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1. The Effects of Convergence: Internationalisation and the Changing Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms

Author:
Anke Hassel and Jürgen Beyer
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The paper examines whether and how the increasing internationalisation of firms impacts on the operation of a co-ordinated market economy. Following the tenets of agency theory it assumes that an emerging market for corporate control changes the monitoring mechanisms that oversee management. Since Anglo- American forms of monitoring are usually associated with a higher return for investors compared with Continental European firms, a change in the distribution of the net value added of firms is expected. Using financial data on 59 large German companies, the paper shows that the emerging convergence of German corporate governance practices to Anglo-American standards has had a weak, but significant, impact on the distribution of net value added. This is in contrast to the impact of the internationalisation of firms on product markets, which does not have an effect. Since the market for corporate control is, however, still underdeveloped in Germany, the main effects remain to be seen.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
America, Europe, and Germany

2. An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance

Author:
Gregory Jackson and Martin Hopner
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Corporate governance in Germany is often described as a bank-oriented, blockholder or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control have not played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. These changes include the strategic reorientation of German banks from the “house bank” to investment banking, the growing consensus and productivity orientation of employee codetermination and corporate law reform. A significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control. The implications for the German model are examined in light of both claims by agency theory for the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities within Germany's specific “variety” of capitalism. While the efficiency effects are questionable, the growing pressures for German corporations to achieve the higher stock market valuations of their Anglo-American competitors threaten the distributional compromises underlying the German model.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
America and Germany