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1. Assessing military cyber maturity: strategy, institutions and capability

Author:
Greg Austin and Jason Blessing
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms to their military cyber forces must be made. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by international circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, or whether they warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. One of the most profound influences on the evolution of a country’s military cyber forces and strategies is politics. This paper offers insights into how the governance and organisational factors of domestic politics facilitate or inhibit the dissemination of cyber concepts and capabilities throughout military forces beyond the main signals or cyber intelligence agency. There are at least three reasons to analyse military cyber maturity. The countries currently pursuing such capabilities are not satisfied with the development levels in policy and strategy they have so far reached. There is increasing potential for crippling cyber attacks on key elements of military capability or supporting infrastructure. And no country has yet succeeded in the broad dissemination of cyber capabilities through its armed forces in ways that leading military planners would like. Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms in the armed forces must be made to satisfy national security needs. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by inter-national circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, akin to artillery or submarines; or whether they are sufficiently transformative of military power to warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. This paper provides an impact matrix which can be used by governments, their armed forces and research analysts to understand the ways in which military cyber reforms can be facilitated or inhibited by governance and organisational processes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Managing the looming missile-proliferation problem in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In light of the range of capabilities that contemporary missile systems and associated technologies can provide, it is unsurprising that more and more states around the world aspire to acquire them. In the Asia-Pacific, the involvement of the three major nuclear powers – China, Russia and the United States – as well as middle powers make the situation even more complex and unstable. When the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, the Asia-Pacific seemed to enter a ‘post-INF’ era in which regional states may face dim prospects for arms control and potentially a fierce theatre-level, missile-led arms race. This essay reviews emerging trends in missile proliferation and analyses the relevant risks of these trends before assessing some of the mechanisms that address proliferation challenges. It then explores ways of curbing and even reversing these trends from a Chinese perspective. It is increasingly clear that since 2010 the world has been undergoing a period of nuclear modernisation and missile proliferation. The US and Russia, which possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have both recently accelerated efforts to modernise their respective nuclear arsenals. As highlighted in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the subsequent policy and budget decisions of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has abandoned a pledge – made by former president Barack Obama − to abstain from researching and deploying new kinds of nuclear warheads. Since then, the US has deployed a low-yield nuclear warhead (W76-2) on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in late 2019 and begun to redevelop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) as another key component of its nuclear-modernisation plan. For the air-leg of the US triad, the US Air Force received a final proposal for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) in November 2020 ahead of its preparations to seek approval for the system’s development. The LRSO is a nuclear-armed cruise missile intended to serve as a replacement for the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Furthermore, the US also tested a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) in August 2019 and a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in December 2019 following Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. All these capabilities are deemed by the US to be effective measures to counter a limited nuclear attack from Russia or China. Russia, which maintains a stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads assigned for use and an estimated further 2,060 awaiting retirement and dismantlement, is in the middle of a decades-long nuclear-forces modernisation programme. This modernisation also incorporates the addition of new types of strategic delivery systems, which were unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. These include a new nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Avangard, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, Burevestnik, a new anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, Zircon, and a nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped uninhabited underwater delivery vehicle, Poseidon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

3. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

4. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

5. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

7. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia

8. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

9. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:
Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Leading edge: key drivers of defence innovation and the future of operational advantage

Author:
Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The ability to develop and integrate emerging and disruptive technologies in defence is rapidly becoming a metric of success in the global competition for power. In this paper, Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier provide a systematic conceptualisation of defence innovation. By empirically analysing innovation efforts in five countries – notably, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the paper identifies and analyses four key drivers of defence innovation, provides a better understanding of how the five nations prioritise among them, and explores how they are linked to future operational advantage.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

11. Security and the Arctic: navigating between cooperation and competition

Author:
Nick Childs
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Arctic region is undergoing particularly dramatic change, driven chiefly by environmental factors resulting from climate change. This is affecting the Arctic to a greater extent than any other region of the globe, with the region warming twice as fast as other parts of the planet. Consequently, the Arctic has become a region of growing strategic interest and concern. New geostrategic frictions are emerging as a result of increased military activities and the prospect of new maritime routes and greater access to resources; the increased focus on how to respond to the threat to the environment; and the impact of all this on Arctic populations and especially indigenous peoples. This is adding to the complexities of relations between different players and creating new dynamics of cooperation and competition in and around the region, with the increasing interest and potential influence of China one of the most significant developments in play. This is stimulating interest in the region and a perceived requirement for new thinking about how to preserve Arctic stability and mitigate risks, while protecting economic, political and diplomatic opportunities. For much of its recent history, the region has traded on a notion of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, meaning that it has been uniquely shielded from many of the world’s strategic issues and frictions, and that the states and peoples which inhabit it have been largely able to organise themselves and coexist in peace, with a few general tenets and instruments of the rules-based international order to act as frameworks and guides. However, as the Arctic has become less inhospitable, both climatically and physically, it has also become less benign in a geo-strategic sense. It can be argued that, compared to other regions, the Arctic remains an arena or relatively low tension overall. Nevertheless, the increasing elements of competition of various kinds are raising concern about the defence and security risks, particularly given the absence of a mechanism or a framework to even discuss defence and security issues in the region that includes all the key players.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Arctic

12. China Global Security Tracker, No.6

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka

13. European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, James Hackett, and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In 2019, European governments’ combined defence spending, when measured in constant 2015 US dollar terms, surpassed the level reached in 2009, before the financial and economic crisis led to a series of significant defence-spending cuts. However, a different strategic paradigm – one that Europe is struggling to adjust to and which is once more a concern for European governments – has re-appeared in this past decade: great-power competition. Russia attempted to change international borders in Europe through the use of force in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to support an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s challenge to Euro-Atlantic security exists in multiple dimensions: as both a conventional military and also a hybrid-warfare issue, with Russia working to dislocate existing societal alignments and disrupt political processes in Western states. The poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer (and of his daughter) in the United Kingdom, attributed by the British government to Russia, underlines further how much the character of conflict has changed. How to manage the challenge Russia poses without simply reverting to Cold War logic remains a worrying problem for governments in NATO and the European Union member states. Meanwhile, European security establishments are beginning to recognise the growing political, economic and military influence of a rising China. Although less of an immediate challenge, China’s growth in these areas has possible profound consequences in the long run. Indeed, in December 2019, NATO declared: ‘We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.’2 For the United States, China has already become the pacing military threat. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in June 2019, opens with the assertion that ‘the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater’. In other words, the European theatre is not. European analysts and officials have begun to wonder whether the US might begin to see Europe through an Asian lens, seeking to generate European commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, or at the very least getting Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security and thereby freeing up US resources. Although there will be some elements of the US military presence in Europe that are indispensable to US military action in other regions of the world, that might not be enough to sustain Washington’s firm commitment to European security in the future, regardless of who occupies the White House. Significantly, not even the US has the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously any more, meaning binary choices regarding focus are inevitable. As some observers have argued, Europeans need to urgently assess what Washington’s choices in this regard – and their implications for Europe – might look like. Considering both how to deter Russia and what a European contribution to containing China might entail represents a major challenge for Western European nations, which have relegated defence to a secondary position, as almost a discretionary activity. European states partially demobilised in the 1990s and early 2000s, intellectually and in terms of their force structures, in response to the end of the Cold War. For example, according to IISS data, in 1990 West Germany alone was thought to be able to field 215 combat battalions and the UK 94. Today it is a fraction of that. However, security challenges relating to regional instability, crisis management and transnational terrorism – which all dominated the previous two decades – have not disappeared. On the contrary, all these still demand attention and the investment of European resources. While there is a growing recognition among Europe’s analytical community, and some governments, that things cannot simply continue as before in terms of regional security and defence, coherence and resolve among core actors in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have weakened. The US administration has intensified its call for better transatlantic burden sharing, at the same time displaying a cavalier attitude to the collective-defence commitment enshrined in NATO. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed severe doubts about the viability of NATO’s collective-defence mission. In addition, the British decision to leave the European Union in 2020 implies that the EU has lost one of its most militarily experienced and one of its most capable member states. There is a tendency among many observers and some politicians to argue that European NATO and EU member states need to clarify the political dimension of their defence ambition, via-à-vis greater strategic autonomy, before resolving the problem of how to meet this ambition militarily, at what cost and in what time frame. Indeed, at times, the debate about European strategic autonomy seems to focus more on the degree of independence from the US that its various proponents would like to achieve and less on the military requirement that autonomy is meant to respond to. It is now widely accepted across Europe that Europeans need ‘to do more’ for their own security and defence. Most of the intellectual energy allocated to this aspiration is spent on achieving better coordination – and even a level of integration – among European armed forces. This is useful, but only if it is directed at building capability to provide for the defence of Europe. The existing military capabilities of the European NATO member states fall short when compared to the force requirements generated by the political–military level of ambition as defined by NATO, or for that matter the EU.5 However, this should not be an excuse to lower the level of ambition, nor should the assumption that Europeans are unable to defend themselves be declared an inevitability. Defence output is the result of political, financial and military choices by governments. To think systematically about the challenge of providing capabilities that can meet Europe’s emerging military requirements, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened a group of thinkers and practitioners from Germany and the UK. The group took seriously the US assertion that Europe needs to be able to provide for its own defence. If Europeans can achieve this, they will be valuable partners to the US in upholding and strengthening the liberal international order on which Euro-Atlantic prosperity and security depend. Meeting twice in 2019, the group discussed threat assessments, debated European capability gaps and scoped potential approaches to addressing them. The following pages draw on the group’s deliberations but do not represent a consensus position.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

14. Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies

Author:
Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Little is known about how China’s growing defence budget is allocated, particularly following recent structural reforms. In the absence of publicly available information and new research on Chinese defence economics, outside observers consider the official data to be incomplete. Publications addressing Chinese defence spending often claim that ‘it is widely believed’ official Chinese statistics exclude key categories of military-related spending. For instance, in 2003, one analyst wrote that ‘it is widely accepted that the official budget released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual defense spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure are believed to be missing from official figures.’ The methodologies employed by research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to estimate China’s total military spending date back to the late 1990s. Furthermore, existing estimates do not take into account China’s recent military reorganisation under President Xi Jingping’s direction, which began in 2015, and a wide range of defence reforms. For example, in 2018, the Chinese authorities integrated the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the maritime militias into the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) command structure. It is currently unclear how this restructuring has affected China’s defence spending. In addition, China’s defence spending could have been affected by the increasing fulfilment of weapons procurements by domestic firms. Therefore, a reassessment of China’s defence spending and the methodologies employed is required.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15. Inevitable bedfellows? Cooperation on Military Technology for the Development of UAVs and Cruise Missiles in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Amy J. Nelson and T. X. Hammes
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Today, the ‘small, smart and many’ revolution is providing state and non-state actors with capabilities that previously belonged only to great powers. Advances in specific technologies and manufacturing are broadening access to long-range precision-strike capabilities, and an increasing number of states have an incentive to take advantage of this – particularly those that share a border with China. This paper examines how the evolution of enabling technologies and changes in strategic objectives are increasing the likelihood that uninhabited-aerial-vehicle (UAV) and cruise-missile technologies will proliferate throughout the Asia-Pacific. Through arms sales, new technology-sharing relationships are likely to be created and existing ones reinforced. The current rapid pace of technological evolution means that non-aligned states, non-state actors and even second-tier defence companies are pursuing and contributing to UAV and cruise-missile capabilities. We conclude that although the proliferation of advanced weapons is normally a cause for concern regarding escalation, modern cruise missiles and UAVs may today serve as weapons that smaller states can use to deter aggression from larger states. Historically, the drive to obtain ballistic-missile technology has – when not inhibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and other non-proliferation initiatives – produced unlikely state-to-state development partners (some of which paired off specifically in order to circumvent MTCR restrictions). Ballistic-missile proliferation saw the emergence of partnerships between Pakistan and North Korea, Iran and North Korea, and Ukraine and China – all forged to develop or provide capabilities via aligned political interest. In 2008, Dennis Gormley warned that the pattern of cruise-missile proliferation would likely mirror that of ballistic missiles. It does indeed appear that UAV and cruise-missile proliferation is seeing the same pattern of cooperative, facilitated proliferation. Moreover, while developing nations have historically piggybacked on stronger states through technology sharing, today they are assisted through a number of sharing modalities and mechanisms, including technology adoption, overt cooperation (either co-production or co-development) and sales. To complicate matters further, these mechanisms may also be executed by non-state actors (from violent extremist organisations to defence contractors).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

16. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

18. Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation

Author:
Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, Connor Hannigan, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Between March and November 2018, the 25 participating member states launched 34 projects, with the core aim of addressing the EU’s capability shortfalls. In May 2019, a call for a third round of project proposals will be launched. The IISS undertook an early assessment of how PESCO projects are carried out, to assess whether the momentum on the ground has continued since the projects were announced at the political level. A strong pace of implementation would require detailed timelines, deadlines and financial plans, as well as clear links with EU capability requirements. Questionnaires were sent to the projects’ country leads, and were complemented by interviews and secondary-source research. We looked at various dimensions of implementation: timelines, financial commitments, stakeholder involvement and the projects’ relation to strategic autonomy. The results are mixed. While some projects are off to a strong start, there are common challenges for all
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Brussels, Central Europe, and Western Europe

19. China Global Security Tracker, No.5

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Presenting China as a 'responsible power' – Beijing releases first major defense white paper in four years
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Europe, Canada, Taiwan, France, and North America

20. Advancing UK maritime aviation in the Queen Elizabeth-class era

Author:
Nick Childs
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is on the cusp of regenerating what is a transformational capability. The first of the UK’s new-generation aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, has been at sea on trials for two years, and is working up towards its first operational deployment in 2021. The second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, is scheduled to be accepted into service before the end of the year. The F-35B Lightning II has achieved initial land-based operating capability and the Lightning Force has carried out its first overseas deployment, Lightning Dawn. Maritime aviation in the round has undergone a significant transformation, and there has been a substantial increased focus on collaboration and partnering with industry as well as developing stronger links with critical allies. To underscore the significance of the undertaking, then secretary of state for defence Penny Mordaunt announced on 15 May 2019 that the UK planned to produce a National Aircraft Carrier Policy to lay down a blueprint for how the new carrier era would help deliver the UK’s global objectives. In addition, on 4 June, then prime minister Theresa May announced that the UK would earmark the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to form part of NATO’s significant new Readiness Initiative. These developments have prompted thought and discussion on the extent to which the carrier programme will enable and actually drive the transformation of UK joint-force capabilities, and are posing questions about the demands such a programme will place on UK defence and industry. This paper considers both the opportunities and challenges that the carrier era presents in a number of key areas
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and London

21. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit

Author:
Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

22. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:
Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

23. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation:  The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies.  Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met.  Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition.  Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).  The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

24. China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies

Author:
Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In its quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil–military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China’s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe’s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a ‘whole-of-government’ regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China’s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Asia