Publishing Institution: NATO Defense College / Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Regional Cooperation

1. Deterrence by Detection: Using Surveillance to pre-Empt Opportunistic Aggression

Author:: Thomas G. Mahnken and Grace B. Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: On NATO’s entire Eastern and South-Eastern flank, the Allies face a major, pressing and subtle challenge. Using sub-conventional grey zone tactics, Moscow has repeatedly tried, and at times succeeded, in expanding its influence, eroding international norms, undermining the rules-based in- ternational order, and shifting the balance of power in its favour. Preventing Russia from launching such op- portunistic acts of aggression is particularly import- ant because its armed forces are developing the ability to attack quickly – under the cover of increasingly capable defences – countries on their periphery in a clear effort to impose a fait accompli.1 NATO countries are at a particular disadvantage in this type of compe- tition. Their force structures consist of expensive and technologically complex information-gathering platforms, such as satellites and manned aircraft, which due to their high costs are also scarce and employed with reluctance by states who generally hesitate to put them in harm’s way. Additionally, the prohibitively high cost of these platforms deters some countries from investing in these types of capabilities. As debates within NATO about cash, capabilities and contributions continue to hold the stage, highlighting Allies’ needs for different types of capabilities – less expensive, more resilient, and relatively more disposable – is important.2 Equal- ly critical is the need for Allies to develop new concepts of operations as well as new organi-zations to employ them effectively. The solution may not involve fielding exotic new capabilities so much as employing existing ones in innovative ways. It will also benefit greatly from approaches that allow Allies and partners to participate fully. If we do not adapt, we risk being surprised by potentially catastrophic events in a future conflict.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Southern Europe

2. Operation Althea and the Virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement

Author:: Olivier Rittimann
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: What is commonly known as the “Ber- lin Plus” arrangements, signed in March 2003, provides for the European Union (EU) to draw upon NATO’s assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance would not be militarily involved. Following lengthy delays incurred by the Cyprus question, it was only as of 2003 that the agreement was successfully implemented with the transfer of operations from NATO to the EU in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2004). The Berlin Plus agreement guarantees EU access to NATO planning capabilities, which contribute to EU- led military operations through the identification of command options, procedures for release and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, and the exchange of classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules. At the end of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1999), the EU had no defence staff fit to plan nor conduct an operation, and it is only fifteen years ago that member states established national Operation Headquarters (OHQ), which nations make available for EU operations, as was done in 2006 in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo and in 2007 in Chad. At the end of the 1990s, the Berlin Plus proposal made em- inent sense: it prevented any duplication (by the EU) of assets and fostered the emergence of a European operational culture. But is the Arrangement still fit for purpose almost 20 years later?
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

3. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:: Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

4. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:: Andris Banka
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

5. NATO 2030: New Technologies, New Conflicts, New Partnerships

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO’s history is marked by both profound continuity and deliberate adaptation. Over the past seven decades, NATO’s mission, the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and its constitutive values – democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law – have not changed. Similarly, the Alliance’s founding principle, namely the commitment Allies have made to defend each other and work together for their common security and defense, is as relevant today as it was when the Alliance was established in 1949. At the same time, NATO has adapted throughout its history to ensure it always remained capable to fulfil its mission and guarantee the defense and security of the almost one billion citizens it was established to protect. In the last decade, this meant that the Alliance had to boost its ability to tackle more sophisticated non-conventional threats. It has done so by investing in resilience as well as by enhancing its tools to fight terrorism, counter cyber threats, and respond to hybrid challenges. Even more fundamentally, since 2014, NATO has responded to the changing security environment by implementing the biggest adaptation of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War. This has led to deploying combat- ready troops in the East of the Alliance, modernizing NATO’s command structure and Headquarters, enhancing the readiness of Allied forces and to an increased and sustained Allied commitment to invest more in defense. In this context, NATO 2030, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s initiative, is driven by the belief that, to remain a strong and agile Alliance, NATO must continue its adaptation and focus on how to respond to a rapidly changing security environment. At the December 2019 NATO Leaders Meeting, Allied Heads of State and Government asked the Secretary General to lead a forward-looking reflection on NATO’s future. They asked him to provide concrete recommendations to NATO leaders in time for the 2021 Summit. In response, the Secretary General launched NATO 2030, focusing on the key question of how to prepare the Alliance for the next decade. To inform his thinking, the Secretary General decided to reach out and gather ideas from a wide number of actors: he appointed an independent group to provide him with their advice, established the NATO 2030 Young Leaders to hear the recommendations of the “next” generation, and launched a number of dialogues with civil society, youth and the private sector. The rationale behind this approach is solid: in an increasingly complex world where security challenges are more diverse and diffuse, it is especially important to engage with a broad set of stakeholders and to take different perspectives into consideration. The NATO Defense College’s work on NATO 2030 fits within this broader set of discussions and contributes to the policy debate on NATO 2030 and on NATO’s future more broadly. The timing is especially ripe for a reflection on NATO’s future adaptation. Looking at 2030, the Alliance needs to prepare for a more uncertain and competitive world. This requires understanding how the shifting global balance of power will affect both the international rules-based order as well as Allied security. It will be essential to consider how to best ready the transatlantic Alliance and how to forge a common approach to tackle these systemic challenges. At the same time, preparing for the future also means accounting for exponential technological changes and their impact on how conflicts are understood and fought; as well as stepping up efforts to combat climate change and prepare to mitigate and counter its security impact. It is also important to stress that while NATO needs to adapt to new challenges, it must also continue to strengthen its ability to tackle existing ones. NATO 2030 thus gives the Alliance an opportunity to both take stock of the impressive adaptation occurred over the past decade and to redouble its efforts to prepare for the upcoming one. To do so, the Secretary General put forward three broad goals: to keep NATO strong militarily, to make the Alliance stronger politically, and to ensure it adopts a more global approach. The papers presented in this volume contribute to the thinking on how to meet each of these goals. First, keeping NATO strong militarily is of course central to ensuring the Alliance’s ability to fulfil its mandate. Collective strength and solidarity are equally crucial to maintain Allied unity and cohesion and to underpin the Alliance’s political role. Ensuring NATO stays strong militarily requires sustained Allied investment in defense, but also a focus on Allied resilience and on technological innovation. Andrea Gilli’s paper on “NATO, Technological Superiority and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” tackles the crucial question of how to ensure NATO’s technological superiority in the future. The paper rightly recognizes that historically the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend has always been predicated upon maintaining a technological edge over competitors and potential adversaries. Looking at a future of exponential technological change and geopolitical competition, it is evident that preserving Allied technological superiority will become simultaneously more complex and more important. NATO has recognized the growing importance of investing in innovation and in preventing a transatlantic gap when it comes to the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies in security and defense. This is why, in recent years, the Alliance has redoubled its efforts in this field. Building on this progress, it is important to examine what more NATO could do towards 2030 when it comes to technological innovation in general and emerging and disruptive technologies specifically. Gilli’s paper points to a number of important areas, including by stressing the need to think creatively about what role NATO can play to foster transatlantic innovation and encourage more Allied investments and cooperation on R&D. A similarly interesting and related notion is the need for NATO to reflect on its role when it comes to transatlantic training and education, both crucial to fostering cooperation and boosting interoperability. Second, NATO 2030 focuses on how to strengthen NATO’s political role. On the one hand, this means ensuring NATO remains the platform where North America and Europe consult and coordinate on all issues relevant to their common security and defense. On the other hand, a more political NATO is also an Alliance that is better able to rely on both military and non-military tools to fulfil its mandate. The importance of this issue emerges clearly in Marc Ozawa’s paper “Adapting NATO to grey zone challenges”. The essay examines NATO’s tools and responses to a world in which competitors and potential adversaries increasingly rely on political, diplomatic, economic and military tools to challenge Allied security. The author argues that responding to these hybrid challenges requires the Alliance to update its broad strategy and expand its toolkit. This conclusion aligns with the Secretary General’s call to update the 2010 Strategic Concept to take into account the new strategic environment. In addition, enhancing NATO’s ability to respond to grey zone challenges, from information warfare, to asymmetric approaches and economic coercion, also means continuing and enhancing the Alliance’s work on resilience, as the first line of defense against both conventional and non-conventional challenges. In this respect, Ozawa rightly argues that NATO should both expand the lens through which it looks at resilience and widen the actors it involves in its consultations on this issue. Expanding NATO’s work on resilience could include, among others, using NATO more as a platform to discuss, identify and mitigate economic vulnerabilities that could be exploited to both sow disagreements and undermine Allied security. Similarly, broadening consultations on issues related to resilience and countering hybrid threats could lead to both more regular NATO meetings of Allied national security advisors and more robust engagement with the private sector. Finally, the Secretary General’s vision for NATO 2030 highlights the importance of adopting a more global outlook. Even though NATO is a regional Alliance, the challenges it faces are global, from terrorism to climate change. In this context, the question of how to better leverage NATO’s partnerships becomes especially important. Thierry Tardy’s essay, “From NATO’s partnerships to security networks” affirms the importance of partnerships as one of NATO’s key political tools and looks at how to further enhance them towards 2030. In a world of growing geopolitical competition, one of the key questions for NATO 2030 is how to further strengthen the Alliance’s political dialogue and practical cooperation with like-minded partners to deal with global challenges and defend the rules-based international order. Another important priority should be to examine how to further invest and leverage in partnerships to contribute to peace and stability in NATO’s immediate neighborhood. The three papers developed by the NATO Defense College’s researchers engage with the Secretary General’s 2030 vision by looking at how the Alliance can enhance its ability to innovate, strengthen its toolkit against hybrid threats and further leverage its partnerships as an important political tool. The breadth of topics reflects the fact that NATO finds itself in the most complex and challenging security environment since the end of the Cold War. In turn, this requires in-depth thinking about how to continue to deter and defend and tackle existing challenges as well as how to redouble efforts to adapt and innovate to address emerging ones.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

6. Central European Security: History and Geography Matter

Author:: Marcin Zaborowski
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The post-Cold War enlargements have changed the Alliance, its geopolitics and the definition of its purpose, which is no longer limited to deterring against threats to Allies’ territory. Enlarge- ments have also redefined the security and defence policies of the new member states, by transforming their armed forces, civil military relationships and im- pacting their defence industries. The states that joined NATO since 1989 are usually categorized as Central Europe or Central and East- ern Europe. Within this Central European realm of new member states, one can distinguish between the North-East, the Centre, the South-East, and the West- ern Balkans. All states in these groupings were com- munist prior to the end of the Cold War. Today, with the Cold War fast becoming a faded memory, Central Europeans tend to define their security needs with in- creasing divergence, with major repercussions on their defence policies, in spite of their belonging to the same Alliance. This Policy Brief maps out Central Europe by identifying groups of states in the region and looking at defence policy divergences. It focuses on a number of indicators, such as defence spending, acquisition of defence equipment and attitudes towards hosting for- eign NATO troops on their soil.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

7. The Strategic Argument for a Political NATO

Author:: Heather A Conley
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The 1949 Washington Treaty is a remarkably brief document consisting of a preamble and 14 articles. The Treaty describes only the po- litical commitments and obligations of the signato- ries. It does not articulate a requirement for NATO members to spend a certain amount of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense nor does it specify the military capabilities that a NATO member must possess to defend the Alliance. From 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was the singular locus of geopolitical discus- sion between North America and Europe. These were not easy discussions, yet the Alliance weathered strident policy and geopolitical policy differences. NATO also endured its members temporarily ceasing to be democracies due to military coups or concern about Communist influence on NATO governments. With a political body standing on the shoulders of a credible military deterrence, Allies were able to deploy creative problem-solving skills to bridge political dif- ferences, such as the policy innovation of deterrence and détente, while pursuing other, quieter methods, such as the temporary suspension of sharing sensitive intelligence from compromised NATO governments. Unfortunately, NATO’s centrality as a political forum greatly diminished after the Cold War as the Alliance reduced its political consultations in a less demanding geopolitical environment. Despite occa- sional interruptions of intense political discussion re- lated to conflict in the Balkans and the September 11th attacks, US retrenchment, combined with Europe’s inward focus, minimized NATO as a political forum. NATO was increasingly consumed by tactical decisions on out-of-area operations and transatlantic policy divisions over the Iraq War which fueled both Europe’s desire for greater autonomy and America’s questioning of the military utility of its Allies. NATO leaders substituted tactical – albeit important – military decisions regard- ing troop contributions, placement, and caveats as a substitute for political discussion. This political drift has now become so great that NATO members have begun to withhold support for the defensive planning of other Allies and new disputes between NATO members have the potential to escalate.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

8. The Global Dimensions of NATO's Future Posture

Author:: Michael Clarke
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO has always been an important player in global politics. It is in the nature of the Alli- ance that its essential military missions were always carefully defined and its geographical boundar- ies strictly set by the collective defence commitments among its members. Nevertheless, NATO’s role as a politico-military institution among the great powers of the Cold War ensured it would always be global- ly significant. It could not have been otherwise. This remains as much the case – though now in different ways – as we consider the international environment taking shape for the 2030s. In this new environment the unavoidable global responsibilities of being a regional military alliance can be summarised in three ways; looking at NATO’s role in helping western powers defend their wider interests in the multi-polar world; helping meet the pseudo-ideological challenges posed by the rise of autocracies; and contributing to issues of the “global commons”.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

9. NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security

Author:: Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: This Research Paper addresses four key issues: 1) a holistic definition of strategic stability, highlighting the principal sources of instability in Europe and identifying requirements for strengthening stability in Europe; 2) an examination of recent NATO efforts to shore up its defense and deterrent capabilities, while underscoring the need to address defense against non-military threats to stability; 3) a discussion of how a comprehensive arms control agenda could contribute to strategic stability, including wide-ranging discussions with Moscow about Russia’s place in an evolving European security framework; and 4) an analysis of three different strategic approaches that NATO might pursue, each of which combines enhancements to military and non-military defense and the possibility of a broader collaborative security agenda. The continuing volatility of NATO’s strategic environment will require that NATO maintain its long-established strategies of deterrence, defense, and reassurance. However, a strategy that depends almost exclusively on the deployment of military forces will be insufficient to sustain strategic stability in the long run. NATO also requires a clear and purposeful strategy that incorporates both defense and dialogue – including arms control policies – as integral and complementary tools for addressing threats. The authors recommend that NATO should proceed to shape a new Strategic Concept by outlining a 21st century Harmel Doctrine, emphasizing both defense and dialogue with Russia as complementary paths to improving strategic stability. Simultaneously, NATO should fulfill its requirements for a 21st century strategy for deterrence and defense in dealing with nuclear, conventional, cyber, hybrid, and other military and non-military threats. For the foreseeable future, NATO will need to craft a strategy for security and stability in Europe based on the assumption that Russia does not share the West’s worldview and will likely continue to seek to undermine the stability and cohesion achieved in Europe following the end of the Cold War. If Russia proves unwilling to engage in a meaningful collaborative security relationship, NATO will be justified in embarking on a 21st century version of a renewed “containment” policy that includes the reintroduction of even greater military capabilities in Europe. In all cases, NATO should ensure that Alliance cohesion – including its transatlantic security link – is preserved even as it deliberates difficult strategic questions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

10. NATO 2030- The Military Dimension

Author:: Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO must “stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach 1 globally”. When launching the reflection pro- cess on NATO’s future role, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg set these three priorities to frame his vision of NATO 2030. At their meeting in London in December 2019, NA- TO’s political leaders mandated a “forward-looking re- flection process” on how NATO should further adapt to ensure it was able to successfully cope with a world of competing great powers due to the rise of China and Russia’s persistently aggressive posture, together with instability along NATO’s southern periphery, new trans- national risks emerging from pandemics, climate change and disruptive technologies. Establishing a unified stra- tegic vision is vital for upholding the Alliance’s cohesion, credibility and effectiveness. Looking forward, what does this mean for NATO’s military dimension?
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

11. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:: Olivier Roy
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

12. Net Assessment: "Competition Is For Losers"

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Under the guidance of the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in 2020 NATO embarked on a reflection process aimed at equipping the Alliance for the challenges of 2030.1 Composed of several parts, actors and phases, the process ul- timately aims to make NATO more relevant in the years ahead when technological disruption, climate change, competition among Great Powers and vio- lent non-state actors will pose new and major threats. Ideas, proposals, and recommendations are coming in from within and from outside the Alliance. Inter- estingly, among the recommendations, several voices have called for NATO to expand its net assessment capabilities.2 For most observers, even in the security and defence world, net assessment is an esoteric word. While many may have heard of Andrew Marshall and the US Department of Defense’s Office of Net As- sessment, most would probably struggle to define the term. This Policy Brief provides a short introduction to the topic: what is net assessment, how and why has it emerged, how reliable is it and how could NATO use it?
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

13. NATO, Strategy, and Net Assessment

Author:: Niccolo Petrelli
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In late 2020, analysts recommended for the first time the establishment within NATO of a net assessment (NA) capability to deal with an in- creasingly complex strategic environment.1 The same recommendation was reiterated in the NATO 2030 report to address the problem of “strategic simultane- ity”: i.e. the emergence of multiple, simultaneous and interconnected threats. According to the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General, “NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office [...] with the mission of examining NATO’s strate- gic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. [...] A net assessment function [...] would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options [...]”.2 The term NA was first coined in the US during the early 1970s by national security official Andrew W. Marshall to refer to a constellation of concepts and techniques for evaluating relative power. In West- ern usage, however, and for some decades now, it has been employed in a broader sense to denote the function of combining the appreciation of one’s own strength against that of one’s opponents in interna- tional affairs at the highest level.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

14. Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy

Author:: Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: This Research Paper seeks to describe and explain the principles of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. It does not defend or take sides – in favour of or against – a particular thesis, concept, idea or school of thought. While it mostly applies to Western conceptions and debates (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, NATO), most of the points made seem widely shared.1 The paper is structured as an investigation of nuclear strategy, moving stage by stage from the conceptual level to the planning level before setting out the issues that revolve around nuclear deterrence. Following an initial conceptualization of deterrence, the paper looks at its implementation in the nuclear domain. It then describes the various notions associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy, as well as the related interactions with weapons systems. It also explains the main dilemmas and questions associated with nuclear strategy, offering food for thought on the future of nuclear deterrence. One author suggests that there have been four waves of nuclear deterrence analysis.2 The first of these, in response to the invention of the atom bomb, conceptualized the basis of nuclear deterrence. The second focused on formal theorizing (with the occasional help of game theory), in a world of increasingly diversified nuclear arsenals. The third wave, based on trends observed over a period of many years, used case studies to judge how efficient nuclear weapons had been in deterring aggressions. The fourth wave, leveraging advances in cognitive sciences to challenge the initial “rational actor assumption”, grappled with post-Cold War problems such as so-called rogue states and terrorist networks. We may now be entering a fifth wave, as the expansion of cyberspace and the advent of artificial intelligence and quantum computing may have ramifications for nuclear deterrence. This Research Paper seeks to take stock of this corpus of studies, so as to produce a contemporary framework designed for policy-makers, practitioners and scholars.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

15. Alliance capabilities at 70: achieving agility for an uncertain future

Author:: Camille Grand and Matthew Gillis
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The credibility of any alliance depends on its ability to deliver deterrence and defence for the safety and secu- rity of its members. Without capability, any alliance is deprived of credibility and exists only on paper. De- spite a rocky history – up to and including the current debate on burden-sharing – capability lies at the heart of NATO’s success. There is good cause to draw opti- mism from the Alliance’s accomplishments throughout its 70 years in providing a framework for developing effective and interoperable capabilities. However, the future promises serious challenges for NATO’s capabilities, driven primarily by new and dis- ruptive technology offering both opportunities and threats in defence applications. Moreover, develop- ments in these areas are, in some cases, being led by potential adversaries, while also simultaneously mov- ing at a pace that requires a constant effort to adapt on the part of the Alliance. On the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, the future outlook requires a serious conversation about NATO’s adaptability to embrace transformation and develop an agile footing to ensure its future relevance.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

16. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept

Author:: Jeffrey H. Michaels
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In the Declaration that emerged from the Decem- ber 2019 London Leaders Meeting, NATO Secre- tary General Jens Stoltenberg was tasked to present Foreign Ministers with “a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant exper- tise, to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation”. This new tasking has been largely attributed to French President Emmanuel Ma- cron’s remark the previous month that the Alliance was suffering from “brain death”. Speaking at a press conference alongside Stoltenberg, Macron elaborated on his comment, complaining the Alliance was overly focused on “cost-sharing or burden-sharing” whereas too little attention was being placed on major policy issues such as “peace in Europe, the post-INF, the re- lationship with Russia, the issue of Turkey, who is the enemy?”3
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, and North America

17. Turkey’s military policy in Syria: implications for NATO

Author:: Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In three decades, Ankara’s strategic agenda in Syria has considerably changed. First, back in the late 1990s, Tur- key’s primary goal was to put an end to the Hafez al-As- sad regime’s use of the PKK terrorist organization as a proxy. To address the threat at its source, Ankara resort- ed to a skillfully crafted coercive diplomacy, backed by the Turkish Armed Forces. A determined approach – championed by Turkey’s late president Suleyman Demi- rel – formed the epicenter of this policy: it was coupled with adept use of alliances, in particular the Turkish-Is- raeli strategic partnership. In October 1998, Syria, a trou- blesome state sponsor of terrorism as designated by the US Department of State since 19791, gave in. The Baath regime ceased providing safe haven to Abdullah Oca- lan, the PKK’s founder who claimed thousands of lives in Turkey. The same year, Damascus signed the Adana Agreement with Ankara, vowing to stop supporting ter- rorist groups targeting Turkey. In the following period, from the early 2000s up until the regional unrest in 2011, Turkish policy aimed at reju- venating the historical legacy. During that time, Ankara fostered its socio-cultural and economic integration efforts in Syria – for example, cancelling visas, promoting free trade, and holding joint cabinet meetings. Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by then Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s thought, popularly formulated in the concept of “Strategic Depth”. Refer- ring to David Laing’s anti-psychiatry school, Davutoglu claimed that the nation was alienated from its roots and embraced a “false self”. To fix the “identity crisis”, Tur- key pursued charm offensives in the Middle East. This ideationally motivated stance even led to speculative neo-Ottomanism debates in Western writings.2 From 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, there were high hopes as to Turkey’s role model status. In April 2012, before the Turkish Parliament, then For- eign Minister Davutoglu stated that Ankara would lead the change as “the master, pioneer, and servant” of the Middle East.3 Five years later, the Turkish administration dropped these aspirations. At the 2017 Davos meeting, then Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek stated that the Assad regime’s demise was no longer one of his gov- ernment’s considerations.4 In fact, by 2015, Turkey had to deal with real security problems on its doorstep, such as the Russian expedition in Syria, ISIS rockets hammer- ing border towns, the refugee influx, and mushrooming PKK offshoots.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, Syria, and North America

18. No time to hedge? Articulating a European pillar within the Alliance

Author:: Jens Ringsmose and Mark Webber
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO has for seven decades seen its share of crisis, argument and division. Still, few would dis- agree that the presidency of Donald Trump has added a new layer of discord and unpredictability to what the late Michael Howard once described as “an unhappy successful marriage”.1 Germany, France, and Denmark have all been brow-beaten by the US President, and even the UK, America’s staunchest ally, has been taken aback by Trump’s behaviour.2 But there is something far worse going on here than a marital argument. By calling into question America’s commitment to Article 5 and even to NATO membership itself Trump has, in effect, threatened a divorce.3 True, Trump’s words are often at odds with American actions. US ma- terial commitment to NATO remains strong, evi- dent in the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), and US participation in exercises such as Trident Juncture and Defender Europe 20. But words still matter, particularly when spoken by a President with a maximalist interpretation of his prerogative powers. Europeans governments may not welcome it, but Trump has raised the possibility of American abandonment. So, the Allies have been forced to consider their options. All European capitals rec- ognize there is no realistic alternative to “Plan A” – a credible American security guarantee – but many are beginning to think of a “Plan B” outside of NATO that supplements the fragile transatlantic link. This sort of reaction to the “Trump shock” is understandable but ill-conceived. Hedging in this way might end up triggering exactly what the Eu- ropeans wish to avoid: the US walking away from its European Allies. There is a risk, in other words, that the hedge will become a wedge. The Europe- an Allies should instead up their game in support of NATO and return to the idea of a European pillar in the Alliance. A stronger and more coher- ent European contribution to defence and securi- ty that straddles both NATO and the EU would demonstrate to a sceptical audience in Washing- ton that NATO-Europe is pulling its weight in the trans-Atlantic Alliance. “Plan A” is still alive, but it could do with a bit of life support.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

19. Projecting Stability to the South: NATO’s other challenge

Author:: Chloe Berger
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In the spring of 2020, the Atlantic Alliance’s “large pe- riphery” to the South, which extends from the Sahel to the Asian borders of the Arabian Gulf, remains in a state of dangerous instability. The health and con- tainment measures taken by the authorities against the COVID-19 crisis have put popular claims to rest. The case of Lebanon shows, however, that the urgency of the pandemic has not made the demands of the pop- ulation disappear. Beyond managing the health crisis, there is no doubt that the future of the region’s lead- erships1 will largely depend on their ability to miti- gate both the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, as well as the political ones. In this “broader MENA” region, whose confines and internal cohesion are unstable, the challenges are ever more complex. Despite the relative consensus between NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Is- tanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners on the deep-rooted causes of the structural instability, the po- tential solutions are much debated. NATO’s “Project- ing Stability” concept raises as many questions with the partners, as it does within the Alliance, since a desired end-state has yet to be defined. While all efforts con- tributing to an increase in stability are a priori welcome, the Alliance and its partners must agree on the conditions of stability in order to identify and implement effective means suited to the local context.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, North America, and Gulf Nations

20. "NATO 2030. United for a new Era.": A Digest

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: On 25 November 2020 the independent Reflection Group, established by the NATO Secretary Gen- eral following the December 2019 London Lead- ers meeting, released its report titled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era”.1 Composed of ten leading personalities,2 the Group was mandated to look at NATO’s current and future role and suggest recommendations on how to rein- force Alliance unity, political consultation between Allies, and NATO’s political role. The initiative came implicitly as a response to the French President’s statement about NATO being “brain dead”, made in the context of the October 2019 US withdrawal from northern Syria and the subsequent Turkish operation there, both apparently carried out without consultation within NATO. The Report is divided into three parts, looking in se- quence at: the vision and main findings; the security and political environment; and recommendations.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

21. "NATO-Mation": Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The increasing power of processors, accuracy of algorithms, and availability of digital data are driving the dramatic artificial intelligence (AI)-centred technological transformation now in progress. These changes have already turned companies, industries and markets upside down, and we are also starting to see their effects on the battlefield. The employment of unmanned vehicles, reliance on big data for target detection, identification and acquisition, as well as the potentials of machine learning in other critical functions such as logistics and maintenance are only some of the possible examples of how warfare will evolve in the near future. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Allies cannot be bystanders during this technological transition. Some countries and organizations have already taken important steps. Others are more hesitant. The Atlantic Alliance has a moral obligation to act, both to preserve and extend its military leadership – and thus the wealth and security of its citizens – and to shape this process in keeping with its democratic principles, freedom-inspired values and commitment to fundamental human rights. As NATO works on its Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which could be published in 2021, this Research Paper aims at contributing to both the policy debate and the public discussion about AI and its implications for the Alliance. The paper offers a series of analyses, lessons learned, proposals, and recommendations, that build on best practices and solutions adopted in the civilian and military fields, on perspectives drawn from the academic literature as well as on ideas generated in the broader AI community. The various parts of the paper are all linked to the single overarching concept of “NATO-mation”, or the idea that NATO has an important role to play so as to prepare for and to shape this technological transformation. NATO Allies need to be proactive: without common, coordinated, cooperative or joint solutions, they will not be able to achieve all their goals effectively and efficiently.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

22. Energy security in the Baltic Region: between markets and politics

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO addresses energy security concerns in three ways, through strategic awareness, infrastructure protection and energy efficiency measures. However, what may be a concern for NATO is potentially a problem for member states with conflicting views on the issue, the politics of which impact their interactions within the Alliance. Nord Stream 2, the trans-Baltic pipeline connecting Ust-Luga (Russia) to Greifswald (Germany), is one such example because it is so divisive. This Policy Brief advocates a role for NATO as a constructive partner with the European Union (EU), the governing body for energy security issues in tandem with national governments, while avoiding the divisive politics of direct involvement. NATO and the EU have complementary perspectives on energy security. The Alliance’s view is directed at broad security implications and the EU’s Director- General for Energy (DG Energy) is more focused on market matters. In this complementarity of perspectives NATO could indirectly assist DG Energy in making better energy policies and help to avoid the politicization of projects that create friction within the EU, the type that can spill over into NATO. The strife around Nord Stream 2, for example, works against both EU unity and cohesion within NATO such that, what may not have originally been perceived as a problem for NATO, becomes one.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

23. Vostok 2018: ten years of Russian strategic exercises and warfare preparation

Author:: Dave Johnson
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The visibility, scale and scope of Russian military exercises have been a focus of the Western media and specialist literature since 2014. Of most recent interest, Russia conducted Vostok 2018, the latest it- eration of its annual strategic1 exercises, from early July to 17 September 2018. Vostok (meaning East) is part of a system of strategic exercises that the Russian Armed Forces have been developing since 2009. It is one of the four named annual strategic exercises conducted on a rotating basis among four of Russia’s five military districts. It should be noted that these visible events represent a small fraction of Russia’s nationwide whole-of-Government effort to develop the ability to conduct large-scale operations against a major military power, and to influence po- tential adversaries.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

24. Preparing for “NATO-mation”: the Atlantic Alliance toward the age of artificial intelligence

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The unprecedented pace of technological change brought about by the fourth Industrial Revolution offers enormous opportunities but also entails some risks. This is evident when looking at discussions about artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML) and big data (BD). Many analysts, scholars and policy- makers are in fact worried that, beside efficiency and new economic opportunities, these technologies may also promote international instability: for instance, by leading to a swift redistribution of wealth around the world; a rapid diffusion of military capabilities or by heightening the risks of military escalation and conflict. Such concerns are understandable. Throughout history, technological change has at times exerted similar effects. Additionally, human beings seem to have an innate fear that autonomous machines might, at some point, revolt and threaten humanity – as illustrated in popular culture, from Hebrew tradition’s Golem to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, from Karel Čapek’s Robot to Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot and the movie Terminator. This NDC Policy Brief contributes to the existing debate by assessing the logic behind some of these concerns and by looking at the historical record. While some worries are warranted, this brief provides a much more reassuring view. The implications are straightforward: NATO, its member states and partners should not be afraid of ongoing technological change, but embrace the opportunities offered by new technologies and address the related challenges. In other words, the Atlantic Alliance should start a new transformation process directed toward the age of intelligent machines: it should start with what I call “NATO-mation”. The goal is not only preserving and enhancing NATO’s military superiority and thus better contribute to global security in the decades ahead but also ensuring that its values, ethical stances as well as moral commitments will remain central in a rapidly- changing security environment.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

25. NATO’s coming existential challenge

Author:: Karl-Heinz Kamp
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Seven decades after it was established, the North Atlantic Alliance is doing fairly well and fully de- serves being described as the most successful secu- rity organization in modern history. By constantly evolving and adapting, NATO managed to main- tain its relevance on both sides of the Atlantic in fundamentally different security environments. It preserved the territorial integrity of its members during the Cold War and was crucial for bringing down the Iron Curtain. It helped to bring peace to the Balkans and prevented Afghanistan from once again becoming a breeding ground for jihadist ter- rorism. Since Russia’s return to revanchist policies in 2014, NATO again guarantees the freedom and security of its members in the East. In the long term though, NATO faces an almost existential problem, as it will be difficult to main- tain its relevance for the United States as the dom- inant power within the Alliance. This will be less a result of the current president’s erratic policy than of the geostrategic reorientation of the US away from Russia and towards China. NATO will also have to fundamentally alter its geographic orienta- tion to avoid falling into oblivion.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

26. NATO’s Futures: the Atlantic Alliance between Power and Purpose

Author:: Sten Rynning
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: This NDC Research Paper argues that in spite of these warning signs, NATO can regain its balance between power and purpose and thus secure its future. NATO’s balancing act is ultimately a question of leadership: it is within the reach of Allied leaders to balance the interests and geopolitics of Europe and Asia, as well as the restrained and affirmative policies that represent Canada and Europe’s inclination for concerted diplomacy on the one hand and the United States inclination for strategic engagement on the other. Regrettably, these leaders may be drawn to some of the easy NATO visions that offer stringency of purpose, as in “come home to Europe”, or inversely, “go global”. Yet the reality of the Alliance’s geopolitical history and experience is that NATO is strong when apparently contrasting interests are molded into a balanced vision. Today, NATO can only encourage European investment in global, US-led policy if it secures stability in Europe, while inversely, NATO can only secure US investment in Europe’s security order if the Allies are open to coordination on global affairs. The report first outlines the basic geopolitical trends with which the Alliance is confronted: an Alliance leader questioning its heritage of overseas engagement, China’s rise as a great power, an emerging alignment between China and Russia in opposition to liberal order, and the track record of southern unconventional threats dividing the Allies on matters such as counter-terrorism, immigration control, stabilization and development. The Allies seem to be hesitating on the West-East axis and paralyzed as a collective on southern issues, which leads the report to sketch three NATO futures.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Liberal Order, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

27. “NATO@70”: still adapting after all these years

Author:: Julian Lindley-French
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In April 1949, at the signing of the foundation doc- ument of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Treaty of Washington, the Western Allies had twelve active divisions. They believed, erroneously as it turned out, that Stalin’s Red Army had 175 di- visions on the other side of the River Elbe which marked the then inner-German border. At the time the West consoled itself with the monopoly that the United States had on atomic weaponry. Such com- placency ended on 29 August 1949 with a nuclear shock when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. The new NATO was also tied inextricably to Europe’s then recent past. Soon after the Treaty of Washington was signed the French newspaper Le Monde suggested that the creation of NATO repre- sent a big step down the road to German rearma- ment: “The rearmament of Germany is present in the Atlantic Pact as the seed in the egg”.1 April 1949 thus encapsulated both the ambition and the tensions that were to mark the three strands of post-World War Two European security and defence: transatlantic relations, the German Question and the road to European Union and how to both engage Russia and defend against it.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Germany, and North America

28. NATO is doing fine, but the Atlantic Alliance is in trouble

Author:: Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Twenty years ago, as the Atlantic Alliance was get- ting ready to celebrate its 50th anniversary, this au- thor published a piece entitled “Will NATO still exist in 2009?”.1 It argued that NATO’s lost sense of mission after the disappearance of the Sovi- et threat, disagreements over peacekeeping, and a growing US disinterest for Europe legitimately raised the question of the Alliance’s ability to sur- vive ten years from then. Today NATO’s Article 5 missions are once again taking center stage and the relevance of the Alli- ance is hardly questioned. But questions are still being raised about its political solidity. Is it more le- gitimate today to wonder about NATO’s existence ten years from now than it was in 1999? To a point, no. There is no longer a significant debate about NATO’s relevance. However, there are severe ten- sions in the transatlantic relation, which Russia’s aggressiveness is unlikely to dampen. NATO has remarkably adapted and has even been rejuvenated: but the Atlantic Alliance remains in trouble. And this, in turn, could have consequences on NATO’s ability to deter and act.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

29. NATO at 70: enter the technological age

Author:: Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: As NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary, it has re- turned nearly all the way to its original deterrence and defence roots. While it remains in the busi- ness of collective security and crisis management, for the past five years – since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – Article 5 tasks have come to dominate the agenda of the commanders, plan- ners and policy makers. As for the years ahead, the challenges come in three forms. The first is to finish the transition to common defence. 2019 is not 1949; the nature of the technologies that determine winners and los- ers has changed. And while NATO has adapted admirably in many ways, it has work left to do, par- ticularly in addressing cyber vulnerabilities. The second challenge is also related to technolo- gies, and it is to start preparing for the next gener- ation of partly or fully automated warfare, which will make use of artificial intelligence (AI). The re- search and development is well under way, on the part of the Allies as well as potential adversaries. A lot less thinking is taking place with regard to how defence politics – the way Allies agree on plans and guide operations – will be affected. That is a mistake. The changes which automation will bring to NATO deliberations will be no less dramatic than those which will happen on the battlefield. The third challenge is more immediate and po- litical in nature: it is to keep the Alliance unified inthe face of unprecedented soul-searching on the part of the biggest Ally, the United States. And while by virtue of its size and dominance Wash- ington tends to be self-referential, reactions from the rest of NATO member states do make a dif- ference, both positive and negative. Their track re- cord over the past two years has been mixed.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

30. Building the airplane while flying: adapting NATO’s force structure in an era of uncertainty

Author:: Sara B. Moller
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO has made a series of reforms (“Adaptation Measures”) to the NATO Force Structure (NFS), the pool of conventional national and multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance’s disposal on either a permanent or temporary basis.1 Designed to strengthen NATO’s long-term military posture and enable quick response to emergencies wherever they arise, the post-2014 initiatives constitute the most ambitious attempt at modernizing the NFS in a generation. While NATO deserves praise for the speed with which it reacted to security developments on its Eastern flank in recent years, the importance Brussels placed on responding quickly has come at the expense of a comprehensive theater-wide strategy for the new force structure. Because the new Adaptation Measures were adopted largely on an ad hoc basis, with different framework nations often taking the lead, the question of their relationship with existing NATO initiatives and structures received insufficient attention early on. Indeed, within the Alliance, many officials continue to liken the post-Wales force structure adaptation process to the act of building an airplane while flying. The political expediency which initially gave rise to the Adaptation Measures has since given way to intra-Alliance debates about burden-sharing and the appropriate number of resources to commit to one flank. At the core of these disagreements lie members’ differing threat perceptions. To succeed, however, the new NFS will require the support of all members. For this reason, it is imperative that NATO officials and member states redouble existing efforts to forge consensus on an Alliance-wide threat assessment.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

31. What NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy?

Author:: Kris Quanten
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until 2001, NATO considered the terrorist threat as a secondary phenomenon with a limited impact on the Alliance. The 9/11 attacks marked a radical turnaround: suddenly terrorism became a top secu- rity priority. This was also the first and only time in NATO’s history that Article 5 was invoked, further- more for a terrorist attack. Initially, the reaction to 9/11 was purely military. However, it soon became clear that there was lit- tle strategic vision underlying the initiatives to fight terrorism at the operational level. Hence, the hasty approval, at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, of a Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.1 This Concept foresaw a number of new initiatives, such as intelligence sharing, CBRN measures, the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, and Civil Emergency planning, as a priority. Yet all these separate initiatives lacked coordination and an overarching vision.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

32. Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO’s North-Eastern border

Author:: Sven Sakkov
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of Europe went on a “strategic holiday”. The West had won and the future was bright. Even the fact that at its weakest the Russian Federation was still able to create frozen conflicts at its borders did not dent this optimism. Defence spending in Eu- rope was plummeting throughout the 1990s, and all the way to 2014. NATO’s prevailing paradigm changed from being a collective defence organi- sation more to something of a collective security actor, with many main missions and a plethora of partnerships. After the shock of 9/11, the Alliance focused on counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Military capabilities required to fight a modern near-peer adversary atrophied even further. In this context, some Allies did not take their eyes off Russia – primarily Poland and the Baltic States. Yet they were perceived by major Western Allies as nuisances requiring psychological counselling, as countries who had been traumatised by their harsh history and hence had become incapable of embracing this new reality of partnership with Rus- sia. Even the Russian military aggression against Georgia in 2008 did not change that Zeitgeist. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her “reset” button to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov just seven months after Russian tanks rolled into Georgia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Northern Europe

33. A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy of Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 1949-2019

Author:: Diego A. Ruiz Palmer
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In this Research Paper, Diego Ruiz Palmer argues, that in spite of the many crises over seven decades, NATO has been a forum in which Allies were able to stand together, build a common purpose, most notably through a process of strategy- making. What is strategy-making and why is it important? Strategy-making is mainly about building a shared sense of strategic thinking and doing within the Alliance; it is about making the Alliance a cohesive and credible defence actor that draws on a solid and Alliance-wide political and military posture. This is achieved through a process of constant consultation, planning, policy-making, shared threat assessment and buy-in by all member states. Strategy-making is important because it determines the long-term success of the project. This was true in the past, but still holds today, at a time when the Alliance is re-embracing a deterrence and defence agenda. If, as Diego Ruiz Palmer puts it, strategy-making has been the “key ingredient in sustaining a constancy of purpose in often turbulent times”, then it must continue to be so, as external and internal challenges – in the post-Cold War era more than ever – question the relevance of the Alliance. Diego Ruiz Palmer recounts the strategic odyssey in systematic and meticulous detail: from the very first steps of the Alliance’s establishment, to the post-Cold War adaptation, through the doctrinal evolutions of the 1960s, to NATO’s strategic and operational renaissance in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Throughout, Diego draws on a rich mix of NATO’s archives and declassified documents, secondary sources, and his own expertise of the institution’s life. The result is inspiring, and will no doubt become a reference document on NATO’s nature and ability to navigate through turbulent strategic waters. One may simply hope that the fate of the Alliance does not resemble that of the Odyssey’s hero.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

34. The necessary adaptation of NATO’s military instrument of power

Author:: Jan Broeks
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of a series of actions taken by Russia: Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; Russia’s military posture and provocative military activities, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violations of NATO Allied air- space, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nu- clear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nucle- ar dimension. In parallel, growing instability in our southern re- gion, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are chal- lenging our security. These factors can all have long- term consequences for peace and security in the Eu- ro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe. Yet it is mainly Russian military actions that have brought deterrence and collective defence back to the fore- front of NATO’s agenda.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

35. Deterring hybrid threats: the need for a more rational debate

Author:: Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine in 2014, the Western strategic community is trying to come to grips with the concept of hybridity.1 Some ob- servers were quick to point out that the idea of combining military and non-military tools was far from new, and they warned against exaggerating hy- brid warfare.2 However, Russia’s apparently seam- less and effective blending of political, diplomatic, economic, electronic and military tools in order to annex Crimea and support separatists in the Don- bas seemed to herald a new era of hybrid warfare: a revisionist power was using both old and new means to undermine and, eventually, tear down a post-Cold War order it considered unfair and un- favourable.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

36. Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a “Low Tension” Environment

Author:: Mathieu Boulegue
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s military posture in the Arctic is informed by the changing geopolitical environment, and can no longer be considered in isolation from the country’s growing tensions with the West. In this sense, the period of “Arctic exceptionalism” – in which, by convention, the region has been treated as a zone of depoliticized cooperation – is coming to an end. Certainly, the Russian Arctic is not exceptional for Moscow in military-operational terms. Russia’s leadership has accorded the same threat perception to the Arctic as it has to other theatres of operation. It seeks consistent control over foreign military activity in the Russian Arctic, and ensured access for Russian armed forces, particularly the Northern Fleet. Russia’s military build-up in the Russian Arctic and the Kremlin’s intentions are, at least for now, defensive in nature. Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) primarily aims to ensure perimeter defence of the Kola Peninsula for the survivability of second-strike nuclear assets. Russia’s “Bastion” defence concept consists of the projection of multi-layered sea denial and interdiction capabilities. Another Russian priority is to ensure the Northern Fleet’s access to, and passage along, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. This has hitherto been achieved through military infrastructure along the NSR. However, due to the receding ice, Moscow will seek to enforce “border control” over a larger portion of its Arctic area in the future. The revamping of dual-use border control infrastructure and facilities is deemed a priority for safeguarding Russia’s vision of national security in the AZRF. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has deployed substantive force and capabilities along its northern border in the AZRF. Parts of the armed forces, such as the Arctic Brigade, are now Arctic-capable and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. The Northern Fleet has been repurposed with the Arctic environment in mind, and has been provided with Arctic-specific military technology and training. Russia acts as a status quo power and a reluctant rule-follower in the Arctic, partly because international law there plays in its favour, and partly because it is in Russia’s interest to do so. Despite growing tension, cooperation between Russia and other Arctic nations is likely to endure.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Arctic

37. Russia and China: “axis of convenience” or “stable strategic partnership”?

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: s the growing relationship between Russia and China a short term “axis of convenience” as some have suggest- ed or rather a “stable strategic partnership” described by China’s former vice Foreign Minister, Fu Ying”.1 Based on current events, it is still too early to tell how substan- tive this relationship will develop. On the one hand, there are impressive achievements in cooperation with clear sig- nals from Moscow and Beijing of their future aspirations, which are serious and long-term. On the other hand, there are indications that things could fall apart quickly consid- ering a contentious history that is still in living memory, lingering distrust and socio-cultural obstacles. Although both countries have finally agreed on a mutually recog- nized border, growing Chinese influence and the sheer disparity of populations in the border region raise con- cerns that even Russian leadership privately acknowledge. For the time being, however, the forces bringing both countries together are enough to overcome these obsta- cles. Although the current direction of bilateral relations is towards cooperation, it is still a fragile sort. Because co- operation requires the participation of Russian and Chi- nese leadership, it could recede without their active pro- motion. In the long term much will depend on how the leadership navigates through the phases of cooperation, both military and economic. For NATO, this underscores the need to incorporate Far East developments into its strategic awareness of the Eastern Flank, particularly with respect to the convergence of political, military and eco- nomic forces.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

38. NATO and EU training missions in Iraq – an opportunity to enhance cooperation

Author:: Niels Schafranek
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the past fifteen years, NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation has been expanding with mixed results. Fundamentally, the two organizations are different: NATO, as an intergovernmental military alliance, focuses on collective defence, crisis man- agement and cooperative security. The EU, on the other hand, is a political and economic union that has developed a security agenda under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, there are also overlapping security activities such as the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, involving the EU in peacekeeping, and potentially even tasks of combat for EU forces in crisis management.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

39. Fighting “Men in Jeans” in the grey zone between peace and war

Author:: Peter Braun
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2014, all NATO Summit Declarations have pointed to terrorism and hybrid warfare as the main and most immediate threats to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance and its members.1 Surprisingly, the two threats are largely addressed separately – the fact that ter- rorism happens to be an important element of hybrid warfare is not mentioned at all. This pa- per seeks to examine whether NATO’s current concepts of counter-terrorism (CT) are ade- quate for countering potential terrorist threats in a hybrid environment. To do so, the paper be- gins by examining how terrorism could be used in a hybrid scenario. Thereafter, the particular challenges that these threats pose to collective defence, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, are addressed. Finally, this paper considers the extent to which key elements of NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy fit the spe- cific challenges posed by terrorism as a possible component of hybrid warfare.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

40. From hybrid warfare to “cybrid” campaigns: the new normal?

Author:: Antonio Missiroli
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The speed and intensity at which the strategic land- scape has evolved over the past two decades requires constantly updating our analytical and operational tools, capturing change as it occurs, anticipating it whenever possible, and also framing it in terms that facilitate adaptation and cooperation. The recent de- bates over “hybrid” are an excellent case in point.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

41. The role of democracy and human rights adherence in NATO enlargement decisions

Author:: Eyal Rubinson
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: What is the role that democracy and adherence to hu- man rights play in NATO enlargement decisions? Democratic conditionality, a strategy of setting clear benchmarks of liberal-democratic reforms as a pre- requisite for membership, has been a central theme in NATO history. Adherence to democracy and human rights was cited in the Washington Treaty of 1949, and more recently in the 1995 Study on NATO En- largement, the 1994 Framework Document of the “Partnership for Peace” programme, the 1999 Mem- bership Action Plan (MAP) and other fundamental texts. However, despite this repeated insistence on condi- tionality, many candidate states did not satisfactorily improve their records pre-accession, and are increas- ingly unable to meet the requirement of a function- ing democracy, according to internationally renowned indices.
Topic:: NATO, Human Rights, Regional Cooperation, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Global Focus

42. NATO and the EU The essential partners

Author:: Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The state of NATO-EU relations is currently high on the political agenda. There are at least three reasons for this. First, there is a genuine expectation that both organisations should increasingly work together and complement each other in an era where threats are multifaceted. There is a recognition that tackling such threats, while having to adapt their respective positions in light of geopolitical muscle flexing in other parts of the world, requires both organisations to strengthen the partnership. In 2016, the two institutions adopted a Joint Declaration that reflected on this necessity: “In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond”.1 Second, there are concerns over how NATO-EU relations are faring at a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times. In particular, US relations with several EU member states and the EU in general are mired in disagreements on issues ranging from the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, to the possibility of introducing new tariffs on specific goods traded between the two sides. Looming on the horizon there are also concerns about the implications of Brexit for NATO-EU relations – in particular, whether it may inadvertently complicate both organisations’ ability to work together.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

43. What NATO contribution to the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific?

Author:: Jean-loup Samaan
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: On 3rd April, 2019 in Washington, DC, US Vice Pres- ident Mike Pence addressed an audience of Western current and former statesmen gathered to celebrate the 70th anniversary of NATO. After taking stock of the Alliance’s accomplishments over the previous decades, Pence ventured on the emerging challenges and touched on an unexpected subject, the Indo-Pa- cific region: “By working together, we can maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific where independent na- tions boldly pursue their own interests”.1 Although the Indo-Pacific has by now become a central feature of policy discussions in the US, it has been relatively absent from talks within NATO circles, as the issue is perceived as a matter lying outside the organization’s mandate. But security de- velopments in this region do matter for its member countries. Moreover, there are ways the organization could play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific with- out compromising its pre-existing priorities. Against that backdrop, this Policy Brief aims to contribute to the emerging discussion on NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific by first providing an appraisal of the policy implications of the US strategy towards the region, and then identifying realistic expectations for a NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Indo-Pacific

44. The enhanced Forward Presence: innovating NATO’s deployment model for collective defence

Author:: Christian Leuprecht
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) is not merely a deterrence mechanism that relies on NA- TO’s reputation to guard the northeastern flank, but an innovative deployment model in response to the spectrum of emerging threats that confront the Alliance and its members. On the one hand, the eFP enables select mem- ber states to support others, harnessing the econ- omies and economics of an alliance with the legit- imacy of a NATO mandate under circumstances where not all member states want to, or are able to, opt in; or when timelines are tighter than a full- fledged NATO mission could meet. On the other hand, the eFP’s potential for crisis management and security cooperation to address the spectrum of traditional and emerging threats identified in the Wales, Warsaw, and Brussels Summit commu- niqués is considerable: collective defence aside, the current eFP is already showing promise in areas such as building societal resilience and improved security cooperation among member states that are deploying and exercising together – but, in the case of the Baltic states, for instance, without a permanent US headquarters or operational pres- ence. This study starts with a summary of the ratio- nale that informs the eFP and situates it as a quint- essential manifestation of NATO’s new mission set beyond the 2014 Wales Summit. The eFP is be- spoke for the highly dynamic and complex threat environment that is challenging NATO resources on multiple fronts, both in- and out-of-area. The Brief explicates the political and deterrence pur- poses of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in northeastern Europe. It also considers eFP’s strategic effects, conceptual limits, and the extent to which this new deployment model might lend itself to confronting a myriad of security risks – conventional and unconventional – that member states face in the 21st century. The final sections rationalize the prospects and value of applying the eFP framework for other conceivable in-area op- erations: the benefits that accrue from rotational forces, and in circumstances when there is NATO consensus but absent willingness by all members to make an actual contribution and commitment; all of which embodies the premium put on the shift in deterrence from political reputation to mil- itary preparedness.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

45. NATO at 70: what defence policy and planning priorities?

Author:: Patrick Turner
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO at 70 shows no sign of slowing down. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by a growth in the challenges to which we must respond, and a high tem- po of decisions and adaptation. NATO’s ability to adapt to the changing security environment has always been a core strength – but this ability has been and will continue to be put to the test. In the last five years, since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been going back to basics. Its core purpose of defending Allies has come back to the fore. But not to the exclusion of other tasks and priorities such as: NA- TO’s operations and missions, for example in Afghani- stan, Kosovo and Iraq; our broader contributions to the international fight against terrorism; or our work to build partner capacity. This Policy Brieffocuses on NATO’s efforts to strength- en its defence posture. The NATO shorthand for our efforts to improve our collective defence is deterrence, defence and dialogue (the “three Ds”). These are un- derpinned by responsiveness, readiness and reinforce- ment (the “three Rs”), as well as strengthened national resilience to attack. More investment and commitment by non-US Allies in line with the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the shorthand for which is cash, capabilities and contri- butions (the “three Cs”), provides the crucial enablers for the three Ds and the three Rs.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

46. Calibrating the scope of NATO’s mandate

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Anniversaries are opportunities to look back at what has been achieved and to look forward to what ought to be changed and, possibly, improved. Having reached a mature age, an anniversary can also be an occasion to ponder deeper questions of self-identity, purpose and ambition. In 2019 NATO turned 70, and if, overall, it can be proud of what it has achieved for the security of its citizens since 1949, there are also challenges that con- strain its full success as a security actor. More specifically, since 2014, the combination of the Alliance’s two main missions of “deterrence and defence” and “projecting stability”, furthermore in a context of transatlantic tur- bulence and deep tension among member states, has raised a number of questions about NATO’s capacity to remain united and fit for purpose. While the security environment is increasingly com- plex, with constantly evolving threats, and adversaries challenging established state actors and the way they fight, how should NATO further adapt to remain rel- evant? While conflicts are increasingly “hybrid”, should NATO embrace the largest portfolio possible to match the various layers of hybridity, or should it stay focused on what it does best – delivering hard power? Proba- bly both: staying focused might be an option in an ide- al world, but in fact, broadening the scope of NATO’s mandate will be difficult to resist.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

47. The Brain and the Processor: Unpacking the Challenges of Human-Machine Interaction

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: This volume touches upon this and a set of related messages that ultimately put human beings at the very center of this transformation toward intelligent machines: one of the paradoxes of the second machine age – as Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee call it – is in fact that the more tasks computers take over, the more important becomes the role of people.4 Technology replaces tasks, not human beings, and human beings at each round of automation specialize in the tasks with higher added value.5 In other words, technological changes tend to complement human activities, enabling people to specialise in those areas where they have a comparative advantage. However, the transition is not bereft of problems: new skills and new organizational structures are needed to exploit the potentials of new technologies. The emergence of artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data – that in this volume will be interchangeably used alongside terms such as intelligent machines – can potentially represent a major turning point in human history. For the moment, we are dealing – and we will likely continue to do so – with weak or limited AI, namely single- purpose systems, i.e. machines that may reach an outstanding performance in one realm but cannot even fulfill the most basic task in a related field.6 Strong, or general, artificial intelligence – also referred as singularity – will occur when machines will, like human beings, be able to conduct a plurality of multidimensional activities, from driving a car to empatizing with peers, from playing video games to conducting different work activities.7 The contributions in this volume attempt to map the underlying causes, direct implications and broader consequences of the transformation at hand. Their main collective value is that they adopt different, but complementary approaches that ultimately corroborate the underlying theme of the entire volume, namely that as machines become more capable and easily available, the more important become human beings. The world of defense and security often looks with both amazement and concern at other fields. It rarely, however, truly engages with them, also intellectually. Building on a conference jointly organised in December 2018 between the NATO Defense College Research Division and the Paris-based Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, this volume has tried to address this shortfall by bringing together defense scholars and security practioners, economists and psychologists, historians and lawyers as well as business consultants and roboticists with the goal of looking from different angles at the domain of AI and reason, together, on its possible meanings and consequences.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

48. Imitation, innovation, disruption: challenges to NATO's superiority in military technology

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Analysts, academics and observers are worried that NATO countries may lose their industrial leadership in defence production. Globalization and advances in communications are widely believed to enable enemies and adversaries alike to copy NATO countries’ state- of-the-art weapon systems, and possibly even surpass them by developing next-generation weapon systems. Moreover, so-called disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and additive manufac- turing are believed to offer cheaper and less technologi- cally demanding options to countries that do not possess the decades’ old defence industrial base of NATO coun- tries. These countries could then use such new technolo- gies for weakening NATO force structure. These concerns are real and deserve close scrutiny. However, adversaries and competitors still face signif- icant challenges which are more insidious than those NATO countries are facing. Because of the complexity of modern technology, imitation, innovation and disruption in armaments production have become increas- ingly demanding over the past decades – especially for naval and aerial platforms intended to operate in com- petitive environments. For NATO this implies more tar- geted defence investments and exploitation of industrial specialisation across the Alliance, as well as experimen- tation and innovation with new technologies to favour their future integration into the NATO force structure.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS