Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Publication Year within 10 Years

11. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Commercial Satellite Use Catalyzes Nuclear-Armed States to Combat: A Wargame After-Action Report (Occasional Paper 2306)

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Recent reports of Elon Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use his satellites to help it mount strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea pose a basic question: Just how sustainable might military use of commercial satellites be? So far, the United States and other spacefaring nations have deferred or taken a hands-off approach to dealing with this issue. When it comes to space, states are roughly where they were with sea power in the 1600s and air power before World War I: dramatic acts of air war and naval piracy were about to ensue, but instituting national or international regulation hardly seemed urgent… until they were. How prepared are we to deal with such a transition in space? Can we keep non-state and state actors from using space to intensify the pace of military air and ground operations? Or are space Lusitanias, in which the world’s major powers get dragged into wars, more likely? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) designed and conducted a wargame this summer tailored to this purpose. SpaceNews published the game’s results (see below). The game’s play begins in 2027 with a Pakistani terrorist group’s hijacking of “commercial” Chinese satellite services to mount an attack against an Indian nuclear base. The terrorists’ aim is to drag Pakistan into a war with India to help decide the status of Kashmir. Through a number of twists and turns, the game ends with intensified ground operations between Pakistan and India and China and the United States engaging in space combat against a set of each others’ commercial space satellites. Are we ready for this future? The short answer is no. The long answer can be teased from the game’s report and its key takeaways below.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Space, War Games, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

13. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

14. A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Utopia?

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Earlier this summer, well before Hamas launched its raids against Israel, Pierre Goldschmidt, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) former Deputy Director for Safeguards, sent me an analysis of how to approach creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. I agreed to publish it along with a commentary by Ariel Levite, the former Deputy Director of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission. The result is the attached occasional paper, “A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Utopia?” The greater Middle East is at a critical juncture. Either the number of states in the region having nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons options will grow or the number will be frozen and decline. Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria will either become Israel’s nuclear equal (or come within weeks of doing so) or they will forgo the option. In any case, creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the region has been promoted for nearly a half-century and is sure to be an issue in the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings scheduled through 2026. Yet, many analysts have dismissed going to zero nuclear weapons in the region as being unrealistic. Certainly, with Israel so embattled, any movement toward creating a zone now will take even longer. On the other hand, current developments suggest time may not be on our side. Less than a month after Hamas’ first incursions, not one, but two elected Israeli parliamentarians, including a junior member of Israel’s cabinet, publicly recommended Israel use its nuclear weapons against Hamas in Gaza. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince has fielded growing concerns that Iran might quickly get nuclear weapons by repeating his earlier public threat to acquire nuclear weapons if Tehran does. In an effort to deflect this threat and to “stabilize” the region, the Biden Administration wants the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords. As a part of any such deal, the Crown Prince, though, has demanded that the United States green-light Saudi efforts to pursue a “peaceful” uranium enrichment program. This would effectively give the Kingdom a nuclear weapons option and would catalyze nuclear hedging throughout the greater Middle East. It’s unclear if such racing can be curbed. Pierre Goldschmidt lays out an alternative incremental approach toward creating a weapons free zone in the region. Ariel Levite clarifies many of the serious reservations about proceeding now that most Israelis would likely have. Each makes points worth our attention. The hurdles are real but so are the risks of not trying to surmount them.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

15. Dangerous Decline: Russia’s Military and Security Influence in the Global South and the Implications for the United States

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study argues that Russia seeks to boost its military and security influence in the Global South in light of what it considers a protracted, systemic confrontation with Western states. Russia’s capacity to accrue such influence will vary considerably by domain and country. The war against Ukraine and its effects on Russia’s economy, technology base, and reputation are shaping demand and supply side factors—what states in the Global South want from Russia, and what Russia can offer. Though Russian power projection in the Global South will be limited, the impact of Moscow’s actions on U.S. strategic interests will not be trivial.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Global South

16. Radiological Security in Contested Territories

Author:
Margarita Kalinina-Pohl, Artem Lazarev, Miles Pomper, George Moore, and Edward Kendall
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Radioactive materials, such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60, are located in more than 100 countries and in every region of the world. They are used widely for medical, scientific, and industrial purposes—but can also be used maliciously as key ingredients in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), the most notorious type of which is known as a “dirty bomb” which disperses radiological material using explosives. Though responsibility for the development and enforcement of regulations pertaining to the safety, security, and full cycle management of radioactive sources rests with state authorities, thousands of radioactive sources today exist in areas without the clear presence of a state. Such areas are often characterized by conflict and rampant criminal activity as a result of weak or nonexistent governance. Radioactive material located in these contested or poorly governed territories poses a serious risk for regional and global security, as they could be trafficked illegally and used in an RDD or for other malicious purposes anywhere in the world. International and regional organizations face a range of political and legal challenges in helping secure radioactive materials in contested territories since the sources in question are often found beyond the de facto or de jure control of UN-recognized states. Addressing the safety and security of these materials requires stakeholders to navigate uncharted legal issues and play creative roles to secure or transport these materials into safer areas. This report covers one of the few success stories involving the removal or elimination of dangerous radioactive sources from a contested territory. It describes and assesses the lessons learned from the Republic of Moldova’s removal of approximately 2,700 disused radioactive sources and materials from the breakaway region of Transdniestria. Though these materials were located in a territory that is not de facto governed by an International Atomic Energy Agency member state, creative diplomacy by the Republic of Moldova, the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (the unrecognized authorities in Transdniestria), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other key stakeholders contributed to the success of this removal operation. The report describes these diplomatic efforts and analyzes the significant political, legal, and technical factors that contributed to the success of this multiyear mission. While recognizing that each country and conflict is unique, we hope that this case study can serve as a successful model of cooperation and confidence building for reducing radiological risks in contested territories around the world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. An Oral History of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group

Author:
Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The full research report on the Oral History of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group is now available to read and download. The report, authored by Dr. Hanna Notte and Dr. Chen Kane, draws on archival documents and interviews with working group participants to piece together a comprehensive account of the series of ACRS multilateral and bilateral meetings which took place in the early 1990s between states and entities in the Middle East. Dr. Notte and Dr. Kane conducted and compiled dozens of oral history interviews with diplomats and officials who participated in the ACRS multilateral meetings in the early 1990s, following on the heels of the Madrid Conference of 1991. Transcripts of these oral history interviews, the transcript of a critical oral history roundtable on ACRS (convened in November 2021), and previously-unpublished documents on ACRS from US Presidential archives and private collections of American diplomats, are all freely available in a new digital archive, ACRS Oral History Project, hosted on the Wilson Center’s website.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nonproliferation, Oral History, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. Blocking the Gateways to Nuclear Disorder in the Middle East

Author:
John Spacapan
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study will explain how the United States and like-minded states can still stop, or at least significantly slow down, the bomb’s spread in the Middle East. The historical record as well as the current intentions of potential proliferators in the region suggests this is possible, but Washington will need to start planning now. The three case countries of this monograph – Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – are all taking aggressive steps toward nuclearization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Middle East

20. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia