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1. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:
Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

2. European Solar PV Manufacturing: Terminal Decline or Hope for a Rebirth?

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While solar photovoltaic (PV) installations are booming in Europe (and in other parts of the world), the local industry is closing down. Over the past two years, the European installed solar PV capacity has been multiplied by two. On the other hand, the remaining European manufacturers of solar PV panels are dying. Installed solar PV capacities are experiencing an unprecedented increase in Europe: in two years, they have been multiplied by two with 60 gigawatts (GW) added in 2023. However, local solar PV manufacturers are not benefiting from it as the Chinese competition is knocking them down. Structurally much more competitive, prices of Chinese solar panels have further decreased by 42% in 2023 – making it difficult even for some Chinese companies to survive and forcing many of the remaining European manufacturers out of the market. This situation fragilizes Europe’s strategic autonomy and decarbonization. Covid-19-like disruption or an aggression against Taiwan would leave the continent without any supply. American manufacturers are also flexing their muscles with the aggressive Inflation Reduction Act. Europe’s answer, the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), a tougher approach to China’s imports and national support measures, could create a new generation of solar PV manufacturers in Europe.
Topic:
Manufacturing, Renewable Energy, Solar Power, Decarbonization, Strategic Autonomy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

3. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

4. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and France

5. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:
Brad Setser
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. The Prospects of Indonesia’s Nickel Boom Amidst a Systemic Challenge from Coal

Author:
Thibault Michel
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Indonesia is a country that is booming economically and demographically. This not only matters for regional political and energy security, but also increasingly, for the world’s energy transitions, due to Indonesia’s large metal reserves, as well as its equally important coal consumption in industry and for power generation. Over the last 20 years, Indonesia’s economy has been characterized by very dynamic growth, massive increases in its electricity demand, and coal consumption and exports. Hence, its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are on a steady growth trajectory, although the country has committed to lowering them by 32% (unconditional) or 41% (conditional) by 2030. With its Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership application, occurring in the context of global energy transition requirements and geopolitical confrontations, Indonesia is today at a crossroads. Indonesia has 42% of the world’s nickel reserves, as well as substantial reserves of copper, gold, tin, and, notably, coal. This wealth in natural resources has given the mining industry crucial importance in Indonesia’s economic growth and has recently taken an even more prominent place: Indonesia has managed to become the world’s largest nickel producer within just a few years, as its share in global nickel extraction grew from 5% in 2015 to 50% in 2023. The country is also the world’s third copper ore exporter. Coal and energy transition minerals have progressively replaced oil and gas in Indonesian exports. Between 2011 and 2023, oil and gas exports fell by nearly two-thirds and their share in the national exports decreased from 20% to 6%. In 2023, export revenues from copper were larger than those of oil and equal to gas earnings. Yet, having major mineral deposits and mining activities is no longer considered sufficient by the Indonesian government. So far, the mineral industry’s growth has relied hugely on Chinese investments and on low-added-value activities, especially in pyrometallurgy processing. Diversification of trade partners and expansion into new, entire value chains is, therefore, a key objective for the Indonesian government. Indonesia is seeking to boost trade with the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and even the Eurasian Economic Union. However, negotiations over respective agreements are currently encountering hurdles due to American legislation (the Inflation Reduction Act and Foreign Entities of Concern status), which could seriously threaten Indonesian exports of battery mineral components to the US market while they also face hurdles to entering the EU due to environmental regulations. The second part of Indonesia’s strategy focuses on the development of new industrial segments of value chains: refining facilities, hydrometallurgical processing plants, battery factories, etc. To develop these activities, the Indonesian government is using two main tools: the divestment of foreign companies in local firms and export bans on crude ore exports. Such bans have been introduced for nickel in 2020 and for bauxite in 2023, while they are expected for copper in 2024 and perhaps even later for tin. Indonesia is today also confronted with the negative repercussions of mining activities on its soil, including protests over the lack of safety in its mines and smelters, citizens’ expropriations, the presence of indigenous tribes on mining sites, and, above all, damage to the environment. Such damage also has its roots in the substantial amounts of energy used to feed smelters, which mostly rely on the use of coal. Decarbonizing Indonesia’s economy has thus become a central challenge for the country, where the consequences of climate change are already palpable on the archipelago’s soil, with extreme weather events and the sinking of the capital city – Jakarta – as sea levels rise. To carry out the tremendous transformation towards net-zero emissions while ensuring steady and sustainable development, the country has signed a Just Energy Transition Partnership and prepared decarbonization scenarios within this framework. Key priorities in the coming years include renewable energy deployment, grid development and an early phase-out of coal. Deploying renewable energy sources as well as large and resilient grids is made more difficult by the country’s geography. The archipelago includes 17,000 islands, some of them being undeveloped, hard to access and far away from each other. Furthermore, the levelized costs of solar and wind power are currently high in Indonesia compared with other developing countries, while public subsidies for coal do not favor low carbon generation sources. If the two first points are thus very challenging, the last one appears to be the hardest, considering the Indonesian economy’s tremendous dependency on coal. Concerns are therefore rising about Indonesia’s ability and even willingness to pursue a genuine, albeit differentiated decarbonization pathway. There are also many questions regarding Indonesia’s mineral trade strategy. New bans on crude ore exports are expected to come into force, while new mining and mineral processing operations are under development across the archipelago, as quantities of nickel produced in the country are at historic highs. This extraordinary increase in nickel production, concomitant with a global economic slowdown, has resulted in a sharp fall in nickel prices, with nickel losing half of its value between January 2023 and February 2024. As a result, many producers are finding themselves in danger, especially in Australia or New Caledonia. While there could be a deliberate strategy to flood the markets and neutralize competition, notably by Chinese companies that control 75% of the global nickel supply (mainly from Indonesia but also from the Philippines), the country faces serious dilemmas. Indonesia’s oil and gas production is diminishing, and it increasingly relies on nickel exports and higher nickel prices for its economic stability, with coal also remaining very important. Indonesia’s resource nationalism and industrial strategy, which include attracting foreign investments, notably via its OECD membership pledge, require a credible pathway to reduce the carbon footprint of its electricity generation. Among the pathways towards both decarbonization and the development of industrial battery value chains, three steps could be considered: Deploying renewable energy sources, especially solar photovoltaic (PV) power and offshore wind farms, as well as progressively transferring subsidies from coal to renewable energy sources. Developing a clean battery industry based on high environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria and on the wealth of Indonesia’s subsoil, which includes most of the metals used in battery manufacturing. Protecting climate and biodiversity by favoring innovative solutions for mining waste management and upholding high ESG standards.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Electricity, Coal, Lithium, Minerals, Energy Transition, and Nickel
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

7. "A Capital City Will Always Be a Capital City”: Konya’s Rise Under the AKP’s Rule

Author:
Elisa Domingues dos Santos, Jules Liaud, and Dorothee Schmid
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While the May 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections looked as a difficult test for the flagging Islamo-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), they eventually held on to power, demonstrating their remarkable foothold in the Turkish context. The party notably recorded one of its highest scores in Konya, confirming the massive and uninterrupted support of this two-million inhabitants central Anatolian city for Turkish political Islam. The phenomenon can be explained by the benefits that Konya has derived from its relationship with the Islamic movement for several decades. Long marginalized in a provincial space, little connected to Western Turkey’s centers of power, Konya, renowned for its history and religious heritage, became an “Anatolian tiger” under the AKP rule. The province’s economic development started from an agricultural base (Turkey’s cereal granary) enabling the emergence of a local agro-industry. It was driven by dynamic small and medium-sized enterprises, combining conservative values with entrepreneurial efficiency. Forging close ties with the AKP, Konya has benefited from territorial development policies that facilitated its rapid opening to the world. Thanks to its Anatolian identity, central geography, diversity of human flows and capacity to project its economic dynamism into increasingly distant markets (like Africa), Konya has become a showcase for the paradoxical modernity of the new Turkey.
Topic:
Elections, Entrepreneurship, Domestic Politics, and AKP
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Konya

8. Understanding the Role of Women in Nigeria’s Non-State Armed Groups and Security Architecture

Author:
Michael Nwankpa
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian government after successive military regimes, it has continued to face enormous challenges to its legitimacy and monopoly of the use of force. Protest groups, social movements, and non-state armed groups have emerged over the years to demand good governance in some cases and, in other extreme cases, secession, self-determination, and subversion of Nigeria’s secular political system. Many groups have been willing to take up arms against the state to pursue their objectives. Men are usually the significant actors in these armed groups, while most women are considered victims. However, since 2014, when Boko Haram started deploying female suicide bombers and mobilizing more and more girls and women in its terrorist strategies, women’s role in Nigeria’s armed conflicts and their capacity to use violence have gained visibility. Despite this, ascertaining the role of women (mainly whether they occupy positions of power and can perpetrate violence) in non-state armed groups’ activities against the Nigerian state remains difficult, judging by the overwhelmingly male-dominated recipients of the government’s amnesty and deradicalization programs. Relying on interviews with key respondents, this paper fills this gap by interrogating the role of women as victims or perpetrators in Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies, Nigeria’s two foremost insurgencies since the return to democracy in 1999, as well as engaging with the prospect of an effective legislative and policy response that is negotiated by increasing the number of women in security and political leadership positions.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Women, Disarmament, Boko Haram, Armed Conflict, Amnesty, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, and Niger Delta

9. Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Elections: Campaigning for Continuity

Author:
Juliette Loesch
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Indonesia is gearing up for its next general election on February 14, with a potential runoff scheduled in late June. This major electoral process will determine the nation’s next president and vice-president since incumbent President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, will step down after ten years in office in compliance with the constitutional limit of two terms. Voters will also decide on nearly 20,000 representatives at the national, provincial, and district levels. Another provincial election is set for November this year, although discussions are currently unfolding in the Parliament to advance it to September. This proposed timeline has triggered concerns about possible interference from the current administration, given that the new one will only be appointed in October. Indonesia’s general election will determine the nation’s next president and vice-president. A turnout of 204 million voters, over a total population of 277 million, is expected to show up at the polls. The election features a three-way race between prominent political figures Prabowo Subianto, Ganjar Pranowo, and Anies Baswedan. All three candidates have affiliations with the current administration of President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, with Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto even competing for his legacy. As of early February, Prabowo, Jokowi’s defense minister, and his vice-presidential pick Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s eldest son, are leading the polls. Experts nonetheless foresee a probable runoff, which is set in late June 2024. Concerns have surfaced regarding Jokowi’s interventions in the campaign, which seem to support the Prabowo Gibran ticket. While such interference is not inherently unlawful, certain actions undertaken by the administration to support Prabowo and Gibran raise more serious concerns about election
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Presidential Elections, and Continuity
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Asia-Pacific

10. South Korea’s Emergence as a Defense Industrial Powerhouse

Author:
Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, South Korea’s ascent in the global arms market has been remarkable. This surge, particularly amid a shifting geopolitical landscape and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War, has captured the attention of security watchers worldwide. This paper delves into the intricacies of the South Korean defense industry’s rapid emergence, wherein arms sales skyrocketed to 17.3 billion USD in 2022, and provides an in-depth analysis of its portfolio, capacity, and the rationales guiding its development over the last five decades. It explores how South Korea has capitalized on critical opportunities, including overcoming steep barriers to entry to major contracts with Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland. It sheds light on South Korea’s competitive technologies, mass production capacity, and cost-effectiveness, and addresses the crucial role played by the government’s diplomatic support and coordination with key allies and partners. Against that backdrop, it concludes with some implications for the global defense industry and security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Industry, Armament, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Poland

11. Germany’s Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy: Balancing Sustainable Development and Energy Security

Author:
Jeanette Süß
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
With the war in Ukraine, Germany’s “traffic light” coalition government has had to adapt its climate policy to the upheavals caused by this war, which has turned its economic, energy, and military model upside down. Against a backdrop of high energy costs and increasing calls for reshoring in Europe, German industry is looking at how to maintain its competitiveness while decarbonizing its industry. To combat climate change and find new forms of energy cooperation that are more sustainable for the planet, the federal government has set up a Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy bringing together its collaborative actions with partner countries. Climate, energy, and development partnerships play a vital role in this context, and emerging countries are key partners for climate initiatives. They have a high demand for energy and exploit resources, though without always respecting environmental, social, and governance standards. Their renewable energy (RE) production potential is significant, and there are major opportunities for CO2 reduction thanks to modernization technologies that Germany is seeking to transfer to its partners. To this end, Germany is using a multitude of diplomatic tools and is leveraging a unique network of international agencies, chambers of commerce and climate finance players.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

12. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
Topic:
Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

14. India-Russia Relations in Troubled Times: Steady but Stagnating

Author:
Aleksei Zakharov
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the trajectory of India-Russia relations post-February 2022. The war in Ukraine emerged as a significant challenge for bilateral ties, presenting new obstacles to political and diplomatic relations and intensifying the previous difficulties in developing economic cooperation. Moscow and New Delhi have demonstrated divergent approaches to the advancement of their strategic partnership. While Russia has rushed into reinventing the old friendship with India, the latter has acted with greater discretion. New Delhi has demonstrated a nuanced approach to navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, staying on good terms with Moscow and the West. India’s record imports of Russian crude and other commodities, at times in defiance of Western sanctions, have allowed for a considerable boost in bilateral trade. While this “oil connection” may benefit both the Indian and Russian economies, it should not be misperceived as a leap forward in partnership. The structural challenges appear to still prevent the two sides from reinvigorating the economic ties. Furthermore, their geopolitical understanding is waning, and their defense cooperation is currently in a state of limbo. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, India seems to be prioritizing maintaining the status quo in its relationship with Russia over pursuing new initiatives. This may help to prevent the two sides from drifting apart too far in the near term but is unlikely to lead to any substantive progress in their relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, and India

15. Political Coalitions in Turkey in the Run-Up to the 2023 Elections

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2023, already marked by a deadly double earthquake in the south-east of the country in February, is the year of the centenary of the Republic, but above all an election year for Turkey. The general elections (parliamentary and presidential) will take place on May 14 and are unanimously considered to be crucial for the political future of the country. The electoral campaign is polarized around two major coalitions: the People’s Alliance, led by the presidential AKP and the MHP, which supports the re-election of President Erdoğan; and the Nation Alliance, formed by the main Kemalist party CHP with five other parties, and supporting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as a presidential candidate. Two other coalitions are also present and could tip the election one way or the other: the Labor and Freedom Alliance, centered around the progressive and pro-Kurdish HDP, and the Ancestral Alliance, which supports the nationalist Sinan Oğan. While this political configuration may seem familiar to European observers – where cross-party coalitions are common, especially in parliamentary regimes – there are indications, such as the tensions between the İYİ Party and its partners in the Nation Alliance over support for Kılıçdaroğlu, that call into question the nature of these coalitions: are they motivated by ideological proximity, or are they merely tactical tools for gaining power? In particular, these coalitions seem to derive from the nature of the Turkish political regime and its evolution over the last decade, with an ultra-presidentialization of the system under the successive presidential terms of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which has led all political actors to position themselves in relation to his personal power. As socio-economic conditions weaken the AKP’s electoral base, the prospects for this election seem more open than ever.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

16. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

17. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:
Florian Vidal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

18. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

19. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

20. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

21. The Politics of New Cities: Diversification of Actors and Recentralization of State Power in the Case of Diamniadio

Author:
Sina Schlimmer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The construction of new cities on the African continent is in vogue. From multifunctional urban hubs to eco-districts, the images that accompany the announcement of these projects promote an African urban future based on modernity and technology. This trend for urban planning that claims to make a clean sweep of pre-existing approaches is not unique to African countries, whose governments are inspired in particular by North African and Asian models. However, the promotion of new cities in Africa is part of the lively debate that has been going on for several years on the rapid urbanization of the continent's countries. The creation of modern cities, organized and corresponding to the urban planning standards of international metropolises, is presented as a means of avoiding haphazard, chaotic urban development. This paper offers a critical analysis of the policy of new cities based on an empirical study of the new urban pole of Diamniadio (PUD) in Senegal. Two key arguments are put forward in this paper. First, the analysis deconstructs the ex nihilo character of these urban projects and emphasizes that they are part of public policy trajectories. Due to its geo-economic and strategic position, Diamniadio has been at the heart of the Dakar region's territorial planning policies since at least the end of the 1990s. Secondly, new towns are far from being neutral and technical urban planning instruments; rather, they are political devices that convey interests and stimulate power games. By delimiting the boundaries of the PUD, which is presented as President Macky Sall's political footprint, the central government regains certain administrative powers, particularly in terms of land planning and allocation. In addition, the PUD reflects competition from foreign actors, both public and private, and the growing importance of emerging actors such as Turkey.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, State, Urban, and Cities
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

22. Higher Renewable Energy Targets in Germany: How Will the Industry Benefit?

Author:
Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
“Deutschland – Einstieg in die Deindustrialisierung?” – “Germany, the beginning of deindustrialisation?” asked the German economic newspaper Handelsblatt in the context of the spike in energy prices that has put at risk thousands of companies across Germany in 2022. Whereas some sectors such as steel, glass and chemicals have been seriously hit, the manufacturing industries operating in the areas linked to the energy transition (such as renewable energies and hydrogen production) should benefit from decisions taken to reach climate neutrality. Will the German industry benefit from the ambitious commitments agreed by the new coalition? The boom and bust of the solar sector in 2011 are a reminder that a strong internal demand does not necessarily translate into strong and resilient supply chains on the national territory. In the context of generous support schemes, several companies emerged in the 2000s benefiting from the strong demand for solar panels before being overwhelmed by Asian competitors. Nowadays, more than 90% of solar panels are imported from China. The level of ambition of the Federal government for the Energiewende has dramatically increased with the new coalition elected in 2021, the share of renewables to be reached in the power mix by 2030 being set at 80% (against 47% in 2022). The German wind industry has however been affected by a slowdown of the expansion of capacities, several rounds of onshore wind and solar auctions being in 2022 undersubscribed. The added value of the Energiewende in terms of job creation has been ambivalent so far. The country’s current industrial geography might be partly reshaped with the efforts made by northern and eastern States to deploy renewables and green hydrogen at large scale. Stakes are high for southern Germany since new spatial patterns are emerging in the automotive sector too. While Chinese competition in the solar and wind manufacturing sectors is tough, the Inflation Reduction Act has reinvigorated discussions around a stronger industrial policy.
Topic:
European Union, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

23. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

24. Food Systems in the Pacific: Addressing Challenges in Cooperation with Europe

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
More frequent climate disasters, rising sea levels, the economic fallout of Covid-19 lockdowns, border closures, supply chain constraints, and the global impact of the war in Ukraine have aggravated the challenge of maintaining sustainable and resilient food systems for Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Food systems in PICs are of great importance due to their impact on the health and well-being of Pacific peoples, local livelihoods, and national economies. Between 50 and 70% of Pacific people depend on agriculture and fishing activities for their livelihoods. The Pacific is home to extensive crop biodiversity, and Pacific countries are developing unique value chains for markets and international supply. However, they also face unique challenges in realizing equitable benefits in the global food system. Additionally, the Pacific needs to tackle issues like malnutrition and non-communicable diseases. Urgent global and local action is needed to manage climate change and other risks and ensure resilient food systems. Europeans are also confronted with the global food crisis and are actively working with their Pacific partners to find and fund solutions to address current and future risks by investing in local sustainable food systems. This Briefing explains the complex issues at stake regarding food systems in PICs and explores ways to address these challenges, both at the local level and in cooperation with Europeans. This Briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar "Food Security in Times of Crisis: Connecting the Pacific and Europe," organized by the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri)'s Pacific Islands Program in partnership with the Pacific Community (SPC) on December 8, 2022. Contributions from panelists will, therefore, be highlighted.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Food, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, European Union, Oceania, and Pacific Islands

25. Imagining Beyond the Imaginary. The Use of Red Teaming and Serious Games in Anticipation and Foresight

Author:
Héloïse Fayet and Amélie Ferey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking. In September 2022, The New York Times revealed that the successful Ukrainian offensive on Kharkiv had been prepared in a series of wargames conducted that summer. Given this success, further wargames have been undertaken with a view to a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring. This rise in the popularity of wargames, which come in various forms, is due to their ability to immerse participants in a situation, helping them to become aware of their strategic and tactical blind spots and to identify their own vulnerabilities by putting themselves in the enemy’s position. The ability to anticipate crises and foresee conflicts is essential in order to maintain the initiative and ultimately win out. Thus, the aim of defense foresight is to understand the different forms future wars might take (asymmetric, hybrid, high intensity), the weapons systems that may be employed (drones, high-velocity missiles), and the factors that could trigger them. The use of wargames or scenario analyses to facilitate anticipation and foresight goes hand in hand with changes in the relationship between military and political leaders and civilians, who no longer hesitate to hold the former to account when they have failed to foresee a crisis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck thus refers to the paradox of a society that is keen to predict the future because of its aversion to risk and the fact that it is now much more difficult to foresee what might happen in the short term due to very rapid technological developments. The modern world generates both risks and progress, and the inability to foresee strategic ruptures carries significant political costs, which explains why politicians set so much store in anticipation and foresight. The initiatives launched by Florence Parly after being appointed French minister of the armed forces in 2017 included promoting experimentation in new cognitive tools. Beyond the issue of technology, the aim was to rethink information management within the ministry in order to make it more agile and cross-cutting. In addition to a significant budget allocated to innovation in the 2019–2025 Military Programming Law, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has drawn inspiration from methods often originating in other organizational cultures, such as start-ups and the private sector, in order to improve its creativity and accelerate its adoption of digital technology.
Topic:
War Games, Military, and Anticipation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

26. Russia at War and the Islamic World

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

27. Digital Sovereignty: European Policies, American Dilemmas

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
European digital sovereignty has been made a priority by Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission. Due to the privileged position of American companies in the European market, Brussels’ efforts towards digital sovereignty (on privacy, antitrust, data sovereignty, etc.) are closely scrutinized by American policymakers. They often view European initiatives as “protectionist” and unfairly targeting U.S. companies. However, the American vision of European digital sovereignty has evolved in recent years under the influence of two main factors. On the one hand, awareness of the problematic effects and practices of platforms has led to a consensus on the need for reform in the digital sector. On the other hand, technological competition with China has been elevated to a priority. This vision remains fraught with contradictions, along inter-party, intra-party, inter-agency, state-federal, and issue-based fault lines. Washington’s position on anti-monopolistic practices is an illuminating example, characterized by a double discourse between a desire to reform the U.S. digital sector domestically and active diplomacy to dilute these efforts at the European level. Nonetheless, several American actors – particularly in the legislative branch – are seeking to learn from the successes and flaws of European regulations for American reform projects, such as on platform regulation or privacy. The China factor reinforces the ambiguity of the U.S.’ position. It creates new opportunities for cooperation in the face of perceived common vulnerabilities (infrastructure security, inbound investments, etc.) and autocratic definitions of digital sovereignty. However, it also raises tension and misunderstanding on the American side towards European reforms that often target American companies more than Chinese ones. Lastly, while American and European companies have adapted to the need for digital sovereignty through a range of technical and commercial solutions, the temptation of a maximalist definition of European sovereignty continues to create major stumbling blocks, particularly on the cloud.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Cloud Computing, Digital Sovereignty, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. South Korea and IPEF: Rationale, Objectives and the Implications for Partners and Neighbors

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As a key manufacturer of high-end technology components critical to the sustainability of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea is essential in any effort to rebuild a resilient global supply chain but also to the promotion of a clean economy. South Korea can thus contribute to two of the pillars of IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), specially to pillars II and III (supply-chain resilience and a clean economy). However, as the US executive and legislative branches intensify their hawkish approaches to China, they have not given much consideration to the possible damage they will inflict on the strategic interests of some of their allies. In particular, they have not fully considered Korean factors when legislating on bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This paper argues that allies such as South Korea and France must make the White House and US legislature aware of the external consequences of their decisions and behavior, and that they must cooperate within the confines of US-led strategic initiatives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

29. Nigeria’s 2023 Election: Democratic Development and Political Fragmentation

Author:
Sa'eed Husaini
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Nigerians will go to the polls on February 25 to elect a new president and members of the National Assembly. This marks the 7th in an unbroken sequence of presidential elections held since the country’s return to democracy in 1999. With President Muhammadu Buhari unable to compete in the election having served two full terms, the unpopular ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) party will face a formidable challenge, not only from its traditional rival, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), but also from an unprecedented ‘third party’ challenger – a previously marginal but now surging Labour Party. This paper analyzes Nigeria’s 2023 election not only in the context of this unique partisan configuration, but also considering the wider set of factors that will, in all probability, influence the organization and the outcome of the election. These factors include the preparedness of the Independent National Electoral Commission and especially its capacity to properly deploy its newly acquired biometric and result transmission technologies. In addition, the analysis explores the ways in which the voting process and result will also reflect the limitations and risks imposed by Nigeria’s current climate of chronic insecurity, resulting from active armed militia and criminal groups operating across nearly all regions, but particularly in the Northeast, Southeast, and South-south. Insecurity has likewise coincided with rising elite polarization and the breakdown of the “zoning’ consensus ahead of the election, elevating the importance of identitarian political rhetoric in the campaigns. While insecurity appears likely to contribute to the trend of declining voter turnouts observed in previous elections, the apparent increase in political interest, particularly among young voters, as reflected in the spike in the collection of voters cards ahead of the election might mark a countervailing trend. Against this backdrop, the paper also considers the major parties, candidates, their political projects as well as their target constituencies. It finds that the parties articulated moderately divergent emphases while remaining largely consonant on the contentious economic questions of the period. It also considers possible elections scenarios that may result from the varying institutional and political characteristics of the main parties. Ultimately, it finds that the 2023 poll will represent the continued evolution of Nigerian electoral institutions and political participation in a context of lingering social division and insecurity.
Topic:
Development, Democracy, Political Parties, Presidential Elections, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

30. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

31. Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries. Longstanding Strategic Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), building on its historical ties and strategic interests in the region. The wealth of these territories in fishery resources and raw materials, the crucial importance of the maritime routes, and the strategic geographical location of PICs in the context of Sino-American rivalry have been key factors behind Tokyo's expanding engagement. Despite these strategic interests, the cooperation with the PICs in the postwar era up until the emergence of the Indo-Pacific narrative has been quite fragmented, reflecting the rather low priority given to the region, the multiplicity of the objectives pursued, and the diversity of engaged actors. Nevertheless, the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) process initiated in 1997 provided an innovative multilateral framework to coordinate with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) over economic cooperation, improve Japan’s communications and iron out tensions, starting with nuclear. The incorporation of the PICs into Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision cements their position in Tokyo’s efforts to preserve a rules-based international order and counterbalance China’s growing influence. Security issues of Asia have thus started to appear on the agenda of the PALM Summits. In addition, Japan has stepped up its cooperation with its closest allies and partners – the US and Australia – as part of the operationalization of a FOIP in Oceania. Finally, a major provider of development aid, Tokyo has also become a diplomatic and security partner for the Pacific Islands. Japan has stepped up naval diplomacy and defense dialogues in the region, in addition to being very active in maritime capacity-building, as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. Despite the rise of Japanese cooperation, which is now truly multidimensional and strategic, Tokyo's ability to influence the Pacific islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. Indeed, the PICs feel little concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. With the US and its other partners increasing their presence in the area, there is a strong impetus for Japan to reinvest in the Pacific. However, Tokyo has yet to develop a formal strategy or vision for the region. This could be announced at the next PALM summit in 2024, which will mark the 10th iteration of this meeting and could be a significant milestone.
Topic:
Development, Cooperation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

32. Reshuffling Value Chains - South Korea as a Case Study

Author:
Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Despite all the talks about the reshuffling of value-chains and the trend to a form of industrial “Desinicization” (or decoupling/disengagement from China), the example of South Korea does not vindicate such assertions. The expansion of Korean direct investment in neighboring countries such as China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains a reality and it has not changed in any fundamental way over the past two decades. South Korean companies’ decisions to locate in one country rather than another are still very much based on cost factors, even if security considerations are increasingly factored in. Similarly, reshoring, which has been high on the South Korean government’s agenda for a long time, remains a marginal phenomenon for South Korean companies, despite the incentives provided. Rather than the relocation of production (in the form of reshoring or nearshoring) South Korean companies have turned to more unexpected options, such as the development of complementarity-based partnerships or vertically-integrated production networks with commodity suppliers, as in the case of the production of rare earth-based magnets. Such a strategy is likely to become more popular in the future, as it nicely combines economic and security considerations. Without a doubt, due to the highly politicized nature of the technology involved, the semiconductor industry is the one undergoing the most significant changes. In a context of rising Sino-US rivalry, the US has ramped up pressures on China with far-reaching consequences, leading South Korean semiconductor companies (with the support of the government) to engage in a strategy combining relocation to the US and onshoring in South Korea. While the economic logic is likely to prevail in most sectors thus limiting the scope for supply chain reshuffling, the examples of the semiconductor and rare earth-based magnets suggest that important changes can still be expected in the future in industries that are deemed strategic.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Supply Chains, Value Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

33. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:
Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:
European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

34. Balancing Security and Innovation: Opposition's View on Turkey's Digital Policies

Author:
Mesut Özcan and Ussal Şahbaz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey on May 14, 2023, are expected to be closely contested. Polls suggest that the ruling AK Party-led People’s Alliance will lose its majority in parliament, resulting in a hung lower house. This would create an opportunity for multiparty dialogue and temporary alliances on specific policy issues, leading to legislation that is the result of multiparty bargaining rather than the agenda of a dominant party. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to understand the Turkish opposition’s views on a variety of policy issues, with digital policies being a particularly underexplored one. At the intersection of political, economic, and technological issues, digital policies are regulations that have to adapt to a rapidly changing landscape of technological advances on a global scale. Turkey, as a regional power and an upper-middle-income economy, has attempted to take advantage of technological innovations to further promote economic growth and national security purposes. However, the AK Party government's efforts have been met with skepticism from opposition groups as they have fallen short of protecting individual rights and freedoms online. The study is organized into four sections, with an analysis of the political situation on the eve of the upcoming elections, a description of the technological ecosystem in Turkey, an analysis of the evolution of digital policies in Turkey under the AK Party’s successive governments, and a detailed overview of the main opposition parties' digital policy positions. This study thus provides insight into the future of digital policies in Turkey and the potential impact of the upcoming elections on this pivotal issue.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Digital Economy, Internet, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

35. China in the Race to Low Earth Orbit: Perspectives on the future internet constellation Guowang

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In April 2021, the Chinese government officially, but rather quietly, established a new state-owned enterprise (SOE) named China SatNet. Its mission: build out China’s “mega-constellation” program for low Earth orbiting internet satellites, known as Guowang (“national network”). Several scattered programs had already been launched in China since 2018, and the establishment of this new SOE appears aimed at streamlining and accelerating the development and deployment of the future national constellation. China's goal is to position itself in the highly strategic sector that is space-based broadband mobile telecommunication networks, so far dominated by the American SpaceX and its Starlink constellation. These constellations promise significant commercial and military outcomes that have aroused the interest of states. In this field, Beijing lags behind SpaceX, but demonstrates a fierce determination to catch up and compete with its rivals. China has already registered a request with the International Telecommunications Union to put 12,992 satellites into orbit, or roughly 1,000 more than what has so far been authorized for Starlink. To achieve its goals, China relies on traditional aerospace and telecommunications SOEs, and now on the newcomer China SatNet. It also relies on an emerging ecosystem of companies and start-ups (GalaxySpace in particular), and encourages local governments to build production parks for the space industry and new launch centers across the country. China is thus gearing up to achieve its ambitions, but will nevertheless have to face multiple challenges, including the financing of its industry in a constrained economic context, the development of a viable business model which has not yet been proven elsewhere, and above all, the growing strategic and technological rivalry with the United States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Space, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China and Asia

36. Is International Climate Finance Unfair and Inefficient?

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Finance is arguably the most sensitive climate negotiation topic. Different studies have shown that rich countries emit the majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while the climate footprint of the poorest countries is much more limited. In addition, the countries that emit the less often turn out to be among the most vulnerable to climate change, with high needs in terms of adaptation finance. According to some analysis, the 46 least-developed countries suffer from a high risk of loss and damage, and the countries that are the least at risk are in Europe. Therefore, developing countries are demanding contributions from the developed world to address their climate finance needs (both in terms of mitigation and adaptation). These demands have been somehow met with a pledge made at COP 15 in 2009, where developed countries announced a yearly contribution of 100 billion dollars (USD) by 2020. However, this pledge has not been honored. Meanwhile, climate change is accelerating and, as a result, countries’ needs in terms of adaptation are increasing, as well as their loss and damage. The finance gap is widening and though the 100 USD billion pledge is expected to be achieved in 2023, analysis from the think tank Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) shows that it will not be enough to address the current needs. According to their analysis, the current flows need to be increased by at least 590% annually. This briefing will show that, in addition, climate finance is not accessible to the poorest and therefore increases inequalities and the exclusion of the most vulnerable countries. The Prime Minister of Barbados, Ms. Mia Motley, complains that the “international financial system […] is broken, outdated, infested with short-termism and downright unfair. In parallel, the multilateral climate finance governance is evolving: new multilateral banks and donors are gaining ground and could be the first step of a power shift in climate finance from Western countries to emerging economies. Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods institutions are being reformed, and new mechanisms may bring promising developments (e.g., under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement). The Paris Summit for a New Global Financial Pact on June 22-23, 2023 is an opportunity to address these issues, though it also risks highlighting the North-South tensions further.
Topic:
European Union, Climate Finance, Energy Transition, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, and France

37. A Framework for a Win-Win Europe-Africa Energy and Climate Partnership

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
North-South tensions are exacerbated at a time of unprecedented turmoil for both Europeans and Africans. European polycrises (geopolitical, energy-related and economic) echo the systematic vulnerability of Africans, which is reinforced by external shocks. Following a dialog of the deaf, with rising discontent, tensions, and misunderstandings on both sides, there is now a new phase of discussion, coordination, and cooperation to achieve very concrete, high-impact actions. Europeans and Africans need each other to advance the European energy transition on the one hand and make decisive and rapid progress toward achieving the SDGs on the other. The urgency and issues at stake are such that this opening window to change the dynamics and achieve major and rapid advances should not be missed. Key priorities for action include debt restructuring, reinforcing funding, de-risking investments into SDGs segments, new priorities for the energy and mining sectors, and fostering private investment. There has been progress on financial and economic issues at recent COPs, and at the June 2023 summit in Paris, calling for a New Global Financial Pact. But Europeans still need to reconsider and consolidate their approach to hydrocarbons, electricity, mining, and biodiversity, taking into account the expectations and needs of the countries concerned. The widespread electrical and energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is a mounting factor of instability and now requires a breakthrough and a careful balance between fossil fuels and low-carbon solutions. Would sub-Saharan Africa develop as Europe, Russia, China, or the United States did in the 20th century, all efforts to preserve the planet would be vain. In the electricity sector, given the immense hurdles that lie ahead, a key issue at stake is to de-risk investments, strengthen concessional finance and target it more effectively. Tools can be put in place quickly. States, for their part, need to strengthen their regulatory frameworks and modernize their national companies. Networks are a weak link and deserve to be supported by international financial institutions. In the field of hydrocarbons, where major upstream activity is taking place, increasingly to the benefit of resource holding nations, the challenge is to avoid any new resource curse, to multiply development opportunities, and to minimize social and environmental impacts. Solutions do exist, and all actors must now assume their responsibilities. The mining sector requires infrastructure of all kinds, as well as the progressive implementation of demanding ESG criteria to protect the environment and workers, while fostering local and national development. Europeans need to mobilize capital, build industrial alliances, help train workforces, and structure win-win projects which create jobs and infrastructure. In the field of biodiversity, a huge opportunity for action and development is opening up, provided that the integrity of certification mechanisms and governance at the local level are strengthened, involving all stakeholders in a transparent way. The energy transition envisaged in Europe is in no way transposable to sub-Saharan Africa, where the main challenges concern access to affordable energy and clean cooking, development, youth employment, and adaptation to climate change. A challenge for Europeans is to speed up processes and reinforce the ability to accompany multidimensional projects, and not to be too prescriptive, so as not to lose influence and attractiveness further. The taxonomy, non-financial disclosure rules, or ESG criteria matter of course, but require some flexibility, and to be included in a process or progressive convergence. Priorities should be refocused on rapidly ensuring overall access to clean cooking, which is the mother of all battles and a key to development and environmental preservation. All the required technologies and solutions are available, and Kenya, alongside a few other countries in the region, showcases strong progress. With relatively modest resources, this existential challenge could be decisively addressed. Then comes the issues of transmission and distribution grids, and the wider infrastructure. Against this backdrop, providing public support for hydrogen export projects in the region appears less of a priority for European capitals at this stage. Finally, the success of the current re-engagement between Europeans and Africans will very much also depend on the European Union’s ability to foster the decrease of its greenhouse gas emissions so as to make room for the inevitable rise of emissions in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in the region need to improve governance and their investment frameworks to foster inclusive, sustainable, and stable economic growth and development, and avoid that all stops soon again. Yet these governments also need to raise the same demands and issues of climate justice to China, Russia, Middle East, or North American countries, which are the world’s largest polluters and are less committed than is Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Ecology, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Europe

38. High-Intensity Warfare: What Challenges for the French Armed Forces?

Author:
Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The new French Military Programming Law for 2024-2030 resolutely commits the French armed forces to the path of high intensity. However, this term continues to be the subject of debate and confusion within the defense community. To better understand its scope and implications for France, we need to offer a strict definition of the notion. In military terms, high intensity refers first and foremost to a type of engagement deploying a high level of kinetic energy within a limited space and duration. Added to this energy factor is the level of technological sophistication of equipment (capital intensity) and the lethality resulting from these two elements. A concept of high capability intensity is thus emerging, based on the triptych energy-technology-lethality. This capability intensity must be distinguished from the political intensity, or virulence, of an armed conflict, which depends above all on the interests at stake. When the stakes are very high for one of the parties, the conflict takes on the aspects of a major war, in which its very survival is at stake. Conversely, when real but non-existential interests are at stake, the result is limited war. While military history offers examples of conflicts combining high political and military intensity, it has also recorded cases of limited wars involving high capability intensity. It is this configuration that seems most relevant to France, where, in principle, the nuclear deterrent protects against any threat to the nation’s vital interests. This then opens up a wide range of scenarios that fall short of vital interests but lie beyond the capability and operational horizons of the last three decades, which have been characterized above all by crisis management and on which the current format of the French armed forces has been constructed. Strategic solidarity within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance or defense agreements, confrontation with a large or medium-sized power in peripheral areas, confrontation with a “proxy” third-party actor supported by a powerful state, or confrontation in isolated common spaces (the high seas, exo-atmospheric space, cyberspace, the seabed, etc.) are all hypothetical scenarios that would fall within the scope of high capability intensity. With this in mind, the French armed forces must be prepared to operate in high-intensity environments. Missions in these environments will be characterized by two major factors. The first is high attrition owing to the lethality of a battlefield marked by quantity. To cope with this, we will need to rethink the trade-offs between volume (equipment, ammunition, etc.) and survivability. The second factor is the adversary’s contestation of the commons (air, sea, cyber, information), which will call into question all the elements of military superiority in the Western war model. As a result, operating in the high-intensity arena means giving priority once again to missions of environmental superiority, in order to regain a freedom of action that will be increasingly challenged. For their part, ground forces will no longer be able to take joint support for granted and will need to regain autonomy of maneuver in order to contribute to multi-domain action. High-intensity warfare is therefore an important prospect for the French armed forces, and one that cannot be brushed aside on the grounds that France has a permanent deterrent. The advent of an unstable world marked by multidirectional strategic competition calls for a thorough reconsideration of the conventional formats and missions of the French armed forces, if decision-makers are to retain their freedom of action on the strategic scale.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Army, Military, and High-Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
Europe and France

39. The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Anya Fink
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions. This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war. Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty. In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention. Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. How to Curb Investments in Chinese Technology: Initiatives and Debates in the United States

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In a continuation of U.S. efforts to slow China's development and acquisition of strategic technologies, Washington has imposed new restrictions on American investment in Chinese technology sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and semiconductors. On August 9, 2023, President Biden issued an unprecedented executive order, announcing notification requirements and prohibitions for U.S. tech investments in China. Three sectors are targeted: semiconductors, quantum information technology, and artificial intelligence. Washington’s main concern is that these investments are accompanied by technology transfers and “intangible benefits” contributing to the development of Chinese military capabilities. This concern, first voiced in the 1980s, has received a heightened political response since 2018. Considering the emerging consensus in Congress and the multiplication of bills, further measures are likely to be adopted in the coming months. The European Union and certain Member States are beginning to reflect on the consequences of U.S. measures, and on the relevance of adopting their own tools to control investment in China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Investment, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computers, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

41. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations

Author:
Dimitri Minic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Russian army is very critical of its war in Ukraine. Not just of the first phase of the failed special military operation (SVO), which was inspired by the theorization of bypassing, but also of the strategic deterrence phase that preceded it. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations Download 0.98 Mo Russian military theorists have commented on the profound lack of preparation not just for the SVO, but also—in many areas—for the heterotelic war the SVO has become. The Russian army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Ukrainian army are generally, and sometimes quite directly, recognized. The Russian military elites have made numerous recommendations for improving Russia’s military performance, primarily focusing on the ground and aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the Russian army has mostly adapted (more or less successfully) to the difficulties it has encountered in the last year and a half in Ukraine. Although the Putin regime is authoritarian and intent on reducing freedom of expression in Russian society, the existence and tolerance of a certain amount of truth-telling at this level of the military apparatus indicate that the Russian army’s and state’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

42. The Next Surge of Conflict in the South Caucasus Is Still Preventable

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tragic exodus of the Armenian population from the Nagorno Karabakh region has closed a chapter in the long saga of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The disappearance of this self-proclaimed republic provides the opportunity to bring these bitter hostilities to an end; it takes, nevertheless, plenty of wishful political thinking to believe that a peace treaty could be swiftly negotiated. Mutual animosity is a profound, but not necessarily insurmountable obstacle. The greater problem is that it is hard to expect from Azerbaijan, ruled by the hereditary autocratic regime of President Ilham Aliyev, a magnanimity in victory. Pushing the defeated adversary further yet and maximizing the damage is much more in the nature of this regime, rendering the prevention of a new spasm of armed conflict an urgent task for all stakeholders in peace in the South Caucasus. The fate of Nagorno Karabakh was predetermined by the outcome of the 44-day long air-land battle in autumn 2020, in which the Armenian forward defense positions were breached, leading to the capture of Shusha, a key stronghold in the rugged theater of operations, by the Azeri forces. In that triumph, Aliyev showed strategic patience and accepted the Russian offer of a ceasefire. Much in the same way he calculated the right moment for starting the offensive operation, he assumed a total victory was inevitable in a matter of a few years, lessening the need to push forward with the military conquest of the whole enclave. The timeframe for the Russian peacekeeping operation was set on five years, but Russia’s aggression against Ukraine made it possible for Azerbaijan to force the closure of the postponed final act of geopolitical drama two years beforehand.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Displacement, Armed Conflict, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

43. How to Meet the Industrial Challenge of Electric Mobility in France and in Europe

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Diana-Paula Gherasim, Clémentine Vannier, and Adam Contu
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
How to Meet the Industrial Challenge of Electric Mobility in France and in Europe Notes de l'Ifri, November 2023 The deployment at scale of electric mobility in France and in Europe withholds significant industrial, societal, geopolitical, and financial challenges, against the backdrop of strategic dependencies along the value chain of the electric vehicle (EV). A certain lack of vision of the value chain as a whole, of the needs and objectives at each stage, and of how to ensure consistency and follow-up over time adds up to the concerns of industry players, who not only need to catch up from a technology point of view, but also to innovate, to secure the value chains, the workforce, the supply in low-carbon affordable energy and to scale up production and recycling capacities. Gigafactories are a major industrial step forward but should not obscure the complex and much broader nature of the battery value chain, and more generally of EVs’ value chain. This note summarizes the key findings of Ifri’s extensive study with the same name and its ten key recommendations for overcoming the industrial challenges of electric mobility deployment in France and Europe: Developing a holistic approach to the supply of critical raw materials, focusing on five key areas: domestic extraction, refining, mining diplomacy and environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards and recycling. Ensuring the stable and competitive supply of low-carbon electricity. Building integrated partnerships with European players at all stages of the EV value chain, with a view in particular to rapidly securing a certain number of cathode and anode active material (CAM and AAM) and precursor cathode active material (PCAM) production capacities, and supporting innovation in battery chemistry, which is the only way for Europeans to distinguish themselves from China. Planning in order to acquire an integrated mastery of the value chain, to develop the skills and train the workforce. Moderating the demand in critical raw materials as a key to resilience, as alternative means of transport, fewer car sales and smaller batteries, contribute to reduce the future increase in raw material needs. Re-imagining mobility to make it more sustainable, accessible, and fair. Setting up and calibrating a support system for the deployment of the different stages of the electric mobility value chain in France, whose cost to the national budget could be in the region of €8-9 billion a year, over the next few years. Protecting industries from unfair and less virtuous practices. Exploiting the growth of electric mobility to strengthen the integration of variable renewable energies into power systems. Ensuring that the European Union (EU) has the appropriate resources to meet the multiple industrial and technological challenges linked to EVs in the context of polycrises. Only some of these have been covered in this study, as EVs cannot be reduced to batteries alone, and involve many other key equipment and issues, hence the need to have an EV based approach, as opposed to one centered around battery-cells.
Topic:
Mobility, Transportation, Energy, Electric Vehicles, Energy Transition, and Greenhouse Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Global Focus

44. Georgia: Another Russian Front

Author:
Régis Genté
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The end of 2023 is due to mark a turning point in Georgian history. In December, the European Council will decide whether to award the country European Union (EU) candidate status. For the majority of Georgia’s 3.7 million citizens, this decision is extremely important, as 81 percent of them say that they want their country to join the EU. However, the government and the ruling party Georgian Dream, under the informal control of the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, have consistently acted contrary to this deeply rooted popular desire since coming to power, taking a foreign policy approach, at least since 2021, that has undermined relationships with Western partners and brought the ex-Soviet republic back into Russia’s sphere of influence. After twenty years of pro-European policy, this divergence between Georgia’s rulers and its population has provoked a succession of political crises in the country over the last few years. Moscow is supporting this dramatic shift in Tbilisi’s strategic orientation and may even have initiated it. Numerous indicators show that in practice Russia, which waged war against Georgia in 2008, continues to regard its neighbor as another battlefield in its confrontation with the West. These developments in Georgian politics presage the emergence of major political and geopolitical tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, and Georgia

45. Climate, Finance, and Geopolitics: Human Self-delusions and the Challenges for Europe

Author:
Sylvie Goulard
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The combination of geopolitical tensions, climate disruption, and the growing role of finance in the economy is taking us into uncharted territory. Until recently, each of these subjects was handled separately, but they are now inextricably linked by two shared characteristics: the gravity of the threat, and the fact that they all lay bare the scale of human self-delusions. There are also interactions between them: between climate and finance, since states have a tendency to pass this “hot potato” onto the private financial sector; and between geopolitics and finance, because money remains the “sinews of war” and debt is a vulnerability, especially for any actor wanting to exercise full sovereignty. These issues are particularly acute for the European Union (EU) that is still a work in progress. Key Takeaways: Finance, climate science and geopolitics were once separate subjects. Now linked, their commonality is that they reveal the illusions of those who, in the 20th century, thought they had mastered finance, tamed nature, and prevented war. The financialization of the economy, climate change and the resurgence of armed conflict have exposed these illusions and call for a new awakening. With planetary limits about to be reached, it will not be enough to rely on finance alone. Similarly, the rise in geopolitical risks calls for resources which, in a context of high indebtedness, are no longer available to governments. For Europe, which is facing these challenges without being solidly constituted, the challenge is even greater, but across the globe it is high time to ask questions about exacerbated national sovereignty and the lack of respect by governments for the commitments they have made.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Finance, Economy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe

46. Europe and the Geopolitics of 5G Walking a Technological Tightrope

Author:
Julien Nocetti
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The acute Sino-American tensions which started in 2018 have been coupled with controversies around 5G technology, exemplified by the spotlight placed on Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei and the security risks associated with its use. For Europe, the 5G challenge at the international level is drawing a very complex landscape. Just like artificial intelligence, 5G materializes a very strong geopolitical sensitivity around the control of critical technologies. 5G is indeed critical because of its expected quasi-ubiquitous use, the gradual shift towards network technologies based entirely on software, and the potential strengthening of already dominant players (including digital platforms via cloud services). The United States-China rivalry is limiting the European Union’s room for action, against a backdrop of security considerations and low levels of investment. The continent’s various players (the European Commission, the main European powers, private players such as Nokia and Ericsson) have not adopted a uniform stance, reflecting an entanglement of technological dependencies on China and the United States. Meanwhile, the issue of semiconductors, symbolizing both the technological decline and the renewal of the EU’s ambitions, is fully integrated into the development of 5G. These chips constitute the "muscle" of the system and trigger new geo-economic challenges in which Europe must still find its place.
Topic:
European Union, Internet, 5G, Telecommunications, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Rewinding the Clock? US-Russia Relations in the Biden Era

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The escalating crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022 has returned US-Russia relations to center stage. Faced with the prospect of a new Russian military intervention, US President Joe Biden has re-engaged with Vladimir Putin in a manner reminiscent of the diplomacy of the superpower era. But this latest American attempt at accommodation raises more questions than answers. In the intervening three decades the world has changed out of all recognition, the international influence of the US-Russia relationship is much diminished, and their cooperation has sunk to historic lows. Can Washington and Moscow defy gravity and achieve some level of pragmatic engagement? There is good reason for skepticism. Neither side is truly invested in cooperation, but instrumentalizes it to other purposes. The Biden administration hopes to neutralize Russia in order to focus on the all-encompassing challenge of China. The Kremlin looks to undermine American influence as part of its project of promoting Russia as an independent global power. These goals are essentially irreconcilable. Looking ahead, the real question is not whether the United States and Russia can recalibrate their relationship to new “normal”, but whether they can avoid confrontation in an increasingly fluid and disorderly world.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Intervention, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

48. French Engagement in the Western Balkans: Boosting Strategic, Political, Economic, and Societal Cooperation

Author:
Florent Marciacq and Romain Le Quiniou
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After years of lower interest, France has signaled its ambition to re-engage in the Western Balkans. It is not starting from scratch. Historical affinities with the countries of the region abound, in culture, sciences, politics, and economy. But shifting priorities in the past decades have eroded French presence in the region. To regain a foothold in this important part of Europe, France has taken a series of initiatives aimed at boosting its engagement. In 2016, it hosted the Berlin Process summit; in 2017, it launched with Germany an initiative to coordinate the drive against firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans; in 2018, it expanded the intervention mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) to all Western Balkans countries and adopted a national Strategy for the Western Balkans; in 2020, after a two-year stalemate, it withdrew its reservations against the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, while sketching the contours of the revised enlargement methodology. Drawing from a series of consultations in the region and structured cooperation with partner think-tanks, this policy paper is conceived as an independent, expert contribution to French efforts at re-engaging with the Western Balkans. It explores perceptions of French re-engagement in the region and reflects the potential of the 2019 Strategy for the Western Balkans in light of the forthcoming French Presidency of the European Council and in the context of the grands débats on the future of Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

49. Governing Cities in Africa. A Panorama of Challenges and Perspectives

Author:
Sina Schlimmer
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
By 2050, about 60% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will live in urban areas. The governance of the rapid growth of capital and intermediary cities in Africa is one of the priorities of the international development agenda. Between 2020 and 2050, African cities, and especially secondary cities, have to absorb more than 700 million urban dwellers. Given these projections, urban growth in Africa has become a central concern of the international community, including experts from international organizations, researchers, aid agencies, and the private sector. While expert meetings and research initiatives on the future of cities are accumulating, this study aims to take stock of the debate. First, it provides an overview of the major issues that mostly policy-oriented research on cities in Africa has dealt with since independence. Based on this review, our paper builds on the concept of urban governance to approach the transformation and growth of African cities. Hereby we take into consideration the multiple actors (public, private, civil society, etc.), policy sectors (land, housing, infrastructure, etc.), and scales (local, national, international) that shape the political, economic, and social aspects of urban life. The paper also addresses African cities as part of a broader urban-rural continuum. Second, this study proposes concrete avenues to contribute to ongoing research and technical initiatives on urban governance in Africa. More knowledge and data are needed to inform the debate on urban infrastructure financing and the role of intermediate cities in the broader urbanization process in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that a more detailed comprehension of land tenure systems is fundamental to understanding the challenges of future urban development in Africa.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Urban, Rural, and Cities
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, Tanzania, and Sub-Saharan Africa

50. Convince and Coerce: U.S. Interference in Technology Exchanges Between its Allies and China

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tough-on-China policy adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations has – and will increasingly have – important consequences for Washington’s allies, both on their infrastructure choices (5G, submarine cables...) and on their technological exchanges with China. Indeed, the U.S. objective of slowing down China’s technological development has been translated into multiple policies, primarily targeting China but also – directly or indirectly – U.S. partners. On the one hand, Washington deploys a range of coercive and incentive tools to prevent its allies from adopting certain technologies, supplied by Chinese companies and « untrusted » by American authorities (in terms of cyber, data or infrastructure security). Case studies of U.S. efforts against the deployment of Huawei’s 5G or Hengtong Group’s undersea cables reveal a similar strategy, combining direct diplomatic pressure, a threat awareness campaign, and financial incentives. On the other hand, in line with the United States’ historical use of the extraterritoriality of its law and its position as an economic superpower to influence its allies’ decisions, Washington seeks to restrict transfers of critical technologies from allies to China. As the main manufacturers (along with the United States) of these technologies, American allies are increasingly constrained by these legal and diplomatic restrictions, which target one of their main trading partners and tend to extend beyond strictly military or cutting-edge technologies. For example, in order to limit sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, U.S. authorities are combining changes to the American export control regime with diplomatic efforts (bilaterally and multilaterally) to persuade allies to align their own export policies with those of the United States. While the Biden administration appears to be placing greater emphasis on cooperative and incentive approaches, it seems likely that the multidimensional U.S. strategy serving these two objectives will continue, and even be strengthened. Among allies (and especially in Europe), this trend has raised awareness of the security challenges posed by certain Chinese suppliers, but also of the risks associated with the growing coercive practices of the great powers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, Semiconductors, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

51. India–East Africa: A Not So Healthy Relationship?

Author:
Isabelle Saint-Mezard and Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Due to historical as well as geographical reasons, India and East Africa have long been close partners. In the recent period however, and even more so since the early 2000s, these ties have tightened as a result of combined efforts by the government of India and its business community. The presence of communities of Indian origin in several East African countries has also acted as a catalyst. East Africa is perceived as a valuable partner both by Indian authorities and by Indian private companies. Although the two types of Indian players may not explicitly coordinate their actions, their interests dovetail nicely in this particular region. The health sector sticks out as one major sector on which Indian actors focus in East Africa. It provides a striking example of the multilayered complementarity between India and East Africa, on the one hand, and between public and private Indian players’ interests on the other. However, India’s activism in the health sector is not necessarily perceived positively by the East African host countries. Despite some technology transfers and efforts by the Indian actors, be they public or private, to promote capacity-building, East African countries find themselves in a situation of dependence as a result of Indian companies exporting and producing drugs, building hospitals, improving hospital management and Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, or digitalizing healthcare. However, the major point of tension pertains to the promotion of medical tourism. Although offshore healthcare comes with many benefits, it is unlikely to be sustainable for the East African economies in the long run. Moreover, the money spent on medical tourism could arguably be used more usefully to develop local medical facilities and competence. The recent developments in the context of the pandemic have made the associated risk very clear. The challenge in the coming years will be for the two parties to find a way to better balance their relationship and set it on firmer ground – in other words, to make it healthier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

52. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East

53. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

54. French Special Operations What Is Their Role in the Context of Great-Power Competition?

Author:
Laurent Bansept
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2022 marks thirty years since the creation of the Commandement des operations spéciales (COS, Special Operations Command). Those three decades have been dominated by missions carried out in volatile environments, most often against irregular adversaries, primarily terrorist groups. Special operations are distinguished from clandestine and conventional operations by the specific nature of their mission, more than by the means used to carry it out. Built according to an indirect approach and under political-military control, French special operations can complement as well as support conventional operations or offer an alternative. While counter-network operations continue to be an important part of special forces’ activities, the return of major engagement assumptions requires a return to their original practices and the integration of gray zone requirements. Increasing stealth and developing partnerships and the piloting capabilities of relay-actors are all avenues that will enable French special forces to adapt to the new constraints they face.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Intervention, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Special Forces
Political Geography:
Europe and France

55. Power to the Cooks! New Clean Cooking Opportunities for Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2.6 billion people globally and 1 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) cook using biomass fuel. The detrimental effects on the environment and public health, as well as the time and money lost are considerable. If nothing new is done, this situation will worsen further in SSA. • The rapidly decreasing costs of solar power and batteries, coupled with efficient devices such as electric pressure cookers, alongside new business models, now offer an immense potential to achieve universal access to clean cooking. • Efficient electric cooking can be off or on grid, with or without batteries. It does not have to fulfill all cooking needs; fuel stacking is already common in many kitchens and should remain so. E-cooking can be cheaper than using biomass fuels, but high upfront costs must be broken down into manageable repayments. • Governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often implement parallel strategies to increase access to electricity and to clean cooking. Integrated e-cooking strategies should be fostered and implemented to help achieve these sustainable development goals jointly by 2030.
Topic:
Sustainable Development Goals, Electricity, African Union, and Energy
Political Geography:
Africa

56. The Military Use of Small Satellites in Orbit

Author:
Mariel Borowitz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The number of small satellites in orbit has increased rapidly over the last decade, and the growth of this sector is expected to accelerate even more in coming years. Small satellites offer unique economic opportunities, due to their shorter development time, their lower cost as well as their manufacturing in assembly line style processes. Many small satellite applications envision systems comprised of constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites, which offer a number of advantages, such as the increase in temporal resolution, or revisit rate, as well as formation flying. Military users can take advantage of commercial systems for military purposes - leveraging existing capability without the need to develop new systems internally. Militaries must look for ways to harness these trends to their advantage, both by making use of commercial offerings, and by examining military-specific opportunities. Military leaders envision a time when battlefield imagery could be requested and received by commanders on the ground and used for real-time decision-making. The U.S. Army's Project Convergence experimented with this capability in October 2020.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Satellite, and Military
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

57. The Sino-Lithuanian Crisis: Going beyond the Taiwanese Representative Office Issue

Author:
Konstantinas Andrijauskas
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2021 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Lithuania. Instead of commemorative events and customary lofty rhetoric, the bilateral relationship rapidly plunged to a level rarely seen in either country’s foreign policies since the end of the Cold War. Sino-Lithuanian relations remain de facto downgraded to the level of chargé d’affaires, Lithuania’s physical embassy in Beijing is empty, while the southernmost Baltic state continues to withstand China’s multidimensional campaign of diplomatic, discursive and, most importantly, economic pressure. The principal cause behind this diplomatic crisis was the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021. This Briefing will argue, however, that there were other important reasons behind the current state of affairs that had been accumulating over the course of two years. The opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021 triggered an unprecedented diplomatic crisis between the People’s Republic of China and Lithuania. China resorted to massive economic coercion measures to pressure Vilnius, such as the freezing of bilateral trade. European multinational companies also reported that Beijing blocked their exports because of Lithuanian components in their products. In late January 2022, the European Union (EU) launched a case at the World Trade Organization against China over discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania. The current crisis must be understood in the broader context of the degradation of the relations between China and Lithuania, but also the EU, since 2019. As such, this crisis is symptomatic of the developing trend in the relationship between the EU and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and WTO
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

58. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Piece in the Industry Decarbonization Puzzle

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a first step toward reconciling the European Union (EU)’s climate and trade interests. However, a complementary set of domestic and external policies will be needed to drive the decarbonization of European and global energy-intensive industries. • By 2035, the EU must have fully replaced its unsustainable free allocation regime by an effective CBAM. Yet, rushing implementation may bring little climate benefit and additional strains on industrial competitiveness, in a context of soaring energy prices. • Even with the CBAM as a complement, the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is no silver bullet. Triggering large-scale investment in deep-decarbonization projects across the EU requires a package of well-coordinated policies, including those enabling crucial access to affordable low-carbon electricity. • Climate clubs are not a credible alternative to the EU’s CBAM, nor desirable amid the geopolitical crisis. Instead, the EU should convince all large industrial countries that the race for clean manufacturing requires guiding principles, to avoid undue distortion of trade and ensure a fair industrial transition globally. • Setting expectations about CBAM at the right level – both internally and externally – is the best way to support the EU’s green industrial policy while containing diplomatic tensions.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Industry, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

59. Digital Sovereignty Review of Macron’s Term and Debates in the 2022 Presidential Campaign

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
One month before the French presidential election, this briefing assesses the actions undertaken during Macron's term as well as the presidential candidates' proposals concerning France's digital sovereignty. Emmanuel Macron’s five-year term has been characterized by notable efforts to reinforce French digital sovereignty through regulation, securing industries and infrastructures, and supporting strategic sectors. The candidates running for the 2022 presidential election tend to also adopt a maximalist view of sovereignty, which in the digital domain is not limited to data protection, but also includes an industrial component. While all the candidates denounce the current government’s policy on cloud computing, their other proposals in the digital domain are generally in line with the action taken since 2017. However, the weakness of the candidates’ proposals on the international dimension of technology is problematic, at a time when partners and rivals are articulating their foreign policies around these issues, with significant effects on Europe’s efforts toward digital sovereignty.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Emmanuel Macron, Presidential Elections, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Europe and France

60. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action

Author:
Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. The EU’s Plan to Scale up Renewables by 2030: Implications for the Power System

Author:
Susanne Nies
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The climate and geopolitical crises call for speeding up the implementation of the European Green Deal around two main pillars: reducing energy consumption and investing in low-carbon alternatives. The swift and massive deployment of renewable energies (REN) is a major industrial challenge for the European electricity system. • Scaling up renewable energy (REN) is paramount for climate protection and energy security, but it is also a major industrial challenge for the European Union (EU). The REPowerEU plan requires multiplying the installed capacity for solar photovoltaic (PV) power by a factor of 3 and raising wind capacity by a factor of 2.5 in less than 8 years from now. • To achieve such ambitious targets, permit-granting and administrative processes need to be streamlined, while greater consistency between environmental and climate legislation is required for both REN and related infrastructure. • The precondition for massive REN deployment is an efficient and flexible energy system. The latter needs to be enforced throughout the Fit for 55 Package, and through European and national energy “system” development plans. • The EU’s REN ambitions – those related to offshore wind in particular – are disruptive in terms of technology needs, investments, as well as governance. Interim steps as well as regional and national strategies must be developed accordingly.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

62. Two Shades of Blue: Europe and the Pacific Islands, Strategic Partners in the Indo-Pacific Era

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, France and the European Union (EU) have published their respective Indo-Pacific strategies and a Ministerial Forum was held in Paris on February 22, 2022, bringing together over 60 foreign affairs ministers from European and Pacific Island countries. France and the EU are re-engaging in this strategic region, which is an economic and political center of gravity whose stability is threatened by transnational risks (climate change, epidemics, pressure on natural resources) and by inter-state tensions exacerbated by US-China rivalry. However, the area spanning the 22 member countries and territories of the Pacific Community (SPC) has received less attention and can even be described as a blind spot in these Indo-Pacific discussions. Yet, although they have a population of only 13 million, these Pacific Island states and territories have a combined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of almost 40 million square kilometers (km2) and are strategically located close to East Asia. These territories and their natural resources have attracted and still attract keen interest and sometimes very violent competition between powers. Today, the Pacific Islands are on the front line of the global existential challenges of climate change, biodiversity protection and sustainable development, but also geostrategic rivalries. Due to the geographical distance and Europe's still limited knowledge of this region, political, economic and media interest is often lacking. For this reason, Ifri and the Pacific Community (SPC) have decided to organize a research program on the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands. This Briefing is based on discussions that took place at the program’s opening conference on March 10, 2022; contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted. This report provides an overview of current regional issues in the Pacific Islands and argues for greater European engagement in the region. This rapprochement is justified firstly because European and Pacific Island countries share similar values and face similar challenges, and secondly because new European interest and facilities make Europe a partner of choice to support sustainable development in the Pacific Islands. Since this engagement will come with various challenges, recommendations for European decision-makers are outlined in the conclusions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Ocean

63. The Political Economy of the Metaverse

Author:
Sam Gilbert
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The "metaverse", at the heart of the strategy of large digital companies such as Facebook (Meta), does not yet exist and it will take decades to build it. This briefing provides an overview of the issues. The metaverse is a persistent online world with a developed economy, that can be experienced in virtual reality (VR) by unlimited numbers of people. Current talk of the metaverse is primarily a narrative about the growth potential of the video gaming and enterprise software sectors, in the context of advances in VR technology and changes to everyday life brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. Major technological and governance breakthroughs will be required before the metaverse can be built. Efforts to realize the metaverse are more likely to be led by incumbent American and Chinese big tech companies than European challengers.
Topic:
Metaverse, Virtual Reality, and Digital Companies
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

64. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

65. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

66. Connectivity in Central Asia at the Crossroads of International Crises: Transport, Energy and Water from Interdependence to New Cooperation Ways

Author:
Michaël Levystone
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
From the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan by the Taliban to the war in Ukraine, not forgetting climate change, the most serious international crises, whether circumstantial or systemic, are having a severe impact on connectivity in Central Asia with regard to transport, energy, and water. While the search, which is an existential one for the countries of this landlocked region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), for foreign partners has been legitimized and even encouraged by the troubling context in which they are evolving, the steps they have taken in this respect since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, show an obvious desire to bypass Russia, which has been heavily sanctioned by the West. As a result, Central Asian transportation networks are developing in two directions: to the west, with Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea as key links in Sino-European trade routes; and to the south, whether by sea (development of port links from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and Iran) or by land (creation of a railway line between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). In the energy sector, Kazakhstan, hindered by Russian blockades of its main oil pipeline, is turning to the Caspian Sea in order to be able to continue transporting oil to European markets. Turkmenistan exports its gas to the Chinese and South Asian markets, where its projects, but also those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the field of hydropower, are being hampered by developments in Afghanistan. Lastly, the question of water highlights the paradox of interdependent countries that are divided between those that control Central Asia's water resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the rest, located downstream of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). While a growing number of initiatives are being launched to promote smart management of the region's significant water resources, this remains the most polarizing issue in Central Asia, despite its urgent nature.
Topic:
Water, Regional Integration, Transportation, Connectivity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Central Asia

67. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

68. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:
Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

69. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

70. The Geopolitics of Seawater Desalination

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Élise Cassignol
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Water desalination is gradually emerging as the leading solution to cope with increasing water stress: i.e., the imbalance between water demand and quantities available. The United Nations estimates that by 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will be affected by such challenges. The causes of water scarcity are multiple, including climate change, intensive agriculture, and population growth. This requires states to rethink their water policies, which are central to preserving their stability, resilience and sovereignty. A real “boom” in desalination industries is at work. The majority of Gulf countries now largely depend on desalinated water for their inhabitants’ consumption: in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 42% of drinking water comes from desalination plants producing more than 7 million cubic meters (m3) per day, in Kuwait it is 90%, in Oman 86%, and in Saudi Arabia 70%. In 2022, there were more than 21,000 seawater desalination plants in operation worldwide, almost twice as many as a decade ago, and the sector’s capacity is growing at between +6% and +12% per year. By 2030, desalination capacity in Middle Eastern countries is expected to almost double, as part of plans announced in the region to prepare these economies for their transition to “post-oil” and to foster resilience. Saudi Arabia’s desalination capacity is set to increase from 5.6 million cubic meter (m3) per day in 2022 to 8.5 million m3 per day in 2025, and it will have to cover more than 90% of the country’s water consumption. The same holds for the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel, where the production of desalinated water will more than double by 2030. With the rise of available solutions to meet all such needs, these technologies are now in demand on virtually every continent, while the Middle East today represents only 50% of installed capacity worldwide. In Africa, large-scale projects have recently been announced in Algeria and Morocco, countries that until now have had sufficient resources. Other countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Kenya supply many cities with desalinated seawater. This is also the case for Cairo. In the Indo-pacific region, particularly in China and India, the needs for desalinated water are increasing, driven by growing industries and decreasing available water. In 2020 alone, the construction of more than 35 desalination plants was announced in China, as well as six in the Philippines, and six in Taiwan. In the Americas, the west coast of the United States stands out with important projects in California, and Texas is not far behind. In Latin America, new projects are emerging in Peru and Chile, driven mainly by the needs of the mining industry, while in Mexico the demand for desalinated water notably comes from the population. Finally, island areas stand out for their strong needs for desalinated water: Cebu in the Philippines, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and the Maldives are increasingly using desalination capabilities. European firms still lead, but Asian or local players are taking off There are many industrial players of varied size, although some have emerged for more than ten years as undisputed market leaders: in France, they include Engie and Veolia, whose merger with Suez opened up new prospects in the Americas, the Middle East and Europe; but there is also IDE Technologies, the Israeli champion of desalination; Korea’s Doosan Heavy, China’s Abengoa, and Spain’s Acciona. More recently, companies in emerging countries have distinguished themselves by obtaining large-scale contracts. This is particularly the case of Gulf players like the Emirati company Metito and the Saudi firm Advanced Water Technologies. Egypt also has industrial actors. Overall, the technology of reverse osmosis is largely mastered, while production differentiation concerns capacity, operational costs, electricity consumption and plant life.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Water, Industry, and Desalination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

71. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:
Camille Morel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

72. Five Years after China’s Plastic Import Ban Have Europeans Taken Responsibility?

Author:
Eugénie Joltreau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After the 2017 Chinese waste import ban, the international and European Union (EU) legislative framework on waste exports has been revised. • The amendment to the Basel Convention is stricter on the possibility to export plastic waste outside the EU, which has integrated the amendment in the waste shipment regulation (WSR) and is considering further export restrictions. Moreover, a Directive to reduce the use of single-use plastics and stimulate local demand for recycled plastics has been adopted. • The recycling rate of plastic packaging has been deteriorating since 2016 in view of the growing quantities of plastic packaging waste and limited export outlets, despite an increase in the tonnage recycled. Exports of plastic waste from the European Union have been reduced and partly redirected, with some negative environmental impacts reported. The EU demand for certain recycled plastics has boomed, encouraged by the new regulation, yet overall, EU plastic packaging consumption keeps increasing. • The debate on the export ban opposes a view of responsibility for the treatment of waste with the promotion of international waste trade as a means to achieve a global circular economy (for plastics). However, there is no evidence that the waste trade enables to increase the global recycling rate, reduces the use of virgin plastic, and reinforces sustainability. • The European Commission (EC) has released a new legislative proposal that tightens up waste export possibilities but does not ban it.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Recycling, Waste, Imports, and Plastic
Political Geography:
China and Europe

73. Fishing for Chips: Assessing the EU Chips Act

Author:
Niclas Poitiers and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China, the United States, and the European Union (EU) are currently developing strategies for semiconductors aimed at financing R&D and the installation of new factories on their territories, in particular through subsidies. The EU Chips Act, announced in February 2022, represents a real break in Europe's industrial policy. Key Takeaways: Drawing lessons from the ongoing shortages in chip supply, the United States, China, and the European Union are adopting industrial policies in the semiconductor sector in search for supply chain security and economic and technological competitiveness. The EU Chips Act in particular represents a notable shift from a long-held opposition to industrial subsidies seen as detrimental to international competition. The proposal will support R&D in Europe, provide a legal basis for EU member states to use subsidize domestic semiconductor manufacturing, and facilitate trade measures to intervene in the supply chain in times of crisis. This new global subsidy race to build foundries carries the risks of channeling billions in public funds into unprofitable investments, due to the complexity of semiconductor production and risks of overcapacity in certain segments. To avoid that, cooperation with like-minded partners of the EU, especially the US, appears necessary but still needs to be worked out.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Digital Policy, Value Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

74. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific: Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The “new scramble for the Pacific” is characterized by a race for the control of maritime space and resources, oscillating between ocean grabbing and ocean commoning. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific. Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation Download 0.96 Mo This tendency can be seen in the endemic nature of Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing (estimated in 2016 as 10% of the overall catch in the Pacific Islands Countries – PICs), but also in the multiplication of large Marine Protected Areas (MPAs): delimited areas in which certain human activities such as fishing are restricted to conserve resources (the Pacific hosts the majority of the world’s MPAs). The European Union (EU), as the biggest importer of fish (which imports half of its tuna from the Pacific) and a leader in biodiversity protection, has a key stake in ensuring a sustainable management of these resources. Moreover, Europe has territories in the Pacific (French New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis & Futuna) with large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that are difficult to monitor and protect in the face of diverse challenges: foreign intrusions, IUU fishing, narcotrafficking and interstate tensions. Hence, ocean governance is one of the seven priority areas of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. MPAs have been the favorite scheme to manage the maritime space and protect biodiversity & marine resources. Large or small, they can offer minimal or total protection by limiting certain human practices. A loosely defined framework, MPAs allow for a greater control over a designated territory. As such, it is a truly geopolitical object, and is not immune to controversy. This said, MPAs are a key tool for biodiversity conservation, and a vital scheme to achieve the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’s call to protect at least 30% of the planet – land and sea – by 2030 (the 30x30 initiative). To be useful and successful, MPAs or other protection schemes need to be considered efficient and fair – hence legitimate. This requires adequate access to scientific data to ensure the process is knowledge-driven and to gauge the effectiveness of the protection measures. Local communities, their economic needs and their traditional knowledge of the ocean, should be taken into account at each stage. Moreover, surveillance should be ensured to deter illegal activities and enforce protection measures. This briefing argues that building two-way bridges between experts, decision-makers and populations in Europe and the Pacific Islands will be extremely beneficial to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of ocean governance schemes. The Pacific needs scientific data that Europe can offer. Europe can greatly benefit from understanding the Pacific Islanders’ needs and learn from local customary practices to protect resources in a more relevant and democratic manner. This participatory, multi-scaled approach would provide new paths towards more efficient resource protection schemes in Europe, too, taking into consideration tools that may not have conservation as an objective, but are effectively sustaining biodiversity. This briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar “Are Marine Protected Areas a relevant tool for the Pacific?” organized by Ifri’s Pacific Islands Program on June 21, 2022. Contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, Governance, European Union, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
France, Pacific Ocean, and Oceania

75. Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change

Author:
Nicola Leveringhaus
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Dating back to the first test in 1964, the Chinese nuclear force modernization process is motivated by other nuclear powers’ modernization across the years, mostly from the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by domestic factors such as economic debates and tensions in the scientific community. China Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change Download 0.63 Mo At first, technical difficulties and a greater investment in conventional forces prevented the development of a ‘lean and effective arsenal’. However, the end of the Cold War and better economic conditions allowed China to improve its weapons toward a greater duality and mobility, thus reflecting the first tensions between the Chinese no-first-use doctrine and its growing technical capabilities and ambitions. Nowadays, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is bigger than ever, ranking third in size amongst nuclear global powers and with an estimated 1,000 warheads in 2030. The weapons’ efficiency is also reportedly higher, aiming at a fully functioning triad. Furthermore, doctrinal debates are still ongoing, with potential consequences on arms control and risk management.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

76. “Don’t Bank on the Bombs” New European Standards Affecting the Defense Industry

Author:
Amélie Ferey and Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has underlined the need to upgrade the European armed forces, the urgency of the fight against climate change—as illustrated by reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—requires the political mobilization of the European Union (EU) to carry out the transition to climate neutrality. The EU has therefore established guidelines for ambitious action in these two areas. Via its Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, it intends to contribute to world stability with the support of a permanent and viable defense tool. Via its 2018 green finance plan, the European Commission aims to redirect financial flows toward sustainable activities and thus facilitate the 480 billion euros (€) of additional annual investments which will be necessary if it is to achieve its environmental objectives by 2030. The tension between these two objectives— strengthening European defense on the one hand and promoting sustainable finance on the other—was made manifest in lively discussions regarding the integration of the defense sector into European taxonomy projects and the expansion of the Ecolabel. These proposals led to concerns among companies of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), wary of the perceived threat to their funding.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Industry, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

77. A Green-Blue Alliance in Motion: Pacific Island Countries and Europe Fighting Climate Change

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) were the first to ratify the Paris climate agreement in 2015. Indeed, for them, climate change has had very concrete implications for years. Islanders have seen the sea level rising, endangering the very existence of atolls. They have also experienced increasingly violent cyclones and other natural disasters, and must deal with multiple impacts of a changing climate on their everyday lives More than bearing the brunt of such impacts, and they have been calling for the rest of the world to awaken to this existential threat. At the recent UN General Assembly, the government of Vanuatu, supported by other states, led an initiative to ask for the opinion of the International Court of Justice on climate change. The European Union (EU) has been a proactive leader in international negotiations on climate change; it strives to lead by example and do its share to mitigate climate impacts and support adaptation efforts. But it was perhaps on only this past summer that climate change began to feel very real for European public opinion, as the continent was ravaged by a series of heatwaves, major wildfires and droughts that had serious impacts on biodiversity, agriculture, but also human health. Some have said this is the “end of innocence” for the Europeans on climate change. This episode might help bridge the gap and make Europeans better understand what the populations of the Pacific Islands have been enduring, keeping in mind that PICs are more exposed and have fewer financial resources to implement solutions. It might also raise greater interest about the way Oceanians could adapt and provide innovative solutions. This Briefing argues that climate change challenges require an innovative, transformative approach to deliver results on mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for loss and damage. Europe and Oceania are two leading actors that already have a fruitful record of cooperation, and are willing to step up their cooperation to lead this transition to a new model. This paper is based on discussions that took place during the webinar “Climate Change: The Pacific Island Countries, seven years after the Paris Agreement” organized by Ifri’s Pacific Islands Program, in partnership with the Pacific Community, on September 20, 2022.4 Contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Regional Integration, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
Europe, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

78. COP27: Will Egypt Bring New Life to Climate Conferences?

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The COP26, held at the end of 2021 in Glasgow, was emphatically heralded as “the last best hope for the world to get its act together”. Many elements are pointing to a particularly difficult COP27, among which the unfinished work of the Glasgow COP, the worsening of the climate crisis, the tensions in the hydrocarbon markets, and the risks of economic recession. This COP in Sharm-El-Sheik is nevertheless the first hosted outside the European continent since 2016 and the first under the aegis of a rapidly changing UN Climate Change. It takes place on the African continent and, like the COP28 chaired by the United Arab Emirates, is held in a country that wants to be a hub for all types of energies. Therefore, the role of gas in the energy transition has become a central topic. Finally, African countries are pushing for a greater contribution from rich countries to the fight against climate change, especially regarding the financial adaptation, and the acceleration of implementation efforts (rather than announcements of new initiatives).
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Renewable Energy, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
North Africa and Egypt

79. Open Innovation in Defense. Passing Fad or New Philosophy?

Author:
Raphaël Briant
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The use of civilian technologies on the battlefield—one of the lessons that can be drawn from recent conflicts—is attracting growing interest from the armed forces of France and other nations. The growing number of examples of effective integration of civilian technologies into the armed forces, including during conflict, shows the importance of open innovation and the acceleration of the international race toward innovation in the defense industry. The war in Ukraine offers several practical examples of the operational added value that open innovation can offer. A case in point is the GIS Art for Artillery smartphone app, the deployment of which was speeded up after Ukraine was invaded by Russian forces, and which enables Ukrainian soldiers to order an artillery strike by entering the GPS coordinates from their phones. Under certain conditions, open innovation in defense can therefore reset or even reverse the balance of power. Its goal is to detect, stimulate, and capture civil society innovations and, via short cycles, integrate them into force structures so as to seize opportunities or respond to challenges on the ground. For states, this mode of innovation now seems to be the norm, without raising questions about the way armament operations are conducted. More than just a passing fad resulting from the development of “agile methods” imported from the civilian world, open innovation in defense has become vital to ensuring operational superiority. It strengthens arguments in favor of a “new philosophy” for France’s Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe and France

80. France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live Up to Pacific Challenges

Author:
Jérémy Bachelier and Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Back in September 2021, the announcement of AUKUS – the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) was a shock to Paris. Not only it meant the brutal conclusion of a submarine deal signed in 2016, but it also provoked a major breach of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners – shedding crude light on the divergences of approaches regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge. This initiative, intended to be a coordinated response to the Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific, called into question France’s strategic positioning in the region. One year after, however, AUKUS does not seem to have marked a major turning point regarding the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Pacific. After an immediate aftershock, France's bilateral relations with Washington, Canberra and to an extent London gradually recovered. Political and strategic discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the recent visits of the Australian Prime minister and minister of Defense in France and numerous bilateral calls at the end of Summer between French and Australian political and military leaders have pointed to a positive dynamic for an improved strategic cooperation in the region. Rather than prompting a radical change in the France's Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS highlighted a fault line between the strategic/political rhetoric level and the operational level of defense cooperation regarding the French engagement in this region. The multiple maritime security and climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands region require France to cooperate closely with its regional partners, starting with Australia, and continue to promote effective multilateralism. In addition, the growing risks of high-intensity conflicts in the vicinity of the Pacific Islands region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea, require for France to speed up the strengthening of its interoperability with its regional allies in the coming years and probably to decide on the role it would like to - and be able to - concretely support its own interest and allies.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, AUKUS, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Australia, United States of America, Pacific Ocean, and Pacific Islands

81. The European Green Deal, Three Years On: Acceleration, Erosion or Fragmentation?

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The European Green Deal (EGD) is the single most defining policy initiative of the von der Leyen Commission. Since its publication in December 2019, it has become the European Union’s (EU) new raison d’être: protecting the planet and Europeans from environmental degradation, through a holistic approach to the energy transition, while promoting sustainable growth and a just transition with no social group or territory left behind. The credibility of the EGD was secured by the European Climate Law, which makes the objectives of climate-neutrality by 2050 and a reduction of at least 55% in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 legally binding at the EU level. This has given a strong mandate to the European Commission (EC) to propose an overhaul of European energy and climate policies. The EC has lived up to the task remarkably, resolutely sticking to an accelerated policy and legislative timeline, featuring around 30 strategies and action plans, in addition to emblematic, coherent legislative packages like Fit for 55. The European Parliament has also positioned itself as a key stakeholder, finding consensus on overall targets and objectives. While all Member States (MSs) finally subscribed to the EGD ambition and agenda, they remain torn between a discourse that is largely supportive of the energy transition, but which in reality suffers from insufficient implementation efforts and mounting difficulties. Three years since the EGD set the direction of travel for the EU for the next 30 years, the EU finds itself in the midst of a storm not seen since World War II, coming just after it successfully weathered the Covid-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is a tectonic game changer with profound implications that are yet to be fully grasped. For energy and climate policies, these new realities require reviewing many assumptions about the energy transition, energy security, social acceptance, economic competitiveness, and hence, decarbonization strategies and policies going forward.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Fossil Fuels, Nuclear Energy, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

82. The United Arab Emirates and Sino-American Competition: Towards a Policy of Non-Alignment?

Author:
Jean-loup Samaan
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In just under five years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has accelerated its rapprochement with Xi Jinping’s China, to the point of becoming the first Gulf country to find itself at the heart of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington. Although benefiting from a large US military presence, the UAE has made its partnership with the Chinese regime a new priority that goes beyond energy and trade. Over the past five years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has used its economic and strategic rapprochement with China as a tool to diversify its foreign policy. If this Chinese policy of the UAE - which has traditionally been Washington's partner in the region - mirrors the erosion of American influence in the Gulf, the sustainability of Abu Dhabi's strategy should be questioned. Despite its aspirations for strategic autonomy, the UAE remains heavily dependent on US security guarantees, meaning that tensions between Washington and Abu Dhabi over its growing partnership with Beijing in sensitive areas (5G network, defence cooperation) could undermine its security foundations. While the energy crisis ensuing from the war in Ukraine allows the Gulf oil-producing countries to be in a powerful position vis-à-vis Western consumers, Abu Dhabi now seems determined to maintain its balancing act between Washington and Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

83. New Paradigm for Electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Are Decentralized Hybrid Systems Changing the Game?

Author:
Hugo Le Picard
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After several decades of reforms, the situation in centralized power sectors has hardly changed. The sub-Saharan power sector remains underdeveloped, and power sectors are experiencing significant financial difficulties that have been further exacerbated first by the effects of the pandemic and then the war in Ukraine. The operating losses of all African power sectors exceeded $150 billion in 2020. In view of the region’s population growth, centralized grids cannot fully meet their electricity needs, even in areas with access. Consequently, individuals and businesses are motivated to become more independent from the centralized grid to meet their electricity consumption needs. Market mechanisms are at work to fill the gaps created by the weakness of the centralized grid. The market for decentralized systems is experiencing strong growth in the region and has enormous potential in light of the grid's weakness: in addition to 600 million sub-Saharans without access to electricity, there are 500 million with access but who are coping with an unreliable or expensive grid. On a continent-wide basis, this is an opportunity worth more than $350 billion by 2030. The large-scale expansion of the market for decentralized systems in areas covered by the grid is significant for the development of the sector. In view of the significant increase in urban population and the increasing attractiveness of decentralized systems, it cannot be excluded that the existing, yet weak, centralized grid may become partly redundant. However, a power sector that develops around decentralized systems can also have advantages, if these new uses are designed and integrated into the development policies of power grids. These systems can provide faster access to electricity than the centralized grid for people without access. Similarly, the high modularity of these systems allows consumers with existing access to electricity to climb the energy ladder, enabling them to access new electrical services depending on their budget and needs. The lower cost of decentralized, renewable systems can also reduce the cost of electricity for commercial and industrial consumers, promoting their economic competitiveness and the penetration of renewable technologies across the continent. Decentralized generation capacity can also increase grid resilience, making consumers less dependent on centralized infrastructure. Finally, in the longer term, if electricity is generated primarily where it is consumed, it does not need to transit through transmission lines. It would also prevent electricity losses along transmission lines, that are high in many countries in the region. It would also limit the need for substantial investment in grid infrastructure which is difficult to raise private funds for and for which the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates an average of $40 billion per year is needed in the coming years. While the region’s centralized power sectors are experiencing increasing difficulties due to Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine, decentralized systems will be called upon to play a key role in expanding access to electricity on the continent now more than ever. With the availability of capital dwindling in emerging countries, development finance institutions (DFI) could further support investment in the ecosystem of businesses trading in green decentralized solutions to facilitate access to clean electricity on the continent.
Topic:
Business, Electricity, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

84. Modernizing the People's Liberation Army: The Human Factor

Author:
Marc Julienne and Constantin Lagraulet
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tremendous demographic challenges facing China will not significantly affect the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the immediate future, but will become more problematic in the medium and long term. The rapid aging of the population and the resulting socio-economic imbalances will put pressure on defense budgets, military wages and the general attractiveness of the army. For the time being, the PLA’s primary goal in terms of human resources is to build a less oversized, more professional army, prepared for high-intensity combat. This objective is in line with the institutional reform of 2016, which shortened the chain of command and strengthened the political and ideological control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the PLA through an overhaul of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This reform also involved a major restructuring of China’s armed forces. The PLA is pursuing a streamlining target that emphasizes quality over quantity. This qualitative improvement concerns equipment, forces and chains of command, and is driven by the need to elevate modernity, operational effectiveness and interoperability. An analysis of the evolution of the PLA Navy Marine Corps and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) demonstrates this qualitative upgrading trend and the prioritization of combat readiness. To integrate increasingly modern and complex equipment, the PLA is also focusing on recruiting and retaining young conscripts and volunteers with a high level of education, in order to increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The major reforms being carried out thus aim to enhance the status of the military so as to strengthen its economic and social attractiveness. On the other hand, the PLA, like other armies around the world, is confronted with societal phenomena such as internet addiction, near-sightedness and obesity, which hinder its ambitions and force it to make trade-offs in its selection standards.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Demographics, Modernization, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and Asia

85. “Open” Telecom Networks (Open RAN): Towards a Reconfiguration of International Competition in 5G?

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In line with the anti-Huawei diplomatic campaign of the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has promoted an alternative: Open RAN, a concept defined by "open" network architectures. At the intersection of 5G geopolitics and standards, what risks and opportunities does Open RAN present for European technological sovereignty? The Radio Access Network (RAN) is the radio part of a mobile telecommunications system that enables the connection between a mobile device (such as a phone or computer) and the core network. While traditionally a single vendor (such as Huawei, Ericsson, or Nokia) provides a “proprietary” or “closed” solution for this part of the network, Open RAN (Open Radio Access Network) is a concept describing disaggregated architectures that divide the RAN into several bricks connected by open interfaces. The objective is to allow the operator to buy these hardware and software bricks from various suppliers, and to choose freely the most suitable option for each part. In the current context of a concentrated 5G market, dominated by three major manufacturers and even facing the risk of an Ericsson-Nokia duopoly with the exclusion of Huawei from many countries, telecom operators emphasize the flexibility and diversification of suppliers allowed by Open RAN, which would allow both more innovation and cost reduction. In line with its diplomatic campaign against “unreliable” Chinese suppliers, the United States has actively promoted Open RAN as an alternative. However, Open RAN seems far from being a panacea for Europe: in addition to the difficulties that remain in terms of maturity, security, performance and transparency of the specification process, it risks increasing European dependence on foreign suppliers. Although Huawei is not part of the international bodies working on Open RAN (such as the Telecom Infra Project or the O-RAN Alliance), many companies close to the Chinese political and military authorities are. Beyond the question of supplier security, American lobbying is linked to the commercial opportunity that Open RAN represents for American companies, currently leaders in the cloud, software and generic hardware components…even though they do not have a major 5G champion. Open RAN is therefore an issue at the crossroads of the geopolitics of 5G and standards, to which the European Union is beginning to provide a common political and analytical response, despite the diversity of positions among member states.
Topic:
5G, Telecommunications, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

86. The European Union Industrial Strategy: Reconciling Competition and Geoeconomic Challenges

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The EU’s basic assumptions, on which it grounds its economic and trade power, are being steadily cast into doubt. The EU’s main trade partners, the US and China, increasingly set their sights on securing their supply chains, which may further a potential decoupling. This shift is likely to be accelerated in the context of growing geopolitical instability. Multilateralism and international trade principles are increasingly challenged by a weakening of international institutions and the recourse to asymmetric market practices, while technological leadership will be key in the struggle for global leadership. Being fundamentally built on economic openness, the EU is comparatively ill-equipped to respond to these developments. Its biggest economy, Germany, is prompted to assert itself if it does not want to lose in competitiveness. While the EU is developing strategies, policies, and instruments to adapt to this change of circumstances and increase its resilience, a shift in mentalities, leaving behind political and economic short-term interests, will be necessary.
Topic:
European Union, Trade Policy, Industry, Supply Chains, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

87. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

88. Once a Jihadist, Always a Jihadist? A Deradicalization Program Seen from the Inside

Author:
Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has traditionally taken a security-based approach to the fight against terror. It was a latecomer to the field of radicalization prevention and the establishment of disengagement programs aimed at jihadists. It only started to think seriously about the issue in 2013 and its first attempts involved certain irregularities. For that reason, deradicalization suffers from a persistent bad reputation in France. The disengagement and reintegration programs established since 2016—RIVE from 2016 until 2018 and PAIRS, which started in 2018 and is still running—have operated behind closed doors. Discreetness was preferred to overcommunication. This study—the result of a long-term field survey of the staff, participants, and partners of PAIRS—opens the black box of disengagement methods. It offers a nuanced assessment of these initiatives, which, after four years of operations, have produced reassuring results: among the dozens of terrorist offenders who have participated in RIVE and PAIRS in open custody, none have reoffended.
Topic:
Terrorism, Radicalization, Islamism, Jihad, and Deradicalization
Political Geography:
Europe and France

89. Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State

Author:
Michaela Collord
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Beginning with early voting in Zanzibar on October 27, 2020, Tanzanians went to the polls in a general election for district councilors, Members of Parliament (MPs) and the President. As official results began to be declared, it became clear that Tanzania’s long-time ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, had won a landslide. After significant opposition party gains in recent elections, these results constituted a dramatic reversal and a de facto return to one-party rule. Opposition parties continue to challenge this outcome, denouncing what they affirm was not a genuine election but a state-orchestrated sham. Reflecting on these dramatic shifts, this study addresses two questions: What explains the election results? And what are the implications for Tanzanian politics going forward? The main point is that the 2020 elections were a result of President John Pombe Magufuli’s efforts to consolidate authoritarian control after he first came to power in 2015. The study outlines how Magufuli used his first term not only to marginalize opposition parties but also to centralize power within the ruling party. It then examines how these processes intensified ahead of the election, culminating in the official declaration of an overwhelming Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) victory at all levels. The note concludes by discussing the implications of this election outcome for Magufuli’s second term, focusing on his control of parliament and the possibility of a constitutional amendment lifting presidential term limits.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

90. Collective Collapse or Resilience? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic affected defense priorities across Europe? When the pandemic reached its cities, Europe was already under severe internal and external stress. By throwing the continent and the world into an unprecedented economic crisis while security challenges abound, the pandemic has exposed Europe to a risk of irreversible loss of capacity for collective action, hampering its influence and control over its regional areas of interest. One year after, this report provides a comparative assessment of the impact of the pandemic on the foreign and defense policies and spending levels of ten different European countries. It not only aims at assessing the immediate impact of the pandemic on the defense posture of each country but more importantly at mapping in which areas the pandemic did or might prove disruptive for European defense priorities, whether directly or indirectly. Although uncertainty remains about the long-term effects of the current crisis, the different case studies highlight that, contrary to the most pessimistic scenarios, the pandemic has so far had a relatively modest impact on defense and security policies. Monitored European countries have so far shown resilience in their individual and collective responses to the crisis. If anything, changes brought by the pandemic are less striking than the continuity observed in most cases when it comes to foreign and defense policies, from stated levels of ambition to defense spending plans. It is, however, unclear how enduring this resilience can prove in the longer-term in the face of disruptive developments such as new variants of the virus, sweeping domestic political developments in Europe, radical changes in the US commitment to European security, or an intensified strategic competition in Europe’s neighborhood and beyond it.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

91. The Automotive Industry: The Achilles’ Heel of German Economy?

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The global car market has been shrinking since 2018. This is a key economic sector for Germany whose producers belong to the Top 15 carmakers worldwide. Yet they are running the risk of being outclassed and eventually replaced, given emerging actors in the USA and China. These new competitors benefit from the growing digitization of the mobility sector, disruptive economic models and the obsolescence of vehicles with an internal combustion engine. This form of propulsion is progressively being replaced by less-polluting alternatives, which are being endorsed by public authorities. The Chinese-American rivalry is also impacting German carmakers, whose strategy greatly relies on the globalization of production chains. This has led to major successes in the past, but the threat of a technological decoupling between the USA and China limits German carmakers’ activities in terms of production and exports. Access to the Chinese market, which accounts for nearly 20% of the global population, is indispensable for the German brands that intend to benefit from China’s catch-up effects. European industrial and political actors plan to invest in promising sectors whilst seeking to respect environmental and social objectives. Also, the European Union (EU), led by a German powerhouse, intends to prevent market distortions such as hurdles to market access, while supporting the emergence of technologies and the compliance with production standards. However, developments in the automotive sector are challenging the EU’s capacity to act in a unified fashion, even if the EU is not seeking to impose its vision on the industry’s private sector, in a top-down manner.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Industrial Policy, European Union, Social Policy, Mobility, Industrialization, Green Deal, and Automotive Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

92. Green Batteries: a Competitive Advantage for Europe’s Electric Vehicle Value Chain?

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Aligning its climate and industrial policies, the European Union (UE) is introducing sustainability requirements for the whole life-cycle of electric vehicle (EV) batteries. This initiative would not only ensure that EVs fit with Europe’s climate-neutrality and resource-efficiency pledges, but also give European new entrants a better chance to compete. Since 2017, the EU’s nascent green industrial policy has made the EV battery value chain its favored experimental field. The wave of investments in battery cell manufacturing projects suggests that the worst-case scenario of Europe subsidizing massive battery cell imports will not materialize. Cell manufacturers have a direct commercial interest in setting up operations closer to the European automakers’ EV assembly factories, and Member States can provide an additional argument for local cell production with their large financial support for EU-based industrial projects. However, strategic autonomy remains a distant dream, as most confirmed projects are being developed by non-EU stakeholders. In addition, Europe has not yet managed to attract corresponding investments in the manufacturing of battery cell components, while its very limited control on raw material supply chains does not match its political aspirations. Despite pressure from civil society, the lack of consensual calculation methodologies makes it almost impossible for manufacturers to substantiate their green claims, especially with regards to carbon footprints. Yet, the life-cycle assessment (LCA) literature points to cell and active material manufacturing as key climate hotspots. Thus, efforts should concentrate on reducing energy consumption for these critical production steps and covering incompressible needs with grid-based or contract-based low-carbon electricity, provided the latter option guarantees the additionality of renewable electricity supplies. In addition, the extraction and refining of raw materials offer the second largest and mostly untapped potential for green differentiation, especially when combining climate and local environmental impact considerations. Ultimately, manufacturing green batteries does not necessarily require locating all production steps in Europe, but European players may have a competitive edge thanks to their expertise in measuring and improving the sustainability of their operations. In addition, reducing the environmental footprint of products requires a holistic view of supply chain management, which pleads for building closer ties between industrial stakeholders. Should the final text of the Batteries Regulation retain an ambitious timeframe for information and labelling requirements, it could be a game changer for the European EV market. The methodological and practical challenges should not be underestimated, but the best way to obtain robust implementation rules is to engage the industry in the drafting process. If the EU legislator confirms that customers should be able to compare the environmental performance of EV batteries as of 2023, companies should see the urgency of sharing their knowledge with the EC, and Member States will allocate appropriate resources to enforcement procedures. Likewise, the political signal will encourage EU automakers to place greater focus on sustainability in their ongoing supplier selection processes, instead of waiting for future industrial cycles to take serious action. The Batteries Regulation is not just about the EV value chain, it is an opportunity to demonstrate the high potential of Europe’s green industrial policy, delivering consumer trust, jobs, and strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Batteries, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Europe

93. Denmark: A Case Study for a Climate-Neutral Europe

Author:
Thibault Menu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, Denmark has steadily emerged as a leader and role model in the global green energy transition. Its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2010 have been reduced at greater pace than those of the European Union (EU) average. This transformation is all the more impressive, given that the country used to be a significant oil and gas producer which also relied heavily on coal for power generation. From its highly publicized success in offshore wind, to its ambitious goal of cutting GHG emissions by 70% by 2030 - which would put Denmark as a European and global frontrunner, with only Finland being more ambitious and planning to be climate neutral already by 2035 – as well as its pioneering green energy policies, the country has transformed itself into a beacon for low carbon technologies and public policies. The country has a record high share of renewable energy sources in power generation, with wind in the lead. Given the recent announcements and climate goals set by the Von der Leyen Commission, Denmark serves as an interesting case study for other European and world nations alike on how to embark on their own energy transitions. This paper assesses whether the country is really successful in accelerating even more than its European peers in its decarbonization process. And if so, what is so special about Denmark and what can be learned from its transformation? Policies range from well-publicized successes, such as the country’s ability to nearly rid itself from coal in its power mix in less than thirty years by increasingly developing its wind power potential, in leading the offshore wind segment and championing repowering, but also its lesser-known achievements, such as the diffusion of combined heat and power (CHP) and district heating across the country. Another success point of the country’s strategy relies in promoting energy efficiency in the industrial sector as well as its use of energy taxation for enhanced decarbonization, even in challenging sectors such as transportation. Questions remain open, especially concerning the sustainability credentials of biomass, a fuel which is a key component of the country’s energy mix, but also the future role of natural gas, which has an important balancing role in power generation, given the country decision to rid itself of oil and gas (O&G) production by the middle of the century. To a large extent, the Danish success story so far can be linked to a combination of socio-political factors including: a high level of stability and predictability in energy policy stemming from Denmark’s long historical tradition of broad energy agreements, a cross-sectoral and holistic approach to developing the nation’s energy policy involving a high level of participation from various public and private actors, a willingness to back innovative technologies, combined with generous public policy schemes in order to bring them to market-level competitiveness. Next frontiers will consist of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration projects, as well as low carbon energy islands. However, it would be somewhat reductive to simply equate Denmark’s success story to these previously mentioned factors. Indeed, the Scandinavian nation also benefits from certain geographical dispositions which are great assets for its path to decarbonization. For one, the country is ideally placed to develop variable renewable energy sources, most notably wind power given its topography and its strong wind resources. On top of this, Denmark also benefits from an incredibly reliable and interconnected power grid thereby making renewable energy integration into the wide energy system all the easier. In addition, the fact that its power grid is one of the most interconnected in Europe entails that excess renewable energy production can quickly be exported when the wind blows, just as imports can hastily be called upon when wind is found to be lacking. Finally, from a more socio-political perspective, the relatively flat social structure of Danish society as well as the country’s high level of institutional trust, makes policymaking and policy implementation simpler as well as more effective than in other European states. As such, although this paper identifies important lessons to be learnt from Denmark’s decarbonization strategies, the context as well as the particular characteristics of the country in which these were implemented should nevertheless be considered when seeking to establish similarly successful carbon reduction policies. In any case, Denmark is still far from coming close to achieving its objectives and will have to accelerate its decarbonization on all fronts: the country’s current total primary energy supply still relies for 60% on fossil fuels.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Decarbonization, and Green Deal
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

94. Complementarity or Competition? Franco-British Cooperation and the European Horizon of French Defense Policy

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
What does future hold for the Franco-British defense partnership after Brexit? France and the United Kingdom have, for long, enjoyed a close defense relationship, thanks in part to their analogous strategic cultures. The 2010 Lancaster House treaties built on this proximity to expand cooperation in the fields of nuclear weapons, force projection, interoperability and industrial integration. In spite of genuine progress in the first years following the treaties, the Franco-British strategic partnership has had to face two pitfalls: on the one hand, Brexit and its political consequences for the United Kingdom, and, on the other hand, President Macron’s attempt to revive European defense and Franco-German cooperation. The tenth anniversary of Lancaster House should offer the opportunity to rethink the convergence between bilateral cooperation and the resolutely European horizon of French defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, and Germany

95. Mavi Vatan, the "Blue Homeland": the Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Turkey’s activism in the Eastern Mediterranean now appears to be guided by an ambitious legal and geopolitical doctrine, based on the claim of a vast maritime domain – the “Blue Homeland” or Mavi Vatan in Turkish. Developed by admirals of Turkey’s Navy, who are aware of the strategic importance of the sea, this approach is influential among Turkey's military, political, economic, and intellectual elites. Although it presents certain contradictions with the traditional vision of the Islamo-conservatives, Mavi Vatan has been adopted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offering him the opportunity to consolidate his alliance with nationalist movements and to provide a legal framework for his action in Libya. However, the success of this doctrine also depends on Turkey's ability to modernize its naval forces, an effort that will require the maintenance of strong international partnerships.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nationalism, Navy, Grand Strategy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey and Mediterranean

96. Russia and Turkey. Strategic Partners and Rivals

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The extraordinarily troublesome year 2020 tested many international institutions and bilateral ties, but few experienced sharper challenges than the complex relations between Russia and Turkey, which have a strong impact on crisis developments in Europe’s immediate neighborhood. Moscow can be content that Ankara is now perceived in Paris, Berlin and Washington DC as a major troublemaker, but it finds itself rather too often on the receiving end of Turkish attempts at projecting power. It was the unreserved and forceful support granted by Turkey to Azerbaijan in the war against Armenia in autumn 2020 that forced many Russian analysts to re-evaluate the status and prospects of relations with this important and difficult neighbor. There is a degree of compatibility between the autocratic political systems maturing in Russia and Turkey, but the latter state is a NATO member, while the former perceives the Atlantic Alliance as the inexorable adversary. Many drivers shaping Russian-Turkish relations, from deepening domestic discontent with corrupt authoritarian rule to the shifts in the European energy market, are outside the control of their ambitious autocrats. This analysis will focus on the most recent and ongoing shifts in the character of this relationship. Evaluation of the key dimensions of bilateral interactions, from historical and economic to personal, is followed by an investigation of the dynamics of interplay in four key intersections: the Syrian warzone, the Black Sea area, the Libyan conflict, and the Caucasus, shaken by the new spasm of war around Nagorno Karabakh.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Middle East

97. Great Britain and Africa: Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals

Author:
François Gaulme
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In 2020-2021, Prime Minister Boris Johnson undertook to fundamentally change the operational mode and strategy of relations between the United Kingdom and the African continent bequeathed by his predecessors since 1997. Great Britain and Africa : Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals He first put an end to the autonomy and power of the great Department for International Development (DfID), by merging it with the Foreign Office. Deciding to make the granting of aid political, he also reduced its amount on the grounds of the recession hitting the country but against British legislation itself. His strategy for external deployment, adopted in March 2021 and based primarily on an “Indo-Pacific tilt”, has marginalised the relationship with Africa to which Theresa May had wanted to give new impetus in the perspective of the Brexit in 2018. While taking up her concept of “Global Britain”, her successor now seems to want to limit ties with Africa to business relations, highly impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as minimal participation in security efforts on the continent. This note analyses such reversals in a historical perspective of the end of a relational cycle. It concludes that Boris Johnson’s very personal policy towards Africa is too reductive not to be amended. In particular on aid and fundamental rights, it neglects the complexity of British positions towards this continent. By reaffirming the strength of the strategic relationship with the United States, it will also have to adapt to the new African policy of the Biden administration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Foreign Aid, and Boris Johnson
Political Geography:
Britain, Africa, and Europe

98. Commercial Space in Europe: A Balancing Act between Physics, Politics and Profession

Author:
KP Ludwig
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Satellite constellations have become core elements of the digital transition. Over the next decade, several thousand satellites will have to be launched, to build these constellations. For positioning satellites, preferably in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), reliable and affordable launch services are essential. At the end of 2020, the European Space Agency (ESA) awarded three German space start-ups competing contracts in order to support its small-launch system. One may identify a change in Germany’s space policy, since the ESA Ministerial Council (MC) in Seville in late 2019. Besides supporting programs in its traditional fields of interest, Germany showed a special interest in supporting the Commercial Space Transportation Service acceleration program for the above-mentioned German space start-ups. This report is focused on a technical analysis of the market demands and the special commercial market conditions in LEO. It describes the competitive situation and, especially, the limiting conditions, which may hinder private investors from continuing to support a sound technical solution. These are: the size of the accessible market share, the natural risks of operating complex systems in a hostile environment, and the regulatory hurdles in acquiring formal approval by the authorities. A major factor for the expected business success is and will be the governmental support that the consortia can acquire.
Topic:
Space, Digitization, Satellite, and Airspace
Political Geography:
Germany and European Union

99. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

100. Health Data Governance: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe, China, and the United States

Author:
Clément Tonon and Julie Martinez
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The health crisis has triggered a tectonic movement in the recomposition of health data governance and protection models around the world, while accelerating the investment of large digital companies in the field of e-health. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the shortcomings of pre-existing governance models in every region of the world and the need to move towards a model of public health crisis management "through health data". For Europe and for France in particular, the health crisis has revealed a long "technological innocence". Despite a strategic awakening, questions remain about the ability of Europeans to cooperate effectively and move towards a common digital space in health. In the United States, the pandemic has created tensions around the health data governance model – particularly on the articulation between the federal government and state authorities. Changes are announced by President Joe Biden, which tend towards a model of global regulation of personal data. In China, the pandemic has accelerated the transition to a model of surveillance capitalism which could lead in the short term to a new power struggle between the regime and the Chinese digital giants. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the rise of digital companies, which are now positioning themselves on the entire value chain of health data, from its raw collection via connected objects to its mass processing for insurance purposes. They now have all the levers in hand to economically value this massive data with the help of artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Health, Governance, Geopolitics, Data, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America