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1. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:
Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

2. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3. Protecting NATO’s security community

Author:
Alexandra Gheciu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Following Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, numerous Western policy-makers and analysts have interpreted the Alliance’s cohesiveness and prompt response as evidence of its value in protecting the transatlantic community of liberal-democracy. NA- TO’s Allies, the argument goes, have clearly demon- strated their shared determination to protect allied ter- ritory and core liberal-democratic values, re-affirming the Alliance’s unshaken commitment to the principle of collective defence. But can this momentum be sus- tained? While the Ukraine crisis has triggered initial prac- tices of unity, it has also highlighted – and rendered more complex – difficult questions, tensions and nor- mative dilemmas for NATO. This policy brief exam- ines some of the key challenges that NATO is likely to face in protecting the transatlantic security commu- nity in the unstable, post-February 2022 environment. What is particularly important to understand is that some of those challenges concern key norms and val- ues around which NATO defines itself. There are no simple answers to the political questions facing the security community – but there are steps that can be taken to put the Allies in a stronger position to ad- dress them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

4. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

5. War in Europe: preliminary lessons

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day, the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades. Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the exception of part of the Donbas). For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has displayed a political unity that was admittedly lacking in recent years prior. The United States has demonstrated unequivocal commitment to the defence of Europe, while European Allies have shown both political resolve and a will to take defence spending seriously. Very little dissent or freeriding has occurred in the West. Solidarity with Ukraine has been optimal, both politically and through the delivery of weapons. Still, Allied support is constrained by the imperative of non-belligerence. NATO Allies have made it clear upfront that they have no desire to directly confront Russia, hence the rejection of a no-fly-zone or any other move carrying the risk of inadvertent escalation. That said, NATO has deployed part of its NATO Response Force and activated its defence plans. Allies have strengthened their presence in each of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) four existing battlegroups, and committed to the deployment of four additional battlegroups in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. 40,000 troops are officially deployed under direct NATO command on the Eastern flank as of the beginning of April, together with ships and air assets. Most importantly, the US has staged a comeback in Europe, with an overall deployment of 100,000 troops, among which approximately 20,000 have deployed since the beginning of 2022. The European Union (EU) too has acted swiftly, most notably through the imposition of sanctions on Russia in lockstep with US and UK sanctions. The EU has also flexed its muscle through the newly created European Peace Facility (EPF), which has delivered three instalments of EUR 500 million to finance the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. At the time of writing, EU states had not taken the decision to extend sanctions to oil and gas imports from Russia, unlike the US and the UK. If such a decision is taken, this would lead to a major energy crisis – and therefore economic crisis – in the whole of Europe. The war, then, raises a series of questions about the current and future European security order. First, will Western unity endure over time? What are the risks that the US or some European states will defect once the initial shock of the invasion has faded, once sanctions begin harming European economies, once the possibility of a re-engagement with Russia is floated, or once the Indo-Pacific inevitably regains US attention? Second, how will the war impact European security institutions – most notably NATO and the EU – and to what extent will the current situation positively shape the partnership between the two? Third, how resilient will Europe be in the face of a possible energy crisis provoked by the cessation of oil and gas deliveries from Russia? Fourth, from a military perspective, what lessons can be drawn from the first months of the Russian offensive regarding both Russia’s capacity (or incapacity) as a first-tier military power and in the changing (or unchanging) character of modern war? Finally, what initial lessons should we draw regarding nuclear deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to dissuade harmful Russian nuclear-related actions? This collective Research Paper, authored by NDC Researchers and the NDC Commandant, explores these questions directly, identifying some preliminary lessons from the war. In the first chapter, Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann looks at the war’s potential impact on the distribution of tasks between NATO and the EU. The second chapter, written by Thierry Tardy, examines NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression and outlines implications for both the EU and for NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. The third chapter, co-authored by Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy, analyses Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian battlefield and draws early conclusions about Russian military power. Fourth, Marc Ozawa explores the war’s impact on European energy security and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Finally, Cynthia Salloum assesses how the crisis questions the very concept of deterrence and Allies’ ability to deter the Putin regime. This Research Paper is published alongside a series of related events and publications (notably in the Policy Brief series) that the NATO Defense College Research Division has organized in relation to the ongoing revision of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. To that end, it arrives in tandem with an adjacent NDC study on the strategic shifts impacting NATO’s core tasks and in anticipation of a multi-authored analysis (to be released in September 2022) of the forthcoming Madrid Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

6. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

7. The Dos and Don'ts of Strategy Making

Author:
Marina Henke
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Strategic Concept is NATO’s most import- ant document after the Washington Treaty. It identifies the foundational elements of the Al- liance: it defines NATO’s strategic goals, the key risks and threats the Alliance faces, and designs a strategy of how to overcome those challenges. Since its in- ception, NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts. The latest one was published in 2010. Given the ex- traordinary events of the last decade if not months, including Russian aggression in Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive posturing in the Asia Pacific, a new NATO Strategic Concept is urgently needed and will be presented at the 2022 Madrid Summit. In this context, it is worth asking: how do we design good strategy? What are the main building blocks of strat- egy? How can NATO most efficiently integrate the variety of tools at its disposal into a coherent, cohe- sive whole? Practitioners and academics have over the years identified best practices in strategy design along with some common mistakes.1 This Policy Brief sum- marizes their most important findings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

8. Lessons from NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan

Author:
Benjamin Zyla and Laura Grant
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
AFter US troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021, the Taliban launched an offensive to take back control of the country. By August, the militants had retaken con- trol of most (administrative) districts and President Ashraf Ghani and other key officials fled the country. NATO Allies rushed to close nearly all of the military and civilian infrastructure they had built since 2001, and hastily set up air bridges to evacuate their citizens and personnel from Kabul. Most of this was done by the member states while NATO as an organization mainly stood on the fringes. Critics have focused on these events to call for an evaluation of this hasty and uncoordinated withdraw- al, and of the entire Afghan intervention more gener- ally. Among others the NATO Parliamentary Assem- bly called upon member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance not only to “conduct a thorough, clear-eyed, and comprehensive assessment of the Alliance’s 20-year engagement in Afghanistan”, but also demanded to incorporate these lessons into “NATO’s New Strategic Concept”.1 This Policy Brief aims to contribute to the lessons learned analysis that will be central to discussions at the NATO Summit this coming June in Spain. We of- fer eight findings and recommendations, based on a four-year long study of the effectiveness of the Af- ghan intervention.2
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

9. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and North America

10. NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Julia Rushchenko
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. This was the first effort to link women to the peace and security processes, including affirming their central role in pre- vention and resolution of conflicts. Resolution 1325 stressed the importance of equal participation, urging states to ensure women are given an opportunity for full involvement in peacebuilding, security and polic- ing. It also called on all parties to protect women and girls from sexual abuse during or in the aftermath of armed conflict, and address their special needs during repatriation, resettlement, and rehabilitation. While the WPS agenda was initially UN-led, since 2000, its relevance to achieving sustainable peace has gradually been acknowledged by a number of international or- ganizations, including NATO. Numerous studies have appeared in the past two decades to assess WPS commitments in internation- al organizations and states, by identifying gaps and celebrating achievements. At the same time, until re- cently, NATO was arguably absent from the gender discourse, and attempts to engage with female per- spectives within the Alliance have mostly remained fragmented. In part, this was because of the pacifist stance of the feminist scholarship and an argument that military organizations are mainly governed by masculine norms.1 This Policy Brief aims at examining best practices andgaps in incorporating a gender perspective among NATO Allies and partners, focusing on women in the security sector. It provides a set of recommendations regarding the WPS agenda, taking into account the current security threats facing Allies and partners.2
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Private Sector, and Gender
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

11. NATO and human security

Author:
Mary Kaldor
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The August 2021 Afghan debacle offers NATO a moment for serious reflection about its role in the world. Some are drawing the conclusion that NATO should not engage in out-of-area opera- tions in the future and should instead focus on its core function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory from at- tack by foreign states, while dealing with the terrorist threat through long distance strikes using drones. But NATO members should draw a different conclusion, namely that in this globalised interconnected world, no one is safe from the complex combination of dangers that include war and violence, climate disasters, forced migration, pandemics or extreme poverty. It is no lon- ger possible, if it ever was, to insulate one part of the world from what happens elsewhere. What is needed is not retrenchment but rethinking and redirecting of NATO’s role. In this Policy Brief, I put forward the idea of a global strategy based on human security. Human security is understood as the security of individuals and the com- munities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. Human security offers an alternative way to address “forever wars” whether we are talking about conflicts in different parts of the world, the so-called war on terror, or the geo-political competition with Russia and China. Human security implies that the security of Afghans or Chinese is just as important as the security of Americans or Europe- ans.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

12. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

13. Challenges to NATO's Nuclear Strategy

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In 2022, NATO will present its new Strategic Concept. Since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was published, NATO and the world have changed significantly. At the time, NATO was primarily engaged in crisis management, including in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept enabled the Alliance to further expand – conceptually and geographically – its out-of-area activities, together with the core tasks of cooperative security. Eleven years later, the dominant paradigm of international politics is great power competition: in other words, countries like Russia and China are competing with the West strategically, economically, militarily, and in terms of values. Many things have remained constant, however: one is the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Since 2010, Allies have continued to affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, notwithstanding the Alliance’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

14. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:
Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

15. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

16. NATO and the future of arms control

Author:
Dominik P. Jankowski
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The crisis of arms control1 is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.2 This Research Paper analyzes the past, present, and future of arms control in the Euro- Atlantic region, through an examination of what arms control actually does well, and what it does not do. It puts an emphasis on the role of NATO Allies in this regard, based on the Alliance’s past experience and taking into consideration current multilateral and multi- domain environment. The paper is based on three assumptions. First, arms control is not dead and its goals remain valid. Second, arms control is a policy tool, not an end in itself. In practice, for NATO Allies it means that any decisions on arms control must reflect the requirements of the Allies’ strategy of deterrence and defence. Third, in their approach o arms control, NATO Allies should be guided by the principles of security, stability, and verification.3
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

17. NDC@70: more relevant than ever

Author:
Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The information revolution put brick and mortar academic institutions under pressure to adapt, and the COVID pandemic has increased atten- tion on higher education models – business, intellectu- al, and philosophical. As the NATO Defense College (NDC) turns 70, and the Alliance ponders a new Stra- tegic Concept, it is worth reviewing the NDC model and value of education more broadly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower created the College in 1951 to prepare military and civilian officials for duty in NATO posts or in NATO-related positions in their capitals. War col- leges in France, the United States, and the United King- dom provided the conceptual basis for the NDC, but the NATO equivalent would have two differences: the NATO College would focus on Alliance issues more than national colleges, and consensus-building would be a key part of its education method. Seventy years later, the College still prepares military and civilian officials to assume positions of responsibility within NATO and that preparation has always included acquiring geo-stra- tegic knowledge and building relationships. NDC@70 means reflecting on how senior leaders acquire knowl- edge, develop skills, and strengthen relationships in to- day’s challenging period with rapid rates of technologi- cal change and increasingly segmented societies.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

18. Future warfare, future skills, future professional military education

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Created in 1951 by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to endow NATO Allies’ officers with a forum for strategic education and politico-military re- flection, this year the NATO Defense College is cele- brating its 70th anniversary. In a world of rapid change and growing uncertainty, the best way to honor the past is to prepare for the future. This Policy Brief contributes to this goal by looking at the future of Professional Military Education (PME). Based on the recent Con- ference of Commandants,1 the discussion is divided into three parts: what the future of warfare is, what skills future warfighters will need to possess, and how professional military education will have to change ac- cordingly.
Topic:
NATO, Education, War, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Professionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

19. The US in NATO: adapting the Alliance to new strategic priorities

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the June 2021 NATO Summit, Allies agreed that “[we] will engage China with a view to de- fending the security interests of the Alliance”, as “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based inter- national order and to areas relevant to Alliance securi- ty”. For Washington, it was a win to have NATO, the cornerstone of the United States’ network of alliances, acknowledge the challenge posed by China and expand the Alliance’s predominantly transatlantic focus. During his visit to Europe in Spring 2021, President Biden signalled that “America was back” with a clear vision for NATO and that he was seeking European partners’ support. The US President’s recommitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is premised on the expectation that NATO address the country’s current and future strategic concerns, in a security and geopolitical environment that has dramatically changed these last twenty years. China, technological competi- tion, climate change, and hybrid threats and their desta- bilizing effects on NATO member states’ political co- hesion, are now at the core of the US strategic agenda. These priorities redefine NATO’s purpose. In this con- text, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, to be presented in 2022, aims at addressing these very changes, espe- cially as the Alliance enters the post-Afghanistan era. The US objectives vis-à-vis NATO are threefold. In the short term, the Biden administration seeks to re- engage with NATO as part of a larger effort to work with Allies around the world. US public opinion is clearly supportive of the Alliance across political affiliations, despite the politicization of the debate under the Trump administration. In the longer term, NATO will remain relevant to the US, only if it contributes to the strategic competition against China. This can take different forms and re- quire moving beyond two decades of out-of-area oper- ations to tackle challenges of a broad nature, especially in the cyber and techno- logical realms. Finally, the US aims to continue work on struc- tural issues within the Alliance, such as bur- den-sharing and political cohesion, whilst devel- oping a new partnership agenda that better fits its priorities. To sum up, NATO will remain a “global alliance” shaped by the US global strategic priorities, and will continue to strengthen its engagement with “global partners” as the increasingly complex security environment requires transregional approaches.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

20. Partners Across the Globe and NATO’s Strategic Concept

Author:
Gorana Grgic
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s history is one of continuous adapta- tion in the aftermath of critical junctures both 1 during and after the Cold War. The most recent push to transform the Alliance is embodied in laying out the groundworks towards the new Strategic Concept and the institutional campaign “NATO 2030” which calls for the Alliance to become more political- ly active and global in reach, along with strengthening its military power.2 Among the issues this effort has spotlighted are NATO’s global partnerships which at the moment include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan, i.e. NATO’s Partners Across the Globe (PAG). This Policy Brief assesses the value of NATO’s Part- ners Across the Globe in light of the new security challenges and argues that preserving the status quo vis-à-vis global partnerships is not advisable since it is incompatible with the changing strategic goals. In pro- viding the recommendations moving forward, it argues the Alliance has two options. First, the Alliance could overhaul the PAG grouping and distinguish between the types of partners with whom it can establish deeper cooperation. Namely, this would involve elevating the Asia-Pacific Four into an institutionalised grouping, rather than having it remain an informal platform for cooperation. Alternatively, NATO could do away with the existing PAG nomenclature and keep the partner- ships flexible and issue specific. It could thus follow the “NATO 30+n” model, which would include working with a set group of partners on different issues.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

21. European allies and the forthcoming NATO strategic concept

Author:
Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept will primarily serve the purpose of adapting the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to 21st century realities. This includes an updated threat analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci- etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the considerable changes European security underwent since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con- cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative security approach to Russia. The new text will also be the first post-Trump administration document, one elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate- gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes heated debates on European security, particularly on the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a consensus on this concept and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need for a stronger, and in many ways more independent Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however, most of these developments are structural in nature, and have persisted for some time.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

22. Deterrence by Detection: Using Surveillance to pre-Empt Opportunistic Aggression

Author:
Thomas G. Mahnken and Grace B. Kim
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On NATO’s entire Eastern and South-Eastern flank, the Allies face a major, pressing and subtle challenge. Using sub-conventional grey zone tactics, Moscow has repeatedly tried, and at times succeeded, in expanding its influence, eroding international norms, undermining the rules-based in- ternational order, and shifting the balance of power in its favour. Preventing Russia from launching such op- portunistic acts of aggression is particularly import- ant because its armed forces are developing the ability to attack quickly – under the cover of increasingly capable defences – countries on their periphery in a clear effort to impose a fait accompli.1 NATO countries are at a particular disadvantage in this type of compe- tition. Their force structures consist of expensive and technologically complex information-gathering platforms, such as satellites and manned aircraft, which due to their high costs are also scarce and employed with reluctance by states who generally hesitate to put them in harm’s way. Additionally, the prohibitively high cost of these platforms deters some countries from investing in these types of capabilities. As debates within NATO about cash, capabilities and contributions continue to hold the stage, highlighting Allies’ needs for different types of capabilities – less expensive, more resilient, and relatively more disposable – is important.2 Equal- ly critical is the need for Allies to develop new concepts of operations as well as new organi-zations to employ them effectively. The solution may not involve fielding exotic new capabilities so much as employing existing ones in innovative ways. It will also benefit greatly from approaches that allow Allies and partners to participate fully. If we do not adapt, we risk being surprised by potentially catastrophic events in a future conflict.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Southern Europe

23. Operation Althea and the Virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement

Author:
Olivier Rittimann
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What is commonly known as the “Ber- lin Plus” arrangements, signed in March 2003, provides for the European Union (EU) to draw upon NATO’s assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance would not be militarily involved. Following lengthy delays incurred by the Cyprus question, it was only as of 2003 that the agreement was successfully implemented with the transfer of operations from NATO to the EU in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2004). The Berlin Plus agreement guarantees EU access to NATO planning capabilities, which contribute to EU- led military operations through the identification of command options, procedures for release and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, and the exchange of classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules. At the end of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1999), the EU had no defence staff fit to plan nor conduct an operation, and it is only fifteen years ago that member states established national Operation Headquarters (OHQ), which nations make available for EU operations, as was done in 2006 in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo and in 2007 in Chad. At the end of the 1990s, the Berlin Plus proposal made em- inent sense: it prevented any duplication (by the EU) of assets and fostered the emergence of a European operational culture. But is the Arrangement still fit for purpose almost 20 years later?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

24. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:
Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

25. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:
Andris Banka
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

26. NATO 2030: New Technologies, New Conflicts, New Partnerships

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s history is marked by both profound continuity and deliberate adaptation. Over the past seven decades, NATO’s mission, the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and its constitutive values – democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law – have not changed. Similarly, the Alliance’s founding principle, namely the commitment Allies have made to defend each other and work together for their common security and defense, is as relevant today as it was when the Alliance was established in 1949. At the same time, NATO has adapted throughout its history to ensure it always remained capable to fulfil its mission and guarantee the defense and security of the almost one billion citizens it was established to protect. In the last decade, this meant that the Alliance had to boost its ability to tackle more sophisticated non-conventional threats. It has done so by investing in resilience as well as by enhancing its tools to fight terrorism, counter cyber threats, and respond to hybrid challenges. Even more fundamentally, since 2014, NATO has responded to the changing security environment by implementing the biggest adaptation of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War. This has led to deploying combat- ready troops in the East of the Alliance, modernizing NATO’s command structure and Headquarters, enhancing the readiness of Allied forces and to an increased and sustained Allied commitment to invest more in defense. In this context, NATO 2030, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s initiative, is driven by the belief that, to remain a strong and agile Alliance, NATO must continue its adaptation and focus on how to respond to a rapidly changing security environment. At the December 2019 NATO Leaders Meeting, Allied Heads of State and Government asked the Secretary General to lead a forward-looking reflection on NATO’s future. They asked him to provide concrete recommendations to NATO leaders in time for the 2021 Summit. In response, the Secretary General launched NATO 2030, focusing on the key question of how to prepare the Alliance for the next decade. To inform his thinking, the Secretary General decided to reach out and gather ideas from a wide number of actors: he appointed an independent group to provide him with their advice, established the NATO 2030 Young Leaders to hear the recommendations of the “next” generation, and launched a number of dialogues with civil society, youth and the private sector. The rationale behind this approach is solid: in an increasingly complex world where security challenges are more diverse and diffuse, it is especially important to engage with a broad set of stakeholders and to take different perspectives into consideration. The NATO Defense College’s work on NATO 2030 fits within this broader set of discussions and contributes to the policy debate on NATO 2030 and on NATO’s future more broadly. The timing is especially ripe for a reflection on NATO’s future adaptation. Looking at 2030, the Alliance needs to prepare for a more uncertain and competitive world. This requires understanding how the shifting global balance of power will affect both the international rules-based order as well as Allied security. It will be essential to consider how to best ready the transatlantic Alliance and how to forge a common approach to tackle these systemic challenges. At the same time, preparing for the future also means accounting for exponential technological changes and their impact on how conflicts are understood and fought; as well as stepping up efforts to combat climate change and prepare to mitigate and counter its security impact. It is also important to stress that while NATO needs to adapt to new challenges, it must also continue to strengthen its ability to tackle existing ones. NATO 2030 thus gives the Alliance an opportunity to both take stock of the impressive adaptation occurred over the past decade and to redouble its efforts to prepare for the upcoming one. To do so, the Secretary General put forward three broad goals: to keep NATO strong militarily, to make the Alliance stronger politically, and to ensure it adopts a more global approach. The papers presented in this volume contribute to the thinking on how to meet each of these goals. First, keeping NATO strong militarily is of course central to ensuring the Alliance’s ability to fulfil its mandate. Collective strength and solidarity are equally crucial to maintain Allied unity and cohesion and to underpin the Alliance’s political role. Ensuring NATO stays strong militarily requires sustained Allied investment in defense, but also a focus on Allied resilience and on technological innovation. Andrea Gilli’s paper on “NATO, Technological Superiority and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” tackles the crucial question of how to ensure NATO’s technological superiority in the future. The paper rightly recognizes that historically the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend has always been predicated upon maintaining a technological edge over competitors and potential adversaries. Looking at a future of exponential technological change and geopolitical competition, it is evident that preserving Allied technological superiority will become simultaneously more complex and more important. NATO has recognized the growing importance of investing in innovation and in preventing a transatlantic gap when it comes to the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies in security and defense. This is why, in recent years, the Alliance has redoubled its efforts in this field. Building on this progress, it is important to examine what more NATO could do towards 2030 when it comes to technological innovation in general and emerging and disruptive technologies specifically. Gilli’s paper points to a number of important areas, including by stressing the need to think creatively about what role NATO can play to foster transatlantic innovation and encourage more Allied investments and cooperation on R&D. A similarly interesting and related notion is the need for NATO to reflect on its role when it comes to transatlantic training and education, both crucial to fostering cooperation and boosting interoperability. Second, NATO 2030 focuses on how to strengthen NATO’s political role. On the one hand, this means ensuring NATO remains the platform where North America and Europe consult and coordinate on all issues relevant to their common security and defense. On the other hand, a more political NATO is also an Alliance that is better able to rely on both military and non-military tools to fulfil its mandate. The importance of this issue emerges clearly in Marc Ozawa’s paper “Adapting NATO to grey zone challenges”. The essay examines NATO’s tools and responses to a world in which competitors and potential adversaries increasingly rely on political, diplomatic, economic and military tools to challenge Allied security. The author argues that responding to these hybrid challenges requires the Alliance to update its broad strategy and expand its toolkit. This conclusion aligns with the Secretary General’s call to update the 2010 Strategic Concept to take into account the new strategic environment. In addition, enhancing NATO’s ability to respond to grey zone challenges, from information warfare, to asymmetric approaches and economic coercion, also means continuing and enhancing the Alliance’s work on resilience, as the first line of defense against both conventional and non-conventional challenges. In this respect, Ozawa rightly argues that NATO should both expand the lens through which it looks at resilience and widen the actors it involves in its consultations on this issue. Expanding NATO’s work on resilience could include, among others, using NATO more as a platform to discuss, identify and mitigate economic vulnerabilities that could be exploited to both sow disagreements and undermine Allied security. Similarly, broadening consultations on issues related to resilience and countering hybrid threats could lead to both more regular NATO meetings of Allied national security advisors and more robust engagement with the private sector. Finally, the Secretary General’s vision for NATO 2030 highlights the importance of adopting a more global outlook. Even though NATO is a regional Alliance, the challenges it faces are global, from terrorism to climate change. In this context, the question of how to better leverage NATO’s partnerships becomes especially important. Thierry Tardy’s essay, “From NATO’s partnerships to security networks” affirms the importance of partnerships as one of NATO’s key political tools and looks at how to further enhance them towards 2030. In a world of growing geopolitical competition, one of the key questions for NATO 2030 is how to further strengthen the Alliance’s political dialogue and practical cooperation with like-minded partners to deal with global challenges and defend the rules-based international order. Another important priority should be to examine how to further invest and leverage in partnerships to contribute to peace and stability in NATO’s immediate neighborhood. The three papers developed by the NATO Defense College’s researchers engage with the Secretary General’s 2030 vision by looking at how the Alliance can enhance its ability to innovate, strengthen its toolkit against hybrid threats and further leverage its partnerships as an important political tool. The breadth of topics reflects the fact that NATO finds itself in the most complex and challenging security environment since the end of the Cold War. In turn, this requires in-depth thinking about how to continue to deter and defend and tackle existing challenges as well as how to redouble efforts to adapt and innovate to address emerging ones.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

27. Central European Security: History and Geography Matter

Author:
Marcin Zaborowski
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The post-Cold War enlargements have changed the Alliance, its geopolitics and the definition of its purpose, which is no longer limited to deterring against threats to Allies’ territory. Enlarge- ments have also redefined the security and defence policies of the new member states, by transforming their armed forces, civil military relationships and im- pacting their defence industries. The states that joined NATO since 1989 are usually categorized as Central Europe or Central and East- ern Europe. Within this Central European realm of new member states, one can distinguish between the North-East, the Centre, the South-East, and the West- ern Balkans. All states in these groupings were com- munist prior to the end of the Cold War. Today, with the Cold War fast becoming a faded memory, Central Europeans tend to define their security needs with in- creasing divergence, with major repercussions on their defence policies, in spite of their belonging to the same Alliance. This Policy Brief maps out Central Europe by identifying groups of states in the region and looking at defence policy divergences. It focuses on a number of indicators, such as defence spending, acquisition of defence equipment and attitudes towards hosting for- eign NATO troops on their soil.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

28. The Strategic Argument for a Political NATO

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 1949 Washington Treaty is a remarkably brief document consisting of a preamble and 14 articles. The Treaty describes only the po- litical commitments and obligations of the signato- ries. It does not articulate a requirement for NATO members to spend a certain amount of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense nor does it specify the military capabilities that a NATO member must possess to defend the Alliance. From 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was the singular locus of geopolitical discus- sion between North America and Europe. These were not easy discussions, yet the Alliance weathered strident policy and geopolitical policy differences. NATO also endured its members temporarily ceasing to be democracies due to military coups or concern about Communist influence on NATO governments. With a political body standing on the shoulders of a credible military deterrence, Allies were able to deploy creative problem-solving skills to bridge political dif- ferences, such as the policy innovation of deterrence and détente, while pursuing other, quieter methods, such as the temporary suspension of sharing sensitive intelligence from compromised NATO governments. Unfortunately, NATO’s centrality as a political forum greatly diminished after the Cold War as the Alliance reduced its political consultations in a less demanding geopolitical environment. Despite occa- sional interruptions of intense political discussion re- lated to conflict in the Balkans and the September 11th attacks, US retrenchment, combined with Europe’s inward focus, minimized NATO as a political forum. NATO was increasingly consumed by tactical decisions on out-of-area operations and transatlantic policy divisions over the Iraq War which fueled both Europe’s desire for greater autonomy and America’s questioning of the military utility of its Allies. NATO leaders substituted tactical – albeit important – military decisions regard- ing troop contributions, placement, and caveats as a substitute for political discussion. This political drift has now become so great that NATO members have begun to withhold support for the defensive planning of other Allies and new disputes between NATO members have the potential to escalate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

29. The Global Dimensions of NATO's Future Posture

Author:
Michael Clarke
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO has always been an important player in global politics. It is in the nature of the Alli- ance that its essential military missions were always carefully defined and its geographical boundar- ies strictly set by the collective defence commitments among its members. Nevertheless, NATO’s role as a politico-military institution among the great powers of the Cold War ensured it would always be global- ly significant. It could not have been otherwise. This remains as much the case – though now in different ways – as we consider the international environment taking shape for the 2030s. In this new environment the unavoidable global responsibilities of being a regional military alliance can be summarised in three ways; looking at NATO’s role in helping western powers defend their wider interests in the multi-polar world; helping meet the pseudo-ideological challenges posed by the rise of autocracies; and contributing to issues of the “global commons”.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

30. NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security

Author:
Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper addresses four key issues: 1) a holistic definition of strategic stability, highlighting the principal sources of instability in Europe and identifying requirements for strengthening stability in Europe; 2) an examination of recent NATO efforts to shore up its defense and deterrent capabilities, while underscoring the need to address defense against non-military threats to stability; 3) a discussion of how a comprehensive arms control agenda could contribute to strategic stability, including wide-ranging discussions with Moscow about Russia’s place in an evolving European security framework; and 4) an analysis of three different strategic approaches that NATO might pursue, each of which combines enhancements to military and non-military defense and the possibility of a broader collaborative security agenda. The continuing volatility of NATO’s strategic environment will require that NATO maintain its long-established strategies of deterrence, defense, and reassurance. However, a strategy that depends almost exclusively on the deployment of military forces will be insufficient to sustain strategic stability in the long run. NATO also requires a clear and purposeful strategy that incorporates both defense and dialogue – including arms control policies – as integral and complementary tools for addressing threats. The authors recommend that NATO should proceed to shape a new Strategic Concept by outlining a 21st century Harmel Doctrine, emphasizing both defense and dialogue with Russia as complementary paths to improving strategic stability. Simultaneously, NATO should fulfill its requirements for a 21st century strategy for deterrence and defense in dealing with nuclear, conventional, cyber, hybrid, and other military and non-military threats. For the foreseeable future, NATO will need to craft a strategy for security and stability in Europe based on the assumption that Russia does not share the West’s worldview and will likely continue to seek to undermine the stability and cohesion achieved in Europe following the end of the Cold War. If Russia proves unwilling to engage in a meaningful collaborative security relationship, NATO will be justified in embarking on a 21st century version of a renewed “containment” policy that includes the reintroduction of even greater military capabilities in Europe. In all cases, NATO should ensure that Alliance cohesion – including its transatlantic security link – is preserved even as it deliberates difficult strategic questions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

31. NATO 2030- The Military Dimension

Author:
Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO must “stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach 1 globally”. When launching the reflection pro- cess on NATO’s future role, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg set these three priorities to frame his vision of NATO 2030. At their meeting in London in December 2019, NA- TO’s political leaders mandated a “forward-looking re- flection process” on how NATO should further adapt to ensure it was able to successfully cope with a world of competing great powers due to the rise of China and Russia’s persistently aggressive posture, together with instability along NATO’s southern periphery, new trans- national risks emerging from pandemics, climate change and disruptive technologies. Establishing a unified stra- tegic vision is vital for upholding the Alliance’s cohesion, credibility and effectiveness. Looking forward, what does this mean for NATO’s military dimension?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

32. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:
Olivier Roy
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

33. Net Assessment: "Competition Is For Losers"

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Under the guidance of the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in 2020 NATO embarked on a reflection process aimed at equipping the Alliance for the challenges of 2030.1 Composed of several parts, actors and phases, the process ul- timately aims to make NATO more relevant in the years ahead when technological disruption, climate change, competition among Great Powers and vio- lent non-state actors will pose new and major threats. Ideas, proposals, and recommendations are coming in from within and from outside the Alliance. Inter- estingly, among the recommendations, several voices have called for NATO to expand its net assessment capabilities.2 For most observers, even in the security and defence world, net assessment is an esoteric word. While many may have heard of Andrew Marshall and the US Department of Defense’s Office of Net As- sessment, most would probably struggle to define the term. This Policy Brief provides a short introduction to the topic: what is net assessment, how and why has it emerged, how reliable is it and how could NATO use it?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

34. NATO, Strategy, and Net Assessment

Author:
Niccolo Petrelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In late 2020, analysts recommended for the first time the establishment within NATO of a net assessment (NA) capability to deal with an in- creasingly complex strategic environment.1 The same recommendation was reiterated in the NATO 2030 report to address the problem of “strategic simultane- ity”: i.e. the emergence of multiple, simultaneous and interconnected threats. According to the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General, “NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office [...] with the mission of examining NATO’s strate- gic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. [...] A net assessment function [...] would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options [...]”.2 The term NA was first coined in the US during the early 1970s by national security official Andrew W. Marshall to refer to a constellation of concepts and techniques for evaluating relative power. In West- ern usage, however, and for some decades now, it has been employed in a broader sense to denote the function of combining the appreciation of one’s own strength against that of one’s opponents in interna- tional affairs at the highest level.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

35. Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper seeks to describe and explain the principles of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. It does not defend or take sides – in favour of or against – a particular thesis, concept, idea or school of thought. While it mostly applies to Western conceptions and debates (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, NATO), most of the points made seem widely shared.1 The paper is structured as an investigation of nuclear strategy, moving stage by stage from the conceptual level to the planning level before setting out the issues that revolve around nuclear deterrence. Following an initial conceptualization of deterrence, the paper looks at its implementation in the nuclear domain. It then describes the various notions associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy, as well as the related interactions with weapons systems. It also explains the main dilemmas and questions associated with nuclear strategy, offering food for thought on the future of nuclear deterrence. One author suggests that there have been four waves of nuclear deterrence analysis.2 The first of these, in response to the invention of the atom bomb, conceptualized the basis of nuclear deterrence. The second focused on formal theorizing (with the occasional help of game theory), in a world of increasingly diversified nuclear arsenals. The third wave, based on trends observed over a period of many years, used case studies to judge how efficient nuclear weapons had been in deterring aggressions. The fourth wave, leveraging advances in cognitive sciences to challenge the initial “rational actor assumption”, grappled with post-Cold War problems such as so-called rogue states and terrorist networks. We may now be entering a fifth wave, as the expansion of cyberspace and the advent of artificial intelligence and quantum computing may have ramifications for nuclear deterrence. This Research Paper seeks to take stock of this corpus of studies, so as to produce a contemporary framework designed for policy-makers, practitioners and scholars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America