Publishing Institution: International Institute for Strategic Studies / Publication Year: within 25 Years / Topic: Military Strategy

1. Regional security and alliances in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific: implications for European security

Author:: Bastain Giegerich, Emile Hokayem, and Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Regional security dynamics and the constructs to manage them are in flux around the world. Governments are attempting to address a multitude of simultaneous security challenges; determine the depth and scope of achievable and desirable security autonomy versus the unavoidable interdependencies with friends and opponents alike; and maintain a focus on their specific regional hotspots, whilst also positioning themselves for the era of systemic competition between an assertive China and the United States. This research paper analyses the challenges and implications of regional security dynamics in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific for European security to inform discussions in NATO and the EU on their respective global role and help decide on an achievable level of ambition for dealing with partners and challengers. Against this background, both the European Union and NATO are revising their strategic guidance to produce in 2022 – in the case of the EU – the so-called Strategic Compass, a document to give further shape and substance to the Union’s international security role, and – in the case of NATO – a new Strategic Concept to replace an earlier version developed in 2010. Aspects of international order, geopolitics and regional stability will inform these documents as both organisations will need to tackle their respective global role and decide on an achievable level of ambition for dealing with partners and challengers. NATO’s 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué suggested that NATO would work to improve its ‘ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security… [and] increase… dialogue and practical cooperation with existing partners’. In addition, NATO heads of state and government decided to ‘strengthen NATO’s ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners’. The draft Strategic Compass document debated by EU ministers in November 2021 stated that the EU would ‘bolster partnerships where they are mutually beneficial and serve EU values and interests, particularly when there is a shared commitment to an integrated approach to crises and capacity building’, and proposed a range of multilateral, regional and bilateral initiatives to deepen and strengthen partnership formats.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Middle East and Indo-Pacific

2. Assessing military cyber maturity: strategy, institutions and capability

Author:: Greg Austin and Jason Blessing
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms to their military cyber forces must be made. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by international circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, or whether they warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. One of the most profound influences on the evolution of a country’s military cyber forces and strategies is politics. This paper offers insights into how the governance and organisational factors of domestic politics facilitate or inhibit the dissemination of cyber concepts and capabilities throughout military forces beyond the main signals or cyber intelligence agency. There are at least three reasons to analyse military cyber maturity. The countries currently pursuing such capabilities are not satisfied with the development levels in policy and strategy they have so far reached. There is increasing potential for crippling cyber attacks on key elements of military capability or supporting infrastructure. And no country has yet succeeded in the broad dissemination of cyber capabilities through its armed forces in ways that leading military planners would like. Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms in the armed forces must be made to satisfy national security needs. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by inter-national circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, akin to artillery or submarines; or whether they are sufficiently transformative of military power to warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. This paper provides an impact matrix which can be used by governments, their armed forces and research analysts to understand the ways in which military cyber reforms can be facilitated or inhibited by governance and organisational processes.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Digitization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

3. Military capabilities in Europe: a framework for assessing the qualitative dimension

Author:: Bastain Giegerich and James Hackett
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: There is renewed focus in Europe on deterring and defending against state-level aggression. However, after decades of mainly crisis-management operations abroad, questions are being asked about the capability of European armed forces to achieve these tasks. Within the context of a deteriorating security environment, limited resources and a need for governments to better explain the benefits of defence, this report examines factors important in assessing military capability. There is particular focus on six input areas that are central to assessing the qualitative dimension of capability. The report includes contributions from seven specialists from across Europe, offering perspectives on these lines of enquiry and their relative importance to European states’ military capability now and in the future.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, State Building, and Resource Management
Political Geography:: Europe

4. Military ambitions and competition in space: the role of alliances

Author:: Greg Austin, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, and Tim Wright
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Emerging trends in space ambitions and capabilities of major state actors have given renewed urgency to efforts by NATO and other coalitions to build stronger alliance relations to secure shared interests in space. This report reviews the military ambitions, operations and capabilities of leading and aspiring space powers in order to assess their likely impact on alliances, partnerships or other national-security coalitions. China wants to overtake Russia as a space power by 2035 and become at least a co-equal with the United States by 2045. For its part, Russia is determined to maintain its standing as a space power. Both are testing the boundaries of the existing order in space through various actions, including weapons testing, and both are keen to demonstrate that they now have the capabilities to attack adversary space assets. Partly in response to this, in 2020 the US declared its intention to radically reshape the operating environment of space to better meet its interests, while its allies and partners have announced new space ambitions as well. India and Japan are setting new strategic goals for space policy in response to China’s threatening behaviour. France is positioning itself to climb higher up the ladder of military space power, while the United Kingdom and Germany have set new aspirations for economic gain and further influence on the diplomatic aspects of space. In this environment, military alliances have become more prominent in shaping space policy. The US has stepped up its engagement with other governments, either through existing alliances or new partnerships, to secure its interests. China and Russia, which have few allies of relevance, except perhaps each other, are concentrating on constraining the effectiveness of the United States’ alliances. The three space powers harbour renewed fears of technological surprise by their rivals, and this makes sharing research on space warfare among allies more important than ever. For example, testing of the most visible space weapons, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, is escalating – and this is now only one of more than 20 forms of attack on space assets being tested or already in place. But there remain questions about how to achieve scale and military effect using all these methods for wartime operations, including kinetic ASAT weapons: would China or Russia be able to launch successful attacks against the entire military satellite fleet of the US (all 173 units) in the opening stages of a war? Assuming they could not, what proportion of the fleet would have to be disabled for the attack to have a positive military or strategic effect for the attacker?
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, Strategic Competition, and Territory
Political Geography:: Global Focus

5. Managing the looming missile-proliferation problem in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In light of the range of capabilities that contemporary missile systems and associated technologies can provide, it is unsurprising that more and more states around the world aspire to acquire them. In the Asia-Pacific, the involvement of the three major nuclear powers – China, Russia and the United States – as well as middle powers make the situation even more complex and unstable. When the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, the Asia-Pacific seemed to enter a ‘post-INF’ era in which regional states may face dim prospects for arms control and potentially a fierce theatre-level, missile-led arms race. This essay reviews emerging trends in missile proliferation and analyses the relevant risks of these trends before assessing some of the mechanisms that address proliferation challenges. It then explores ways of curbing and even reversing these trends from a Chinese perspective. It is increasingly clear that since 2010 the world has been undergoing a period of nuclear modernisation and missile proliferation. The US and Russia, which possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have both recently accelerated efforts to modernise their respective nuclear arsenals. As highlighted in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the subsequent policy and budget decisions of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has abandoned a pledge – made by former president Barack Obama − to abstain from researching and deploying new kinds of nuclear warheads. Since then, the US has deployed a low-yield nuclear warhead (W76-2) on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in late 2019 and begun to redevelop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) as another key component of its nuclear-modernisation plan. For the air-leg of the US triad, the US Air Force received a final proposal for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) in November 2020 ahead of its preparations to seek approval for the system’s development. The LRSO is a nuclear-armed cruise missile intended to serve as a replacement for the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Furthermore, the US also tested a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) in August 2019 and a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in December 2019 following Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. All these capabilities are deemed by the US to be effective measures to counter a limited nuclear attack from Russia or China. Russia, which maintains a stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads assigned for use and an estimated further 2,060 awaiting retirement and dismantlement, is in the middle of a decades-long nuclear-forces modernisation programme. This modernisation also incorporates the addition of new types of strategic delivery systems, which were unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. These include a new nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Avangard, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, Burevestnik, a new anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, Zircon, and a nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped uninhabited underwater delivery vehicle, Poseidon.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

6. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

7. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

8. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

9. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

10. The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military-to-military cooperation in response to the global coronavirus pandemic signals a growing role for the military within China’s diplomatic activities. Historically, the PLA played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, in the wake of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA’s role in national diplomacy and security strategy has grown to serve both strategic and operational goals and has reached new heights in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Military-to-military COVID-19-related engagement has taken place within a larger context of Beijing’s expanded diplomatic efforts to improve China’s global reputation following its initial delayed and mishandled response at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Publicly available data shows that COVID-19 military diplomacy began in March 2020, when the PLA sent protective equipment and clothing to Iran. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. The PLA’s vaccine assistance to 13 countries globally fits within a wider vaccine-centric diplomatic effort by the Chinese government but so far has been far smaller in scale. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa. The focus on the BRI and South–South diplomacy also reflects China’s wider diplomatic narrative and foreign policy objectives. The PLA’s activities were usually framed within the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative that China sought to promote through its civilian aid diplomacy. It is likely that the PLA sought to cooperate with militaries wherever it could and focussed on countries with which it already enjoyed established friendly relations, rather than using the PLA’s military diplomacy to establish new strategic relations. The PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s instructions.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China and Asia

11. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities

Author:: Antoine Levesques
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: South Asia and Asia

12. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India

Author:: Manpreet Sethi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

13. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

14. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia

15. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Middle East

16. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:: Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe

17. Revitalising arms control: the MTCR and the HCoC

Author:: William Alberque
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The paper examines the two most important multilateral frameworks for curbing the spread of uninhabited aerial systems (missiles and UAVs) capable of delivering large conventional payloads and weapons of mass destruction – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Specifically, the paper discusses the origins and history of the MTCR and HCoC, their evolution over time (or lack thereof) and seeks to measure them against their intended goals. In the end, it urges for radical reform, but also provides suggested incremental changes that should be enacted immediately. It includes analysis of several specific regional security issues and related action–reaction defence-modernisation trends. This paper was drafted within the framework of the Missile Dialogue Initiative (MDI). The MDI was launched by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2019 and is administered by the IISS. The MDI has created a Track 1.5 dialogue (government and non-government experts working together) to contribute to state-level discussions of potential policy responses to the accelerating spread of missile capabilities to state and non-state actors. The MDI appears in the context of the erosion of the global and regional arms-control architecture and during a period of rapid technological change, which includes the evolution and spread of new, advanced missile systems that have contributed to growing instability.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Instability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

18. Leading edge: key drivers of defence innovation and the future of operational advantage

Author:: Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The ability to develop and integrate emerging and disruptive technologies in defence is rapidly becoming a metric of success in the global competition for power. In this paper, Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier provide a systematic conceptualisation of defence innovation. By empirically analysing innovation efforts in five countries – notably, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the paper identifies and analyses four key drivers of defence innovation, provides a better understanding of how the five nations prioritise among them, and explores how they are linked to future operational advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

19. Armed uninhabited aerial vehicles and the challenges of autonomy

Author:: Douglas Barrie, Oskar Glaese, Niklas Ebert, and Franz-Stefan Gady
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Two decades ago, the notion of arming an uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) was little more than a niche pursuit. Today, at least 20 countries have weaponised UAV systems in their inventories, with other nations pursuing acquisition, while the capability is also proliferating to non-state actors. The air vehicles range from small, crude, hobbyist-style UAVs favoured by some non-state groups, to large, long-endurance platforms capable of being fitted with a range of sensors and air-to-surface weapons. Technological development continues apace with an increasing emphasis on greater automation and reducing the human workload, along with the emergence of a type of hybrid UAV and air-to-surface munition along side the more established loitering munition. While uninhabited systems are increasingly embraced by many armed forces, they remain an uneasy subject in the wider public realm, where the perceived lack of human control remains an ethical issue. There also continues to be concern in the legal community regarding how increasingly automated – and perhaps one day autonomous – weapon systems fit within the law of armed conflict – legal concept rather than legislation, sometimes also referred to as international humanitarian law. These subjects were the focus of a 21–22 June 2021 seminar organised by IISS Europe to help further the debate and to better understand the implications of weapons-capable uninhabited systems. This paper reflects the discussions and many of the issues raised by the participants.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Europe

20. Ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East: the current landscape and options for arms control

Author:: Hassan Elbahtimy
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East. Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address. While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Middle East

21. Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Little is known about how China’s growing defence budget is allocated, particularly following recent structural reforms. In the absence of publicly available information and new research on Chinese defence economics, outside observers consider the official data to be incomplete. Publications addressing Chinese defence spending often claim that ‘it is widely believed’ official Chinese statistics exclude key categories of military-related spending. For instance, in 2003, one analyst wrote that ‘it is widely accepted that the official budget released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual defense spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure are believed to be missing from official figures.’ The methodologies employed by research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to estimate China’s total military spending date back to the late 1990s. Furthermore, existing estimates do not take into account China’s recent military reorganisation under President Xi Jingping’s direction, which began in 2015, and a wide range of defence reforms. For example, in 2018, the Chinese authorities integrated the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the maritime militias into the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) command structure. It is currently unclear how this restructuring has affected China’s defence spending. In addition, China’s defence spending could have been affected by the increasing fulfilment of weapons procurements by domestic firms. Therefore, a reassessment of China’s defence spending and the methodologies employed is required.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. Post-INF Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific: Political Viability and Implementation Challenges

Author:: Tanya Ogilvie-White
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Collaborative efforts to build a new arms-control architecture are urgently needed following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) – especially in the Asia-Pacific, where arms-racing pressures are unbridled. High-level discussions within the Trump administration on deploying previously prohibited ground-based INF-range (500–5,500 kilometres) missiles in the Asia-Pacific could hamper progress; rather than convincing Beijing to engage in (as-yet-unspecified) trilateral arms-control negotiations, they could increase strategic risks, strain relations between the United States and its allies in the region (Australia, Japan and South Korea) and encourage closer Sino–Russian military cooperation. Efforts to create arms-control momentum are welcome, but to be politically viable, new initiatives need to be fair, equitable and underpinned by strategic empathy, reciprocity and mutual restraint. A more constructive approach would see the US and its Asia-Pacific allies using their combined diplomatic capital to push for a formal regional arms-control dialogue, which could initially focus on confidence building and strategic-risk reduction, and over the longer term help lay the foundations for a new arms-control regime.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:: Global Focus

23. Inevitable bedfellows? Cooperation on Military Technology for the Development of UAVs and Cruise Missiles in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: Amy J. Nelson and T. X. Hammes
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Today, the ‘small, smart and many’ revolution is providing state and non-state actors with capabilities that previously belonged only to great powers. Advances in specific technologies and manufacturing are broadening access to long-range precision-strike capabilities, and an increasing number of states have an incentive to take advantage of this – particularly those that share a border with China. This paper examines how the evolution of enabling technologies and changes in strategic objectives are increasing the likelihood that uninhabited-aerial-vehicle (UAV) and cruise-missile technologies will proliferate throughout the Asia-Pacific. Through arms sales, new technology-sharing relationships are likely to be created and existing ones reinforced. The current rapid pace of technological evolution means that non-aligned states, non-state actors and even second-tier defence companies are pursuing and contributing to UAV and cruise-missile capabilities. We conclude that although the proliferation of advanced weapons is normally a cause for concern regarding escalation, modern cruise missiles and UAVs may today serve as weapons that smaller states can use to deter aggression from larger states. Historically, the drive to obtain ballistic-missile technology has – when not inhibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and other non-proliferation initiatives – produced unlikely state-to-state development partners (some of which paired off specifically in order to circumvent MTCR restrictions). Ballistic-missile proliferation saw the emergence of partnerships between Pakistan and North Korea, Iran and North Korea, and Ukraine and China – all forged to develop or provide capabilities via aligned political interest. In 2008, Dennis Gormley warned that the pattern of cruise-missile proliferation would likely mirror that of ballistic missiles. It does indeed appear that UAV and cruise-missile proliferation is seeing the same pattern of cooperative, facilitated proliferation. Moreover, while developing nations have historically piggybacked on stronger states through technology sharing, today they are assisted through a number of sharing modalities and mechanisms, including technology adoption, overt cooperation (either co-production or co-development) and sales. To complicate matters further, these mechanisms may also be executed by non-state actors (from violent extremist organisations to defence contractors).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

24. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. Promoting and Projecting Stability: Challenges and Perspectives

Author:: Amanda Lapo, Bastain Giegerich, and James Hackett
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of EU and NATO policy. There is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for stabilisation measures while at the same time complicating their supply. This paper focuses on the role that military and security actors can play in supporting stabilisation efforts. The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of European Union and NATO policy. This ambition is also reflected in many of their member states’ national-level policy and strategy documents. The direction and implementation of these policies are influenced by a range of motivations including security worries, humanitarian concerns and historical ties. Stability is a challenging endeavour at the best of times, and there is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for it while at the same time complicating its supply.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Political stability, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

26. China Global Security Tracker

Author:: Helena Legarda
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Europe has become a major target of China’s push to acquire advanced key technologies. These technologies support the development of dual-use products with civilian as well as military applications, a development that is in line with China’s efforts towards civil-military integration. The EU has been slow to wake up to this trend. Despite recent efforts, including those to set up a tighter investment screening mechanism, it still lacks strong coordinated regulations to protect its research and technologies. Even more importantly, the author of our newest China Global Security Tracker, MERICS researcher Helena Legarda, warns that Europe lacks a clear policy or strategy to keep up with China’s ambitions in this area. Joint European initiatives providing strategic guidance and adequate funding for innovation in dual-use technologies will be needed to not only preserve but to advance the EU’s scientific and engineering expertise. The China Global Security Tracker is a bi-annual publication as part of the China Security Project in cooperation between Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This issue also features the Trump administration’s tightened export controls in response to China’s civil-military integration efforts, and it tracks other security developments in China in the second half of 2018, from the launch of a number of new defense systems to an increase in China’s military diplomacy activities around the world.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Beijing, and Asia

27. Defending Europe: scenario-based capability requirements for NATO’s European members

Author:: Ben Barry, Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, and Bastain Giegerich
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The study applies scenario analysis – with scenarios set in the early 2020s – to generate force requirements, and assesses the ability of NATO’s European member states to meet these requirements based on data from the IISS Military Balance Plus online database. The cost of closing the identified capability shortfalls through equipment acquisition has been estimated. The objective of the study is to enable informed policy dialogue both in Europe and in a transatlantic setting. The study explicitly does not intend to predict future conflicts nor the intentions of any of the actors involved. Neither does it wish to prescribe a certain path of action to be pursued by European NATO governments. The first scenario examined deals with the protection of the global sea lines of communication (SLOCs). In this scenario, the United States has withdrawn from NATO and has also abandoned its role of providing global maritime presence and protection, not just for its own national interest but also as an international public good. It thus falls to European countries to achieve and sustain a stable maritime-security environment in European waters and beyond, to enable the free flow of international maritime trade, and to protect global maritime infrastructure. The IISS assesses that European NATO members would have to invest between US$94 billion and US$110bn to fill the capability gaps generated by this scenario. The second scenario deals with the defence of European NATO territory against a state-level military attack. In this scenario, tensions between Russia and NATO members Lithuania and Poland escalate into war after the US has left NATO. This war results in the Russian occupation of Lithuania and some Polish territory seized by Russia. Invoking Article V, the European members of NATO direct the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to plan Operation Eastern Shield to reassure Estonia, Latvia and Poland, and other front-line NATO member states, by deterring further Russian aggression. European NATO also prepares and assembles forces for Operation Eastern Storm, a military operation to restore Polish and Lithuanian government control over their territories.
Topic:: NATO, Military Strategy, Maritime, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and Europe

28. Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation

Author:: Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, Connor Hannigan, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Between March and November 2018, the 25 participating member states launched 34 projects, with the core aim of addressing the EU’s capability shortfalls. In May 2019, a call for a third round of project proposals will be launched. The IISS undertook an early assessment of how PESCO projects are carried out, to assess whether the momentum on the ground has continued since the projects were announced at the political level. A strong pace of implementation would require detailed timelines, deadlines and financial plans, as well as clear links with EU capability requirements. Questionnaires were sent to the projects’ country leads, and were complemented by interviews and secondary-source research. We looked at various dimensions of implementation: timelines, financial commitments, stakeholder involvement and the projects’ relation to strategic autonomy. The results are mixed. While some projects are off to a strong start, there are common challenges for all
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Brussels, Central Europe, and Western Europe

29. Advancing UK maritime aviation in the Queen Elizabeth-class era

Author:: Nick Childs
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The United Kingdom is on the cusp of regenerating what is a transformational capability. The first of the UK’s new-generation aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, has been at sea on trials for two years, and is working up towards its first operational deployment in 2021. The second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, is scheduled to be accepted into service before the end of the year. The F-35B Lightning II has achieved initial land-based operating capability and the Lightning Force has carried out its first overseas deployment, Lightning Dawn. Maritime aviation in the round has undergone a significant transformation, and there has been a substantial increased focus on collaboration and partnering with industry as well as developing stronger links with critical allies. To underscore the significance of the undertaking, then secretary of state for defence Penny Mordaunt announced on 15 May 2019 that the UK planned to produce a National Aircraft Carrier Policy to lay down a blueprint for how the new carrier era would help deliver the UK’s global objectives. In addition, on 4 June, then prime minister Theresa May announced that the UK would earmark the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to form part of NATO’s significant new Readiness Initiative. These developments have prompted thought and discussion on the extent to which the carrier programme will enable and actually drive the transformation of UK joint-force capabilities, and are posing questions about the demands such a programme will place on UK defence and industry. This paper considers both the opportunities and challenges that the carrier era presents in a number of key areas
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and London

30. European security in crisis: what to expect if the US withdraws from NATO

Author:: Lianna Fix, Bastain Giegerich, and Theresa Kirch
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Recent developments in transatlantic relations have reignited the debate about the need for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Yet, efforts by European leaders to substantiate the general commitment to 'take their fate into their own hands' are so far lacking sufficient progress. Against this backdrop, the Körber Policy Game brought together a high-level group of senior experts and government officials from France, Germany, Poland, the UK and the US to address a fictional scenario that involves a US withdrawal from NATO, followed by multiple crises in Europe. How will Europeans organise their security and defence if the US withdraws from NATO? To what extent will future European security be based on mutual solidarity, ad-hoc coalitions or a bilateralisation of relations with the US? Which interests would the respective European governments regard as vital and non-negotiable? What role would the US play in European security after the withdrawal? The Körber Policy Game is based on the idea of projecting current foreign and security policy trends into a future scenario – seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the interests and priorities of different actors as well as possible policy options. The starting point is a short to medium-term scenario. Participants are part of country teams and assume the role of advisers to their respective governments.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Brussels

31. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:: Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

32. The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: James Hackett
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: As US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet in Singapore on 12 June, it is useful to keep in mind what is at stake. The long-standing tinderbox of the Korean Peninsula, if ignited through another provocation or miscalculation, could spark a full-scale war that could well go nuclear. The prize of diplomacy – sustainable peace on the peninsula – is all the more valuable when one considers the range of military capabilities potentially in play. This information is of use in assessing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should the current efforts fail. Weapons based on the Korean Peninsula have become faster, more precise and more powerful. North Korea has tested a thermonuclear weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile and more accurate shorter-range missiles, all designed to offset the relative qualitative weakness of its broader conventional forces. It has also pursued advanced cyber capabilities. South Korea, meanwhile, has focused on developing military systems allowing for more rapid and precise strikes. US forces on the peninsula have introduced yet more advanced capabilities. For these reasons the IISS provides this independent, measured and detailed analysis of military dynamics on the peninsula. The report focuses on the defence policies and military capabilities of the two Koreas, and the US military forces stationed in South Korea which can be brought to bear in a crisis. While it does not ignore unconventional systems, it principally focuses on conventional capabilities. Due to its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, compared with those of South Korea and its US ally. Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s armed forces remain equipped with a wide range of conventional military systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its armed forces, at around 1.2 million, are the fourth-largest in the world. Its conventional military power remains significant, not least because of these numbers (for instance, 4,000 main battle tanks and 8,500 self-propelled- and towed-artillery systems) and the weight of fire they could rapidly bring to bear if employed. Seoul, for instance, is within range of many of North Korea’s artillery systems. North Korea has also developed increasingly advanced cyber capabilities as another aspect of its asymmetric power. The North will continue to improve these, if only to slow the decline in military parity between it and the South. US and South Korean defence authorities assume that the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and command-and-control networks. However, recent events like the Wannacry ransomware attacks have shown that North Korea is now using its cyber power for another purpose: raising revenue to support the regime. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defence policy and military posture is dominated by the security challenge from the North. This has led Seoul to pursue military capabilities, and strategies, designed to defeat North Korean provocations. These range from developments in air-defence, intended to tackle North Korea’s air force and missile capabilities, to strategies designed to pre-empt a potential North Korean provocation. To enable these strategies, South Korea has developed and procured increasingly advanced military systems, ranging from its own Hyeonmu ballistic- and cruise-missiles, to advanced air-to-ground air-launched weapons and, in the next few years, squadrons of F-35A combat aircraft. Working closely with the South Korean armed forces, the US maintains a military presence some 28,500-strong in South Korea, augmented by advanced military systems on the peninsula like the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic-missile-defence system, and the military power deployed by the US in the broader Indo-Pacific. This publication builds on the contributions of expert analysts of military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the extensive information holdings available in the IISS Military Balance+ database. It was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit

Author:: Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence. Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane. More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America

34. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit

Author:: Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and London

35. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:: Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

36. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit

Author:: Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation: The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies. Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met. Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition. Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

37. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit

Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

38. Reducing the Risk of Iran Developing an ICBM

Author:: Michael Elleman
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: With the Iran nuclear accord currently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, argues Michael Elleman in a new report. The lack of curbs on Iran’s missile programme was cited by President Donald Trump in May 2018 as one of the principal reasons for withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the nuclear accord consequently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles. The most promising would be to lock in, through negotiations, the 2,000 kilometre-range limit that Iran has previously stated is its maximum requirement. While this would not reduce the threat perceived by Iran’s regional neighbours, it would forestall development of systems that could target Western Europe or North America. Tehran is not likely to commit to verification measures for such negotiated range limits, however, without receiving something in return. One bargain that could be considered would be to allow Iran to continue its satellite-launch programme, under certain conditions, while capping the maximum range of its ballistic missiles. Such a trade-off may also be relevant to the North Korean case.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

39. China Global Security & Taiwan

Author:: Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The focus of this issue of the China Global Security Tracker is the growing threat that China’s rapid military modernization presents to Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army has demonstrated its new capabilities through aggressive maneuvers over the last few months, simulating an attack on Taiwan. China’s party and state leader Xi Jinping has left no doubt that he views the reunification with Taiwan as key for China’s future national strength. The China Global Security Tracker is a semi-annual publication. It is part of the China Security Project, a cooperation between the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). In her analysis of events during the first half of 2018, MERICS researcher Helena Legarda tracks China’s growing military expenditures as well as steps taken by the Chinese Communist Party to extend its control over the military.
Topic:: Nationalism, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Africa, United States, China, Taiwan, Beijing, and Asia

40. Could the EU deliver on its military ambitions after Brexit?

Author:: Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, Christain Möelling, and Torben Schutz
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: he ability of the European Union to act in defence, today and in the future, is an important reference point in the debate about EU strategic autonomy in the context of Brexit. The EU has set itself a military level of ambition. Under the heading of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU member states want to be able to conduct a range of military operations. Together with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), this study assesses to what extent the EU is able to fulfil this level of ambition, today and with an outlook towards 2030. The IISS and DGAP have developed policy-compliant scenarios to assess where possible capability shortfalls lie. Our findings benchmark existing and future EU member state capabilities against the force requirements the EU level of ambition generates.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Germany

41. China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies

Author:: Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In its quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil–military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China’s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe’s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a ‘whole-of-government’ regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China’s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS