Union's proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) contemplates extensive regulation of "gatekeeper" digital platforms—firms that perform a "core platform service" in the European Union (defined as online intermediation, online search, social networking, video sharing, electronic communication, cloud services, or online advertising), have a significant impact on the EU internal market, serve as an important gateway between business users and end-users, and enjoy an entrenched and durable position. Although at least one European firm could qualify as a gatekeeper, Hufbauer and Hogan say, the DMA discriminates against American technology firms by singling them out for the label of "gatekeepers." The European Commission’s proposed DMA targets both US tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft and smaller (albeit huge) US tech firms such as Airbnb and PayPal. The authors say the EU goal is to confer competitive advantage on European digital firms, breaching the EU commitment to national treatment of foreign firms, violating their intellectual property rights, and imposing high expenses on the "gatekeepers." At the same time, France is planning to enact its own steep barriers against US and other foreign cloud services.
Topic:: Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

4. The case for a cautiously optimistic outlook for US inflation

Author:: David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Federal Reserve and most other analysts failed to anticipate the surge in inflation in 2021. Considerable debate now surrounds the question of whether the Fed is too sanguine in anticipating that too-high inflation will mostly take care of itself over the next few years, even as the unemployment rate remains low and monetary policy remains accommodative. This Policy Brief concludes that although the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was too optimistic in the projections it issued in December 2021, the broad contour of its baseline inflation outlook for 2022 and beyond remains sensible. The authors find the 2021 surge in inflation resulted mainly from COVID-19-related sectoral developments rather than the classic situation of aggregate demand outstripping the overall economy's long-run productive potential. The statistical analysis in this Policy Brief was conducted before Russia invaded Ukraine. As a result of the war, the inflation situation will probably get worse before it gets better, and could do so in dramatic manner if Russian energy exports are banned altogether. Nonetheless, if the key considerations identified in this Policy Brief remain in place, and if monetary policymakers respond to evolving circumstances in a sensible manner, the inflation picture should look considerably better in the next one to three years.
Topic:: Federal Reserve, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. For inflation relief, the United States should look to trade liberalization

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Megan Hogan, and Yilin Wang
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: With US inflation running at 40-year high rates, the Federal Reserve is signaling more interest rate hikes in 2022 and 2023. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has also vowed to act against what he calls anticompetitive behavior by corporations. But policymakers are overlooking one set of actions that could make a meaningful contribution to taming inflation: trade liberalization. The data cited in this Policy Brief indicate that a feasible package of liberalization could deliver a one-time reduction in consumer price index (CPI) inflation of around 1.3 percentage points, amounting to $797 per US household, about half the size of pandemic relief in 2021. As a bonus, the embrace of trade liberalization would curb inflationary expectations taking hold in American firms now protected by trade barriers from foreign competition.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

6. Trump ended WTO dispute settlement. Trade remedies are needed to fix it.

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China’s exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China’s economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Donald Trump, and WTO
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

7. COVID-19 vaccine supply chains and the Defense Production Act

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the US government used novel policies to accelerate research, development, and production of a diversified portfolio of new vaccines. This paper begins by describing the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 and the initial “priority-rated” contracts agreed to under Operation Warp Speed in 2020 to expedite manufacturing and achieve scale, which succeeded in producing hundreds of millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines by early 2021. However, a puzzle soon emerged, as the scale of US vaccine production was shortly thereafter overtaken by plants in the European Union and India. The paper investigates the tradeoffs US policymakers faced in early 2021 once much of the initial uncertainty about the safety and effectiveness of many COVID-19 vaccines had been resolved—about whether to recalibrate contracts to expand production capacity to help meet global, instead of US, vaccine demand. It also examines the emergence of input shortages and assesses whether both the price constraints implicit in the 2020 DPA contracts and business decisions made to quicken the process of bringing new vaccine plants online globally inadvertently exacerbated them. It also explores the potential need for complementary, input capacity enhancing policies in the face of highly fragmented, cross-border COVID-19 vaccine supply chains.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

8. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:: David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:: Economics, Political Economy, Public Opinion, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. Have trade agreements been bad for America?

Author:: Alan Wm. Wolff, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Many Americans are persuaded that trade agreements of the last 40 years have been a costly mistake. To be sure, open markets leave some people behind, and promises to help those hurt were broken. But on balance, expanding trade has greatly benefited the US economy, and policy approaches taken need to be built on rather than abandoned. Alan Wm. Wolff, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Robert Z. Lawrence say more must be done to help those harmed, but protectionism is not the solution. The international trading system needs more outspoken US support and leadership if it is to be maintained and improved.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

10. CHIPS Act will spur US production but not foreclose China

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The CHIPS and Science Act, export controls, and agreements with allied countries will accomplish many of their multiple objectives. More US semiconductor fabrication plants will be built, US R&D will be accelerated, and advanced chips and chip-making machines will be denied to China, Russia, and other adversaries. However, the Act will not make a material difference to US chip supplies in the next two or three years. Slower economic growth has already tipped the chips market in favor of ample supplies. While collective measures have inflicted considerable short-term pain on China, causing a sharp drop in the fortunes of its high-tech firms, China will respond by redoubling its self-sufficiency programs. The United States, however, should not mimic China in pursuing self-sufficiency, as US self-sufficiency is an illusion. The United States currently exports high-value chips and imports low-value chips, so increasing self-sufficiency would require the United States to prioritize basic chip production at the same time it is supposed to be competing with China in advanced chip production. Continuing to prioritize advanced chip production—where the United States has a clear advantage—is the most efficient course of action.
Topic:: Economics, Legislation, Exports, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

11. Soaring demand is driving double-digit import price inflation in the United States

Author:: Caroline Freund
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: At a time of soaring price increases in the United States, inflation in the US import sector has been soaring the most. Import price inflation in the first half of 2022 was in the double digits, above US consumer price index and personal consumption expenditures inflation. Excess demand for certain imported goods is playing a big role, but so are supply shortages caused by temporary business closures overseas and shipping delays associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Correctly identifying the culprit for misaligned demand and supply, and hence rising prices, is central to understanding the type and extent of policy intervention needed. Using movements in prices and quantities of specific goods, the analysis presented in this Policy Brief shows that the increase in import price inflation has been driven to the same or a greater extent by demand compared with supply constraints. The results have important implications for policies to help reduce the supply and demand imbalance and thus tame inflation.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, COVID-19, Imports, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

12. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

13. Bad news for the Fed from the Beveridge space

Author:: Olivier Blanchard, Alex Domash, and Lawrence H. Summers
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Federal Reserve seeks to cool an overheated US labor market to ease wage hikes and reduce job vacancies, without a painful spike in unemployment. But empirical evidence indicates that these goals have never been accomplished together and remain unlikely now. In fact, fighting inflation will require a reduction in job vacancies and also an increase in unemployment. The inverse relationship between job vacancies and unemployment is measured by the Beveridge curve, named after a British economist. Blanchard, Domash, and Summers find that the Fed’s hope that vacancies can be decreased without increasing unemployment flies in the face of historical empirical evidence. The current low unemployment rate and the very high vacancy-to-unemployment ratio suggest that the labor market is overheating and the natural unemployment rate has increased. It has increased about 1.3 percentage points from its pre-COVID level, implying the labor market is even more overheated than suggested by the current unemployment rate.
Topic:: Economy, Unemployment, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

14. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:: Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

15. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:: David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Protectionism, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. The US–China trade war and phase one agreement

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Trump administration changed US trade policy toward China in ways that will take years for researchers to sort out. This paper makes four specific contributions to that research agenda. First, it carefully marks the timing, definitions, and scale of the products subject to the tariff changes affecting US-China trade from January 20, 2017 through January 20, 2021. One result is that each country increased its average duty on imports from the other to rates of roughly 20 percent, with the new tariffs and counter-tariffs covering more than 50 percent of bilateral trade. Second, the paper highlights two additional channels through which bilateral tariffs changed during this period: product exclusions from tariffs and trade remedy policies of antidumping and countervailing duties. These two channels have received less research attention. Third, it explores why China fell more than 40 percent short of meeting the goods purchase commitments set out for 2020, the first year of the phase one agreement. Finally, the paper considers additional trade policy actions—involving forced labor, export controls for reasons of national security or human rights, and reclassification of trade with Hong Kong—likely to affect US-China trade beyond the Trump administration.
Topic:: Education, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. COVID-19 and the 2020 US presidential election: Did the pandemic cost Donald Trump reelection?

Author:: Marcus Noland and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: By Election Day 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had killed 234,244 Americans and caused the sharpest macroeconomic downturn in US history. Hypothetical calculations using county-level electoral data show that in a “no pandemic” scenario or a scenario in which the severity of the pandemic was mitigated by 30 percent, Donald Trump would have lost the popular vote but won the electoral vote. In the 20 percent mitigation scenario, the electoral vote would have been tied, giving Trump a presumptive victory in the House of Representatives. For the second time in a row (and the third time since 2000), the candidate who lost the popular vote would have been elected president of the United States.
Topic:: Government, Politics, Elections, Donald Trump, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

18. The role of childcare challenges in the US jobs market recovery during the COVID-19 pandemic

Author:: Jason Furman, Melissa Kearney, and Wilson Powell III
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: This working paper examines how much of the overall decline in employment between the beginning of 2020 and 2021 can be explained by excess job loss among parents of young children, and mothers specifically. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the authors confirm that, in general, mothers with young children have experienced a larger decline in employment, as compared (unconditionally) with other adults, including fathers. This excess job loss is driven by mothers without a four-year college degree. The main point of the paper is to build off this observation and examine how much of the aggregate employment deficit in early 2021 can be explained by parent-specific issues, such as childcare struggles. To examine this question, the authors construct counterfactual employment rates and labor force participation rates that assign to mothers of young children the percent change in employment and labor force participation rates experienced by comparable women without young children. The paper considers multiple definition, sample, and counterfactual specification alternatives. The analysis yields robust evidence that differential job loss among mothers of young children accounts for a negligible share of the ongoing aggregate employment deficit. The result is even stronger (and flips signs) if all parents are considered, since fathers with young children experienced less job loss than other men. The practical implication of these findings is that nearly all of the aggregate ongoing employment deficit is explained by factors that affect workers more broadly, as opposed to challenges specific to working parents.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Children, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Childcare
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

19. Do US firms have an incentive to comply with the FLSA and the NLRA?

Author:: Anna Stansbury
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: To what extent do US firms have an incentive to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)? Stansbury examines this question through a simple comparison of the expected costs of noncompliance (in terms of legal sanctions) to the profits firms can earn through noncompliance. In the case of the FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions, typical willful violators are required to pay back wages owed and in some cases additional penalties, if detected by the Department of Labor (DOL). Based on available data on the penalties levied, a typical firm would need to expect a chance of at least 78-88 percent that its violation would be detected in order to have an incentive to comply with the FLSA. In practice, the probability of detection many firms can expect to face is likely much lower than this. In the case of the NLRA, a firm that fires a worker illegally is required to reinstate the worker with back pay if the violation is detected. Based on empirical estimates of the effect of unionization on firm profits, a typical firm may have an incentive to fire a worker illegally for union activities if this illegal firing would reduce the likelihood of unionization at the firm by as little as 0.15-2 percent. These analyses illustrate that neither the FLSA nor the NLRA penalty and enforcement regimes create sufficient incentive to comply for many firms. In this context, the substantial evidence of minimum wage and overtime violations, and of illegal employer behavior toward unions, is not surprising.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Regulation, and Economy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

20. Raising a caution flag on US financial sanctions against China

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: China’s policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea and its ongoing support for Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela pose major challenges for the United States, where bipartisan pressure is growing to ramp up punitive sanctions against leading Chinese firms and financial institutions. Financial sanctions freeze the US assets or bar US entry of the targeted individuals and firms and prohibit US financial firms from doing business with them. Schott explains why US officials should carefully weigh the risks to international financial markets and US economic interests before imposing punitive sanctions on major financial institutions engaged with China. The collateral costs of such sanctions would be sizable, damaging US producers, financial institutions, and US alliances. By restricting access of major banks to international payments in US dollars and barring use of messaging systems like SWIFT, tougher US financial sanctions would effectively “weaponize” the dollar; friends and foes alike would be pushed to seek alternatives to dollar transactions that, over time, would weaken the international role of the dollar. Instead of doubling down on current unilateral financial sanctions, US policy should deploy sanctions in collaboration with allies and calibrate trade and financial controls to match the expected policy achievements.
Topic:: Human Rights, Sanctions, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed?

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Open Sub-navigation BackOpen Sub-navigation Publications Back Policy Briefs Working Papers Books PIIE Briefings Open Sub-navigation Commentary Back Op-Eds Testimonies Speeches and Papers Topics & Regions PIIE Charts What Is Globalization? Educational Resources Open Sub-navigation Back Senior Research Staff Research Analysts Trade Talks Open Sub-navigation Back RealTime Economic Issues Watch Trade & Investment Policy Watch China Economic Watch North Korea: Witness to Transformation 中文 Open Sub-navigation Back All Events Financial Statements Global Connections Global Economic Prospects Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lectures Trade Winds Open Sub-navigation Back News Releases Multimedia Media Center Open Sub-navigation Back Board of Directors Staff Employment Contact Annual Report Transparency Policy POLICY BRIEF VIEW SHARING OPTIONS Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed? Gary Clyde Hufbauer (PIIE) Policy Brief21-5 March 2021 Photo Credit: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse One economic argument for government subsidies is that they are necessary to compensate firms and industries for benefits they provide to society at large but cannot capture in the prices they charge for goods or services. For example, subsidies to renewable energy are defended because renewable energy limits carbon emissions. When a major economy subsidizes extensively, however, its trading partners are drawn into the game, with losses all around. As the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, a better outcome would entail mutual restraint. But the goal of mutual restraint is no less difficult in international trade than it is in international arms control. Both the European Union and the US federal system try, in different ways, to regulate industrial subsidies. Hufbauer examines efforts to contain unjustifiable subsidies and proposes modest improvements, bearing in mind that as countries struggle to overcome the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little appetite for restoring a free market economy—one in which firms compete with minimum government assistance or regulation. Selective upgrading of the rulebook may nevertheless be possible.
Topic:: Agriculture, Government, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Manufacturing, Industry, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

22. The unappreciated trend toward unilateral trade liberalization

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Afrequently voiced complaint from the Trump administration was that US firms have faced a competitive disadvantage in exports because the US market is open and US tariffs are low but US trading partners protect their markets with high tariffs. The administration used this concern to justify raising US tariffs whenever it could. Lawrence argues that these claims should be more nuanced and account for the extensive unilateral liberalization by many countries over the past 30 years and that the grievances that motivated the Trump trade policies are increasingly misplaced. Many developing countries have reduced their tariffs unilaterally to rates that are far lower than they applied three decades ago and far less than the bound rates reflected in their World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. Globally, on average, tariffs were not raised during the global financial crisis of 2008 and continued to decline through at least 2018. Even when shocks from imports resulted in serious injury to domestic industries, several developing countries temporarily provided safeguard protection but at levels that were lower than their WTO bound rates. This evidence of import liberalization also suggests that rising protectionism was not responsible for the slow growth in world trade that has been evident since 2011. It remains uncertain whether countries will now respond to disruptions to global supply chains since 2018 caused by Trump’s trade policies and the COVID-19 pandemic by reversing their tariff liberalization stance, but the sustained enthusiasm for new megaregional trade agreements suggests many countries will not.
Topic:: Emerging Markets, World Trade Organization, Trade Wars, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. The evolving gender gap in labor force participation during COVID-19

Author:: Simeon Djankov, Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Lisa Hyland, and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Despite many significant gains by women in the paid workforce in recent decades, the percentage of women participating in the labor force has remained lower than the percentage of male participants. Now, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic downturn it precipitated, the gap in labor force participation between men and women in some economies has actually widened, with potentially damaging repercussions for women’s career prospects and pay. The pandemic has disproportionately affected sectors employing more women, such as retail stores, restaurants, and the hotel and hospitality business. An increase in family caregiving responsibilities because of school and childcare closures has also fallen on working mothers' shoulders. Both factors have pulled women out of the labor force. The authors track trends in male and female labor force participation in 43 countries and find substantial differences across countries in the way women’s participation has been affected relative to that of men. In some countries, such as Colombia, Chile, and Cyprus, the gender gap in labor force participation widened the most during the pandemic. The gender gap also widened in the United States, driving 2.5 million women from their jobs in what Vice President Kamala Harris called a “national emergency” for women. In other economies, such as Luxembourg and Lithuania, the gender gap in labor force participation, unexpectedly, shrank during the early period of the pandemic. On average, female employees have fared better in countries where women are less concentrated in the services sector, less likely to be employed as temporary workers, and where laws supported greater equality at the onset of the crisis. Greater government expenditure on childcare in the pre-COVID-19 era, however, does not appear to have insulated female workers from the damaging repercussions of the pandemic.
Topic:: Economics, Gender Issues, Labor Issues, Women, Services, COVID-19, and Empowerment
Political Geography:: Colombia, Chile, Cyprus, Global Focus, and United States of America

24. Startups in the United States during the pandemic reflect some dynamism amid job losses

Author:: Simeon Djankov and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: New business applications have surged in the United States since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The growth is driven largely by startups in online retail, transportation, and personal services. Many of these new entrepreneurs are self-employed and were likely laid off and forced into entrepreneurship by necessity. No official data are available yet on the number of businesses destroyed in 2020, because business data for firms that close without entering bankruptcy are lagging. But the authors calculate that firm births may have surpassed firm deaths during the pandemic. While this boom in business entry is a tribute to the adaptability and potential innovative spirit in US capitalism, one should not be overly optimistic about jobs created in this wave of startups. As many of these new startups are by people forced to strike out on their own, the number of jobs created per new firm is even smaller than it was during previous US recessions. And like online businesses started around the last recession (e.g., Uber, Airbnb, and Venmo), some of these new firms may turn out to be major contenders in their sectors, displacing workers employed by their traditional rivals.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Financial Crisis, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

25. Economic costs and benefits of accelerated COVID-19 vaccinations

Author:: Joseph E. Gagnon, Steve Kamin, and John Kearns
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: COVID-19 vaccination programs are generally understood to be a prerequisite for a return to normalcy in our social and economic lives. Emergency measures to research, test, produce, and distribute vaccines have been expensive, but increases in GDP resulting from the vaccines are expected to exceed those costs by wide margins. Few studies have quantified the economic costs and benefits of different rates of COVID-19 vaccination, however. This Policy Brief focuses on developing such a quantitative assessment for the United States; the approach may be applied to other countries as well. Two illustrative scenarios support the conclusion that most plausible options to accelerate vaccinations would have economic benefits that far exceed their costs, in addition to their more important accomplishment of saving lives. This Policy Brief shows that if, for example, the United States had adopted a more aggressive policy in 2020 of unconditional contracts with vaccine producers, the up-front cost would have been higher but thousands of lives would have been saved and economic growth would have been stronger. Instead, the federal government conditioned its contracts on the vaccines’ being proven safe and effective. The projections presented in this analysis show that even if unconditional contracts led to support for vaccines that failed the phase III trial and ultimately were not used, the cost would have been worth it.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

26. Overheating debate: Why not in Japan?

Author:: Egor Gornostay and Madi Sarsenbayev
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: An intense debate has erupted over whether the unprecedented size of the US fiscal stimulus will cause the US economy to overheat and generate high inflation. To date, the debate has focused primarily on the United States, even though many other developed economies responded to the COVID-19 crisis with unprecedented economic stimulus packages. By some measures, Japan stands out: The total amount of its three consecutive stimulus packages is estimated to exceed 50 percent of its GDP, about twice as high as the US fiscal packages (about 26 percent of US GDP). However, overheating concerns are not being actively raised for Japan. This Policy Brief finds that although Japan’s headline number looks astonishingly high, the actual size of its discretionary fiscal measures is about 16 percent of GDP, substantially smaller than the total size of the US packages. US fiscal stimulus is the largest among Group of Seven (G7) countries relative to GDP, justifying the attention economists have given it. The United Kingdom is estimated to spend more than Japan as a proportion of GDP, but even the UK stimulus program markedly lags behind that of the United States. If additional stimulus measures making their way through the legislative process in Canada are counted, Japan’s fiscal stimulus looks even smaller and would amount to being only average in size among G7 countries. Given this and the lackluster performance of its economy in the first quarter of 2021, it is unlikely that Japan will find itself in overheating territory any time soon.
Topic:: Inflation, G7, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Collateral benefits? South Korean exports to the United States and the US-China trade war

Author:: Mary Lovely, David Xu, and Yinhan Zhang
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: This Policy Brief assesses the extent to which the United States increased its imports from South Korea after the US imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports. Korea benefited from this shift in US imports, although the increase was relatively small in most sectors. The authors use highly disaggregated US import and tariff data to examine adjustments in US purchases of manufactured goods from its trade partners. Their analysis indicates that Korea made a small gain in the US market following the levying of US tariffs on Chinese exports, with Korea’s share of overall US manufacturing imports rising 0.9 percent and its share of US manufacturing imports subject to trade war tariffs rising 1.0 percent. Gains were spread across a variety of manufacturing sectors—such as wood products, textiles and apparel, and machinery—reflecting both the choices made by US officials regarding which Chinese exports to tax and the nature of preexisting trade relationships between South Korea and the United States.
Topic:: Markets, Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

28. Another reason to raise the Fed's inflation target: An employment and output boom

Author:: David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2012, the Federal Reserve formally adopted an inflation target and set it at 2 percent, in line with the level chosen by many other central banks. In hindsight, this setting left policymakers with too little room to cut interest rates when they want to fight recessions. Many researchers have noted that if central banks raised their inflation targets—either individually or in concert—they could do a better job in the long run of keeping inflation near its target and the workforce fully employed. Reifschneider and Wilcox highlight an additional and less-noted consequence of raising the inflation target modestly: The economy could enjoy a temporary but substantial boom in employment and output as it adjusted to the increase in the target. Critical to generating this favorable outcome would be decisive action by monetary policymakers to ensure that the higher inflation target is achieved in a reasonably timely manner. In light of substantial transition benefits, as well as the long-run improvement in economic performance, the authors recommend that the Federal Reserve raise its inflation target to 3 percent as part of its next framework review.
Topic:: Federal Reserve, Employment, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

29. An Uneven Global Rebound Will Challenge Emerging-Market and Developing Economies

Author:: Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: As the US economy rebounds amid elevated inflationary pressures and Europe grows at a rapid clip, an uneven global rebound looms. Although emerging-market and developing economies (EMDEs) generally retain good access to global capital markets for now, their relatively slow pace of COVID-19 vaccination will continue to hamper their economic recoveries and strain their public finances—already stretched owing to the fiscal pressures of the pandemic over the past year and a half. Higher interest rates in the rich countries, particularly the United States, could tip EMDEs into liquidity and even solvency crises. The likelihood of crises is higher if advanced-economy central banks move abruptly, surprising markets. Global policymakers should prepare now by enhancing mechanisms for providing liquidity to EMDEs and, in cases of insolvency, for restructuring their sovereign debts. Perhaps even more important, the scope for uneven recovery can be limited if rich countries make an all-out effort to deliver vaccines globally and enhance less prosperous countries’ infrastructures for getting shots into arms.
Topic:: Emerging Markets, Inflation, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

30. Digital agreements: What’s covered, what’s possible

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Rapidly expanding digital flows have significantly contributed to world economic growth. The exponential expansion of digital flows since 2005 has partially compensated for lethargic growth in global conventional trade and foreign direct investment flows. COVID-19 accelerated the digital revolution in 2020, as businesses and consumers increasingly “went digital” in everything from online education and work to shopping. Many countries, particularly the United States, have enormous commercial and cultural interests in preserving the freedom of cross-border digital traffic. Strong international agreements can keep digital highways open, but agreements reached so far do too little to discipline government practices that threaten to restrict digital flows, allowing ample room for ideological and protectionist obstacles. A new and better agreement is necessary to safeguard the growth of digital flows.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Economic Growth, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

31. How COVID-19 vaccine supply chains emerged in the midst of a pandemic

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Many months after COVID-19 vaccines were first authorized for public use, still limited supplies could only partially reduce the devastating loss of life and economic costs caused by the pandemic. Could additional vaccine doses have been manufactured more quickly some other way? Would alternative policy choices have made a difference? This paper provides a simple analytical framework through which to view the contours of the vaccine value chain. It then creates a new database that maps the COVID-19 vaccines of Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca/Oxford, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax, and CureVac to the product- and location-specific manufacturing supply chains that emerged in 2020 and 2021. It describes the choppy process through which dozens of other companies at nearly 100 geographically distributed facilities came together to scale up global manufacturing. The paper catalogues major pandemic policy initiatives—such as the United States' Operation Warp Speed—that are likely to have affected the timing and formation of those vaccine supply chains. Given the data, a final section identifies further questions for researchers and policymakers.
Topic:: Vaccine, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

32. What US strategy gets wrong about China in Africa

Author:: Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s Africa strategy is rooted in three misconceptions about China’s African footprint—and a fourth about US-Africa economic relations—that are either factually incorrect or overstated in terms of the broader strategic challenges they pose to US interests: (1) Chinese engagement in Africa crowds out opportunities for trade and investment with and from the United States; (2) Chinese engagement in Africa is resource-seeking—to the detriment of US interests; (3) Chinese engagement in Africa is designed to foster debt-based coercive diplomacy; and (4) US-Africa economic linkages are all one-way and concessionary (i.e., aid-based). Hendrix finds little evidence to suggest Chinese trade and investment ties crowd out US trade and investment opportunities. China’s resource-seeking bent is evident in investment patterns, but it is more a function of Africa’s having comparatively large, undercapitalized resource endowments than China’s attempt to corner commodity markets. Chinese infrastructural development—particularly large projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative—may result in increased African indebtedness to the Chinese, but there is little reason to think debt per se will vastly expand Chinese military capacity in the region. And finally, US-Africa economic relations are much less one-sided and concessionary (i.e., aid-based) than conventional wisdom suggests.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Economy, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Africa, China, North America, and United States of America

33. Securing macroeconomic and monetary stability with a Federal Reserve–backed digital currency

Author:: Julia Coronado and Simon Potter
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The US monetary system faces significant challenges from advances in technology and changes in the macroeconomy that, left unaddressed, will threaten the stability of the US economy and financial system. At the same time, low interest rates mean that central banks will not have the policy ammunition they had in the past during the next recession. The Federal Reserve needs new tools to meet its mandates of price stability and maximum employment. It also needs to preserve the safety and soundness of the financial system in a rapidly digitizing world. The authors propose a Fed-backed digital currency to solve both problems. Their proposal creates a regulated system of digital currency accounts for consumers managed by digital payment providers and fully backed by reserves at the Fed. The system would be limited in size, to preserve the functions and stability of the existing banking system. Fed backing would mean low capital requirements, which would in turn facilitate competition. Low fees and no minimum balance requirements in the new system would also help financial institutions reach the roughly 25 percent of the US population that is currently either unbanked or underbanked. Digital accounts for consumers could also provide a powerful new stabilization tool for both monetary and fiscal policies. For fiscal policy, it could facilitate new automatic stabilizers while also allowing the Fed to provide quantitative easing directly to consumers. This tool could be used in a timely manner with broad reach to all Americans.
Topic:: Economics, Government, Monetary Policy, Banks, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

34. Reviving the potency of monetary policy with recession insurance bonds

Author:: Julia Coronado and Simon Potter
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In the second part of their Policy Brief, Coronado and Potter discuss how the system of digital payment providers (DPPs) proposed in their first Policy Brief on this topic adds a new weapon to the monetary toolkit that could be implemented in a timely, effective, and inclusive manner. They describe how a digital currency backed by the Federal Reserve could augment automatic fiscal stabilizers and—more importantly—harness the power of “helicopter” money or quantitative easing directly to consumers in a disciplined manner. To implement QE directly to consumers, Coronado and Potter propose the creation of recession insurance bonds (RIBs)—zero-coupon bonds authorized by Congress and calibrated as a percentage of GDP sufficient to provide meaningful support in a downturn. Congress would create these contingent securities; Treasury would credit households’ digital accounts with them. The Fed could purchase them from households in a downturn after its policy rate hits zero. The Fed’s balance sheet would grow by the value of RIBs purchased; the initial matching liability would be deposits into the DPP system. The mechanism is easy for consumers to understand and could boost inflation expectations more than a debt-financed fiscal stimulus could.
Topic:: Economics, Government, Monetary Policy, and Insurance
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

35. Export controls: America’s other national security threat

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: While the public was transfixed by the Trump administration’s policies alleging that imports were a threat to America’s national security during 2017–20, there was a concomitant and more quiet US policy shift on the export side. Addressing the national security threat presented by exports posed different economic and institutional challenges from those associated with import policy, including the acknowledgment that export controls for legitimate national security reasons can be the first-best policy to confront the problem at its source. Yet, export controls could also be misused as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy to redistribute economic well-being across countries, even from one ally to another. This paper describes how US export control policy evolved over 2017–20, as well as the international institutions—first the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), then the Wassenaar Arrangement—historically tasked with multilateralizing US export restrictions used to protect national security. With the potential for US export control policy to brush up more frequently against WTO rules designed to limit the use of export restrictions, the paper also highlights new challenges for the WTO’s system of resolving trade disputes. Overall, a US failure to strike the right balance for its export control policy would result in it being ineffective at addressing national security risks, costly for the economy, and problematic for trade and diplomatic relations.
Topic:: Economics, Government, National Security, Exports, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

36. A New Policy Toolkit Is Needed as Countries Exit COVID-19 Lockdowns

Author:: Olivier Blanchard, Thomas Philippon, and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The measures that most governments took in response to the sudden collapse in economic activity during the COVID-19 lockdowns nearly exclusively focused on protecting vulnerable workers and firms. These measures included unemployment benefits, grants, transfers, loans at low rates, and tax deferrals. As lockdowns are lifted, governments must shift policies toward supporting the recovery and design measures that will limit the pain of adjustment while preserving productive jobs and firms. This Policy Brief explores how such measures can be designed, with particular emphasis on Europe and the United States. The authors propose a combination of unemployment benefits to help workers, wage subsidies and partially guaranteed loans to help firms, and debt restructuring procedures for small and medium-sized companies handicapped by excessive legacy debt from the crisis.
Topic:: Debt, Economics, Government, Labor Issues, Unemployment, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

37. Developing Countries Can Help Restore the WTO's Dispute Settlement System

Author:: Ana González and Euijin Jung
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: By refusing to fill vacancies in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body—the top body that hears appeals and rules on trade disputes—the Trump administration has paralyzed the key component of the dispute settlement system. No nation or group of nations has more at stake in salvaging this system than the world’s big emerging-market economies: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, among others. These countries have actively and successfully used the dispute settlement system to defend their commercial interests abroad and resolve inevitable trade conflicts. The authors suggest that even though the developing countries did not create the Appellate Body crisis, they may hold a key to unlock it. The Trump administration has also focused its ire on a longstanding WTO practice of giving these economies latitude to seek “special and differential treatment” in trade negotiations because of their developing-country status. The largest developing economies, which have a significant stake in preserving a two-step, rules-based mechanism for resolving trade disputes, could play a role in driving a potential bargain to save the appeals mechanism. They could unite to give up that special status in return for a US commitment to end its boycott of the nomination of Appellate Body members.
Topic:: Development, Government, World Trade Organization, Developing World, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Brazil, North America, Mexico, Thailand, and United States of America

38. To what extent are tariffs offset by exchange rates?

Author:: Olivier Jeanne
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In theory, tariffs are partially offset by a currency appreciation in the tariff-imposing country or by a depreciation in the country on which the tariff is imposed. Based on a calibrated model, this paper finds that US tariffs imposed in 2018 should not have had a large impact on the dollar but may have significantly depreciated the renminbi. This prediction is consistent with a high-frequency event analysis looking at the impact of tariff-related news on the dollar and the renminbi. Tariff-related news explains about one-third of the renminbi depreciation observed in 2018.
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, Exchange Rate Policy, and Currency
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

39. Automatic stabilizers in a low-rate environment

Author:: Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence H. Summers
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: With interest rates persistently low or even negative in advanced countries, policymakers have barely any room to ease monetary policy when the next recession hits. Fiscal policy will have to play a major and likely dominant role in stimulating the economy, requiring policymakers to fundamentally reconsider fiscal policy. Blanchard and Summers argue for the introduction of what they call “semiautomatic” stabilizers. Unlike purely automatic stabilizers (mechanisms built into government budgets that automatically—without discretionary government action or explicit triggers—increase spending or decrease taxes when the economy slows or enters a recession), semiautomatic stabilizers are targeted tax or spending measures that are triggered if, say, the output growth rate declines or the unemployment rate increases beyond a specified threshold. The authors argue that the trigger should be changes in unemployment rather than changes in output, and the design of semiautomatic stabilizers, whether they focus on mechanisms that rely primarily on income or on intertemporal substitution effects (changing the timing of consumption), depends crucially on the design of discretionary policy.
Topic:: Economics, Government, Monetary Policy, and Finance
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

40. A program for strengthening the Federal Reserve's ability to fight the next recession

Author:: David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: If the Federal Reserve does not decisively change the way it conducts monetary policy, it will probably not be capable of fighting recessions in the future as effectively as it fought them in the past. This reality helped motivate the Fed to undertake the policy framework review in which it is currently engaged. Researchers have suggested many steps the Fed could take to improve its recession-fighting ability; however, no consensus has emerged as to which of these steps would be both practical and maximally effective. This paper aims to fill that gap. It recommends that the Fed commit as soon as possible to a new approach for fighting recessions, involving two key elements. First, the Fed should commit that whenever it runs out of room to cut the federal funds rate further, it will leave the rate at its minimum level until the labor market recovers and inflation returns to 2 percent. Second, the Fed should commit that under the same circumstances, it will begin to purchase longer-term assets in volume and will continue such purchases until the labor market recovers. If the forces driving the next recession are not unusually severe, this framework might allow the Fed to be as effective at fighting that recession as it was in the past. If the next recession is more severe, however, the Fed will probably run out of ammunition even if it takes the two steps recommended here. Therefore, both monetary and fiscal policymakers should consider yet other steps they could take to enhance their ability to fight future recessions.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, and Federal Reserve
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

41. Why Trump shot the sheriffs: The end of WTO dispute settlement 1.0

Author:: Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: On December 10, 2019, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 25-year-old system of resolving disputes broke down. This paper explains why. It describes the dysfunctional system that preceded the WTO, when the United States dealt with politically troublesome imports by using voluntary export restraints and increasingly resorted to the “aggressively unilateral” Section 301 policy to resolve trade concerns. The WTO was a compromise between the rest of the world and the United States, whereby the latter accepted some constraints with the expectation that the new system of binding dispute settlement would serve its interests. But although the creation of the WTO resolved some concerns about American unilateralism in the short term, its system of handling disputes turned out to be politically unsustainable.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

42. East Asia decouples from the United States: Trade war, COVID-19, and East Asia's new trade blocs

Author:: Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: he deepening US-China trade war and nationalist reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic are reshaping global economic relationships. Alongside these developments, two new megaregional trade agreements, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), will refocus East Asia’s economic ties in the region itself. The new accords are moving forward without the United States and India, once seen as critical partners in the CPTPP and RCEP, respectively. Using a computable general equilibrium model, we show that the agreements will raise global national incomes in 2030 by an annual $147 billion and $186 billion, respectively. They will yield especially large benefits for China, Japan, and South Korea and losses for the United States and India. These effects are simulated both in a business-as-before-Trump environment and in the context of a sustained US-China trade war. The effects were simulated before the COVID-19 shock but seem increasingly likely in the wake of the pandemic. Compared with business as before, the trade war generates large global losses rising to $301 billion annually by 2030. The new agreements offset the effects of the trade war globally, but not for the United States and China. The trade war makes RCEP especially valuable because it strengthens East Asian interdependence, raising trade among members by $428 billion and reducing trade among nonmembers by $48 billion. These shifts bring regional ties closer to institutional arrangements proposed in the 1990s and incentivize greater cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Trade Wars, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Free Trade, COVID-19, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. Harry Johnson's "case for flexible exchange rates"—50 years later

Author:: Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Fifty years ago, Harry G. Johnson published "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969," its title echoing Milton Friedman’s classic essay of 1953. Though somewhat overlooked today, Johnson’s reprise was an important element in the late 1960s debate over the future of the international monetary system. In this Working Paper, Obstfeld lays out the historical context in which Johnson’s “Case” was written and read and then examines Johnson’s main points and sees how they stand up to nearly five decades of experience with floating exchange rates since the end of the Bretton Woods system. He also reviews the most recent academic critiques of exchange rate flexibility and asks how fatal they are to Johnson’s basic argument. He concludes that the essential case for exchange rate flexibility still stands strong.
Topic:: History, Monetary Policy, Economy, Central Bank, and Currency
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

44. The short- and long-term costs to the United States of the Trump administration’s attempt to deport foreign students

Author:: Sherman Robinson, Marcus Noland, Egor Gornostay, and Soyoung Han
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: On July 6, 2020, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) announced modifications to the Student and Exchange Visitor Program eliminating temporary exemptions for nonimmigrant students taking all classes online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, beginning in the fall 2020 semester. Foreign students violating the rule would be subject to deportation. Under public pressure, the Trump administration rescinded the order on July 14. Had the policy been implemented, more than 1 million foreign students studying in the United States could have been deported. The authors use an economywide simulation model to estimate the economic impact on the United States if the policy had been implemented. They find that the policy would have cost the US economy up to 752,000 jobs and $68 billion in lost GDP in the short run. Their estimates are larger than those reported in other studies because they consider both direct and indirect effects of the policy. In the long run, the move would have reduced the research productivity of American universities and adversely affected research, innovation, and entrepreneurship across the economy, in both the private and public sectors.
Topic:: Education, Migration, Labor Issues, Donald Trump, COVID-19, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

45. How the United States marched the semiconductor industry into its trade war with China

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Trade Wars, Industry, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. A new policy toolkit is needed as countries exit COVID-19 lockdowns

Author:: Olivier Blanchard, Thomas Philippon, and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The measures that most governments took in response to the sudden collapse in economic activity during the COVID-19 lockdowns nearly exclusively focused on protecting vulnerable workers and firms. These measures included unemployment benefits, grants, transfers, loans at low rates, and tax deferrals. As lockdowns are lifted, governments must shift policies toward supporting the recovery and design measures that will limit the pain of adjustment while preserving productive jobs and firms. This Policy Brief explores how such measures can be designed, with particular emphasis on Europe and the United States. The authors propose a combination of unemployment benefits to help workers, wage subsidies and partially guaranteed loans to help firms, and debt restructuring procedures for small and medium-sized companies handicapped by excessive legacy debt from the crisis.
Topic:: Government, Labor Issues, European Union, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

47. When more delivers less: Comparing the US and French COVID-19 crisis responses

Author:: Jérémie Cohen-Setton and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The US package of measures to help households hit by the economic shock from the COVID-19 crisis, including the Paycheck Protection Program, is almost twice as large in proportion of GDP as the French package, but it has proven less effective in curbing unemployment because of poor design and implementation. In contrast, the increase in the unemployment rate in France has been five times less than the increase in the United States. Cohen-Setton and Pisani-Ferry dive beneath the unreliable headline numbers to assess the effectiveness of government support provided to households in March–May 2020 in the two countries. They conclude that the French approach (mirrored in some other European countries) delivered a bigger bang for the buck. But the fact that the US approach has fallen short should not diminish the significance of the policy shift signaled by the enactment of measures to maintain household income.
Topic:: Education, Financial Crisis, European Union, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

48. US unemployment insurance in the pandemic and beyond

Author:: Jason Furman
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Unemployment insurance in the United States has played a critical role in both protecting workers who lost their jobs and supporting the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The abrupt expiration of any form of expanded unemployment insurance at the end of July 2020 would create problems both for the workers directly affected and for the economy as a whole, reducing GDP by about 2.5 percent in the second half of 2020—more than a typical year’s worth of economic growth. Furman emphasizes that expanded unemployment insurance should continue, with adjustments made as the unemployment rate changes. He also points out that the unemployment insurance system had major shortcomings even before the COVID-19 crisis and should be permanently reformed.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Unemployment, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

49. Taming the US trade deficit: A dollar policy for balanced growth

Author:: Joseph E. Gagnon
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: President Donald Trump launched a trade war to eliminate the longstanding US trade deficit. But the trade deficit has only grown on his watch because tariffs were the wrong policy choice. Trade deficits are not always a bad thing, but a wealthy country like the United States should not run a perpetual deficit. Decades of US trade deficits have piled up debt that makes future generations of Americans less well off, as they must pay interest and dividends to foreigners. Cheap imports and the decline in exports have also contributed to the loss of a significant number of US manufacturing jobs. The main cause of the deficit is a secular overvaluation of the dollar, driven by excessive financial flows into dollar assets from foreign official and private investors. Although Trump’s policies have failed, achieving balanced trade is not a hopeless quest. President-elect Joseph Biden should direct his Treasury secretary to pursue a more sensible dollar policy that can tame the deficit without violating any international norms or rules.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Currency, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

50. Using purchasing power parities to compare countries: Strengths and shortcomings

Author:: Patrick Honohan
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Good international economic policy requires good comparative data on national economic performance. In May 2020, the World Bank published the latest comprehensive update of purchasing power parities (PPPs), as part of the International Comparison Program. Produced for 176 countries, these PPPs are used to convert data (especially GDP and other quantities based on national income accounts) from national currencies to a common basis in a way that is meaningful for economic analysis. PPP-adjusted data are essential because the distortions caused by sharp exchange rate movements are significant, especially for times of macroeconomic turbulence. The newly released PPP data contain fewer surprises than those published in previous updates and are an invaluable tool, but Honohan explains why PPPs should be used with caution and an understanding of their limitations. Apart from removing distortions caused by market exchange rate movements, PPPs remove the impact of other factors affecting relative prices, especially productivity differences, which Honohan argues should not be removed if one wishes to compare the overall economic size or strength of a country or region. Adjusting for productivity, he finds that the United States retains its position as the world’s largest economy for the time being, and the European Union (even without the United Kingdom) is just ahead of China.
Topic:: World Bank, Economic Growth, Currency, Data, and Productivity
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

51. China's Financial Opening Accelerates

Author:: Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Despite predictions by some observers that the United States and China are headed for a “decoupling,” China’s integration into global financial markets is accelerating. Regulatory reform has opened China’s financial market to many US and other foreign financial institutions. Foreign ownership of onshore Chinese stocks and bonds is growing rapidly and is likely to continue to expand in 2021. And inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) is on track to hit a new record in 2020. This integration is very asymmetric, however. China retains relatively tight control over both outbound direct investment and outflows of portfolio capital. US efforts to roll back the trend of deepening financial integration by threatening to delist Chinese companies traded on US markets and prohibiting any US investment in 35 Chinese companies that the Department of Defense alleges to be linked to the Chinese military appear to be largely symbolic.
Topic:: Financial Markets, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

52. Did Trump's Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?

Author:: Emily Blanchard, Chad P. Bown, and Davin Chor
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Republican candidates lost support in the 2018 congressional election in counties more exposed to trade retaliation but saw no commensurate electoral gains from US tariff protection. The electoral losses were driven by retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products and were only partially mitigated by the US agricultural subsidies announced in summer 2018. Republicans also fared worse in counties that had seen recent gains in health insurance coverage, affirming the importance of health care as an election issue. A counterfactual calculation suggests that the trade war and health care can account for five and eight of Republicans' lost House seats, respectively.
Topic:: Politics, Elections, Trade Wars, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

53. The WTO's Existential Crisis: How to Salvage Its Ability to Settle Trade Disputes

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: US refusal to allow the appointment of new judges (or members) to the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body—a key component of its renowned dispute settlement system—has pushed the organization into an existential crisis. The Appellate Body no longer has the requisite number of members to hear new cases on appeal. The terms of two of the three remaining members have expired, leaving the WTO without an appeal function. US officials charge that certain Appellate Body decisions on WTO dispute panel rulings have expanded WTO obligations and constrained WTO rights—what trade lawyers call “judicial overreach”—and so they have blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members until other WTO countries address US complaints. Schott and Jung analyze the WTO cases brought against the United States and find that the problem of judicial overreach seems to surface primarily in a subset of US losses in antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases that target specific methods of calculating dumping margins. They warn that disabling the whole appellate system is a disproportionate response to the specific problem. It will weaken enforcement of WTO obligations and undermine prospects for negotiations to update the WTO rulebook, thus corroding the rules-based trading system, one that has been modeled on US law and practice. A better approach would be to exempt AD/CVD cases from appellate review (while still subjecting them to dispute panel rulings). This targeted change in the WTO Appellate Body process, coupled with procedural reforms already advanced in proposals that have been widely supported by WTO members, could mitigate US concerns and allow the Appellate Body to be repopulated.
Topic:: Government, World Trade Organization, Law, Judiciary, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

54. Global Dimensions of US Monetary Policy

Author:: Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: This paper is a partial exploration of mechanisms through which global factors influence the tradeoffs that US monetary policy faces. It considers three main channels. The first is the determination of domestic inflation in a context where international prices and global competition play a role, alongside domestic slack and inflation expectations. The second channel is the determination of asset returns (including the natural real safe rate of interest) and financial conditions, given integration with global financial markets. The third channel, which is particular to the United States, is the potential spillback onto the US economy from the disproportionate impact of US monetary policy on the outside world. In themselves, global factors need not undermine a central bank’s ability to control the price level over the long term—after all, it is the monopoly issuer of the numeraire in which domestic prices are measured. Over shorter horizons, however, global factors do change the tradeoff between price-level control and other goals such as low unemployment and financial stability, thereby affecting the policy cost of attaining a given price path.
Topic:: Economics, Government, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

55. Global E-Commerce Talks Stumble on Data Issues, Privacy, and More

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Zhiyaou (Lucy) Lu
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In early 2019, several important members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) submitted noteworthy proposals in a realm of international commerce that has evolved faster than rules to govern it: e-commerce or digital trade. While countries agree on less controversial subjects like banning unsolicited commercial electronic messages, the three leading WTO members—China, the European Union, and the United States—have big differences in their approaches to more challenging issues: data flows, data localization, privacy invasions by data collectors, transfer of source code, imposition of customs duties and internet taxes, and internet censorship. Their differing viewpoints lead Hufbauer and Lu to conclude that the prospect of reaching a high-level WTO e-commerce agreement is not promising. To reach an agreement, either most of the contentious issues must be dropped or the number of participating countries must be sharply reduced. A WTO accord, even of low ambition, would have value if only to establish basic digital norms on matters such as banning unsolicited commercial messages and protecting online consumers from fraudulent practices. A more ambitious accord covering the controversial issues should be negotiated in bilateral and/or plurilateral/regional pacts rather than in the WTO.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Finance, Privacy, and Data
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

56. WTO'ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem

Author:: Chad P. Bown and Jennifer A. Hillman
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The United States, the European Union, and Japan have begun a trilateral process to confront the Chinese economic model, including its use of industrial subsidies and deployment of state-owned enterprises. This paper seeks to identify the main areas of tension and to assess the legal-economic challenges to constructing new rules to address the underlying conflict. It first provides a brief history of subsidy disciplines in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO) predating any concerns introduced by China. It then describes contemporary economic problems with China’s approach to subsidies, their impact, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to address them. Finally, it calls for increased efforts to measure and pinpoint the source of the problems—in a manner analogous to how the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development took on agricultural subsidies in the 1980s—before providing a legal-economic assessment of proposals for reforms to notifications, evidence, remedies, enforcement, and the definition of a subsidy.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

57. Should Monetary Policy Take Inequality and Climate Change into Account?

Author:: Patrick Honohan
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Should central banks take more account of ethical issues, notably the impact of monetary policy actions on the distribution of income and wealth and on efforts to combat climate change, in the design and implementation of the wider monetary policy toolkit they have been using in the past decade? Although the scope to influence a range of objectives is more limited than is often supposed, and while it is vital to not derail monetary policy from its core purposes, central bank mandates justify paying more attention to such broad issues, especially if policy choices have a significant potential impact. Carefully managed steps in this direction could actually strengthen central bank independence while making some contribution to improving the effectiveness of public policy on these issues.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Monetary Policy, Inequality, and Central Bank
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

58. Average Inflation Targeting Would Be a Weak Tool for the Fed to Deal with Recession and Chronic Low Inflation

Author:: David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Federal Reserve faces two important monetary policy challenges: First, since the Great Recession it has struggled to move inflation convincingly up to the 2 percent target level. Second, during the next recession it will struggle to deliver enough support to the economy unless the recession is unusually mild. As a result, the search is on for alternative policy frameworks that might allow the Fed to achieve its monetary policy objectives more effectively. Among the alternatives is average inflation targeting (AIT). The basic idea is simple: Instead of aiming to return inflation over the medium term to the target rate of 2 percent, the Fed would aim to return the average of inflation over some period to the target rate. The crucial innovation of AIT is that when inflation has been running below the target rate, it would have the Fed aim for above-target inflation in the future, in order to bring average inflation up toward the target. Simulations of the Fed’s workhorse econometric model of the US economy (the FRB/US model) suggest that AIT would be a weak addition to the Fed’s policy toolkit for dealing with recessions and persistently low inflation. In addition, simple versions of AIT would sometimes compel the Fed to run an undesirably restrictive monetary policy. AIT is thus not a very appealing alternative to the current framework.
Topic:: Economics, Global Recession, Monetary Policy, and Federal Reserve
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

59. US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain

Author:: Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The terms of the US-China trade war change often, but the tariff escalations have inflicted documented economic damage on both countries. Expanding the conflict will only increase the damage and reverberate across the world economy. This Policy Brief uses a computable general equilibrium model of the global economy to analyze three scenarios that could unfold in coming months. The first scenario is the current situation (as of June 2019). Two additional scenarios assume implementation of proposed US tariffs and Chinese responses. The models project the situation after the two countries and the rest of the world adjust across a time horizon of three to five years. For the United States, higher tariffs raise prices and reduce demand for consumers and producers. For China, the tariffs raise the prices of consumer goods but have less direct impact on producers, because the Chinese have exempted some intermediate inputs. US exports and imports decline under all three scenarios. But China can successfully divert its exports away from the United States and escape maximum economic damage.
Topic:: Economics, Global Markets, Finance, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

60. Are Central Banks Out of Ammunition to Fight a Recession? Not Quite.

Author:: Joseph E. Gagnon and Christopher G. Collins
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Central banks in the three largest advanced economies (the United States, Japan, and the eurozone) have only limited ammunition to fight a recession based on the tools used to date. The Federal Reserve has the most amount of tried and tested ammunition in this group. If a recession were to hit the US economy now, the Fed would be able to deliver monetary stimulus equivalent to a cut in the short-term policy interest rate of about 5 percentage points, which is sufficient to fight a mild but not severe recession. The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have little ability to ease policy with tools used to date, about the equivalent of a 1 percentage point cut in the policy rate. But they can engage in more exotic forms of monetary policy, such as large-scale purchases of equity and real estate and direct transfers to households, which the Fed cannot do. These tools, however, are largely untested and face political resistance. An important implication of this analysis is that raising expected inflation before a recession hits has a much larger benefit than has been widely recognized. A higher long-run inflation rate gives central banks more room to not only cut their policy rates but also use forward guidance and quantitative easing to reduce longer-term rates.
Topic:: Global Recession, Economy, and Central Bank
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, North America, and United States of America

61. Protectionism under Trump: The China Shock, Intolerance, and the "First White President"

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2016, the United States elected an avowedly protectionist president. This paper uses US county-level electoral data to examine this outcome. The hypothesis that support for protectionism was purely a response to globalization is rejected. Exposure to trade competition encouraged a shift to the Republican candidate, but this effect is mediated by race, diversity, education, and age. If the turn toward protectionism is due to economic dislocation, then public policy interventions could mitigate the impact and support the reestablishment of a political consensus for open trade. If, however, the drivers are identity or cultural values, then the scope for constructive policy intervention is unclear.
Topic:: Economy, Trade, Donald Trump, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire?

Author:: Ana González and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: China's rapid rise and unique economic system and the increasingly aggressive and disruptive US trade policy are posing an unprecedented threat to the global rules-based trading and economic system. The European Union has critical interests at stake in the current escalation, even as it has so far been comparatively spared from US trade policy belligerence and China's reactions. In this context, the European Union should adopt an independent and proactive stance, building on recent efforts and going beyond them. The European Union, even more than the United States or China, has a strategic interest in the preservation of the global rules-based order embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO). It must play a leading role in steering WTO reform and modernization, working closely with broadly aligned third countries such as Japan and other players. It should expand its outreach beyond its immediate negotiating counterparts in both the United States and China, and leading European officials at both the EU and member state levels should work at better understanding China. While strengthening its domestic policy instruments to address new challenges, such as the screening of foreign direct investment for security purposes, the European Union must also resist its own temptations of protectionism and economic nationalism. In support of these objectives, the European Union should prepare itself for difficult decisions, which may involve revising some of its current red lines in international trade negotiations. Conversely, the European Union should stand firm on principles such as refusing one-sided agreements and rejecting abusive recourse to national security arguments in trade policies. The European Parliament, in working with the European Council and the European Commission, will have a critical role to play in steering the European Union through these challenging times.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Economy, Trade Wars, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

63. China, Like the US, Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth Through Manufacturing

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China’s development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China’s competitiveness in the most labor-intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value-added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward more consumption as citizens’ incomes have grown. Like Americans, Chinese people are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China’s production, reducing the role of manufacturing, and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This Policy Brief reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China’s long-term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following the pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Economic Growth, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

64. Chinese Investments in the US and EU Are Declining—for Similar Reasons

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For years China has been one of the world’s most rapidly growing sources of outward foreign direct investment. Since peaking in 2016, however, Chinese outward investments, primarily to the United States but also the European Union, have declined dramatically, especially in response to changes in China’s domestic rules on capital outflows and in the face of rising nationalism in the United States. Concerns about growing Chinese influence in other economies, the ascendant role of an authoritarian government in Beijing, and the possible security implications of Chinese dominance in the high-technology sector have put Chinese outward investments under intense international scrutiny. This Policy Brief analyzes the most recent trends in Chinese investments in the United States and the European Union and reviews recent political and regulatory changes both have adopted toward Chinese inward investments. It also explores the emerging transatlantic difference in the regulatory response to the Chinese information technology firm Huawei. Concerned about national security and as part of the ongoing broader trade friction with China, the United States has cracked down far harder on the company than the European Union.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, and Investment
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. The Rise of Global Innovation by US Multinationals Poses Risks and Opportunities

Author:: Lee G. Branstetter, Britta Glennon, and J. Bradford Jensen
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For decades, US multinational corporations (MNCs) conducted nearly all their research and development (R&D) within the United States. Their focus on R&D at home helped establish the United States as the unrivaled leader of innovation and technology advances in the world economy. Since the late 1990s, however, the amount of R&D conducted overseas by US MNCs has grown nearly fourfold and its geographic distribution has expanded from a few advanced industrial countries to many parts of the developing world, creating an innovation system that spans the globe. Like many aspects of globalization, including the offshoring of manufacturing over recent decades, the globalization of R&D raises concerns about US competitiveness and loss of technological leadership. At the same time, the spreading geographic location of innovation presents opportunities for US-based companies if the right policies are adopted to seize them. The research presented in this Policy Brief demonstrates that US innovators continue to remain involved in important ways in US MNCs' global R&D activities, and fears of a hollowing out of US capacity to innovate—based probably on previous fears about the hollowing out of US-based manufacturing—may be overstated. Indeed, the large and growing pool of highly educated scientists and engineers in the developing world could increase the rate of global productivity growth, to the advantage of US-based companies and the world in general. The authors conclude that a productive way to capitalize on the globalization of MNC R&D is not to oppose it but to combine emerging-market talent with MNC experience so that innovation can flourish to improve global living standards and fuel economic progress.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Multinational Corporations, Risk, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

66. Iran Has a Slow Motion Banking Crisis

Author:: Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Suffering under Western sanctions and security challenges, Iran faces problems as well from its fragile banking system, which has been languishing for decades. Liquidity and solvency weaknesses pose a growing risk to the country’s financial stability. The sanctions reimposed by the United States in 2018 have heightened these vulnerabilities, but the problems also result from the heavy-handed role of the state, corruption, and the Central Bank of Iran’s failure to regulate and supervise the system. Iran’s ability to avoid a run on its banks is aided by their reliance on liquidity assistance, deposit insurance, and regulatory forbearance from the central bank. Depositors are forced to be patient because they have limited options to invest elsewhere. Iran has thus avoided a full-blown banking crisis. But the situation is not sustainable. Banks remain susceptible to external shocks, which could come from a complete halt to oil exports or war.
Topic:: Security, Financial Crisis, Sanctions, Banks, and Financial Institutions
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

67. The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict after 40 Years of Special Protection

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately retaliated with tariffs on more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This paper assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs a new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis—which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization—was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

68. Survival of the International Monetary Fund and Global Economic Cooperation

Author:: Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The International Monetary Fund (IMF)—a quota-based institution—faces a test of its survival as the linchpin of the global financial safety net. Its roughly $1.4 trillion in total financial resources is scheduled to begin to shrink in 2020. In 2015, IMF members committed to strengthening IMF financial resources in the 15th General Review of Quotas, which will end in December 2019. Over the past 25 years, the United States has led the way for a gradual redistribution of IMF quota shares toward faster-growing emerging-market and developing countries. Any significant redistribution of quota shares requires an increase in total quotas. Because of its share of votes in the IMF, the United States must agree to any change in quotas. The Trump administration, however, has signaled that it favors no such change. If the United States does not reverse its stance, IMF members will lose an opportunity to strengthen the institution at a time of global financial uncertainty. Truman says the United States could still change its position and recommends how other member countries should press it to do so.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Politics, International Monetary Fund, Global Political Economy, Donald Trump, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

69. Low Inflation Bends the Phillips Curve

Author:: Joseph E. Gagnon and Christopher G. Collins
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The Phillips curve, which traces out a negative relationship between inflation and unemployment, has undergone tremendous changes over more than 100 years. Some researchers argue that the slope of the curve in the United States fell substantially around 20 years ago so that unemployment now has little or no effect on inflation. This paper shows that another hypothesis is equally consistent with the data: The Phillips curve may be nonlinear when inflation is low, with the economy having operated in the flat region of the curve for most of the past 20 years. The next few years may be decisive in the debate between these hypotheses, as unemployment has returned to a range in which a nonlinear curve ought to display significant steepness. A flat Phillips curve implies little change in inflation going forward, but a nonlinear curve implies moderate increases in inflation over the next few years.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

70. EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire?

Author:: Felipe González and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: China's rapid rise and unique economic system and the increasingly aggressive and disruptive US trade policy are posing an unprecedented threat to the global rules-based trading and economic system. The European Union has critical interests at stake in the current escalation, even as it has so far been comparatively spared from US trade policy belligerence and China's reactions. In this context, the European Union should adopt an independent and proactive stance, building on recent efforts and going beyond them. The European Union, even more than the United States or China, has a strategic interest in the preservation of the global rules-based order embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO). It must play a leading role in steering WTO reform and modernization, working closely with broadly aligned third countries such as Japan and other players. It should expand its outreach beyond its immediate negotiating counterparts in both the United States and China, and leading European officials at both the EU and member state levels should work at better understanding China. While strengthening its domestic policy instruments to address new challenges, such as the screening of foreign direct investment for security purposes, the European Union must also resist its own temptations of protectionism and economic nationalism. In support of these objectives, the European Union should prepare itself for difficult decisions, which may involve revising some of its current red lines in international trade negotiations. Conversely, the European Union should stand firm on principles such as refusing one-sided agreements and rejecting abusive recourse to national security arguments in trade policies. The European Parliament, in working with the European Council and the European Commission, will have a critical role to play in steering the European Union through these challenging times.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Trade Wars, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

71. China, Like the US, Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth Through Manufacturing

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China’s development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China’s competitiveness in the most labor-intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value-added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward more consumption as citizens’ incomes have grown. Like Americans, Chinese people are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China’s production, reducing the role of manufacturing, and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This Policy Brief reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China’s long-term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following the pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. The Rise of Global Innovation by US Multinationals Poses Risks and Opportunities

Author:: Lee G. Branstetter, Britta Glennon, and J. Bradford Jensen
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: For decades, US multinational corporations (MNCs) conducted nearly all their research and development (R&D) within the United States. Their focus on R&D at home helped establish the United States as the unrivaled leader of innovation and technology advances in the world economy. Since the late 1990s, however, the amount of R&D conducted overseas by US MNCs has grown nearly fourfold and its geographic distribution has expanded from a few advanced industrial countries to many parts of the developing world, creating an innovation system that spans the globe. Like many aspects of globalization, including the offshoring of manufacturing over recent decades, the globalization of R&D raises concerns about US competitiveness and loss of technological leadership. At the same time, the spreading geographic location of innovation presents opportunities for US-based companies if the right policies are adopted to seize them. The research presented in this Policy Brief demonstrates that US innovators continue to remain involved in important ways in US MNCs' global R&D activities, and fears of a hollowing out of US capacity to innovate—based probably on previous fears about the hollowing out of US-based manufacturing—may be overstated. Indeed, the large and growing pool of highly educated scientists and engineers in the developing world could increase the rate of global productivity growth, to the advantage of US-based companies and the world in general. The authors conclude that a productive way to capitalize on the globalization of MNC R&D is not to oppose it but to combine emerging-market talent with MNC experience so that innovation can flourish to improve global living standards and fuel economic progress.
Topic:: Economics, Globalization, Multinational Corporations, Risk, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

73. Protectionism under Trump: The China Shock, Intolerance, and the "First White President"

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: In 2016, the United States elected an avowedly protectionist president. This paper uses US county-level electoral data to examine this outcome. The hypothesis that support for protectionism was purely a response to globalization is rejected. Exposure to trade competition encouraged a shift to the Republican candidate, but this effect is mediated by race, diversity, education, and age. If the turn toward protectionism is due to economic dislocation, then public policy interventions could mitigate the impact and support the reestablishment of a political consensus for open trade. If, however, the drivers are identity or cultural values, then the scope for constructive policy intervention is unclear.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Donald Trump, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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