1. Collective screening
- Author:
- Vincent Anesi and Peter Buisseret
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- We study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal is a group whose members hold heterogeneous and evolving values from an agreement with the agent. Learning about the agent’s private information reduces the principals’ conflicts over their joint offer, mitigating a principal’s losses if she is not decisive over future offers. As a consequence, a principal in a group prefers to screen the agent more aggressively than a single principal. We study the dynamics of the principals’ collective choice, and obtain conditions under which decisive members of the group successively trade away their decision-making authority, leading inexorably to the concentration of negotiation power in the hands of a single principal.
- Topic:
- Economics, Political Science, and Decision-Making
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus