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1. Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts

Author:
Katja Creutz
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered debates and initiatives on how to address crimes under international law committed in and against Ukraine, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. A single institution capable of dealing with all international crimes is nonetheless lacking. Tens of thousands of alleged war crimes have been reported and documented, part of which the Ukrainian courts themselves are handling. The massive caseload requires international assistance, in addition to which the ICC is also investigating alleged war crimes. The international community is divided in regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression. As the ICC lacks jurisdiction with respect to this crime in this particular situation, European states are advancing a special ad hoc tribunal. Nonetheless, the majority of countries globally, particularly in the Global South, find it hard to support the initiative. The discussion on the best way to proceed with regard to addressing the crime of aggression committed by Russia is ongoing. Many problematic issues are being debated, ranging from political desirability to the issue of head of state immunities.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, United Nations, War Crimes, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

2. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security

Author:
Timo R. Stewart
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
Topic:
Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

3. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

4. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America